Thesis Defense Presentation: Hedayat Alibeiki

Tuesday, May 30, 2017 13:15to14:15
Bronfman Building Room 310, 1001 rue Sherbrooke Ouest, Montreal, QC, H3A 1G5, CA


Mr. Hedayat Alibeiki, a doctoral student at McGill University in the Operations Management area will be presenting his thesis defence entitled:

Two essays on power and information asymmetries in competitive supply chains

Date: Tuesday, May 30, 2017
Time: 1:15 pm
Location: Room 310, Bronfman Building


Channel parties in today's competitive supply chains are increasingly becoming asymmetric in their power and the level of information they possess regarding several important aspects of their businesses. Even though these asymmetries can be beneficial for some parties, they might create frictions towards other parties' regular practice and profitability.  Studying these asymmetries can be helpful for all parties when making their strategic decisions.  In particular, it helps weak and uninformed players to improve their strategies on how to respond to the additional power of their partners or competitors in the market, while the dominant players might want to reinforce these asymmetries as sources and prerequisites for their competitive advantages in the marketplace. This dissertation examines asymmetries in operations and supply chain management through two specific applications, which has resulted in two essays. The first one focuses on the impacts of market power and cost asymmetries in retail operations. More specifically, it analyzes the effects of superior cost advantage and price leadership possessed by a dominant retailer on his assortment choice. Using several game-theoretical models, this essay aims to explain the asymmetry related causes for the retail assortment reduction, a practice taken by many big-box retailers in some product categories. The second essay is related to the information asymmetry in sourcing and supply management. More precisely, it looks at the buyers' private information regarding the quality scores of their suppliers in price-plus buyer-determined procurement (reverse) auctions. The general goal in this essay is to understand the informational and strategic implications of non-price attributes in procurement auctions as an increasingly popular sourcing mechanism. Using the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium solution concept, this essay provides normative recommendations to the buyers on when and how to share this information with the suppliers. In different ways, both essays support the idea that information and power asymmetries significantly change the motivation and action of channel partners in their operational decisions.

Student Committee Co-Chairs:  Professor Shanling Li and Professor Mehmet Gumus

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