Mondays 2:30-4:30 pm
Stephanie Leary did her B.A. in philosophy at the University of Washington from 2006-2009 and her PhD at Rutgers University from 2010-2016. Before coming to McGill, she was the Oscar R. Ewing Visiting Assistant Professor at Indiana University, Bloomington.
Stephanie's research is primarily in metaethics, metaphysics, and epistemology, but also extends into normative ethics, moral psychology,and philosophy of language. Most of her recent work concerns questions about the metaphysics of normative properties (e.g.goodness, badness, rightness, and wrongness): Are normative properties ultimately reducible to the stuff of science, and what exactly does that mean? Do normative properties cross-cut ethics and epistemology: for example, are there moral reasons for believing certain things and epistemic reasons for acting in certain ways? And should an account of what metaphysically explains why something has some normative property be unified across these practical and epistemic domains?
For more information, visit her personal website: www.stephanie-leary.com
“Non-naturalism and Normative Necessities” (2017) Oxford Studies in Metaethics, 12: 76-105.
“In Defense of Practical Reasons for Belief” (2017) Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95(3): 529-542.
“Defending Internalists from Acquired Sociopaths” (2017) Philosophical Psychology 30 (7):878-895.
“Grounding and Normativity” forthcoming in Michael Raven's Routledge Handbook for Metaphysical Grounding