Stephanie Leary
Associate Professor
Stephanie Leary did her B.A. in philosophy at the University of Washington from 2006-2009 and her PhD at Rutgers University from 2010-2016. Before coming to McGill, she was the Oscar R. Ewing Visiting Assistant Professor at Indiana University, Bloomington.
Most of Stephanie’s research is about whether normative properties like goodness, badness, rightness and wrongness are ultimately reducible to the stuff of science (and what that means), and whether ethical considerations, and not just evidence, are relevant to what we ought to believe (and how so).
She is currently the Principal Investigator of a Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) funded research project, A Metaphysics First Approach to Metaethics (Insight Grant 2025-2030).
For more information, visit her personal website: www.stephanie-leary.com
“Non-naturalism without Contingentism” (with Chris Howard) forthcoming in Oxford Studies in Metaethics (Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.))
“The Applied Moral Turn of the Ethics of Belief Debate,” forthcoming in Evidentialism at 40: New Arguments, New Angles (Routledge), Kevin McCain, Scott Stapleford, & Matthias Steup (eds.)
“Moral Encroachment and #BelieveWomen,” forthcoming in Oxford Studies in Epistemology
“Epistemic Reasons for Action: a Puzzle for Pragmatists,” (2022) Synthese 200: 248 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-022-03686-y
“What is Non-naturalism?” (2022) Ergo 8(52). doi https://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.2253
“Banks, Bosses, and Bears: a Pragmatist Argument Against Encroachment,” (2021) Philosophyand Phenomenological Research 105(3): 657-676. https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12840
“Grounding the Domains of Reasons” (2020) Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98(1): 137-52. https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2019.1612930
“In Defense of Practical Reasons for Belief” (2017) Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 95(3): 529-42. https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2016.1237532
“Non-naturalism and Normative Necessities” (2017) Oxford Studies in Metaethics, 12: 76-105.