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DESCRIPTION:Colloquium Series\n\n'Probability as Value'\n\nWlodek Rabinowic
 z (Lund University)\n\nFriday\, September 22\, 2023\n	3:30-5:30 PM EST\n	Lea
 cock 927\n\nAbstract: According to the Fitting-Attitude Analysis of value 
 (FA-analysis\, or short)\, to be valuable is to be a fitting object of a p
 ro-attitude. A very similar approach can be taken regarding probability: F
 or a proposition to be probable is for it to be a fitting object of (high)
  credence - fitting given the available evidence. To put it otherwise\, to
  be probable is to be credible. Indeed\, many probability theorists\, from
  Poisson onwards\, did adopt this ‘epistemic’ interpretation of the concep
 t of probability. J. M. Keynes’s A Treatise on Probability (1921) may be s
 een as the culmination of this development\, even although its influence c
 an also be discerned in later work (such as Carnap’s on the logical interp
 retation of probability). In Rabinowicz (2008\, 2012)\, I proposed an FA-m
 odelling of value relations that makes room not just for standard value re
 lations (better\, worse\, equally good)\, but also for different types of 
 value incommensurability. In this talk\, based on Rabinowicz (2020)\, I wi
 ll present a structurally similar modelling of probability relations. The 
 modelling provides a new account of Keynesian incommensurable probabilitie
 s\, which goes beyond Keynes in distinguishing between incommensurabilitie
 s of different types.\n\nAs compared with my earlier work on this topic (R
 abinowicz 2017)\, the main new element is an argument that credence is a k
 ind of pro-attitude\, and that probability therefore is a kind of value an
 d not merely a concept that is formally similar to value. The same goes fo
 r probability relations: they are value relations of a certain kind. Anoth
 er new element is the discussion of a distinction between two versions of 
 the FA-analysis of relations in general and of probability relations in pa
 rticular. On one version\, what determines such relations are comparisons 
 between the degrees of pro-attitudes that are fitting toward different ite
 ms\; for example\, whether it is fitting to favor one item more than the o
 ther. On the other version\, value relations instead are determined by com
 parisons of the degrees of fittingness\; for example\, whether it is more 
 fitting to favor one item than the other. I argue that the former version 
 of the FA-analysis is considerably more plausible than the latter.\n\n \n
DTSTART:20230922T193000Z
DTEND:20230922T213000Z
LOCATION:Room 927\, Leacock Building\, CA\, QC\, Montreal\, H3A 2T7\, 855 r
 ue Sherbrooke Ouest
SUMMARY:Wlodek Rabinowicz (Lund University)\, 'Probability as Value' 
URL:https://www.mcgill.ca/philosophy/channels/event/wlodek-rabinowicz-lund-
 university-probability-value-350404
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