Natalie Stoljar

Academic title(s): 

Associate Professor and Interim Director, Institute for Health and Social Policy;

Joint appointment with Institute for Health and Social Policy

Contact Information
Address: 

855 Sherbrooke St. W.
Montreal, Quebec
H3A 2T7

Phone: 
514-398-1331
Email address: 
natalie.stoljar [at] mcgill.ca
Office: 
Leacock 925
Office hours: 

By appointment in Fall 2018.

Research areas: 
Feminist Philosophy
Philosophy of Law
Political Philosophy
Moral Philosophy
Biography: 

Natalie Stoljar received a BA (Hons) LLB (Hons) from the University of Sydney and a PhD from Princeton University. She came to McGill in 2006 after holding positions at the Australian National University, Monash University and the University of Melbourne. Her research is in three areas: feminist philosophy, social and political philosophy, and the philosophy of law. In social and political philosophy, her work focuses on relational conceptions of autonomy. She is co-editor (with Catriona Mackenzie) of the 2000 collection Relational Autonomy. Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency and the Social Self (OUP). In feminist philosophy, she has written on feminist metaphysics, especially gender essentialism, realism and nominalism. In the philosophy of law, she has published on legal interpretation, constitutional interpretation and judicial review, and the methodology of law. She is currently working on procedural justice and the ethics of policy and legal processes.

Prof. Stoljar is the Subject Editor for Gender and Feminism for The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (General Editor, Tim Crane, University of Cambridge). Her research is funded by a SSHRC Insight Grant, 'Silencing, Objectification and Negative Social Scripts. Do They Undermine Autonomy?' (2016-2020), and a SSHRC Insight Development Grant (with Kristin Voigt), 'Relational Equality and Relational Autonomy' (2016-2019).

Prof. Stoljar regularly teaches the Department’s philosophy of law courses (PHIL 348 and PHIL 648). She was Chair of the Department from 2008-2012 and is acting as Interim Director of the Institute for Health and Social Policy in 2018-2019.

Selected publications: 
  • Stoljar, N. In Preparation. ‘Autonomy.’ In Cambridge Handbook of Health Research Regulation (Cambridge University Press).

  • Stoljar, N. 2018. ‘Gender and the Unthinkable.’ In P. Garavaso (ed.), The Bloomsbury Companion to Analytic Feminism (Bloomsbury), pp. 123-143.

  • Stoljar, N. 2018. ‘Answerability: A Condition of Autonomy or Moral Responsibility or Both?’ In K. Hutchinson, M. Oshana and C. Mackenzie (eds) The Social Dimensions of Moral Responsibility (Oxford University Press), pp. 231-252.

  • Stoljar, N. 2017. ‘Intersectionality and Discrimination.’ In K. Lippert-Rasmussen (ed.), The Routledge Handbook to the Ethics of Discrimination (Routledge), pp. 68-79.

  • Stoljar, N. 2017. ‘Relational Autonomy and Perfectionism.’ Moral Philosophy and Politics: 4: 27–41.

  • Stoljar, N. 2016. ‘The Metaphysics of Gender.’ In K. Lippert-Rasmussen, K. Brownlee and D. Coady (eds), Blackwell Companion to Applied Philosophy (Wiley-Blackwell), pp. 211-223.

  • Stoljar, N. 2015. ‘“Living Constantly at Tiptoe Stance:” Social Scripts, Psychological Freedom and Autonomy.’ In M. Oshana (ed.), Personal Autonomy and Social OppressionPhilosophical Perspectives (Routledge), pp. 105-123.

  • Stoljar, N. 2014. ‘Autonomy and Adaptive Preference Formation.’ In M. Piper and A. Veltman (eds) Autonomy, Oppression and Gender (Oxford University Press), pp. 227-254.

  • Stoljar, N. 2013. ‘What Do We Want Law to Be? Philosophical Analysis and the Concept of Law.’ In W. Waluchow and S. Sciaraffa (eds), Philosophical Foundations of The Nature of Law (Oxford University Press), pp. 230-260.

  • Stoljar, N. 2012. ‘In Praise of Wishful Thinking. A Critique of Descriptive-Explanatory Theories of Law’ Problema. Anuario de Filosofía y Teoría del Derecho 6: 51-79.

  • Stoljar, N. 2012. ‘Langton on Autonomy and Objectification’ Jurisprudence 2: 409-415.

  • Stoljar, N. 2011. 'Informed Consent and Relational Conceptions of Autonomy’ The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 36: 275-384.