Associate Professor & William Dawson Scholar
Michael Blome-Tillmann earned a BPhil (2003) and DPhil (2007) in Philosophy from the University of Oxford. Before joining the McGill faculty in 2009 he was the Stevenson Junior Research Fellow in the Arts at University College, Oxford. More recently (2014-16) he was a Marie Curie Experienced Researcher at the University of Cambridge.
Blome-Tillmann's primary areas of research lie in epistemology, the philosophy of language, and especially their intersection (the semantics of knowledge attributions). He has published articles on a number of topics in epistemology, including scepticism, closure, Moorean reasoning, reliabilism, and epistemic contextualism, but also on topics in the philosophy of language. A monograph developing his views on epistemic contextualism has appeared in 2014 with Oxford University Press.
He enjoys discussing a wide variety of philosophical topics.
For more details on his current research please visit his personal website.
- Knowledge and Presuppositions, Oxford University Press (2014).
- Sensitivity Actually, in: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (forthcoming).
- Sensitivity, Causality, and Statistical Evidence in Courts of Law, in: Thought 4/2 (2015), pp. 102-112.
- Ignorance, Presuppositions, and the Simple View, in: Mind 124/496 (2015), pp. 1221-1230.
- Counter Closure and Knowledge despite Falsehood, in: Philosophical Quarterly 64/257 (2014), pp. 552-568 (with Brian Ball).
- Solving the Moorean Puzzle, in: Philosophical Studies 172/2 (2015), pp. 493-514.
- Knowledge and Implicatures, in: Synthese 190/18 (2013), pp. 4293-4319.
- Indexical Reliabilism and the New Evil Demon, in: Erkenntnis 78/6 (2013, pp. 1317-1336 (with Brian Ball).
- Contextualism and the Knowledge Norms, in: Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94/1 (2013), pp. 89–100.
- Conversational Implicatures (and How to Spot Them), in: Philosophy Compass 8/2 (2013), pp. 170-185.
- Knowledge and Presuppositions, in: Mind 118/470 (2009), pp. 241-294.
- Non-Cognitivism and the Grammar of Morality, in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109/1 (2009), pp. 279-309.
- Contextualism, Safety and Epistemic Relevance, in: Philosophical Studies 143/3 (2009), pp. 383-394.
- Epistemic Contextualism, Subject-Sensitive Invariantism and the Interaction of 'Knowledge'-Ascriptions with Modal and Temporal Embeddings, in: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79/2 (2009), pp. 315-331.
- Conversational Implicature and the Cancellability Test, in: Analysis 68/298 (2008), pp. 156-160.
- The Indexicality of 'Knowledge', in: Philosophical Studies 138/1 (2008), pp. 29-53.
- The Folly of Trying to Define Knowledge, in: Analysis 67/295 (2007), pp. 214-219.
- Contextualism and the Epistemological Enterprise, in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, CVII (2007), pp. 387-394.
- A Closer Look at Closure Scepticism, in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, CVI (2006), pp. 383-392.