


# LATITUDES

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VOLUME 5



*Volume V Spring 2011*

# LATITUDES

*The McGill Undergraduate Journal of  
International Development Studies*



McGill University  
Montreal, Quebec, Canada



# LATITUDES

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*Latitudes*

## *A Note from the Editor-in-Chief*

In a world seemingly fraught with war, famine and injustice, humanity today is faced with an array of complex and daunting challenges. This combined with the inequality that characterizes these and other issues, means that solutions are far from simple. For this reason, it is essential that any attempt made to remedy these problems is built on knowledge and skills from multiple academic disciplines. “Latitudes” is the McGill undergraduate journal of International Development Studies, and like the program it represents, our journal takes an interdisciplinary approach to the field of Development.

For Development Studies to remain relevant, input must come from various academic and geographic backgrounds. A search for solutions to the challenges of our day must incorporate a multitude of voices, especially from those who face the issues firsthand. Undoubtedly, this diversity will bring differences of opinion and belief that must be addressed with tolerance and respect. This makes cooperation crucial to the development of meaningful results, since a one-sided approach would inadequately capture the many complexities of current challenges. The six papers included in this issue of “Latitudes” embody this vision and it is our hope that they will spark both contemplation and conversation; as it is through these means that cooperation and real solutions will likely emerge. Although it may at times seem that inequality and injustice will plague our world forever, with passion and compassion, there is still hope that humanity’s ingenuity will bring us closer to these goals.

- Caroline Morrow

*Latitudes*

# **FEMALE EMPOWERMENT AS A CATALYST FOR MALE DISEMPOWERMENT?**

**An Analysis of Masculinity and the  
Current Female-Empowerment Oriented  
Development Paradigm in Kenya**

**Robin Steedman**

*Abstract*

*In recent years, female empowerment programs have become staple components of development projects around the world. Based on the success of many of these initiatives, empowering women has become accepted as a means to achieving real development and material progress in the poorest parts of the world. However, this development process necessarily neglects the empowerment of men in these regions, often to the detriment of both men and women. Kenya provides a good example of the importance of gender relations and masculinity in development projects. The experience of Kenyan men since the onset of colonialism will be used here as a concrete example of the problems associated with only empowering women. The focus will be on the ways men try to reassert their masculinity, and the connection of this to disempowerment. This is achieved first, through a critical discussion of gendered development theory, second, by examining the evolution of masculinity during the colonial and post colonial periods, and finally by analyzing the impact of male disempowerment on gender relations in the contemporary period. It concludes that if gendered development work is to succeed at improving women's lives it must stop excluding men.*

I. INTRODUCTION

In recent years, female empowerment programs have become staple components of development initiatives around the world. Based on the success of many of these initiatives, empowering women has become accepted as a means to achieving real development and material progress in the poorest parts of the world. However, this development process necessarily neglects the empowerment of men in these regions, often to the detriment of both men and women. Kenya provides a good example of the importance of gender relations and masculinity in development projects. The experience of Kenyan men since the onset of colonialism will be used here as a concrete example of the problems associated with empowering only women. The focus will be on the ways men try to reassert their masculinity, and the connection of this reassertion to disempowerment and development work.

The first point of inquiry will be into the way gender and gendered development theory conceives of men and masculinity. This will be followed by a case study of the Maasai in Tanzania, which is used to foreshadow the themes explored in the much larger Kenyan case study. The third section entails an analysis of the formation and transformation of new male identities in the colonial period. This historical inquiry continues with a discussion of gender roles within the Mau Mau Rebellion. The subsequent section is an analysis of the codification of gender

identities in Jomo Kenyatta's classic book *Facing Mount Kenya*. The last section consists of a critical discussion of gender roles and antagonisms in contemporary Kenya and an assessment of the ways in which gendered development theory needs to evolve to properly address problems in gender and development work. This essay concludes that if gendered development work is to improve the lives of women it must stop excluding men, and that the first step in this process is reformulating the fundamental assumptions on which gendered development theory is based.

## II. GENDERED DEVELOPMENT: THEORIES AND PROBLEMS

Gendered development theory has constantly evolved and changed. The first gendered development theory, which began in the 1970s, was called Women in Development (WID). It was an effort to integrate women into development policies and practices.<sup>i</sup> This approach was articulated by American liberal feminists, and the focus was on the need for integration based on the premise that “aid practice is male-biased” and that “by overcoming male-bias in aid practice, women will automatically benefit more from the development efforts.”<sup>ii</sup> This would supposedly come about through legal and administrative changes that would allow for women to thrive in the private sector through ending discrimination against them in this sector.<sup>iii</sup> However, this approach ignored the historical context of development, the “specific social and cultural contexts of women’s lives”,<sup>iv</sup> and the impact of class and race. WID “focused on women or gender as a unit of analysis without recognizing the important divisions and relation of exploitation that exists among women”.<sup>v</sup> Ultimately, WID was fundamentally flawed because its gender categories were too one-dimensional, and its focus on “targeting women alone was not enough.”<sup>vi</sup>

The next important development in gendered development theory was Women and Development (WAD). This theory was a neo-Marxist response to WID. It focused on “the relationship between women and development processes rather than purely on strategies for the integration of women into development”<sup>vii</sup>. The focus of WAD was class inequality rather than gender inequality. In line with this position, WAD theorists recognized that non-elite men, as well as women, have been disempowered by global structures of inequality. However, this was not enough because it neglects gender relations within classes.<sup>viii</sup> The evolution of gendered development theory did not stop with WAD, indeed an even more

significant theory was to follow. This theory was called Gender and Development (GAD) theory, and it departed from WID and WAD theory because rather than looking at women it looks at the “relations between men and women.”<sup>ix</sup> However, like WID it still focused on de-institutionalizing male privilege<sup>x</sup>, and hence worked with the assumptions that men hold all the power and that some of that power needs to be given to women. While constituting an important step in gendered development theory, GAD is still problematic because it relies on western constructions of gender relationships.

In WID, WAD, and GAD, “men emerge as a potent, homogenous category that is invariably treated as problematic.”<sup>xi</sup> Men as ‘the problem’ exist in dichotomy with women as ‘the oppressed.’ However, these categories generalize gender relationships in a way that does not truly reflect reality.<sup>xii</sup> It is problematic to import western gender theory into Africa because experiences of gender are markedly different in the African context. Tsitsi Dangaremba clearly expressed this when commenting about gender roles in her novel, *Nervous Conditions*, when she wrote:

The easy answer in the West is the Patriarchal system. I have become increasingly more reluctant to use this model of analysis as it is put forward by Western feminism, because the situation in my part of the world has one variable, which makes it absolutely different: the men are also in a position of powerlessness.<sup>xiii</sup>

The difference in male power between Africa and the West makes it clear that “it is time to move beyond the old fixed ideas about gender roles and about universal male domination.”<sup>xiv</sup> Men must be studied as men rather than simply in relation to women in gendered development discourses,<sup>xv</sup> and this must account for power differentials between men. Kenyan society may be patriarchal, but this does not mean that all men are successful patriarchs, and furthermore it does not mean that all women are passive victims.<sup>xvi</sup>

Margrethe Silberschmidt has said that ‘masculinity’ and ‘femininity’ are not given by nature, but are instead socially constructed.<sup>xvii</sup> This paper employs this definition of gender. Gendered distinctions in social-value formation are seldom recognized in “the overwhelming amount of research on identity.”<sup>xviii</sup> Furthermore, experts in the field indicate that gender identity is not static or primor-

dial, and instead changes over time. In this vein, the characteristics of and values associated with male or female identity are not immune to change in any society. Normative shifts in identity are especially likely to happen during moments of widespread social, political, and economic transformation where the premises that have validated certain identities have changed or disappeared. This shift in gender identity is precisely what has occurred in modern Kenya.

It is important to note that although there may be multiple ways to exert male identity in a society, not all will be socially accepted. In fact, some will be much more valued than others. This concept is termed “hegemonic masculinity,” and it expresses the notion that within any society there is one socially valued method of being a man, and all men are expected to conform to this type of masculinity. Those men that cannot, or refuse to, conform to this hegemonic masculinity can be distinctly disadvantaged.<sup>xix</sup> Despite the fact that there are many prescriptions for how to be a man in society depending on circumstance, history, and culture, an underlying assumption of gendered development work in East Africa is that only one type of man exists. This assumption employs the notion of hegemonic masculinity, connoting the idea that it “is not men per se, but certain ways of being and behaving, that are associated with dominance and power.”<sup>xxi</sup> In development work, the implication behind hegemonic masculinity is that not all African men are powerful, and as such employing a dichotomy of ‘women the oppressed’ and ‘men the problem’ is too simple. Men can be marginalised and disempowered alongside women and this marginalization is, but should not be, ignored specifically because the subjects are men.<sup>xxii</sup>

Silberschmidt proposes that “precisely because of patriarchal structures working to the detriment of women, hardly any attempts have been made to investigate and analyze the impact of socioeconomic change on men’s lives, and how men are dealing with their new situation”.<sup>xxiii</sup> While it is true that Kenyan women do have unequal access to inheritance, land, opportunity for education, and family property under the Kenyan legal system, it does not follow that because of this all men do have access to the opportunities legally denied to women. There may be no legal constraints on male opportunity, but this does not mean that there are no other constraints. Assessing power relations between genders does “not require subscribing to a hydraulic theory of power whereby the gain of one is necessarily the loss of the other.”<sup>xxiv</sup> This type of gender-power analysis will be used in the following discussion of masculinity in Kenya.

## II. THE MAASAI

Before I begin my in-depth analysis of Kenyan masculinity I will use the example of the Maasai in Tanzania to foreshadow my demonstration of changing masculinity in Kenya. In the absence of a fitting example from Kenya, this case study provides a clearly defined example of the changing value of different masculine identities over time. Very similar processes happened in Kenya, and as such this case study can be used as a stand-in for a clearly defined example from Kenya.

A shift in defining which attributes make a man valuable in society occurred very clearly among the Maasai in Tanzania. During the colonial period, “being ‘Maasai’ [...] came to be understood by Maasai men themselves as being a pastoralist and a warrior: a dominant masculinity forged in opposition, to ‘modernity’ and sustained by certain economic and social interventions.”<sup>xxv</sup> Men who did not conform to this, or who embraced aspects of modernity, were ostracized and stigmatized. These non-conforming men were called *ormeek*, a derogatory term referring to “modern” Maasai men.<sup>xxvi</sup> *Ormeek* initially referred to all non-Maasai Africans. However, during the colonial period the term was expanded to include all Africans who were educated, spoke Swahili, worked in government, or were baptised.<sup>xxvii</sup> Eventually, “the term was invoked to mark, mock, and ostracize any Maasai man who imitated Swahilis, who adopted the practices or fashions of modernity, who sought to be anything other than real Maasai men.”<sup>xxviii</sup>

Contrary to the *ormeek*, the dominant Maasai masculinity based on pastoralism is growing increasingly untenable in the modern world. In fact, “the dominant Maasai masculinity is being reforged to uneasily embrace both the traditional and the modern.”<sup>xxix</sup> This change is due to economic shifts, namely increased land alienation and general economic marginalization. The most striking part of this shift is that “it is precisely the knowledge of the *Ormeek* that is now valued, and the ignorance of traditional pastoralists that is discredited.”<sup>xxx</sup> The traits that have made a man traditionally valuable in Maasai society are now being replaced by precisely those traits that used to make a man not socially valuable. Now men must embrace entirely different ways of being if they want to remain socially accepted. Changes like this also occurred throughout Kenya as a result of colonial policy. Of the economic decline in the contemporary period, Hodgson says:

While the senior and venerable elders lament the past and berate themselves for having clung so desperately to a certain way of being, a mascu

linity they now deride as emodai [stupid], the junior elders ... seek to forge new ways of being a Maasai man that can embrace the claims of the past and demands of the present.<sup>xxxix</sup>

This process is always fraught with tensions, and the ability of men to find a new identity in which they can be socially valued is crucial.

### III. THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF MASCULINITY IN KENYA

#### A. The Evolution of Masculinity and male-female relationships during the colonial period

I will begin my discussion of the historical evolution of masculinity with the onset of the colonial period. Kenya was a white settler colony of the British Empire, to which Europeans were actively encouraged to immigrate. They were promised land, cheap labour, and “large potential profits.”<sup>xxxix</sup> One typical print advertisement made to attract settlers read:

Settle in Kenya, Britain’s youngest and most attractive colony. Low prices at present for fertile areas. No richer soil in the British Empire. Kenya Colony makes a practical appeal to the intending settler with some capital. Its valuable crops give high yields, due to the high fertility of the soil, adequate rainfall and abundant sunshine. Secure the advantage of native labour to supplement your own effort.<sup>xxxix</sup>

Many Europeans heard this call and by 1905 there were nearly 3,000 white settlers in Kenya. They acquired huge landholdings, “all located in the fertile and temperate highlands of central Kenya, an area which was to become the heartland of White Man’s Country.” This land was previously held by the Kikuyu, Kenya’s largest ethnic group.<sup>xxxix</sup>

The colonial encounter in Kenya was constantly tied to the issues of land and labour. The British government promised settlers land and cheap labour, but over time it became increasingly difficult to provide settlers with either of these things. Through complex laws the colonial administration managed to push the Kikuyu<sup>xxxix</sup> off their land and into the wage economy. One of the ways they did this was through taxes. The requirement that these be paid in cash meant that African men needed to begin working in the monetized economy, which meant working for Europeans.<sup>xxxix</sup> In order to further undercut African autonomy the

administration legally banned Africans from growing and exporting profitable crops, such as coffee.<sup>xxxvii</sup> These measures succeeded in marginalizing Africans so extensively that they were forced into the wage economy where the colonial administration could use them for cheap labour to fuel agriculture and industry. Thus, it is apparent that with the onset of British colonial rule there were vast economic changes that deeply affected the Kenyan people. These economic changes also fundamentally altered gender roles and expressions of gender identity.

In the pre-colonial period the gendered division of labour was clearly defined. Women produced food, and men depended on this production. Men on the other hand were pastoralists and warriors. Cattle herding was key to male identity first because cattle were a source of wealth, and second because cattle were a major component of bride price. Through marriage a man gained control over his wife's agricultural production and her children. Thus, the more cattle a man had the more wives he could marry, and in turn the more land his household could cultivate. Polygyny was the norm.<sup>xxxviii</sup> For the Kikuyu, land was fundamentally important to this cycle. Neither men nor women could transition from childhood to adulthood without access to land. Men needed land to accumulate the resources necessary to buy wives, the possession of which would give him certain social privileges and status. Similarly, women needed land in order to cultivate it for food to sustain their families.<sup>xxxix</sup> Thus, both cattle and land were key components in determining gender roles in pre-colonial Kenya.

*Things Fall Apart*, the classic novel by Chinua Achebe, is the quintessential example of the impact of changes on male identity during the onset of colonial rule.<sup>xl</sup> Colonialism subverted power structures that were based on age. In the novel, Okonokwo (the tragic hero) kills himself because his authority, by virtue of age, has been stripped away and given to young men and outsiders who previously could not have held any authority. These changes did occur because of the arrival of the British colonizer, but it is essential to recognize that:

Nineteenth-century Africa was not characterized by lack of internal social and economic competition, by the unchallenged authority of the elders, by an acceptance of custom which gave every person—young and old, male and female—a place in society which was defined and protected. Competition, movement, fluidity were as much features of small-scale communities as they were of larger groupings.<sup>xli</sup>

This means that pre-colonial African society was not static and unchanging. It also means that change in the colonial period was not simply imposed by Europeans, rather members of African groups worked to manipulate the politics of the new colonial order to best suit their interests. Thus, change was not simply imposed from above, but was a complex process of negotiation between the colonizer and the colonized. In *Things Fall Apart* the situation created by the introduction of Europeans was still patriarchal, as women did not gain any more power. It did, however, represent a vital shift in male roles and social standing. This is a clear situation of power differentials between men, as well as between men and women. Similar social changes also occurred in Kenya.

The colonial period caused tremendous change in the way African societies were organized. Africans were not passive in this encounter, and in fact used their own agency to manipulate colonial policy to gain personal and social advantages. The new colonial order was “not an imported piece of top-down colonial social engineering,”<sup>xlii</sup> nor was the process of social change new to African societies. In fact, African men had been actively debating what makes a man for generations.<sup>xliii</sup> Furthermore, the British frequently “invented tradition” for the Africans they were ruling. The British believed strongly in the power of tradition to rule an ordered society so they set about constructing traditions whenever they did not see a suitable tradition already in place. This meant constructing societies that were hierarchically ordered in the manner of British society. It is important to stress that people on both sides of the colonial encounter took up these invented traditions, and that they became deeply entrenched. In Terrence Ranger’s words: “the invented traditions of African societies—whether invented by the Europeans or by Africans themselves in response—distorted the past but became in themselves realities through which a good deal of colonial encounter was expressed.”<sup>xliv</sup> Invented tradition became real lived reality and it has affected the course of social and political developments in Kenya ever since.

These “invented traditions” solidified the advantages held by those in authoritative positions at the time of codification.<sup>xlv</sup> One important way in which the invention of tradition impacted gender relations was that men tended to appeal to “tradition” in their efforts to retain full control over women. This was done to ensure that men would still retain full control over women as economic assets. This was important as women were becoming increasingly productive in

the agricultural sector.<sup>xlvi</sup> Codified “tradition” put men at such a distinct advantage because when the colonists set out to codify tradition they used only male informants, thus “indigenous female belief” remained unrecorded. This created a situation where men’s power and authority was far more dominant and rigid than it had ever been before. In fact, this is why Kenyan law puts women at a distinct legal disadvantage. This is very relevant today because female-empowerment oriented development programs in Kenya often work to overcome the structural disadvantages to women that were created during this period.

An essential part of the British colonial project in Kenya was to transform African men into organized labourers in agriculture and industry. Turning African men into a productive workforce was essential if the colony was to pay for itself and generate a profit. The idea that the empire would be self-sustaining was an important part of colonial ideology. British taxpayers were not to be expected to pay for the empire, even if this meant placing an enormous burden on local African populations in the process of developing the colonial infrastructure.<sup>xlvii</sup> In order to achieve their goal the British thought they needed to totally reconfigure the African workforce. The 1954 Report of the Committee on African Wages states that:

We cannot hope to produce an effective African labour force until we have first removed the African from the enervating and retarding influence of his economic and cultural background.<sup>xlviii</sup>

This attempt to transform men was part of the colonial process of modernizing and civilizing Africa. The new modern African would be industrial, and would provide for his family through wages gained by working for Europeans. This process created a new “provider ideology” wherein men gained status as men by being “breadwinners.” This ideology eventually served to undermine male identity even further because when the Kenyan economy began to decline men also lost this newfound role. Thus, unemployed men were able to fulfill neither traditional nor colonial models of masculinity.

Europeans wanted African men to work in ports, railways, mines, factories, etc., but they also believed that steady, regular work was “what African men tried hardest to avoid.”<sup>xlix</sup> The 1949 African Labour Efficiency Survey stated that:

The East African has not been bent under the discipline of organized work. In his primitive economy, the steady, continuous labour is carried out by women... Though the tasks he performed were prescribed by tribal law and custom, he could do them in his own way and at his own speed, for to him time had no economic value ... To work steadily and continuously at the will and direction of another was one of the hard lessons he had to learn when he began to work for the Europeans.<sup>1</sup>

Thus African men needed to be socialized into industrial labour, and women were a vital component of this socialization process. The colonizers argued that urban and industrial men needed sufficient wages to support their families. This was necessary because the colonizers believed that men surrounded by their families would be more emotionally stable and content. Content men were seen as being less likely to strike and cause economic disruption. Allowing men the ability to keep their families in the city was also important because the colonizers thought that for the industrial man having a womanless working life would be unattractive, and in turn “rural life would prove too attractive to the African man.”<sup>li</sup> This would then decrease the number of men working in industry, and the British could not allow the productivity of colonial industry to decrease.

The colonial imagination did believe that, “with proper British guidance, and tough paternalistic love, Africans could be made into progressive men and women, though it would take many decades or more likely centuries for such a radical transformation to take place.”<sup>li</sup> In this process of transformation women were key since they were thought to be able to control men. Starting in the 1940s there was a desire among the colonizers to “create urban homes for urban Africans.” Women were key in this scenario because they were supposed to be able to passively help men transform into something better than what they were previously. Women were supposed to help men develop stability, “skills, a stake in urban respectability, wage labour, and the orderly running of urban and indeed, national life.”<sup>liii</sup> The perspective that women were needed to transform men came from the idea that if men lived alone, without the emotional contact of a female partner, they would be drawn to militancy. This perspective was not sexual since it was recognized that prostitutes could meet men’s sexual desires. In the colonial imagination, single men would “drift” into militancy, while married men remained “fulfilled and complacent”.<sup>liv</sup>

## B. Masculinity and Mau Mau: the collapse of the colonial period

The end of colonialism in Kenya was brutal. This was due largely in part to the Mau Mau Rebellion. There is little agreement among scholars on exactly what the Mau Mau Rebellion was, or what it meant for Kenya. However, an analysis of this literature is beyond the purview of this essay. Instead of discussing Mau Mau in association with decolonization, nationalism, and nation building this essay will talk about the reconfiguration of gender roles caused by the rebellion. The Mau Mau emergency began in 1952 and lasted until 1960.<sup>lv</sup> In the simplest terms it was a struggle between Kikuyu fighters, Kikuyu loyalists who fought on the side of the British, and the colonial administration. It was bloody and brutal, and in the end it left somewhere between 11,000 and 300,000 Kikuyu dead, depending on the count used.<sup>lvi</sup>

Gender inequalities and relations were a key component of Mau Mau. The Kikuyu grew increasingly desperate after the Second World War as they faced constantly declining economic circumstances where they were increasingly marginalized to subsidize the white settlers. The Kikuyu who lacked the wealth and status that would allow them authoritative positions in their society grew increasingly willing to rebel. This included labourers on white farms, young unmarried men, and female household heads. When the militant members of the rebellion were recruiting, they drew from precisely these groups.<sup>lvii</sup> Gender relations were important to the militants. The postwar colonial administration, through its policies aimed at increasing urban labour, allowed only a select few men to marry. Mau Mau took this power away from the colonial administration and returned it to African control. There was no uniform reformulation of marriage within the Mau Mau movement. Indeed, the Kenya Riigi denied its members relationships while the Kenya Parliament<sup>lviii</sup> instated monogamous and egalitarian marriages among its members.<sup>lix</sup>

Men debated the conduct of masculinity through the Mau Mau Rebellion. As much as Mau Mau was about reclaiming and redistributing land it was also about “marriage, fatherhood, domestic labour, and all the things it meant to be a man.”<sup>lx</sup> This was a period where gender notions were unstable, and they were fundamentally contested and reconfigured, first in the forest and then in the detention camps.<sup>lxi</sup> While fighting in the forests men and women renegotiated gender relationships. In the beginning of the rebellion the fighters did not observe the traditional gendered division of labour. In fact, men frequently performed women’s

customary tasks such as fetching water, and women accompanied men on armed raids.<sup>lxii</sup> But starting in mid-1954, the Kenya Parliament installed gendered labour divisions, making women subordinate to all men regardless of rank. The Kenya Riigi, however, still insisted that men perform women's work.<sup>lxiii</sup>

The rebellion was ultimately put down by the British and over the course of the Mau Mau Rebellion eighty thousand Africans were detained.<sup>lxiv</sup> Detention involved a complex rehabilitation process designed to reintegrate Mau Mau oath takers back into Kenyan society where they could be calmly productive. This process made men live without women and complete domestic chores. This process was meant to transform the fighters to the point where they "could re-enter society, calmed and cleansed of the ideas about marriage and domesticity they had taught themselves while in revolt."<sup>lxvi</sup> White states that Mau Mau memoirs contain:

Numerous examples of detainees making homes for themselves—sharing cooking tasks, sewing, and cleaning cells, kitchens, and offices of the staff who ordered their beatings. By 1956 of 1957, by which time many of the hard core had been in detention for years, they worked hard at making themselves and their fellows comfortable, without overt cooperation, confession, or ever thinking they were anything but hard core.<sup>lxvii</sup>

These are clear examples of the goals that the detention camps were trying to achieve. In fact one of the markers of a man's rehabilitation was his willingness to perform women's work.<sup>lxviii</sup> This system of rehabilitation was so extraordinary because it dramatically changed gender relationships, and in doing so deconstructed the "vision of gender" that colonial officials had tried so hard to construct. Mau Mau was a watershed moment in Kenyan history, and post-Mau Mau the British formally withdrew from Kenya.

#### IV. FACING MOUNT KENYA: NATIONAL CULTURE AND MASCULINITY

The end of the colonial period occurred on June 1st, 1963 when the British handed over control of Kenya to Jomo Kenyatta. Kenyatta had returned to Kenya from Britain in 1947. He had been in Britain for the previous sixteen years. During his stay in England he studied anthropology at the London School of Economics (LSE), cosponsored a Pan African Congress with Kwame Nkrumah,

and wrote his book *Facing Mount Kenya*. In this book Kenyatta defended the cultural practices of the Kikuyu, and wrote of their ability to speak for themselves<sup>lxx</sup> Kenyatta's return to Kenya, "electrified the colony, making it apparent that he was not only the chosen leader of the Kikuyu people but also the popular protagonist for the entire indigenous population of Kenya."<sup>lxxi</sup> This new leadership role was to have important consequences for the coming years of his life. During the Mau Mau Emergency the colonial administration suspected Kenyatta was the mastermind behind the rebellion and detained him between 1953 and 1961. Upon his release in April of 1961 he took up his position as the leader of the Kenya African National Union (KANU), one of the major political parties in Kenya at the time.<sup>lxxii</sup> KANU then went on to win the national elections with Kenyatta as their leader. He later became the first Prime Minister of Kenya and, following a constitutional change, the first President.<sup>lxxiii</sup>

Kenyatta's most important contribution to the formation of male identity in Kenya was his book *Facing Mount Kenya*. Before discussing the gender relations exalted and created by this book it is necessary to know how it gained such wide influence. Kenyatta initially went to England with the intention of gaining support for the Kikuyu cause. However, he was not very successful until he began studying under Bronislaw Malinowski at LSE. In order to successfully advocate for the Kikuyu, Kenyatta needed to be seen as a legitimate spokesperson. This meant establishing his credibility, qualifications, and authority in an accepted mode of discourse. Functional anthropology, with its scientific foundation, provided just that.<sup>lxxiv</sup> Through the forum of anthropology Kenyatta was able to construct a vision of Kikuyu society that both fit his vision for it and demonstrated "the inherent value and dignity of Kikuyu civilization to the Europeans."<sup>lxxv</sup> Through this book, Kenyatta presented himself as authoritative to Europeans and to the Kikuyu. He depicted himself in the garb of an elder on the cover of the book, and he changed his name from Johnstone to the more African sounding Jomo.<sup>lxxvi</sup> In *Facing Mount Kenya* Kenyatta invented a Kikuyu society that neatly followed British hierarchy and order, and in which boys and girls were dutifully trained to accept their places in the social order.<sup>lxxvii</sup> While the book did not achieve Kenyatta's political objectives it did depict the Kikuyu in a far more systematic and sympathetic way than ever before.<sup>lxxviii</sup>

Kenyatta's discussion of the Kikuyu origin myth provides a written underpinning for Kenyan patriarchal structures. As Kenyatta tells it in *Facing Mount*

Kenya, in the beginning, women were in power and men were subordinate, “but somehow the system changed from matriarchal to patriarchal.”<sup>lxxxix</sup> Kenyatta says that this shift occurred because women abused their power and were unjust in their rule over men. Because women were physically stronger at the time, men had to plot first to weaken women and then to overthrow them. They did this by seducing the women and getting them pregnant. Once the women were pregnant the men could overthrow them as the women were so weakened by their pregnant condition. From that point forward Kikuyu society was patriarchal.<sup>lxxx</sup> “The strong message in this myth is that a man’s penis can be an important instrument of enhancing a man’s domination over a woman or invariably of bringing women under subjugation.”<sup>lxxxi</sup> Moreover, this telling of the Kikuyu origin myth demonstrates the patriarchal perspective that women should remain sexually subordinate to men, thus enforcing male control over women.

Following this line of thought, the following excerpt from Kenyatta’s *Facing Mount Kenya* is also important because it demonstrates how relations between men and women have been constructed and reinforced in Kikuyu society.

It is said that while holding superior position in the community, the women became domineering and ruthless fighters. They also practised polyandry. And, through sexual jealousy many men were put to death for committing adultery or other minor offences. Besides the capital punishment, the men were subjected to all kinds of humiliation and injustice. ... Men were indignant at the way in which the women treated them, and in their indignation they planned to revolt against the ruthless women’s administration of justice.<sup>lxxxii</sup>

By identifying the social hierarchy in an origin myth, this excerpt simultaneously sets a legitimating stage for male dominance and authority and negates any possibility for female authority. In so doing, it undercuts female power by demonstrating that women were incapable of justly holding power, and, consequently, if a just social order is to be maintained, power and authority must always rest with men. More importantly, the myth, as told by Kenyatta, sets up precedents for differences in male and female sexual behaviour. For instance, he described male adultery as a minor offence, thus legitimizing womanizing and male sexual activity. This is yet another instance in Kenya where male sexual activity is glorified.

Symbolic representations of men and women in Kenya can be seen in Jomo Kenyatta's book *Facing Mount Kenya*. In this work, the author transformed a Kikuyu-specific<sup>lxxxiii</sup> origin myth into "vibrant national" history."<sup>lxxxiv</sup> However, he was selective about how he chose to portray the Kikuyu. Notably, his references to women "depicted them as sources of potential disorder and conflict, unless kept under patriarchal control."<sup>lxxxv</sup> He further stated that, women should remain socially and sexually subordinate to male authority in marriage. Put simply, for Kenyatta, women were, and should remain, the property of men.<sup>lxxxvi</sup> Male control over women is a pervasive part of Kenyan modernity. "Kenya's national symbols are the cock and bull," both of which are symbols of virility. Throughout Kenya, well respected men are referred to as 'bulls.'<sup>lxxxviii</sup> The symbol of the bull denotes power, virility and aggression, and a man who is called a bull is perceived as having these traits and control over women.<sup>lxxxviii</sup>

## V. GENDER AND DEVELOPMENT IN CONTEMPORARY KENYA

In many cultures, "men, at least, share the belief that men are artificially made while women are naturally born. Thus, men must prove themselves to each other in ways that women do not."<sup>lxxxix</sup> Over time, the activities that traditionally gave Kenyan men their social identity have declined. Once there were no longer any tribal wars to fight, and cattle camps were converted to agricultural land for more profitable cash crops, men had to find new ways of becoming men. The ability of men to prove themselves has continuously shrunk, and now "the lack of income earning opportunities and men's inability to provide for their families tend to undermine male identity."<sup>xc</sup> Throughout history, rich men who are capable of paying bride price for a wife and supporting girlfriends have been greatly admired and respected. Conversely, men who cannot afford to keep women are "despised."<sup>xcii</sup> Men are able to gain social value through control over women. This has become particularly important because economic decline has decreased the feasibility of other male prestige-gaining activities.

Manifestations of patriarchy and sexual control have taken on many different forms in contemporary Kenya, one of which is bull fighting among the Luhya. In this version of bull fighting men pit two bulls against each other. "Bulls are to a large extent symbolic of the men. It may be argued that among the Luhya, bulls – like cocks in Balinese culture – are viewed as detachable, self-operating penises, ambulant genitals with a life of their own."<sup>xciii</sup> The songs that

comprise part of the ritual of bullfighting carry strong sexual innuendos and reinforce notions of hegemonic masculinity, which in the Luhya context means being aggressive, taking risks, and having a powerful personality.<sup>xciv</sup> Bull fighting is a way of demonstrating these characteristics in the era where traditional ways of demonstrating masculinity are dwindling.<sup>xcv</sup> In fact, bull fighting is popular precisely because it is a socially accepted way of gaining social value as a man<sup>xcvi</sup> In contemporary Kenya, men need to find new ways of gaining social value as men, and bull fighting is seen as a non-violent way for men to act out aggression and prove their worth.

Manifestations of male desire for social value in Kenya have taken much more disturbing forms than bull fighting. For example in Kisii District, “gender antagonism and domestic violence have escalated, often resulting in men killing their wives and vice versa.”<sup>xcvii</sup> There are persistent rumours about women poisoning their husbands and in recent years the district has gained infamy for its witch-hunts and witch burnings.<sup>xcviii</sup> Because masculinity is closely linked with sexual power in Kenyan society, men often try to assert their control over women with “macho-sexual behaviour and violence against women.”<sup>xcix</sup> To this end, there has been a marked increase in rape in Kenya over the last 15 years.<sup>c</sup> Onyango argues that the high rate of rape in Kenya is caused by a patriarchal national culture that promotes male domination over women.<sup>ci</sup> Onyango further argues that the solution to this problem is to dismantle the system of patriarchal control and to improve the rights of women. This theory fits neatly within the current development paradigm as it involves empowering women. However, this may not be the most appropriate way to explain or reduce the incidence of rape in Kenya.

The solution proposed by Onyango will likely be ineffective because it ignores the motivations of male behaviour. Onyango argues that men rape because of patriarchal domination, but the historical evidence tends to suggest that control over women is motivated by the desire of men to retain their masculine identity and self-worth. Since there are limited other ways for many men to assert their male identity, control over women has become the most predominant way of doing so. Men have great difficulty changing their economic position, and as such they may resort to exaggerated “owner”/macho behaviour and physical violence against women.”<sup>cii</sup> A man from Kisii expressed this exact sentiment when he said: “there is always a tendency for men to want to overcome women and to show them how aggressive we are. This gives respect and self respect to us men.”<sup>ciii</sup>

Clearly male self-respect is correlated with violence against women. Programs that aim to empower women, particularly those programs that aim to help female victims of violence, need to take this motivating factor into account. Understanding why men act violently is the first step in stopping that behaviour, for only when the cause is known can the symptoms be adequately treated. The first step in understanding is dialogue, and men's voices need to be included in that dialogue.

In an era where men are frequently unemployed women have often become the dominant providers in the household. As the history of changing masculine roles in Kenya demonstrates, Kenyan men have had an increasingly difficult time coping with the challenges of modernity. Traditional male roles are no longer feasible, and men are frequently unable to fulfill new roles. This situation has not been the same for women. Indeed, "women—in order for them and their children to survive—have been forced to take on new roles. Thus, even though structurally subordinate to men, women have aggressively responded to the challenges of economic hardship."<sup>civ</sup> This has subtly changed the power dynamic between men and women. While "the main axis of patriarchal power is still the overall subordination of women and dominance of men," the material conditions of contemporary Kenya have "seriously undermined the normative order of patriarchy."<sup>cv</sup>

Women have taken on more authoritative roles by virtue of their new economic roles and this has led to a diminution of male authority. This is because patriarchal authority rests on the premise that patriarchs provide for their families. When men cannot uphold this responsibility their positions as heads of households become illegitimate.<sup>cvi</sup> Importantly, the situation between men and women has not changed so much that men are no longer considered the heads of households. Men still are considered the heads of their households, regardless of their economic position in relation to their wife, and this is what creates the lack of legitimacy in men's social status. Because hegemonic male identity is based on patriarchal responsibility and privilege, loss of patriarchal control comes in tandem with loss of identity. The result is that male self-worth is undermined because as the heads of households they are supposed to provide for their families, and women stop respecting them when they no longer can.<sup>cvi</sup>

Male self-esteem problems have clearly and negatively affected women. Men frequently spend what little money they earn on prestige-gaining activities such as maintaining or developing relationships with girlfriends. Consequently,

women often feel that they are left with all household responsibilities, including raising children, providing food, and even paying school fees. By failing to provide for their families, many men fall short of their wives' expectations, leading to household tension and women's frustration with their husbands. This also impacts the way men see themselves. Many men see increased female economic activity as a direct challenge to their honour and position within the family. For instance, men from Kisii have argued that, "as soon as a husband starts declining economically, his wife will take advantage and go out to look for other men to satisfy her material needs," and... "A man's honour, reputation, ego, and masculinity are severely affected if he... cannot control his wife."<sup>cvi</sup> Men then turned to infidelity as a way of rebuilding their damaged self-esteem, a practice which most wives do not respect. In turn, many women then see their husbands as a burden, and feel they would be better off without them. This lack of respect further degrades a man's sense of himself and his identity as a man is weakened.

It is commonly held in development circles that the problems associated with patriarchy would be solved if women gained equal status with men, hence the desire to empower women that makes up the mandate of so many development agencies. A World Bank Report from 2003 states that:

Gender inequality ... tends to lower the productivity of labour and the efficiency of labour allocations in households and the economy, intensifying the unequal distribution of resources. ... While women and girls bear the largest and most direct costs of these inequalities, the costs cut broadly across society, ultimately hindering development and poverty reduction.<sup>cix</sup>

In Kenya, there is a pressing need for extra income and economic growth. Women frequently engage in many types of income generating activities, but men who take on "women's work" to help their households are frequently mocked and excluded by their peers. This societal pressure can prevent more men from possibly engaging in these types of activity.<sup>cx</sup> These issues indicate that the most effective method for addressing household inequality is far from clear. Men cannot easily discard their old roles, but much of the literature on gender and development directly suggests that this has to occur. Men will not start to do "women's work" if the implication is that by doing so they stop being men. New opportunities for achieving social legitimacy, as men, need to be included in the dialogue if there is

ever going to be a real change in the socio-economic roles men will undertake.

Margaret Kenyatta was correct when she states that:

Especially in the developing world, we need more education and training for our women, so that they can get better opportunities to work, to be economically independent, to bring up better families, and to be of some use to their countries.<sup>cxii</sup>

Women and their communities could greatly benefit from increased access to these opportunities, but it is also true that men in these same developing countries also need access to these opportunities. The problem with Margaret Kenyatta's statement is that it assumes that poverty is feminine. This is a commonly held sentiment, and the UNDP's Human Poverty Report (1995) postulates that more than 70% of the world's poor are women.<sup>cxiii</sup> While there are dimensions of poverty that are unique to women, such as reproductive rights, poverty is not a lived experience that only women have. Development work is premised on the notion of eliminating poverty and bringing material benefit to the poorer parts of the world. If the criteria for being poor, and thus eligible for development programs, is gender then half the world becomes excluded. Ironically, much of the argument for empowering women is to decrease the social and economic exclusion of women. Gendered development programs will not succeed if they commit the same mistakes that they are trying to eliminate. One way forward is to recognize that men and women can be poor and in need of development assistance, and that the criteria for distributing that assistance needs to include more determinants than gender alone.

The feminization of poverty is strongly linked to the notion of empowering women. "Empowerment" is a buzzword of the current development paradigm. Women are generally seen as those people needing to be empowered, and there is a general global consensus among large development agencies, such as the UNDP, that empowering women will result in poverty reduction and better living conditions for women, and their families, in the poorest parts of the world. This approach has been integrated into the Millennium Development Goals (MGDs) and the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs).<sup>cxiii</sup> However, Andrea Cornwall and Karen Brock argue that development strategies based on "buzz-words" are not an effective way of improving living standards in the developing world.<sup>cxiv</sup> This is because:

The terms we use are never neutral. They come to be given meaning as they are put to use in policies. And these policies, in turn, influence how those who work in development come to think about what they are doing. The way words come to be combined allows certain meanings to flourish, and others to become barely possible to think with.<sup>cxv</sup>

This creates situations where on-the-ground development work conforms with mainstream development policy, but does not sufficiently address the particularities of that locality.

The problem is precisely that development work is one-size-fits-all, but developing areas are not homogenous, and each has its own unique set of cultural and historical circumstances that need to be noted when formulating development policy. In Kenya, the unique historical and cultural situation that is not being noted is the position of men. Following GAD theory, development in Kenya takes note of the relationships between men and women. However, problematically this only takes note of the fact that the system is patriarchal, and therefore works on the assumption that men are in positions of power over women. This then leads to the seemingly unproblematic importation of the empowerment model of development. Upon examining the historical evolution of male and female roles and relationships in Kenya, it becomes clear that male-female relationships are far more complicated than the empowerment model can account for. This model clearly needs to change. The first step in changing this model is to stop basing development strategies on stereotypical understandings of gender relations. Examining the evolution of gender relationships and attempting to understand why particular gender roles are socially valued is one way of doing this.

The goal of gender equality in Kenya is both laudable and necessary; however, empowering women should not result in disempowering men. A re-evaluation of men's position in development must be undertaken as the current conception is fundamentally at odds with the situation of many men in developing areas. Kenyan men have been increasingly marginalized since the onset of colonialism, and this has continued into the current development era. As a result of the elimination of traditional male roles such as warrior and provider in Kenyan society, men have been forced to find new roles. Modern men have thus begun expressing their masculinity in new and often detrimental ways. Essentially, male sexual dominance is an attempt to reassert lost power and social value. Fundamentally, all gender relations are power relations. Therefore power rather than gender is

more applicable as a unit of analysis in the context of stimulating African development. The Kenyan women's activist Wangari Mathai, highlighted the core of the problem when she said in 1992: "I think when we talk about the position of women in Africa and see how miserable it is, quite often we forget that these miserable women are married to miserable men."<sup>cxvi</sup> Improving the position of women in Kenya is necessary, but if this is to be achieved gendered development work has to stop excluding men. The way forward is to include both women and men in the dialogue that forms development policy, and then to continue to involve these actors in the creation and implementation of actual programs.

## VI. CONCLUSION

This essay has outlined one of the consequences of male disempowerment, namely increased sexual aggressiveness. This has not been the only consequence.<sup>cxvii</sup> Male alcohol abuse is another common reaction to the process of emasculation that began with the onset of colonialism. Examining all the social consequences of male disempowerment was beyond the scope of this essay. However, it is necessary to know that these problems exist and that male disempowerment is a much broader problem than this essay can express. This knowledge makes it ever more important for development work to readdress its fundamental assumption about the nature of relationships between men and women in the developing world. As the Kenyan case has demonstrated, gender roles and identities are varied and complex and they cannot be essentialized to equate with western historical experiences. Male and female gender identities radically changed during colonialism, the Mau Mau Rebellion, and on into the contemporary period. It is necessary to appreciate these historical developments because the complex multiplicity of current gender identities and antagonisms can only be understood within the context in which they developed. Gender identities are not primordial, culturally determined, or imposed from without. They are developed and moulded over time through complex sets of negotiations caused by external impositions and internal changes. This is clearly demonstrated in Kenya, and it is high time gendered development work adopted this more complex understanding of gender roles and identities.

Endnotes

<sup>i</sup> Gina Koczberski, “Women in Development: A Critical Analysis,” *Third World Quarterly*, (1998): 395-409.

<sup>ii</sup> *Ibid*, 397.

<sup>iii</sup> Eva M. Rathgeber, “WID, WAD, GAD: Trends in Research and Practice,” *The Journal of Developing Areas* (1990): 490.

<sup>iv</sup> Koczberski, “Women in Development: A Critical Analysis,” 397.

<sup>v</sup> Rathgeber, “WID, WAD, GAD,” 492

<sup>vi</sup> Andrea Cornwall, “Men, Masculinity and ‘Gender in Development’,” *Gender and Development* (1997): 8.

<sup>vii</sup> Rathgeber, “WID, WAD, GAD,” 492

<sup>viii</sup> *Ibid*, 492-3.

<sup>xiv</sup> Cornwall, “Men, Masculinity and ‘Gender in Development’,” 9.

<sup>xv</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>xvi</sup> Andrea Cornwall, “Missing Men: Reflections on Men, Masculinities and Gender in GAD,” *IDS Bulletin* (2000): 19.

<sup>xvii</sup> Cornwall, “Men, Masculinity and ‘Gender in Development’,” 10.

<sup>viii</sup> Holland, Kathryn Holland, “The Troubled Masculinities in Tsitsi Dangaremba’s Nervous Conditions,” in *African Masculinities: Men in Africa from the Late Nineteenth Century to the Present*, ed. Lahoucine Ouzgane and Robert Morrell (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005), 124.

<sup>xiv</sup> Cornwall, “Men, Masculinity and ‘Gender in Development’,” 12.

<sup>xv</sup> *Ibid*, 18.

<sup>xvi</sup> Margrethe Silberschmidt, “Women Forget That Men are the Masters”: Gender Antagonism and Socio-Economic Change in Kisii District, Kenya (Stockholm: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1999), 178.

<sup>xvii</sup> *Ibid*, 19.

<sup>xviii</sup> Margrethe Silberschmidt, “Disempowerment of Men in Rural and Urban East Africa: Implications for Male Identity and Sexual Behaviour,” *World Development* (2001): 659.

<sup>xix</sup> Cornwall, “Men, Masculinity and ‘Gender in Development’,” 11.

<sup>xx</sup> Kopano Ratele, “Studying Men in Africa Critically,” in *Masculinities in Contemporary Africa*, ed. Egodi Uchendu (Dakar: Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa, 2008), 32.

<sup>xxi</sup> Cornwall, "Men, Masculinity and 'Gender in Development,'" 11.

<sup>xxii</sup> The term 'men' is used throughout this essay for the sake of simplicity in terminology. This never implies that men are a homogenous unit. This essay is discussing low-income Kenyan men who have been increasingly disempowered from the colonial period to the present. "Men" is used when there are enough similarities between all of the individuals being discussed that they can be grouped into such a category for the sake of analysis. In some instances it is more beneficial to discuss Kenyan society in terms of ethnic units. In these instances the men within the ethnic category are still of the same socio-economic statures of the men in my broader analysis.

<sup>xxiii</sup> Silbrschmidt, "Disempowerment of Men in Rural and Urban East Africa," 658.

<sup>xxiv</sup> Matthew C. Gutmann, "Trafficking in Men: The Anthropology of Masculinity," *Annual Review of Anthropology* (1997): 398.

<sup>xxv</sup> Dorothy L. Hodgson, "Being Maasai Men: Modernity and the Production of Maasai Masculinities," In *Men and Masculinities in Modern Africa*, edited by Lisa A. Lindsay and Stephan F. Miescher (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 2003), 212.

<sup>xxvi</sup> *Ibid*, 213.

<sup>xxvii</sup> *Ibid*, 219.

<sup>xxviii</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>xxix</sup> *Ibid*, 212.

<sup>xxx</sup> *Ibid*, 222.

<sup>xxxi</sup> *Ibid*, 224.

<sup>xxxii</sup> Caroline Elkins, *Britain's Gulag: The Brutal End of Empire in Kenya* (London: Cape and Pimlico, 2005), 3.

<sup>xxxiii</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>xxxiv</sup> *Ibid*, 10.

<sup>xxxv</sup> The Kikuyu are mentioned more than any other ethnic group in this essay. This is because they were the dominant ethnic group involved in the Mau Mau Rebellion, one of the most significant events in Kenyan history.

<sup>xxxvi</sup> *Ibid*, 10-17.

<sup>xxxvii</sup> Richard J. Reid, *A History of Modern Africa: 1800 to the Present* (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 182.

<sup>xxxviii</sup> Silberschmidt, “Disempowerment of Men in Rural and Urban East Africa,” 660.

<sup>xxxix</sup> Elkins, *Britain’s Gulag*, 14.

<sup>xl</sup> Stephan F. Miescher, and Lisa A. Lindsay, “Introduction: Men and Masculinities in Modern African History,” in *Men and Masculinities in Modern Africa*, ed. Lisa A. Lindsay and Stephan F. Miescher (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 2003), 1.

<sup>xli</sup> Terrence Ranger, “The Invention of Tradition in Colonial Africa,” in *Perspectives on Africa: A Reader in Culture, History, & Representation*, ed. Roy Richard Grinker and Christopher B. Steiner (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1997), 603.

<sup>xlii</sup> Luis White, “Matrimony and Rebellion: Masculinity in Mau Mau,” in *Men and Masculinities in Modern Africa*, ed. Lisa A. Lindsay and Stephan F. Miescher, (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 2003), 177.

<sup>xliii</sup> *Ibid*, 177.

<sup>xliv</sup> Terrence Ranger, “The Invention of Tradition in Colonial Africa,” 598.

<sup>xlv</sup> *Ibid*, 607.

<sup>xlvi</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>xlvii</sup> Elkins, *Britain’s Gulag*, 7.

<sup>xlviii</sup> Frederick Cooper, “Industrial Man Goes to Africa,” in *Men and Masculinities in Modern Africa*, (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 2003), 132.

<sup>xlix</sup> *Ibid*, 128.

<sup>l</sup> *Ibid*, 131.

<sup>li</sup> *Ibid*, 130.

<sup>lii</sup> Elkins, *Britain’s Gulag*, 7.

<sup>liiii</sup> White, “Matrimony and Rebellion: Masculinity in Mau Mau,” 177.

<sup>liv</sup> *Ibid*, 178.

<sup>lv</sup> Bruce J. Berman, “Nationalism, Ethnicity, and Modernity: The Paradox of Mau Mau,” in *Perspectives on Africa: A Reader in Culture, History, and Representation*, ed. Roy Richard Grinker, Stephen C. Lubkemann and Christopher B. Steiner (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 499.

<sup>lvi</sup> The official death count released by the British was 11,000. Later calculations speculate that the number could have been as high as 300,000. Elkins, *Britain’s Gulag*, 366.

<sup>lvii</sup> John Lonsdale, “Moral Ethnicity, Ethnic Nationalism and Political Tribalism: the case of the Kikuyu,” in *Staat und Gesellschaft in Afrika*, ed. Peter Meyns

(Hamburg, 1995), 101-2.

<sup>lviii</sup> The Kenya Riigi and Kenya Parliament were the two Kikuyu groups fighting in Mau Mau.

<sup>lix</sup> White, "Matrimony and Rebellion: Masculinity in Mau Mau," 181.

<sup>lx</sup> *Ibid*, 178.

<sup>lxi</sup> *Ibid*, 183.

<sup>lxii</sup> *Ibid*, 181.

<sup>lxiii</sup> *Ibid*, 182.

<sup>lxiv</sup> *Ibid*, 179.

<sup>lxv</sup> People were inducted into the Mau Mau movement through the process of oath taking.

<sup>lxvi</sup> *Ibid*, 189.

<sup>lxvii</sup> *Ibid*, 188.

<sup>lxviii</sup> *Ibid*, 179.

<sup>lxix</sup> *Ibid*, 185.

<sup>lxx</sup> Elkins, *Britain's Gulag*, 24-5.

<sup>lxxi</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>lxxii</sup> The other main political party was the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU).

<sup>lxxiii</sup> Elkins, *Britain's Gulag*, 358.

<sup>lxxiv</sup> Bruce Berman, "Ethnography as Politics, Politics as Ethnography: Kenyatta, Malinowski, and the Making of Facing Mount Kenya," *Canadian Journal of African Studies* (1996): 317-330.

<sup>lxxv</sup> Berman, "Ethnography as Politics, Politics as Ethnography," 330.

<sup>lxxvi</sup> *Ibid*, 332.

<sup>lxxvii</sup> *Ibid*, 334.

<sup>lxxviii</sup> *Ibid*, 340.

<sup>lxxix</sup> Jomo Kenyatta, *Facing Mount Kenya: The Tribal Life of the Gikuyu* (London: Vintage Books, 1965), 8-9.

<sup>lxxx</sup> *Ibid*, 8-9.

<sup>lxxxii</sup> James Ogola Onyango, "The Masculine Discursive Construction of Rape in the Kenyan Press," in *Masculinities in Contemporary Africa*, ed. Egodi Uchendu (Dakar: Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa, 2008), 61.

<sup>lxxxii</sup> Kenyatta, *Facing Mount Kenya*, 8-9.

<sup>lxxxiii</sup> The Kikuyu are one of the largest tribal groups in Kenya. Moreover, Kenyatta himself was a Kikuyu.

<sup>lxxxiv</sup> Berman, "Ethnography as Politics, Politics as Ethnography," 340.

<sup>lxxxv</sup> Ibid.

<sup>lxxxvii</sup> Ibid, 335.

<sup>lxxxviii</sup> Ibid.

<sup>lxxxviii</sup> Egara Kabaji, "Masculinity and Ritual Violence: A Study of Bullfighting among the Luhya of Western Kenya," in *Masculinities in Contemporary Africa*, ed. Egodi Uchendu (Dakar: Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa, 2008), 37 and 52.

<sup>lxxxix</sup> Gutmann, "Trafficking in Men," 397.

<sup>xc</sup> When used here the term 'tribe' does not imply a primordial identity, rather it implies a socially constructed ethnic category.

<sup>xcii</sup> Silberschmidt, "Women Forget That Men are the Masters," 19.

<sup>xcii</sup> Silberschmidt, "Disempowerment of Men in Rural and Urban East Africa," 659.

<sup>xciii</sup> Egara Kabaji, "Masculinity and Ritual Violence," 37.

<sup>xciv</sup> Ibid, 43.

<sup>xcv</sup> Ibid.

<sup>xcvi</sup> Ibid, 52.

<sup>xcvii</sup> Silberschmidt, "Disempowerment of Men in Rural and Urban East Africa," 662.

<sup>xcviii</sup> Ibid.

<sup>xcix</sup> Silberschmidt, *Women Forget That Men are the Masters*, 18-19.

<sup>c</sup> Onyango, "The Masculine Discursive Construction of Rape in the Kenyan Press," 54.

<sup>ci</sup> Ibid.

<sup>cii</sup> Silberschmidt, "Disempowerment of Men in Rural and Urban East Africa," 665.

<sup>ciii</sup> Ibid.

<sup>civ</sup> Ibid.

<sup>cv</sup> Ibid.

<sup>cvi</sup> Ibid.

<sup>cvi</sup> Silberschmidt, *Women Forget That Men are the Masters*, 12

<sup>cvi</sup> Silberschmidt, "Disempowerment of Men in Rural and Urban East Africa,"

665-6.

<sup>cix</sup> Wanjiku Chiuri, "Men's Role in Persistent Rural Poverty: Lessons from Kenya," in *Masculinities in Contemporary Africa*, ed. Egodi Uchendu (Dakar: Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa, 2008), 164.

<sup>cx</sup> Silberschmidt, "Disempowerment of Men in Rural and Urban East Africa," 663.

<sup>cxii</sup> Snyder and Tadesse, 1995.

<sup>cxiii</sup> Silberschmidt, "Disempowerment of Men in Rural and Urban East Africa," 664.

<sup>cxiv</sup> Cornwall and Brock, *Beyond Buzzwords: "Poverty Reduction", "Participation" and "Empowerment" in Development Policy (2005)*, iii.

<sup>cxv</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>cxvi</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>cxvii</sup> Silberschmidt, *Women Forget That Men are the Masters*, 178.

<sup>cxviii</sup> *Ibid*, 16.

<sup>cxviiii</sup> *Ibid*, 16.

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# THE INVISIBLE HAND THAT HEALS

**Matt Ainsley**

For decades, academics have argued over the most effective method to improve the overall health indicators of a nation. Some claim that the existence of a free press is the most powerful tool for improving the health status of a population while others argue that 'wealthier is healthier'. However, one of the most common assertions in academia is that a democratic political system is the ultimate predecessor to good health, largely due to the influence of special interest groups and electoral incentives in such a political system.

Therefore, it is ironic that the country with the lowest infant mortality rate, Singapore, does not operate under a democratic political regime. Donella Meadows famously described the city-state as a 'benevolent dictatorship'; others have called it 'soft authoritarianism' or 'authoritarian capitalism'. Regardless of the most appropriate label, the common thread is that Singapore is not a democracy - the People's Action Party (PAP) has been in power since independence in 1965 and political rights remain minimal under its leadership.

Singapore has achieved a world-class healthcare system through a careful and well-managed system of avoiding egalitarian welfarism in favour of free market forces. While spending a meager 3% of its GDP on healthcare, Singapore has achieved results that are remarkable, especially when compared to the United States and United Kingdom; who, while spending 16% and 8.25% of GDP on healthcare respectively, achieve chronically lower health indicators. For example, at the time of independence in the 1960s, the infant mortality rate (IMR) in Singapore was 34.8 per 1000. By 1980 this figure had dropped to 11.7, and today it stands at an astonishing world-low of 2.2 deaths per 1000 live births.

Singapore's national healthcare system is divided between the public and private sector. Citizens and permanent residents are entitled to a government healthcare subsidy ranging from 50-80% depending regressively on their income level. Those who are unemployed and living in government housing are entitled to a full subsidy. This program is funded by the "compulsory providence fund" (CPF) whereby a percentage of one's monthly salary, along with an employer contribution, is collectively saved.

The relationship between the government and the public and private hospitals is the most significant aspect of Singapore's healthcare system. The state's role is solely to supply the capital investment and ensure Singapore is equipped with the best medical infrastructure. 'Public hospitals' are not 'public' in the same way they are under the National Health System (NHS) in the United Kingdom, and the entire healthcare system is far more decentralized in Singapore.

For example, public hospitals are run as “private limited companies” and exist in direct competition with the private sector and other public hospitals in the country. Citizens are free to choose public or private hospitals, but given the free market competition, the price variation between the two is minimal. Such inter-industry competition allows for massive gains in efficiency.

When placed in historical context, the logic behind the evolution of this system becomes clear. Singapore is considered one of the four “East Asian Tigers”-Asian countries whose massive economic growth during the latter part of the 20th century can be attributed to a fine balance of state intervention and neoliberal economics. This model has been coined as the “developmental state”. During this time, Singapore carefully fostered human capital formation, capital investment, economic efficiency and protected its public enterprises while concurrently promoting free market neoliberalism. The same system can be seen in China today, where state owned enterprises, such as Air China and China Natural Petroleum, run in direct competition with privately owned companies within the country. China’s recent economic performance reinforces the potential profitability and success of such a model.

Conversely, countries that have historically attempted to monopolize upon state owned enterprises by cutting them off from private sector competition, have yielded astonishing failures as a result of widespread inefficiencies. When no competition exists, industries have no incentive to increase profit margins, make technological innovations and generally seek greater efficiency. For example, in Latin America during the 1970s many countries implemented state-led development strategies, such as the nationalization of various industries. Unfortunately, many of these countries developed massive deficits from the inefficiencies and losses of the state-owned enterprises which effectively destroyed their hopes for economic growth.

Such a monopolization of the healthcare market explains much of what many consider to be the “failure” of the NHS in the UK to meet healthcare goals and improve national health indicators. Although a private healthcare market does exist, this market works in parallel with the NHS, not through competition with it—as is the case in Singapore. By introducing some competition to the healthcare market in the UK, the NHS could eliminate some of its wildly inefficient practices via the invisible hand of the market-inefficiencies that are costing the UK taxpayer a reported £2.7 billion per year, and achieve the same public health success that Singapore has enjoyed for so long.

On the opposite end of the spectrum is the United States, which bases its healthcare system wholly on the free market operations and fails to account for those without the financial means to access these services. Such a system creates negative externalities that impede market efficiency. The Singaporean government takes into account such outliers via their subsidy system. Everyone has access to the same healthcare, but those in lower income brackets are given greater help. This is a system driven by simple economics and even simpler politics. Whereas academics argue that in democracies a better healthcare system emerges because of electoral incentives, Singapore's government has the incentive to keep the people happy. Failure to do so may bring about social unrest and could lead the people of Singapore to demand more political rights. Clearly, the healthcare system is advantageous to Singapore from both an economic and political perspective.

Singapore is taking its hugely successful twentieth century development model and replicating it in the healthcare sector by combining neoliberal market forces with state welfarism. Economics is the study of incentives, and Singapore has combined demand side responsibility, supply side waste management and a government safety-net for the poor to create the ultimate healthcare system.

# CONFLICT AND PEACE RESOLUTION:

*Assessing the Colombian Disarmament,  
Demobilization and Reinsertion Program*

Margoth Rico

*Abstract*

*“Today, the Colombian conflict is the longest and most geographically extended armed confrontation in Latin America: thus, achieving peace in Colombia would be a stabilizing element for the whole Andean region and the Latin American continent in general.”<sup>1</sup> In 2003, Colombia’s government launched the national program for the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration to civil life of illegal soldiers. The purpose of the program is to reduce the number of combatants in the country’s insurgent armies, to give these individuals an alternative to start a new life, and to use it as an effective measure in achieving democratic security. This paper questions whether Colombia’s current governmental demobilization program is indeed a positive move towards ending the civil war in this country, a condition necessary for developmental purposes, or if it is another futile attempt to deal with Colombia’s crisis.*

In any attempt to resolve a conflict, not only must a consensus be reached, but also the transition from conflict towards stability must be closely monitored and facilitated. In 2000, the United Nations officially recognized the process of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) as imperative to peacebuilding attempts. Disarmament is defined as “the collection of small arms and light and heavy weapons within a conflict zone,” demobilization as “the process by which parties to a conflict begin to disband their military structures and combatants begin the transformation into civilian life” and reintegration as “the process which allows ex-combatants and their families to adapt, economically and socially, to productive civilian life.”<sup>2</sup> In 2003, Colombia’s government launched its national DDR program to reduce the number of illegal combatants in the country’s insurgent armies and to give these individuals an alternative to start a new life, an integral component in achieving democratic security. A number of foreign nations, primarily the US, are providing funding for the expansion of this program, and have faith in the efforts of Colombia’s government. However, many critics of the program believe that the continuous failure of the Colombian state in preventing the high number of nationals that join the insurgent forces to begin with should be looked upon with greater importance than any attempts to weaken these armies through demobilization. In addition, there is strong opposition that highlights the many weaknesses of the program, and suggests that the government is circulating propaganda about the successfulness of the program, and is undermining aspects that require further improvement. It is important to question whether Colombia’s current governmental demobilization program is indeed a positive move towards ending the civil war or if it is another futile attempt to deal with Colombia’s crisis. This paper will first briefly discuss Colombia’s internal war and describe the main actors involved, followed by a description of the national demobilization and reinsertion program. Next, two main arguments will be presented: the first will explain the importance of having the DDR national program in place, and the second will discuss how the program still fails to present a viable solution to end Colombia’s ongoing war. This paper concludes that Colombia’s national

disarmament, demobilization and reinsertion program should be kept in place, as it is necessary and has demonstrated some achievements in recent years, but it should be largely modified in order to address the current weaknesses impeding its success.

### **Colombia's Ongoing Conflict**

“Colombia’s violence and armed conflict stems from a complex interaction of economic, social, historical, and political factors.”<sup>3</sup> Colombia has been characterized by its failure to distribute wealth and power among its population, and as a result the country continues to suffer from an ongoing series of armed conflicts. In the nineteenth century the country endured deadly confrontations between conservatives and liberals, followed by the period of La Violencia and the rise of guerilla movements in the twentieth century. Since then, guerilla warfare has intensified with the emergence of the paramilitary groups at the end of the twentieth century, and the growth of drug-trafficking activity.<sup>4</sup> The fights between conservatives and liberals finally came to an end with the creation of the National Front in the late 1950s. Under this agreement, the presidency was alternated between Liberals and Conservatives, and all positions in the government were divided equally between both parties.

The rise of armed revolutionary movements started in the 1960s as a response to the many “political elements that were excluded from the National Front.”<sup>5</sup> Colombia’s main guerrilla movements have been the EPL, the M-19, the FARC and the ELN. The M-19 and the EPL both signed a peace agreement with the government, leaving the FARC and the ELN as the two main guerrilla armies that continue fighting the country’s ongoing civil war. The Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) was initially created by students who condemned the elitist rule of the government and the persistence of inequality. It began in urban areas and later expanded to rural areas, attracting many peasants to the cause. The roots of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) were the communist ideals that emerged in the 1920s, and were intensified later with the Cuban revolution. Their main focus is on agrarian reform and they condemn the inability of the different Conservatives and Liberal governments in adopting a land reform that would equally distribute resources. The FARC later allied with narcotraffickers, increasing their funding, and becoming Colombia’s strongest guerrilla movement to this day.

As explained by Sanin, the objective of both the ELN and the FARC is to form a “popular army that emphasizes discipline and combat capacity” and even though the guerrilla movements are benefiting from their involvement with drug production, they also attempt to increase their profits by extracting “ransom from drug traffickers by kidnapping” members of the main drug cartels and civilians.<sup>6</sup> According to official estimates, “the FARC expanded from 3600 insurgents in 1986 to about 7000 in 1995 and as many as 15, 000 (or even 20,000) by 2000. During the same period, the ELN grew from only 800 insurgents in the mid-1980s to

5000 by 2000.”<sup>7</sup> In the 1990s, another actor in Colombia’s civil war was born: the paramilitary group Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC). With the increasing drug activity in Colombia, a group of nouveaux riches emerged using their large drug profits to buy rural estates. As a response to the increasing number of farmers and civilians that were being affected by guerrilla threats, several nouveaux riches allied with the landed oligarchy in the fight against insurgent movements. For them, the solution to eliminate guerrilla movements depended on creating their own independent paramilitary army. The philosophy was that “if the government could not protect its citizens, the people would have to fend for themselves.”<sup>8</sup>

The dismantling of paramilitary movements has been very successful in recent years, to the extent that the government officially declared that “today there is no paramilitarism.”<sup>9</sup> However, despite efforts to minimize Colombia’s civil conflict, the country continues to suffer from high levels of hostility and many suggest that in some areas of the country the paramilitaries are still actively engaged in combat. As Solimano suggests, Colombia’s main restriction to development and stability is violence. It is affecting the country’s economic growth, as well as “reducing the government’s capacity to alleviate the poverty, inequality and exclusion experienced by the majority of its population, in both rural and urban areas.”<sup>10</sup> The disarmament, demobilization and reinsertion (DDR) program is an example of the efforts that the country continues to implement in an attempt to terminate internal hostilities.

### **The Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Program**

Efforts to demobilize and reintegrate illegal insurgents have been made by various Colombian governments in the past. However, most attempts were ineffective and in many cases, after concluding that no fruitful consequences materialized, the efforts were abandoned by the state and the actors involved. For example, in 1984 under the Betancourt administration “the FARC agreed to a ceasefire and announced the foundation of a political party, the Unión Patriótica. However, following their demobilization and reconstitution as a legitimate political party, some 3,000 members of the Unión Patriótica were assassinated by the paramilitaries.”<sup>11</sup> The government was incapable of ensuring a positive reintegration of ex-combatants to society, and they failed to guarantee their security. As a result, many of the former combatants ended up rejoining the FARC, and the incapacity of the state was once again evident.

In an attempt to improve upon past demobilization efforts, an official disarmament, demobilization and reinsertion program was formally included as part of Colombia’s government agenda in 2003. As expressed by former President Alvaro Uribe, in recent years Colombia has “achieved the demobilization of 46,000 members of different factions and [the country is] carrying out a costly and complex reintegration process with them, that requires truth, justice and redress for the victims.”<sup>12</sup> As Theidon explains, the new DDR program includes three main actors: the government, the demobilized combatants and the communities. The

government must ensure that agreements made through the DDR program are met by all sides, and that all former combatants involved turn over their arms, immediately resign from all acts of violence, and fully commit to the goals of reintegration. Prior to this, the government must identify all those willing to join the program, verify their identities and their membership to insurgent groups, and ensure that they have not engaged in atrocious crimes or mass killings. In case they have committed or commanded others to perform crimes against humanity, they are reviewed under the judicial system, and must serve a given sentence in jail before being able to rejoin the DDR program.<sup>13</sup>

There are three ways by which former illegal soldiers are engaged in DDR. The first one is by voluntarily and independently joining the program, which usually occurs after the individual escapes the illegal army they belonged to. The second way, most common with former child soldiers, is after being captured by the military. If the individual fails to comply with the military's demands, and is unwilling to join the demobilization and reintegration program, in most cases the only remaining option is to serve extended prison sentences. Children present an interesting case as they are protected by the state and are not of legal age to be put in jail, even if they have committed crimes. In most cases the government is able to convince youth to join the DDR program, and most successful cases of reinsertion to civil life have been from minors. The third way is when the entire army or group decides to be part of the program by signing an agreement with the government promising to disarm, demobilize and reintegrate into civil life.

One of the first and larger demobilization examples was in October of 2004, when the AUC leaders announced that in an effort to work with the government they would "demobilize several thousand troops before the end of the year. In the following two months, 2,624 troops belonging to five blocks purportedly demobilized."<sup>14</sup> In addition, the AUC voluntarily turned over a large quantity of weapons and ammunition as well as around 6,500 hectares of land.<sup>15</sup> The government declared this occurrence as a clear sign of progression towards peace, facilitated by their DDR program. Following their surrender of arms and disengagement from military groups, participants enter reintegration, the last and longest part of the program, which attempts to ensure that the ex-combatants do not return to any kind of insurgent or illegal movement, but facilitate social reconstruction and peaceful coexistence in order for the former soldiers to be able to maintain sustainable lives. Social reconstruction is creating services and opening up opportunities that allow ex-combatants to find adequate jobs that pay enough to support themselves and their families, as well as providing essential services, including health, education and security. In addition, the government pledges to protect individuals in the program, and in many cases aid them with a change in their legal identity (for example changing their names) to prevent aggression towards them, or a failure of reintegration in their old communities.

## **The Need and Benefits of the DDR Program**

Colombia's national demobilization and reinsertion program should be kept in place as it is necessary and has yielded some positive change in recent years. The program offers an opportunity for the members of illegal armies to live within a legal framework, in which they are entitled to government protection and civil rights. Once they become part of an insurgent army, most lose the freedom to leave or do not have the means to do so, nor do they have anywhere to go. Therefore, the DDR program serves as an opportunity for illegal combatants to leave military life who are unable to do so by themselves. In recent years, there has been a larger number of former illegal soldiers that within the program, showing its increasing popularity and a growing disillusionment of the guerrilla and paramilitary movements. In addition, the drop in crime levels following demobilization has been undeniable. According to the Colombian National Police, between the year 2002 and 2005 "kidnappings dropped by 73 percent, homicides by 37 percent, terrorist actions by 63 percent, extortion by 31 percent, commercial cargo theft by 50 percent, and auto theft by 37 percent."<sup>16</sup> These numbers are not only the reflection of the successfulness of the DDR program, but also reflect the result of many other positive programs being currently implemented in Colombia. Nonetheless, the importance of the DDR program must not be undermined as it continues to play an increasing role in the efforts to weaken organized insurgency, and it is crucial to the transition from civil unrest to stability.

Revolutionary armies are most often organized by a military hierarchical structure, with few generals and commanders at the top, and a large base of poor peasants and unemployed civilians serving as soldiers at the bottom. Fletcher reports that according to governmental statistics, "80 percent of the demobilized soldiers never finished high school. Approximately 10 percent are functionally illiterate, and many were never eager to join illegal armed groups. About half of the demobilized soldiers say they entered illegal armed groups out of either economic necessity or because of threats against their life."<sup>17</sup> Facing unemployment, poverty and exposure to violence, many individuals sign up for the economic protection that an illegal armed group promises.

If the alternative offered by these insurgent armies was in fact an improvement or at the very least if these groups followed their own ideologies of equal representation and egalitarianism, then the question of whether a reintegration program is urgently needed could be up to debate. However, it has been demonstrated that the lives of most illegal soldiers consist of poverty, torture, and constant suffering. The living conditions in the jungles and the different places where they hide are far from sanitary and comfortable. Furthermore, members do not receive a salary and they do not have access (as individuals) to rent. In addition, Sanin explains that "members can handle huge resources coming from narco-trafficking and kidnapping, but it is always clear that this money belongs to the organization."<sup>18</sup> With the pretext that the organization's interests are above

those of the individual, the top officials of these armies are able to give orders, without always following what is beneficial for all members involved, but rather what benefits them personally. Such an example, reported in various cases, is when superiors demand the separation of couples; they get rid of the husband and take the wife. Sanin continues to explain that “the official position of the organizations is that by joining you make a life-long commitment. And in effect only very, very rarely are allowed to withdraw.”<sup>19</sup> Therefore, even if combatants want to leave, in most cases they are unable to do so, unless they receive some kind of support from the state.

Considering that desertion is one of the worst offences one can make in many militia armies, the government provides free protection to all the ex-combatants of the program. If they fail to follow the government’s security framework, the ex-soldiers risk their lives and become vulnerable to being killed and tortured by the militia army they belonged to. In addition to security benefits, another positive indicator of the DDR program is that demobilized combatants are entitled to a number of benefits, such as education, social and legal services, and a growing number of support centers are being established in order to facilitate their reintegration into society.<sup>20</sup> Fletcher reports that the free education provided by the government to all mobilized ex-combatants has proven to be of high quality. From his study in Medellin, Fletcher describes that most ex-combatants who are willing to collaborate with the government “receive a monthly wage from the government to finish school, completing one grade every three months, attend workshops that teach work and life skills and are also given access to therapy and counseling.”<sup>21</sup> The internal popularity of Colombia’s current government combined with the harsh conditions and disappointment many insurgent soldiers face today as part of these illegal armed movements, insurgent armies are constantly losing esteem and support. In addition, as more ex-combatants turn themselves over and join the program, they encourage others to demobilize. Although there is some information on the internal functioning of the different militia movements in Colombia, there are still numerous undocumented cases of the human rights abuses committed within these groups. As the information pertaining to the group and the lives of their combatants is kept under cover, only in recent years have some of these abuses come to light. One way has been through the reports of people that have been kidnapped by these organizations, and have been able to witness the lives of the members involved. More revealing reports have arisen in large part due to the establishment of the DDR program and the collection of evidence and accounts given by ex-combatants. Once they join the reinsertion program, many are willing to speak about their situation and their lives under the illegal framework of militia welfare. These disclosures of information have not only been crucial for the government and the military’s fight against insurgency, but they also serve as disincentives for other civilians to join guerilla or paramilitary groups. As Evans states, “widespread information is in itself a weapon” that has been efficiently used by the government

to reduce the number of members in insurgent armies.<sup>22</sup> This information is also important as it reveals to the international community the crimes that are being committed by guerilla, paramilitary and mafia groups.

It was not long ago that various groups at a global level were supporting guerilla movements, and Colombia's government was seen as the main antagonist in the civil war. As Juan Manuel Santos, former minister of National Defense and current President, stated: "in certain circles in Europe, there still existed the romantic image of the guerrillas as Robin Hood, or Che Guevara, fighting the bad guys for the benefit of the poor."<sup>23</sup> In recent years, information on the illegal use of child soldiers has been revealed. "Engaging children in war has justly earned a wealth of criticism and odium from citizens, stakeholders, and civil society spokesmen," damaging the image of these groups, not only nationally but also at an international level.<sup>24</sup> In addition, evidence that reveals the unjust treatment given to women has caused even more disdain towards illegal militia armies. As Sanin explains, in several cases pregnant women are forced to abort their babies and many have been raped by the commanders and top officials of these armies.<sup>25</sup> At present, Colombia's illegal insurgent armies are not only being questioned and confronted by Colombia's government and military, but also by the majority of its population and a growing number of international organizations advocating for the respect of human rights at all levels.

### **Weaknesses of the DDR Program**

Although the DDR program is a necessary component of Colombia's conflict resolution, it still has multiple drawbacks that are preventing a more successful process to take place. One of the main points to address is that

with the right legal framework, the demobilization process could have a significant impact in reducing human rights violations in Colombia. But unless the law takes into account the complexity, power, and regenerative capacity of militias, there is a serious risk that the demobilization process will simply give [insurgent] leaders the benefits they seek without resulting in any real advances in terms of accountability or peace.<sup>26</sup>

Colombian Law 418 of 1997 regulates how the demobilization process takes place. Under this law, all ex-combatants that voluntarily demobilize and who are not charged with a serious human rights violation are entitled to receive economic benefits and amnesties for certain crimes. There are many criticisms regarding this legal framework as there is no requirement concerning the amount of cooperation that ex-combatants must give to authorities, in order to be entitled to the benefits of the DDR program.

In addition to restructuring the legal framework that mandates the demobilization process, it is imperative for the state to be able to ensure that all

individuals joining the program are indeed fulfilling their part of the agreement. On the contrary, it has been shown that in many cases once former militia combatants join the DDR program and are entitled to certain amnesties and economic benefits, they either return to violence or had never really abandoned insurgent armies to begin with. Furthermore, the law was initially drafted for cases of independent demobilization, but it is inadequate to deal with the demobilization of larger groups, or to dismantle big paramilitary or guerilla militias. In the case of these larger demobilizations, it is imperative that the process be monitored carefully. It has been proposed by various human rights organizations and countries that in order for members of a group to be entitled to benefits, the leaders must provide a detailed list outlining basic information of each individual and their role, and information on the group's structure and their main sources of funding.<sup>27</sup> These sources of information will allow government investigators to identify past crimes, illegal sources of funding, the victims involved, and verify that ex-combatants are no longer active in any kind of illegal activity.<sup>28</sup>

Furthermore, in many cases the DDR program has proven to be a short-term and unsustainable solution, as many former soldiers are forced to eventually return back to a cycle of poverty where they are unable to find employment, education, healthcare or housing, potentially placing them in a worse off position than in the militia. The first thing to consider is that the program faces a funding shortfall. Currently, the major source of funding, other than the government, is the \$3.25 million of US aid dedicated to this cause through the 2005 Andean Counterdrug Initiative. However, "according to US ambassador William B. Wood, demobilizing for example 20,000 paramilitaries at \$8,500 per soldier totals \$170 million."<sup>29</sup> To make matters worse, the government has been having problems in finding more aid for the program. As Logan & Myers explain, the international community has been reluctant to fund a process that has a questionable legality, as drug-traffickers, paramilitary commanders and criminal guerilla members gain from the process, but do not necessarily compromise to strong mandates of peace and collaboration with authorities. Therefore, questions remain on how the Colombian government plans to afford this costly program and how they plan to make it sustainable.

In addition, Morgenstein explains that even though the DDR program provides its members with economic incentives to succeed independently, "the centers [are] not provided with the needed resources, and the benefits [are] largely insufficient."<sup>30</sup> Until the social services established are able to fully meet the needs of the demobilized former soldiers, the efforts to fully reintegrate them back into society will be inadequate. Furthermore, the constant cycle of poverty and inequality that Colombia faces impedes a smooth reintegration process. Many try to reintegrate to legal society again, by trying to find a job that provides them with enough money to survive. However, not surprisingly given Colombia's unemployment rate of 11.8%, many are unable to do so and must return to the militias.<sup>31</sup>

As Solimano argues, the largest obstacle for development and prosperity

in Colombia is the high levels of violence and instability. At the same time, it is this inability to prosper and develop that causes even more violence in the country, creating a vicious cycle of poverty and war. Furthermore, slow growth in the country has been largely blamed for the inability of the state to reduce inequality levels. It is therefore vital that more social projects targeting the most affected populations become a priority. This will open opportunities for the many individuals that are now faced with extreme levels of poverty and in many cases have to resort to illegal means of making a living, such as the drug business or insurgent groups and criminal gangs. Economic growth, the generation of jobs and sustainable large social projects take time, and are sometimes dependent on external factors such as international markets and economies. Therefore, in the meantime, it is crucial to create emergency employment and social security safety nets. For example, investing in labour-intensive programs, in medical care and in employment subsidies can give a minimum basis of living to ex-combatants. Therefore ex-combatants are more probable to remain in society in the long term while these investments also improve the conditions of other sectors.

Another drawback of the program is the lack of involvement from the local communities, not because of their inability to cooperate and help the DDR program, but because the government neglects the importance of their contributions and their involvement. Although the program has received a lot of attention from the Colombian media, there are many people that are directly involved in the process who were not informed of the program's implementation. As Morgenstein explains, "the national government failed to communicate the details of the reintegration program to local authorities. As a result, civilian populations were often left uninformed, exacerbating feelings of alienation and the perception that their government was collaborating against them and their interests."<sup>32</sup> It is thus essential that the reintegration process adapts to the local needs, and does not try to integrate ex-combatants without working together with the communities to adopt the proper security and social measures needed. In addition, "the issue of reparation for the harm caused to the victims of acts of violence and displacement, including control over lands, does not appear to be addressed with the appropriate levels of participation."<sup>33</sup> Although the DDR targets many victims of the civil war, there are thousands of others that are still gravely affected by the ongoing conflict in the country, and that do not receive any benefits from the program, nor any significant help from the government or the international community. Such is the case for the thousands of Colombians who have been internally displaced by the ongoing threats of violence, and have been forced to seek refuge in other parts of the country where finding the means to survive has become almost impossible. It is therefore imperative not only to continue improving the demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants, but also to target all the victims of war, even if they do not pose a direct threat to national security.<sup>34</sup>

It is important to mention that although the numbers show that the DDR

program has reduced crimes in the country, disagreement remains on the validity behind the government's statistics, and the degree to which these correlate with the DDR program. According to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the program has not resulted in any significant reduction in violence in many zones of the country. Records have shown that paramilitary and guerilla groups continue to control neighborhoods in many communities and cities, and continue to commit acts of violence against all those that do not cooperate with them.<sup>35</sup> Furthermore, in 2006 it was recorded that more than thirty-one thousand soldiers, from just the AUC alone, had joined the DDR program. However, studies made by international organizations later revealed that these numbers were inflated, as some individuals that joined the DDR program were in reality drug traffickers who wished to avoid prosecution, or other civilians pretending to be ex-combatants to get the social benefits.<sup>36</sup>

## **Conclusion**

This paper has introduced Colombia's Disarmament, Demobilization and Reinsertion Program not as an ambitious one-off solution to the country's history of unrest, but as a fundamental component in a series of initiatives designed to improve living standards while achieving social unity, political stability and economic growth across the nation. Although there is currently only limited evidence substantiating DDR's effectiveness in achieving positive long-term goals, it does provide a framework for the reintegration of ex-combatants back into society. It is unquestionable that the standard of living, security and potential for personal development offered by the DDR Program is nowadays vastly superior to that offered by insurgent armies. However, it is imperative to acknowledge that the program must be changed into a transparent, sustainable and effective system that manages to include all those involved. Furthermore it is important to keep in mind that the DDR program is only one step in the process of peacebuilding, but many other adjustments and schemes must be effectively established to support it and further its effects. Going forward, it is imperative that the program addresses its weaknesses to become transparent, far-reaching and "subject to a broad, inclusive, and open public debate."<sup>37</sup> It is also crucial that the program is able to identify the individuals and groups that are truly willing to reintegrate into society, enable the transition based on firm legal foundations, and then provide them with the means to do so on a sustainable and long-term basis. These challenges are made all the more difficult by the situation of ongoing conflict that still exists in Colombia. However, if the government is able to overcome some of these obstacles and prove the effectiveness of the program, international funding is likely to become more accessible, which will no doubt facilitate the widespread adoption of the initiative as well as development in the form of economic growth and stability.

Endnotes

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<sup>2</sup> The Role of the United Nations Peacekeeping in Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, Report of the Secretary-General, UN SCOR, 2000, UN Doc. S/2000/101, 2.

<sup>3</sup> Solimano, *Essays on Conflict*, 179.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, 188-9.

<sup>5</sup> Thomas E. Skidmore and Peter H. Smith, “Colombia: Discord, Civility and Violence,” In *Modern Latin America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 244.

<sup>6</sup> Francisco Gutiérrez Sanín, “Organizing Minors: The case of Colombia” (working paper, Ford Institute for Human Security, 2007), 21.

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<sup>9</sup> UN GAOR, 62d Sess., 8th Plen. Mtg., UN Doc. A/62/PV.8, (2007): 9.

<sup>10</sup> Solimano, *Essays on Conflict*, 189.

<sup>11</sup> Kimberly Theidon, “Transitional Subjects: The Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Former Combatants in Colombia,” *The International Journal of Transitional Justice* 1 (2007): 72.

<sup>12</sup> UN GAOR, 62d Sess., 8th Plen. Mtg., UN Doc. A/62/PV.8, (2007): 8.

<sup>13</sup> Theidon, “Transitional Subjects,” 67-75.

<sup>14</sup> Human Rights Watch, “Colombia: Letting Paramilitaries off The Hook,” *Human Rights Watch Official Reports* (2005): 5.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>16</sup> Morgenstein, Jonathan. “Consolidating Disarmament,” 3.

<sup>17</sup> Kenneth Fletcher, “Colombia Dispatch 10: Education for Demobilized Forces,” *Smithsonian*, October 29, 2008.

<sup>18</sup> Gutiérrez Sanín, “Organizing Minors: The Case of Colombia,” 21.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, 22.

<sup>20</sup> Morgenstein, Jonathan. “Consolidating Disarmament.”

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<sup>22</sup> Peter Evans, “Fighting Marginalization with Transnational Networks: Counter-Hegemonic Globalization,” *Contemporary Sociology* 29, no.1 (2000): 232.

<sup>23</sup> “Dutch Woman Joins Colombian Guerrillas,” *Fox News*, November 26, 2007.

<sup>24</sup> Gutiérrez Sanín, “Organizing Minors: The Case of Colombia,” 17.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, 21-27.

<sup>26</sup> Human Rights Watch, “Colombia,” 1.

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<sup>28</sup> “Executive Summary – Report on the Demobilization Process in Colombia,” In Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Follow-Up on the Demobilization Process of the AUC in Colombia, (Washington D.C.: Organization of American States, 2007), accessed March 25, 2009, <http://www.cidh.oas.org/pdf%20files/Colombia-Demobilization-AUC%202008.pdf>.

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<sup>32</sup> Solimano, *Essays on Conflict*, 180.

<sup>33</sup> Commission on Human Rights.

<sup>34</sup> Morgenstein, Jonathan. “Consolidating Disarmament,” 15.

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**THE IMPACT OF ECONOMIC  
GROWTH AND CAPITALISM  
ON CHINA'S GENDERED  
DIVISION OF LABOUR**

**Portia Crowe**

Economic growth is often cited as a solution to inequality in the developing world. Modernization Theory states that increased GDP leads to both political and social progress and can have important consequences for gender equality. However, as stated by Wendy Sarvasy and Judith Vanallen, “jobs alone are not sufficient to get women out of poverty;” growth is a necessary but insufficient fix for any development issue. This position can be further developed to suggest that economic growth in today’s capitalist world economy is in fact a primary cause of gender disparity in newly industrializing countries. Macroeconomic growth and increasing participation in the world economy are such central elements to rapidly industrializing countries like China that a convincing explanation for gender disparity must take these factors into account. Gender inequality is an outcome of men and women’s ties to the current economic structure—a central position of Dependency and Socialist Feminist theorists. The impact of modern capitalism on sexual divisions of labour in both the workplace and the domestic sphere may therefore be the best rationale for the persistence of gender disparity in China.

Traditionally, gender disparity in China can be characterized by the Confucian prescription that women belong “inside” the family while men belong “outside,” or in the public workplace.<sup>1</sup> The assumption that girls would eventually join their husbands’ families and provide labor for their in-laws deterred natal families from investing in their daughters’ education. Even today, 23.2% of China’s female population has not gone to school, while only 8.5% of the male population has been denied that right, according to the 1995 One-Percent Population Survey.<sup>2</sup> Rather than attending school, young women make up a major part of China’s workforce in nationally- and foreign-owned mass-production factories. They work in industries such as textiles, apparel and electronics and endure long hours of repetitive work. They frequently earn lower wages than male workers do, and often work “double days” in both spheres of domestic and wage labour. Firms often use female labour to survive crises like inflation and recession by keeping women as a reserve labour force that are then vulnerable to fluctuating demand. This was demonstrated during the 1990s Asian Financial Crisis where women were the first ones laid off compared to men.<sup>3</sup>

The existing structures of gender inequality in China can be attributed to traditional, cultural patriarchy. Modernization Theory argues that economic growth is a sure fix for this; however, China’s economy has been growing at rates between 8% and 13% per year for several decades, and gender equality has not improved. To understand why such disparity persists today, one must examine a more recent explanation that “the exploitation of women exists because it serves the needs of capitalism”.<sup>4</sup>

As Kyung Ae Park describes in “Women and Development: The Case of South Korea,” labor-intensive, export-oriented economies rely on low wage,

unskilled, young female labor.<sup>5</sup> Dependency Theory supports this, arguing that women are exploited by the international capitalist system in order to keep workers wages as low as possible.<sup>6</sup> The “dependency” aspect is manifested by foreign multinational corporations who own the majority of factories that employ women and perpetuate inequalities due to the benefits derived from repressed wages and conditions

Socialist Feminist Theory furthers this Marxist-like perspective by linking patriarchy to the economic mode of production.<sup>7</sup> Socialist Feminism considers the uneven distribution and control of economic resources across gender lines, and attributes this to ‘capitalist patriarchy.’ It suggests that this new form of gender disparity occurs during a nation’s transition from an agrarian society to industrial capitalism, where forces that have “atomized” working-class life and entrenched the labour classes have also perpetuated the oppression of women.<sup>8</sup>

Park uses South Korea to illustrate the fortification of women’s subordination in the capitalist economic system. There, women comprised over 70% of the labour market, but were severely underpaid for their work. Nearly twenty years after Park wrote about this, however, gender disparity in South Korea has declined, wages have increased, and multinational firms have moved their production sites to other countries. Park’s description can still be applied to most of East Asia such as China which has been undergoing market liberalization since the initial reforms in 1978. Special Economic and Free Trade Zones with relaxed, free-market laws have opened in major economic centers like Shanghai, Shenzhen, and Guangzhou, where the Dependency-Social Feminist model clearly applies. According to Linda Lim, “female employment in export manufacturing industries is most prevalent where capitalist relations of production are developing rapidly, but traditional patriarchy is sufficient to keep women in an inferior labor market position”.<sup>9</sup> This can be seen in China’s transition to an export-led growth model, which “has transformed China’s economy, including the fostering of a new capitalist-like labor regime and new forces toward division of labor”.<sup>10</sup> With rapid economic growth as its chief national priority, China has opened the door to marketization, foreign direct investment, and mass production geared for export. But “during the course of pursuing economic growth, the transitional state advances processes of [labour] segmentation and [gender] segregation”.<sup>11</sup>

Two aspects of economic capitalism enhance gender disparity in China: the menial compensation that women receive for their contribution to export manufacturing industries (which have pushed China’s economy into second place worldwide), and the sexual division of labour that continues to burden women with the task of reproduction (which, coupled with their new roles of production, denies them both time and access to resources). Indeed “the combination of this [export-led, capitalist] development path and the reproduction of socio-cultural traditions reinforces gender segregation in the urban labor market and gender division of labor in households”.<sup>12</sup>

Women have played a central role in driving China's economy to new heights in recent decades; "female participation in urban China is among the highest in the world, with about nine in ten urban women working".<sup>13</sup> Despite an overall increase in female employment in China, this labour is characterized by low productivity, low skill levels, high turnover, and insecurity of tenure,<sup>14</sup> which subsequently results in low pay, low status, few benefits, and limited upward mobility for female workers.<sup>15</sup> Instead of improving the financial situation of Chinese women, economic growth exploits their disadvantaged circumstances and further cements them in inferior economic positions.

Women are generally concentrated in low-priority sectors within China's official hierarchy of industries, where mining, construction, and metalwork rank highest.<sup>16</sup> While men are employed as masons, loaders, carpenters, and mechanics, urban women work in the typically underpaid textiles and apparel industries, making up 90% of garment workers, 88.4% of seamstresses, and 88.3% of knitters.<sup>17</sup> They also work primarily in the electronics industry. Fan cites a 2000 study in which Siu Mi Tam finds that 99% of the assembly-line workers in a Shekou factory were female.<sup>18</sup> These low-wage industries hire mainly women for their supposed manual dexterity and because "it is believed that women do not have the need or the inclination to be career-minded . . . and so do not mind dead-end jobs with no prospects of advancement."<sup>19</sup>

Socialist Feminist Theory provides several explanations for why women are paid lower wages than are men. First, employers assume that women are less likely to form workers unions and to strike, due to their stereotypically compliant nature.<sup>20</sup> In China, "women, in particular, are expected to docilely submit to the management authority, mostly held by men."<sup>21</sup> Another explanation based on traditional customs argues that women are not the principal breadwinner in the household—that they work simply for pocket money or to make a secondary contribution to household income—and therefore they merit a lower pay.<sup>22</sup> Finally, women earn lower wages because of their high turnover and the shorter span of their working lives.<sup>24</sup> Chinese women's "youth and short tenure . . . have given rise to the 'maiden worker' construction which perpetuates their inferiority and vulnerability to exploitation at the urban workplace." This short labour lifespan is a result of their reproductive responsibilities in the domestic sphere.

Paradoxically, it is this same female labour in the mass production of apparel and electronics that has fuelled growth in China's economy in the recent years. In 2009, Chinese exports were valued at US \$1.204 trillion and clothing, footwear, electronics and toys were among its chief exports.<sup>25</sup> Rather than enhancing women's situation through the diffusion of modern values, capitalist growth in China has only entrenched women in disadvantaged economic positions with little hope of breaking free. Wage inequality and unskilled, menial tasks impede women's prospects for upward mobility within the economic system. When they are socialized to accept an inferior production position, they lose the

motivation to acquire more marketable skills and are grounded in a position of low-valued, low-wage work.

Furthermore, because factories actively seek out young women for the labour force, due to their docility, manual dexterity, and weak bargaining positions, the largest female age participation rate is between ages fifteen and twenty four. This means that these women are joining the labour market rather than completing their education, thus ultimately leaving them less skilled than their male counterparts who begin work at an older age and are able finish school.

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The second contention presented by the Socialist Feminist Theory suggests that a country's transition to a capitalist economic system influences men's and women's division of labour in the public and domestic spheres. Traditionally, women held the responsibility of "reproduction," while men's primary responsibility was that of "production", in the form of wage work in the public domain. Rather than 'modernizing society' to enhance the situation of women, multinational corporations, as well as private national entrepreneurs "profit from existing gender inequalities and exploit the cheap labor of the 'periphery of the periphery,'" thus, deepening female subordination.<sup>27</sup>

Today, many women face "double days" in which they must do both underpaid wage work and unpaid housework, which involves caring for the sick and elderly, cooking, cleaning, washing clothes, shopping, and running errands, as well as child-bearing.<sup>28</sup> Domestic work puts a time constraint on women's economically productive capabilities and denies them access to valuable resources, which could advance their economic situation.

In China, this traditional division of labor within the family takes on a geographical dimension. Rural women, being the primary domestic care-givers, typically have no option but to remain in their villages while men migrate to the cities for work.<sup>29</sup> This prevents them from working and earning wages in urban factories. In this way, the modern capitalist system coupled with China's patriarchal history deepens the gender divide in contemporary society. Because the new economic structure necessitates being in an urban centre in order to participate in China's emerging economic affluence, it automatically excludes rural women from joining the modern labour force.

For the most part, women who do work must exit the workforce upon reaching a marriageable age. In China, "getting married almost always translates into returning to the village and the termination of urban work."<sup>30</sup> This shortens their work tenure and ultimately means that all women receive lower wages based on the assumption that they will only be working temporarily. Furthermore, the sexual division of labour disadvantages the urban women who remain employed and work double days. In the workplace, women are treated as inferior to men because they are "more likely to take time off to care for a sick child, less likely to put in longer hours at work because they are needed at home . . . , and more

likely to suffer the consequences of this double burden of time, energy, and responsibilities.”<sup>31</sup>

The solution to women's economic subordination in Chinese society cannot be one of increased participation in the capitalist mode of production; “employment based on imperialist exploitation cannot liberate women from patriarchal exploitation that is the very condition for their entry into wage labour.”<sup>32</sup> Furthermore, enforcing higher wages for women would likely eliminate the jobs altogether, as multinational corporations can easily relocate production to other countries.<sup>33</sup> One possible solution to be explored is an international push to standardize working conditions in specific industries and to restrict the exploitation of market wage differentials between countries.<sup>34</sup>

“Although patriarchy existed before capitalism, and continues in post-capitalist societies, it is their present relationship that must be understood if the structure of oppression is to be changed.”<sup>35</sup> The combination patriarchy and capitalism, explains the persistence of female economic subordination and gender disparity in newly industrializing East Asian countries like China. Although female labour has largely contributed to China's recent economic prosperity through the mass production of textiles, apparel, and electronics, women are systematically disadvantaged in factories. They are left underpaid, unskilled, and immobile. While most would expect that capitalist economic growth would correct China's traditional gender imbalance, it is actually a greater cause of the imbalance. It has deepened traditional gender divides and left women even more disadvantaged than before. Lim is correct in stating that “ultimately, it is the existing structure of the economy and society that has to be changed if the exploitation of women in the labor force is to be eliminated.”<sup>36</sup>

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# **AN EVOLUTION OF CRITIQUES:**

*Haiti and International Development Aid*

**Margot Fuller**

The seemingly interminable question that has vexed every Haitian expert was best posed by academics Josh DeWind and David H. Kinley: “Why have hundreds of millions of dollars in international economic aid directed at a country no larger than the state of Maryland failed to reverse Haiti’s headlong plunge into deepening poverty?” Haiti is undeniably vulnerable to the imposition of policies by outside agencies. As such, there is an incredibly large body of literature surrounding the effects and effectiveness of foreign aid, in addition to the literature providing policy prescriptions for Haitian development. The debate over the merits of international aid has been evolving for decades, yet remains unresolved and highly contentious as scholars continue to discuss whether or not foreign aid has been beneficial to this small corner of the developing world. In this literature review, I will explore how various academic writers have addressed this ongoing debate and what conclusions scholars have drawn to explain the failure of aid to lift Haiti out of poverty.

Given the long, dismal history of international aid in Haiti, it is not surprising that the scholarly evaluations of foreign aid to the country are overwhelmingly pessimistic. This is highlighted in my review of the current body of literature on Haitian development aid. I have found that the majority of scholars agree that foreign aid has either perpetuated or intensified the crisis in Haiti, and that even with years of effort and intervention by governments, multilateral organizations, NGOs and individuals alike, real solutions remain elusive. Adversely, these very same scholars agree that the importance of, as well as the dependence on, foreign aid in Haiti is indisputable.

Academic literature on Haiti often contrasts the internal and external factors impacting Haitian development. In the same manner, I have found that academics accredit the failure of foreign aid to both internal Haitian actors and to external actors such as international organizations and foreign states. In this paper I will explore the main reasons for the failure of aid to Haiti, attributed by scholars specifically to those external actors involved in Haitian development. Overall, scholars impute the failures of external actors to three factors: the politicization of aid, the privatization of aid, and the imposition of an export-oriented development strategy. I will thus structure my paper in order to analyze scholars’ evaluations and policy prescriptions for each theme. I will conclude by discussing the importance of aid to Haiti despite its failures.

### **Politicization of Aid**

The bulk of the literature concludes that the impacts of economic development projects in Haiti are ultimately determined by the politicization of aid both domestically and internationally. As such, much of the most widely recognized scholars’ policy prescriptions as well as the recent dissertations on the subject focus on issues of governance. Scholars agree that politics have determined the amount, nature, and effectiveness of foreign aid to Haiti, and hence explain

the failure of external actors to help lift Haiti out of poverty.

### **Amount of Aid**

The literature demonstrates that the extent of foreign aid has been determined by Haiti's relationship with the United States and the US's support of the current Haitian regime. Robert Maguire, Michel-Rolph Trouillot, Josh DeWind and David H. Kinley are four of the first widely referenced scholars to explore the importance of the Haiti-US relationship for aid in the 1980s and 90s. In his paper, "Haiti Held Hostage: International Responses to the Quest for Nationhood 1986-1996," Maguire studies the nature and effectiveness of international political, military, and humanitarian actions taken in Haiti. Maguire illustrates how the United States became integral to Haitian development as early as 1804 when it became its dominant trading partner.<sup>1</sup> Trouillot traces the roots of the Duvalier state, and through his exploration of the Haitian political economy also illustrates the origins of the economic dependency on the United States.<sup>2</sup>

In their seminal work, *Aiding Migration: The Impact of International Development Assistance on Haiti*, DeWind and Kinley show how the international community consistently followed the lead of the United States, and either restricted or restored its aid to Haiti according to US policy at the time.<sup>3</sup> As such, foreign aid was almost entirely curtailed from 1963 to 1972, for which the US cited reasons of mismanagement and corruption of aid funds, as well as "irreconcilable differences over human rights abuses" during Francois Duvalier's regime.<sup>4</sup> The US and other bilateral donors, as well as multi-lateral donors such as the World Bank, the UNDP, and the Inter-American Development Bank, all reinstated development assistance after the inauguration of Jean-Claude Duvalier.<sup>5</sup> In this case, the United States chose to prioritize its international political alliances over the Haitian government's domestic human rights abuses.<sup>6</sup> In 1986, the Reagan administration decided that the Duvalier government violated the human rights conditions set up by the United States Congress for economic aid to Haiti and withdrew its support, forcing the President to leave the country.<sup>7</sup> Aid to Haiti continued to be suspended and reinstated for political reasons in the subsequent decades due to events such as the 1987 election massacre, the 1995 transfer of power from Aristide to Préval, and the 1997 elections and resulting constitutional crisis, to name a few.<sup>8</sup> In this time period, DeWind and Kinley maintain that the continuing presence of external actors in Haiti not only failed to make a distinguishable contribution to political or economic reconstruction, but also ignored the aspirations of most Haitians to eliminate all remnants of autocratic rule.<sup>9</sup>

In his recent dissertation, "The Impact of International Intervention on Democratic Development: Haiti and the 2005/2006 Elections," Timothy Pershing calculates the substantial amount of aid that reached Haiti over the years. By 1975, USAID moneys to Haiti reached \$59.3 million, and by the

early 1980s aid topped \$100 million annually.<sup>10</sup> In World Bank figures, the total amount of international aid committed to Haiti from 1973 through 1981 was \$477 million.<sup>11</sup> From 1990 to 2005, the United States obligated at least \$1.47 billion in assistance to Haiti under the State Department.<sup>12</sup> American aid clearly made up the bulk of Haiti's international assistance. Pershing further delves into the United States's perspective vis-à-vis international aid, providing an overview of Washington's policy from the 1960s onwards. In 1961, Kennedy stated: "Foreign aid is a method by which the United States maintains a position of influence and control around the world and sustains a good many countries which would definitely collapse or pass into the communist block."<sup>13</sup> This policy, shaped in the Kennedy Cold War era, continued under Nixon: "Let us remember that the main purpose of aid is not to help other nations, but to help ourselves."<sup>14</sup> Pershing maintains that this has remained the mission of US foreign aid to this day; USAID's, the Inter American Development Bank's, and private NGOs' current practices are all rooted in the Cold War.<sup>15</sup> His overview of US foreign aid policy provides an external explanation for the politicization of aid.

Even today, Haitian scholars continue to reiterate the importance of the bilateral relationship. In their 2008 book, *Haiti in the Balance: Why Foreign Aid Has Failed and What We Can Do About It*, Terry F. Buss and Adam Gardner assert that the US is and has always been the largest contributor of foreign aid assistance. They argue that the composition of aid has varied greatly, depending on "US foreign policy concerns, the nature of the current Haitian government, and the humanitarian needs of the Haitian people."<sup>16</sup> Donors have recurrently suspended, delayed, reduced, and reprogrammed aid to Haiti.<sup>17</sup> The most widely recognized scholars have been in perpetual agreement as to the continuity of Haitian dependency on American aid. The literature thus illustrates how the Haitian economy is dependent not only on international aid, but also the political interests of foreign states, particularly those of the United States. However, it is insufficient to solely consider the total amount of aid contributed to understand the impact of the politicization of aid. Rather, one must examine the sector allocation of aid programs to gain a greater understanding of their effectiveness and failures. In other words, as Buss and Gardner indicate, it is crucial to understand what aid actually funded, as well as the implications of allocated aid not disbursed.<sup>18</sup>

### **Nature of Aid**

The literature emphasizes that in addition to amount, foreign agendas determine the nature of aid to Haiti by imposing development strategies whose targeted sectors and implementing agents are selected outside the country without consulting Haitians themselves. External politicized agendas have consistently determined aid allocation per sector. Catherine Maternowska is one of the most recognized experts on Haiti to explore the political dynamics of aid programs, specifically those in the family planning sector. In her book *Reproducing*

Inequities: Poverty and the Politics of Population in Haiti, Maternowska explores how the multifaceted interplay between local and global politics thwarts development initiatives, however well intentioned.<sup>19</sup> As she illustrates, Haiti's dependency on aid has thoroughly removed any say Haitians have in development programs, leaving Haiti with no power to direct its own aid funds.<sup>20</sup> Instead, "'democratic' conditions, defined by the United States, not Haitians themselves, continue to determine how aid flows to Haiti."<sup>21</sup> As Maternowska exemplifies, even President Rene Préal, a seemingly staunch defender of democracy, yielded to political pressure under the threat of losing all health care funds and forced his Ministry of Health to accept the terms of USAID's health-care plan in 1996.<sup>22</sup> The politicization of aid is so deeply entrenched and the government of Haiti so deeply dependent on foreign aid, particularly from the US, that reform not fully approved by USAID is virtually impossible. In fact, scholars such as Robert Fatton Jr. and Yasmine Shamsie collectively agree that Haitian leaders have become subordinate to the needs of international institutions, loan conditionalities and pressure from donors to adopt recommended policies to the point that they are forced to disregard citizens' demands.<sup>23</sup> Accordingly, the Haitian government is more accountable to external actors than to its citizens.

The literature agrees that foreign donors and international financial institutions have enormous influence on policy in Haiti. DeWind and Kinley show how development programs sponsored by international agencies in the 1970s failed to produce any significant economic growth, program failures which were instrumental in shaping the new development strategy of the 1980s.<sup>24</sup> They then illustrate how the new strategy, formulated by USAID and multilateral development agencies such as the World Bank and the IMF, provided the basis for foreign aid programs in Haiti from 1982 onward, concluding that the strategy "actually intensified the crisis faced by the majority of Haiti's impoverished population."<sup>25</sup> The two major components of the 1982 strategy include the privatization of aid and a focus on export-oriented development, both of which will be reviewed in more depth in the subsequent sections of the literature review.

### **Aid Effectiveness**

Scholars have addressed how the politicization of aid has significantly impacted the effectiveness of aid programs in Haiti, in addition to determining the amount and nature of aid received. According to Maternowska, for instance, the politicization of aid has resulted in enormous tension between Haitian nationals and the international donor community.<sup>26</sup> Maternowska's interviews show how rare it is for Haitians to be consulted on matters that concern them, claiming that foreigners "don't understand [their] problems and [yet they] try to resolve them."<sup>27</sup> The failure to involve Haitians in foreign aid interventions has filled Haitians with resentment, severely impacting their willingness to participate in "exogenous, American-imposed" programs, despite being designed to help them.<sup>28</sup> As Maternowska explains, Haitians have lost control over

project design and other crucial program aspects.<sup>29</sup> Programs instead reflect the agendas instituted through NGOs funded by USAID, largely designed by American consultants, and “reinforce the antidemocratic structures that Haiti has shouldered for hundreds of years.”<sup>30</sup> DeWind and Kinley also question whether or not Haitians would have adopted the same solutions proposed by external actors had they been governed democratically.<sup>31</sup>

Maternowska’s work is reflected in other scholars’ observations and analyses of Haiti as well, including Leah Reesor’s recent graduate thesis, “Community-Based Organizations and Local Governance in Rural Haiti.” Reesor attributes the resentment felt among Haitians towards foreigners not only to the never-ending presence of development workers, but also to the long history of foreign intervention – French colonial rule and American occupation – resulting in the association of whites with control over power, money, and resources.<sup>32</sup> Maternowska contributed to a Ministry of Health paper suggesting improved methods of accountability and evaluation; however, her ideas were rejected because “some form of control by Haitians within the ministry would not be well perceived by USAID and could threaten the future of all public programs.”<sup>33</sup> Maternowska and Reesor thus illustrate how entrenched politicization impedes the effectiveness of aid programs by damaging Haitian relations with the foreign actors, harming the reception of aid, and by impeding positive reform that goes against foreign interests, particularly those of the United States.

#### Privatization of Aid

In addition to the politicization of aid, the literature largely considers the privatization of aid to be one of Haiti’s greatest challenges to development. The policy of privatization, defined by Mark Schuller as “donor shifts within neoliberal globalization whereby NGOs are the preferred targets of public development aid,” rather than the government, illustrates the failure of donors to prioritize politics and governance.<sup>34</sup> In fact, according to Buss and Gardner, “donors funded just about everything in Haiti except democratization, governance, and public sector reform, yet these were key because they determine the effectiveness of all the rest.”<sup>35</sup>

#### Origins and Overview of Privatization

It is emphasized throughout the literature that the phenomenon of privatization is an undeniably colossal driver of underdevelopment. According to renowned Haitian scholar Alex Dupuy, the Haitian state “long ago abdicated its responsibilities to the majority of Haitian citizens” deferring the provision of services to bilateral and multilateral aid donors and NGOs.<sup>36</sup> Unfortunately, as DeWind and Kinley illustrate, when the United States and other donors reinstated aid after the inauguration of Jean-Claude Duvalier, they overestimated the capacity of the Haitian government to conduct economic development programs.<sup>37</sup> The resulting failure of aid in the 1970s fundamentally drove the 1982 development strategy and shaped the emphasis on privatization of aid that

remains entrenched in foreign aid programs today. As Maguire explains, donors sought to substitute for the inefficient and corrupt government and to influence their program priorities through privatization.<sup>38</sup>

The US thus mandated that USAID assistance be provided through private and voluntary organizations (PVOs) in order to bypass the ineffective Haitian government agencies and to emphasize grassroots development.<sup>39</sup> The USAID mission director, Hobgood, predicted that strengthening the private sector would eventually allow it to assert its own demands for governmental reform.<sup>40</sup> Hobgood expressed his belief that “economic pluralism [would] lead the way to political pluralism.”<sup>41</sup> The US has accordingly channeled its funds primarily through the private sector, providing strong support for private projects with high economic returns and relatively less emphasis on public expenditures.<sup>42</sup> As early as 1988 DeWind and Kinley criticized privatization, attributing the failure of the 1982 development strategy partly to PVOs’ ineffectiveness in implementing development programs.<sup>43</sup> Yet since the 1995 passage of the Dole Amendment, USAID has been prevented from providing direct financing to the Haitian government.<sup>44</sup>

As Buss and Gardner illustrate, the public sector has been a constant problem in the management of aid programs.<sup>45</sup> In fact, the Haitian government’s corruption, its abandonment of rural regions and provincial capitals, or exploitation of those areas contribute to the consolidation and entrapment of developmental aid, in both infrastructural projects and financing. Pershing labels this as a “known Haitian particularism.”<sup>46</sup> The Haitian government, with its small size and limited capacity, has played a very limited role in either providing social services or in taking ownership of programs funded through foreign assistance.<sup>47</sup>

#### Failures of Privatization

The literature delves into numerous limitations and failures of privatization, illustrating how the international community’s efforts to provide aid to Haiti by strengthening the private sector have failed in a myriad of ways. As Maguire argues, little international investment was made outside of Port-au-Prince. The concentration of aid in the capital, particularly in the factory zone, exacerbates the urban bias.<sup>48</sup> Pershing and Shamsie also address the entrapment of development aid in Port-au-Prince, which marginalizes the rural poor and prevents foreign assistance from targeting the most impoverished.<sup>49</sup> Contrary to this evidence, USAID argued that funding NGOs directly would reduce the tendency for funds to remain in the capital.<sup>50</sup>

Academics additionally argue that development aid has increased the marginalization of not only the rural poor vis-à-vis the urban population, but also of Haitian vis-à-vis international NGOs.<sup>51</sup> Haitian NGOs have had great difficulty in obtaining legal status. As such, many grassroots organizations are unable to secure funds from governmental and intergovernmental organizations.<sup>52</sup> Haitians continue to see the state as a predator, further diminishing their desire to

proactively register through the Haiti's legal framework.<sup>53</sup>

Perhaps the most widely emphasized drawback of the privatization of aid by scholars is the loss of Haitian institutional capacity building. Maternowska addresses the failure of the government to effectively provide healthcare for its population, blaming the privatization of healthcare through PVOs for increasingly removing control from Haitian public health officials and "leaving the public sector with almost no resources."<sup>54</sup> According to Maternowska, in addition to the loss of state capacity building, privatization has isolated aid programs and made development interventions ineffective since development programs cannot be isolated from other sectors.<sup>55</sup>

### **Failures of NGOs**

According to Edmonds, Haiti has the most privatized social-service sector in the Americas, with 80% of basic services being provided through the private sector by NGOs.<sup>56</sup> Haiti is also the country with the greatest number of NGOs per capita in the world; as such, it is commonly referred to as a "Republic of NGOs."<sup>57</sup> Academics such as Reesor and Schuller address both the positive and the negative impacts of NGOs. Most importantly, a myriad of community development initiatives have been made possible by the support of foreign NGOs.<sup>58</sup> Reesor describes the foreign NGOs in Haiti as essential in filling in the gaps by providing access to education, healthcare, potable water, humanitarian aid, and other basic needs.<sup>59</sup> Furthermore, in rural Haiti where state involvement in such initiatives is virtually non-existent, "the fastest and likeliest way of securing funds for development projects is through applying for grants from foreign development NGOs."<sup>60</sup> Schuller similarly characterizes and praises NGOs for "filling in the gaps" by providing invaluable alternatives to the state while Nicholls brings forth the potential for NGOs to benefit local political participation by sponsoring local groups and bringing people together in rural areas.<sup>61</sup>

On the other hand, Reesor acknowledges drawbacks such as the limited funding the organizations can provide and the dependency on multiple donors to set development priorities; while local grassroots initiatives are able to secure resources thanks to foreign assistance they are simultaneously dependent on foreign funding and interests.<sup>62</sup> Haitians know that seeking funds from a foreign NGO is more efficient and accessible than seeking government assistance, proving that public sector development must be prioritized.<sup>63</sup> Schuller makes a similar point, stating that NGOs are only intermediaries that identify with foreigners and not with Haitians themselves.<sup>64</sup>

The vast majority of scholars agree that the ability of NGOs to bring about a long-term transformation in Haitian development is limited. Lack of transparency, accountability, and the failure to decrease corruption are three of the most cited criticisms of NGOs by both Haitian and other academics, as charitable, non-governmental, and private donations are not normally reported

and are difficult to track and account for.<sup>65</sup> Schuller adds that NGOs directly undermine states through hiring practices that attract the state's human capacity by providing higher salaries.<sup>66</sup> At the same time, NGOs are incapable of filling all the gaps created by the absence of the state, failing to target national highways and trash pickup in many areas.<sup>67</sup> Since NGOs do not have a public mandate, but continue to undermine the state's ability to govern, "Haiti's biggest problem is that the tail is wagging the dog" when it comes to foreign aid.<sup>68</sup> Schuller also argues that NGOs accentuate inequalities created in the neoliberal system, for instance by inflating housing prices in the capital, privileging NGO employees, supporting existing hierarchies and exclusions, and further stratifying the Haitian population.<sup>69</sup> Shamsie similarly states that "it would be overly optimistic to presume that the poorest Haitians, many of whom make their living in the informal sector or in rural areas, would inevitably benefit from a more robust formal private sector."<sup>70</sup>

Despite the undeniable importance of NGOs as "gap-fillers," Schuller draws attention to the distrust and negative views shared by Haitians vis-à-vis foreign organizations.<sup>71</sup> Haitians describe NGOs as "tools of imperialism and harbingers of globalization," a view that crosscuts different political groups throughout Haiti.<sup>72</sup> The distrust is even structured into Haiti's regulatory documents for NGOs, which aim to "protect national sovereignty" and stipulate that NGOs be "apolitical and that they have resources."<sup>73</sup>

#### Policy Prescriptions

Some of the literature on aid effectiveness in the developing world written in the last decade interestingly mirrors the policy prescriptions formulated for Haiti by USAID and multilateral donors in 1982. Stephen Knack, a Lead Economist in the World Bank's Research Department and Public Sector Governance Department, recently addressed the impact of aid on governance and on public sector capacity and accountability. In his work, Knack provides evidence through cross-country empirical tests proving that higher aid levels erode the quality of governance, as measured by indices of bureaucratic quality, corruption, and the rule of law.<sup>74</sup> Knack does not argue against foreign aid entirely. Instead, he presents a multitude of potential policy prescriptions to target the negative impacts of aid. He suggests that donors attempt to depoliticize the distribution of rents from aid funds by directly providing aid to small businesses in the form of microenterprise loans.<sup>75</sup> Knack postulates that building up the private sector would ultimately improve government accountability by increasing the local demand for good governance.<sup>76</sup> He concludes that external donors need to develop less intrusive ways of engaging in public sector reform in developing countries in order to avoid conflict over the control of aid funds, rent-seeking and corruption, and to avoid alleviating pressures to reform inefficient policies and institutions.<sup>77</sup>

Knack's prescription to direct aid towards the private sector as a means

of increasing local demand for good governance and increasing government accountability clearly mirrors the development strategy formulated for Haiti decades earlier. However, as DeWind and Kinley illustrate, that strategy failed to improve the conditions of poverty in Haiti. Thus arises a dichotomy in the literature between academic publications on aid effectiveness in developing countries generally and works on aid effectiveness in Haiti specifically.

Current academic policy prescriptions principally address issues of governance and public sector weaknesses as priorities to increase foreign aid effectiveness in Haiti. However, there is some variation between academics as to how to prioritize state capacity building. Scholarly explanations for the failure of foreign aid to Haiti written in the 80s and 90s reflect the most recent academic works on the subject. Buss and Gardner, who share DeWind and Kinley's 1988 conclusions, explore the effects of the politicization of aid to Haiti and ultimately advocate for prioritizing financial and bureaucratic management and battling corruption over privatization.<sup>78</sup> Maguire also argues that "strengthening the government's capacity is key," and that it is equally important to provide opportunities to rebuild neglected rural economies, emphasizing local rural development.<sup>79</sup> Pershing states that international development initiatives ought to focus on improving the capabilities of local government, particularly in the sectors of infrastructure and services.<sup>80</sup> Reesor emphasizes the decentralization of the Haitian state, arguing that space needs to be created for the articulation of local development priorities of both women and men in rural Haiti in order to bring marginalized "outsiders" into the development process.<sup>81</sup> Her prescription is in line with Pershing's, emphasizing local government specifically rather than general state capacity building and anti-corruption initiatives at the national level as argued by Buss and Gardner. On the other hand, Maternowska advises for the creation of subcommittees within the government to oversee projects implemented by USAID, improve coordination, increase project accountability, and avoid replication of services.<sup>82</sup> Regardless, the general focus on governance and state capacity building illustrates an apparent lack of evolution of policy prescriptions in the literature, further exemplifying the failure of external development aid to Haiti. As Concannon argues, Haiti's lack of infrastructure and history of corruption are reasons to invest in infrastructure and good governance, not to bypass the government.<sup>83</sup>

Edmonds argues that paternalistic aid to Haiti is ongoing and little the norms of NGO-led development have changed little.<sup>84</sup> Scholars criticize donor conferences today for failing to work with popular Haitian organizations, and for criticizing the Haitian government's lack of transparency while NGOs equally need to increase their transparency.<sup>85</sup> Instead, the bulk of the academic literature argues that "the international community must concentrate its resources on building a coherent and functioning state" by developing a large and effective public bureaucracy through which to eventually channel foreign assistance,

without fully abandoning NGOs.<sup>86</sup> As Fatton explains, while NGOs might offer some needed relief, “only the state can provide collective protection and create the conditions for self-sustaining growth.”<sup>87</sup> Similarly, in his literature review on enhancing public sector capacity, Boesen concludes that it is widely-recognized that NGOs can only have a limited impact. As such, aid agencies that recognize their limitations can identify local opportunities, act as mediators and connectors, and provide “non-intrusive financial or technical support.”<sup>88</sup>

### **Export-Oriented Development**

The export-oriented economic development strategy formulated by USAID, the World Bank, the IMF, and the Inter-American Development Bank in 1981 and 1982 has guided economic development programs in Haiti and continues to be a pillar of post-conflict reconstruction today.<sup>89</sup> According to DeWind and Kinley, the strategy was “designed to increase Haiti’s integration into the international economy, particularly into US markets,” thus reorienting Haiti’s resources toward producing goods for export and away from the nation’s domestic market.<sup>90</sup> This export-oriented strategy is widely criticized throughout the literature.

USAID officials believed that such a strategy would “stimulate an expansion of labor-intensive export industries.”<sup>91</sup> However, DeWind and Kinley explain that instead, as Haitians began to produce goods intended for consumption in the United States rather than in Haiti, food and other basic products were increasingly imported. As such the Haitian economy became more dependent on the United States.<sup>92</sup> The policy proposal, criticized by scholars such as Pershing, Shamsie, Fatton, DeWind and Kinley, also explicitly stated that less emphasis should be placed on social objectives in order to prioritize exports.<sup>93</sup> The development strategy focused on increasing investments in the production of goods to be sold and consumed abroad rather than on improvements in health, education, and rural development programs, further directing aid away from the public sector.<sup>94</sup> The World Bank even cited government programs that supported education, health and small farms as “examples of misdirected social objectives.”<sup>95</sup>

According to Pershing, the policies that ensued induced farmers to leave their land in favor of larger agribusiness, encouraging massive rural to urban migration and overpopulating the main cities.<sup>96</sup> USAID anticipated the migration, stating that “even if the transition to export agriculture is successful, AID anticipates a ‘massive’ displacement of peasant farmers and migration to urban centers.”<sup>97</sup> Furthermore, DeWind and Kinley correctly postulated that export-led growth would increase rather than decrease the migration flow from Haiti to the United States.<sup>98</sup> Shamsie is equally critical of the strategy, claiming that it is not inherently pro-poor and thus does not have an observable effect on poverty.<sup>99</sup> Shamsie argues that export-oriented growth would need to directly improve the rural sector, in which the poorest Haitians live and work, in order to address the urban bias of the strategy and to affect poverty reduction.<sup>100</sup> Fatton

contends that instead of continuing with export-oriented growth, Haiti ought to revise its neo-liberal policies and protect and reinvigorate domestic production in order to satisfy basic needs, support rural development, and prevent extreme class and regional inequalities from increasing further.<sup>101</sup>

### **The Importance of Aid**

The bulk of the literature evaluating aid to Haiti condemns foreign assistance as a perpetuator of underdevelopment. Regardless, scholars acknowledge the importance of international development aid for Haiti by virtue of its dependency, which raises the question of whether aid has any merit. The importance of aid can be seen throughout the literature as scholars provide a myriad of cases in which Haiti would have been worse off without international assistance.

Several examples demonstrate that an ineffective government combined with the absence of foreign aid severely impedes economic development. Trouillot notes, for instance, that Haiti's "economy was in decline from 1946-56, that the dependence on agriculture remained as strong as ever, that no industrialization took place, and that all the large 'achievements' of the decade were products of foreign aid."<sup>102</sup> Martin explains how President Aristide was motivated to conclude successful negotiations with the US in 1993 by their promise to lift sanctions, mobilize financial aid, and ultimately provide international assistance to "professionalize the military, establish a separate civilian police force, and reform other institutions."<sup>103</sup> Bevan further states that no economic progress was achieved in 1997 due to the absence of a prime minister, a lame duck government, and the lack of foreign aid as the US had failed to privatize the main state enterprises.<sup>104</sup> Finally, Jamieson illustrates how the suspension of aid by the US and the EU in 2000 brought about the collapse of the government, as Haiti had received twice its government's annual budget in foreign aid throughout the mid-1990s.<sup>105</sup>

While international aid is undoubtedly important to Haiti, the literature still asserts that dependency on foreign aid has perpetuated and intensified Haitian underdevelopment. Buss and Gardner even argue that "it is unlikely that any amount spent [on foreign aid] would have yielded better results."<sup>106</sup> The literature abounds with examples illustrating the importance of aid, showing that Haiti today would likely become worse off should all aid be suddenly curtailed. Ultimately, however, the same examples illustrate Haiti's dependency on foreign assistance rather than the benefits of that aid for Haiti's long-term development. As Pershing notes, internationally supported interventions that have had a "decidedly healthy long-term effect on the quality of democracy in Haiti" are hard to find.<sup>107</sup>

### **Conclusion**

The literature universally concludes that a shortage of aid to Haiti is not the issue; rather, it is the manner in which the money has been spent. Moreover, academics agree that "international cooperation has had two basic shortcomings:

no impact and no sustainability.”<sup>108</sup> Yet while this literature review has sought to comprehend what scholars deem to be the main failures of external actors in providing aid to Haiti, it is important to note that the failure of international aid is also attributable to internal factors. Scholars cited throughout this paper have all addressed the importance of Haiti’s political history, the legacy of poor public management, corruption, a lack of security, and the general shortcomings of the Haitian government as some of the additional causes of Haitian underdevelopment and widespread poverty.<sup>109</sup> These internal factors have all contributed to the diversion of resources from those genuinely in need.<sup>110</sup> In fact, scholars state that donors also emphasize the importance of internal factors in addition to the external. As illustrated by Buss and Gardner, many donors agree that the main drivers of failure are government incapacity, lack of government support for programs funded by foreign assistance, dissension between president and parliament, and aid dependency.<sup>111</sup>

Much of the academic policy prescriptions today target both privatization and export-oriented development; indeed, many view these two factors as the most important targets in aid interventions. However, policy prescriptions fail to address the politicization of aid. Scholars are quick to turn to politicization as one of the main explanations for the failure of aid to lift Haiti out of poverty, yet few have made concrete recommendations to address the issue. Perhaps this is due to the difficulty of affecting change where the interests of foreign governments are paramount. As stated by Buss and Gardner, “in democratic countries, foreign assistance is always vulnerable to changing foreign policy priorities, and there is no way to eliminate this risk.”<sup>112</sup> Multilateral organizations that are controlled by their member nations, who also fund the organizations, are equally susceptible to the politicization of aid.<sup>113</sup> Ultimately, the literature concludes that “it is only in relation to the state that [Haitians can] become citizens with the right to participation in local governance and development, as well as the right to demand accountability.”<sup>114</sup>

While there is an extremely large body of literature on this topic, the most important scholars whose contributions are widely recognized are also consistently cited throughout the literature. These academics have spent numerous years in Haiti itself, providing access to foreign actors and interviews with Haitians in Haiti and in the diaspora. The scholarship thus provides a window into both the internal and external perspectives. What remains to be explored are the views of actors within the Haitian government with respect to state capacity building and development.

Endotes

<sup>1</sup> Robert Maguire et al., “Haiti Held Hostage: International Responses to the Quest for Nationhood 1986-1996.” (occasional paper #23, Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies, 1996), 20, <http://www.watsoninstitute.org/pub/op23.pdf>; “Robert Maguire,” United States Institute for Peace, last modified 2010, <http://www.usip.org/experts/robert-maguire>.

<sup>2</sup> Michel-Rolph Trouillot, *Haiti: State Against Nation, The Origins and Legacy of Duvalierism* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1990).

<sup>3</sup> Josh De Wind, and David H. Kinley, *Aiding Migration: The Impact of International Development Assistance on Haiti* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988), 40.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>7</sup> De Wind and Kinley, *Aiding Migration*, 150-51; Mats Lundahl, “History as an Obstacle to Change: The Case of Haiti,” in “Latin America at the Crossroads: Major Public Policy Issues,” special issue, *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 31, no.1/2 (Spring-Summer 1989): 4, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/165908>.

<sup>8</sup> Maguire, “Haiti Held Hostage,” 21; Terry F. Buss, and Adam Gardner, *Haiti in the Balance: Why Foreign Aid Has Failed and What We Can Do About It* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2008),76; Timothy J. Pershing, “The Impact of International Intervention on Democratic Development: Haiti and the 2005/2006 Elections.” (PhD diss., Brandeis University, 2010), 91.

<sup>9</sup> De Wind and Kinley, *Aiding Migration*, 28.

<sup>10</sup> Pershing, “International Intervention,” 113.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, 51.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, 111.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, 112.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, 72, 113.

<sup>16</sup> Buss and Gardner, *Haiti in the Balance*, 51.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, 67.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>19</sup> “Reproducing Inequities,” last modified 2010, <http://web.mac.com/owl50/iWeb/Site/Reproducing%20Inequities.html>.

<sup>20</sup> Catherine Maternowska, *Reproducing Inequalities: Poverty and the Politics of Population in Haiti* (Piscataway, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2006), 141.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, 143.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, 134.

<sup>23</sup> Leah Reesor, “Bringing the Outsiders In: Community-Based Organizations

and Local Governance in Rural Haiti.” (Master’s diss., York University, 2010), 73-74.

<sup>24</sup> DeWind and Kinley, *Aiding Migration*, 38.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, 40, xiv.

<sup>26</sup> Maternowska, *Reproducing Inequalities*, 146.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, 146.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, 147.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, 148.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, 150, 154.

<sup>31</sup> DeWind and Kinley, *Aiding Migration*, 37.

<sup>32</sup> Reesor, “Bringing the Outsiders In,” 28-29.

<sup>33</sup> Maternowska, *Reproducing Inequalities*, 146.

<sup>34</sup> Mark Schuller, “Gluing Globalization: NGOs as Intermediaries in Haiti,” *Political and Legal Anthropology Review* 32, no.1 (2009): 86, doi: 10.1111/j.1555-2934.2009.01025.x.

<sup>35</sup> Buss and Gardner, *Haiti in the Balance*, 6.

<sup>36</sup> Alex Dupuy, “Beyond the Earthquake: A Wake-Up Call for Haiti,” SSRC, January 2010, <http://www.ssrc.org/features/pages/haiti-now-and-next/1338/1339/>.

<sup>37</sup> DeWind and Kinley, *Aiding Migration*, 40.

<sup>38</sup> Maguire, “Haiti Held Hostage,” 21.

<sup>39</sup> DeWind and Kinley, *Aiding Migration*, 35.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, 36.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, 35.

<sup>42</sup> Pershing, “International Intervention,” 73.

<sup>43</sup> DeWind and Kinley, *Aiding Migration*, 37.

<sup>44</sup> Mark Schuller, “Invasion or Infusion? Understanding the Role of NGOs in Contemporary Haiti,” *The Journal of Haitian Studies* 13, no.2 (2007): 100, <http://www.potomitan.net/downloads/Schuller-Invasion-or-Infusion.pdf>.

<sup>45</sup> Buss and Gardner, *Haiti in the Balance*, 94.

<sup>46</sup> Pershing, “International Intervention,” 51-52.

<sup>47</sup> Buss and Gardner, *Haiti in the Balance*, 94.

<sup>48</sup> Maguire, “Haiti Held Hostage,” 25.

<sup>49</sup> Pershing, “International Intervention,” 51-52; Yasmine Shamsie, “Haiti: Appraising Two Rounds of Peacebuilding Using a Poverty Reduction Lens,” *Civil Wars* 10, no.4 (2008): 423, doi: 10.1080/13698240802354490.

<sup>50</sup> Maternowska, *Reproducing Inequalities*, 144.

<sup>51</sup> Maguire, “Haiti Held Hostage,” 24.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>54</sup> Maternowska, *Reproducing Inequalities*, 142.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*, 144.

- <sup>56</sup> Kevin Edmonds, “NGOs and the Business of Poverty in Haiti,” NACLA, April 2010, <https://nacla.org/node/6501>.
- <sup>57</sup> Maguire, “Haiti Held Hostage,” 22.
- <sup>58</sup> Reesor, “Bringing the Outsiders In,” 51-52.
- <sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, 75.
- <sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, 52.
- <sup>61</sup> Schuller, “Gluing Globalization,” 97; David Nicholls, “Review,” *Journal of Latin American Studies* 28, no.3 (October 1996): 722, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/157727>.
- <sup>62</sup> Reesor, “Bringing the Outsiders In,” 61.
- <sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*, 62-63.
- <sup>64</sup> Schuller, “Gluing Globalization,” 97.
- <sup>65</sup> Buss and Gardner, *Haiti in the Balance*, 49.
- <sup>66</sup> Schuller, “Gluing Globalization,” 97.
- <sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*, 87.
- <sup>68</sup> Schuller, “Invasion or Infusion,” 99.
- <sup>69</sup> Schuller, “Gluing Globalization,” 87, 92-93, 95.
- <sup>70</sup> Shamsie, “Haiti,” 423.
- <sup>71</sup> Schuller, “Invasion or Infusion,” 98.
- <sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*, 100.
- <sup>73</sup> *Ibid.*, 98.
- <sup>74</sup> Stephen Knack, “Aid Dependence and the Quality of Governance: Cross-Country Empirical Tests,” *Southern Economic Journal* 68, no.2 (October 2001): 310, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1061596>.
- <sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*, 327.
- <sup>77</sup> *Ibid.*, 310.
- <sup>78</sup> Buss and Gardner, *Haiti in the Balance*, 6.
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- <sup>81</sup> Reesor, “Bringing the Outsiders In,” 79.
- <sup>82</sup> Maternowska, *Reproducing Inequalities*, 146.
- <sup>83</sup> Brian Concannon Jr., “The Help That Haiti Needs.”
- <sup>84</sup> Edmonds, “Business of Poverty.”
- <sup>85</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>86</sup> Robert Fatton Jr., “Help That Haiti Needs.”
- <sup>87</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>88</sup> Nils Boesen, “Enhancing Public Sector Capacity – What Works, What Doesn’t, and Why?” January 2004, [http://www.nilsboesen.dk/uploads/docs/Review\\_of\\_](http://www.nilsboesen.dk/uploads/docs/Review_of_)

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<sup>89</sup> DeWind and Kinley, *Aiding Migration*, 35; Shamsie, "Haiti," 72.

<sup>90</sup> DeWind and Kinley, *Aiding Migration*, 35.

<sup>91</sup> *Ibid.*, 36.

<sup>92</sup> *Ibid.*, 35.

<sup>93</sup> Pershing, "International Intervention," 73.

<sup>94</sup> DeWind and Kinley, *Aiding Migration*, 37.

<sup>95</sup> Pershing, "International Intervention," 73.

<sup>96</sup> *Ibid.*, 72.

<sup>97</sup> *Ibid.*, 73.

<sup>98</sup> DeWind and Kinley, *Aiding Migration*, 37.

<sup>99</sup> Shamsie, "Haiti," 423.

<sup>100</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>101</sup> Fatton, "Help That Haiti Needs."

<sup>102</sup> Lundahl, "Obstacle to Change," 414.

<sup>103</sup> Ian Martin, "Haiti: International Force or National Compromise?" *Journal of Latin American Studies* 31, no.3 (October 1999):716, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/157817>.

<sup>104</sup> John Bevan, "Review," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 31, no. 1 (February 1999): 225, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/157763>.

<sup>105</sup> Jamieson, "Duties to the Distant: Aid, Assistance, and Intervention in the Developing World," *The Journal of Ethics* 9, no.1/2 (2005), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25115819>.

<sup>106</sup> Buss and Gardner, *Haiti in the Balance*, 67.

<sup>107</sup> Pershing, "International Intervention," 295.

<sup>108</sup> Maguire, "Haiti Held Hostage," 25.

<sup>109</sup> Buss and Gardner, *Haiti in the Balance*, 19.

<sup>110</sup> DeWind and Kinley, *Aiding Migration*, 37.

<sup>111</sup> Buss and Gardner, *Haiti in the Balance*, 89.

<sup>112</sup> *Ibid.*, 85.

<sup>113</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>114</sup> Reesor, "Bringing the Outsiders In," 75.



# INEQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY:

*The Failure of Public Policy on Education  
in India*

**Nicholas Intscher**

## **I. INTRODUCTION**

On the eve of independence in India, Jawaharlal Nehru spoke of the essential task of ending 'inequality of opportunity'.<sup>i</sup> Sixty years later, education opportunity inequality continues as one of India's most prominent problems. The state plays an essential role in shaping the structure of opportunities in a country, and the provision of education is central to this role.<sup>ii</sup> This paper will not seek to demonstrate the importance of education in creating equitable societies, as this has been argued extensively elsewhere. This paper takes this as an assumption and will instead restrict itself to analyzing the role of public policy in India, and whether it fosters or hinders equity within the education system.

Since independence, the government of India has pursued policies on education that revolve around two main themes: the expansion of primary education, and affirmative action of disadvantaged groups. These policies have aimed to improve the opportunities of the disadvantaged by extending educational opportunities to all. This paper argues that these policies have failed to address the inequalities of opportunity in education and that these failures have been caused by fundamental flaws in their implementation. Thus the persistence of inequality of opportunity is, at least in part, due to the failure of the government to end the inequity of education.

To do this, the paper will be divided in the following way. Section II will examine the expansion of public primary education. This section will demonstrate that the policy has failed to achieve results because of the poor quality of education provided through the public stream. The problem of quality is found to be the result of two fundamental flaws in the implementation of the policy: lack of coordination between state and central governments, and the political strength of teachers in shaping education policies. Section III will take a close look at the policy of affirmative action. This paper will argue that the failure of this policy relates to the selection of caste as the sole indicator of eligibility for affirmative action. Finally, section IV will sum up the findings and will offer suggestions for the way forward.

## **II. EXPANSION OF PRIMARY EDUCATION**

The policy of expanding primary education has attempted to spread the access of education in India. Although access to public primary education has increased since independence, it has failed to make primary education a universal right in India. This section of the paper will demonstrate how the expansion of public primary education has failed to improve the options of the disadvantaged, arguing that the failure is a result of two fundamental implementation problems: a lack of coordination between state and

central governments, and the lobbying power of teachers in shaping educational policy.

### **Extent of the Expansion**

Since independence, the government of India has repeatedly set the goal of providing universal primary education for its citizens.<sup>iii</sup> By 1993, 94 per cent of India's rural population lived within 1 kilometer of a primary school.<sup>iv</sup> This clearly shows an expansion of primary education access since political independence.

However, this expansion has not reached the intended 'universal' level. Although many reports show 100 per cent enrolment rates for primary age children,<sup>v</sup> the actual rate is considerably lower than this. Enrolment levels are deceptively high for a number of reasons. First, the phenomenon of dual enrolment skews numbers. Many children are enrolled in both public and private schools.<sup>vi</sup> Enrolment in the public school is used to gain such benefits as mid-day meals, while the actual learning is done at private schools. Furthermore, despite being enrolled in a school, many children do not attend classes regularly.<sup>vii</sup> These phenomena create the illusion of universal enrolment, with enrolment rates sometimes even exceeding 100 per cent.<sup>viii</sup> New studies estimate between 10 per cent and 60 per cent of school age children in various states are not attending school – the former estimate reserved for the educationally progressive states such as Kerala, and the latter for the less progressive, such as Bihar.<sup>ix</sup> Primary education policies in India have clearly not achieved the 'universal' level they pursue.

The state of public expenditure on education has followed a similar path – increasing but not reaching its goal. From 1968 onwards, the National Policy on Education called for the ratio of public expenditure on education to GDP to be raised to 6 per cent in order to achieve the goal of universal education.<sup>x</sup> However this level of expenditure has never been achieved. The peak of government spending occurred in 1989. The rate was only 4.4 per cent and by the late 1990s this rate had fallen to 3.6 per cent.<sup>xi</sup>

### **Quality of Expansion**

Despite significant expansion in primary education, there have been only limited returns in terms of improving education. For example, India's literacy rate, although much higher than the mere 18.4 per cent it recorded in 1951,<sup>xii</sup> remains only 65.2 per cent. This translates into 350 million people in India not being able to read or write.<sup>xiii</sup> Despite a much higher economic growth rate and average income, India's literacy rate is actually on par with sub-Saharan Africa.<sup>xiv</sup> Furthermore, "less than half of all children aged 15-19 had completed the upper primary cycle in 1998-9."<sup>xv</sup> The terrible quality of public schooling in India is a major factor in impeding primary education growth.<sup>xvi</sup> In 2003, the Oxfam Education Report stated with regards to India, "There is no doubting

the appalling standard of provision in public education systems.”<sup>xvii</sup> Several factors contribute to this poor quality of education: poor quality of teaching, poor infrastructure, and high student-teacher ratio (STR).

The quality of teaching is the first and foremost issue. Hanushek argues that quality of schooling in developing countries has a far stronger impact on developing human capital than does the quantity of schooling. And according to him, nothing dictates the quality of schooling more than the quality of teachers.<sup>xviii</sup> In India, poor teaching quality manifests itself in two ways; the first being teacher apathy. The public stream is plagued with high levels of teacher absenteeism. In two prominent surveys, both from 2005,<sup>xix</sup> the rate of teacher absenteeism in public schools was found to be 25 per cent.<sup>xx</sup> Moreover, those teachers who are in fact present tend to be inefficient or not actively teaching. Kremer et al. found that, out of those teachers who were present on any given day, only about half were actually teaching.<sup>xxi</sup> These results illustrate extreme teacher apathy across the public system.

The problem of para-teachers is another contributor to the poor quality of teaching. Para-teachers have emerged as a common phenomenon in Indian public schools. Unlike in many western countries, Indian para-teachers are not in fact aids to regular teachers.<sup>xxii</sup> They perform the same tasks as regular teachers, often working alongside them.<sup>xxiii</sup> The difference lies in their lower qualifications and pay.<sup>xxiv</sup> Although generally well educated, para-teachers are subject to less or no training prior to teaching.<sup>xxv</sup> Students taught by para-teachers are at a disadvantage. Therefore the change from teacher to para-teacher may not simply represent a change in title, but a divide in teaching quality as well. Their greater presence in public schools further contributes to the problem of teaching quality among these institutions.<sup>xxvii</sup>

The second contributing factor in public school quality considers material inputs and infrastructure. Studies in developing countries have found that basic material inputs play a strong determining role in student achievement.<sup>xxviii</sup> Unfortunately in India, primary education is significantly underfunded in this sense. The 1996 Public Report on Education reported serious deficiencies in various important materials and infrastructure in primary schools across northern India.<sup>xxix</sup> Dreze and Sen report that public schools have “endemic shortages of basic teaching aids as well as dilapidated buildings and lack of essential facilities such as water.”<sup>xxx</sup> More recently, donor assistance programs have made tangible improvements to school infrastructure at the primary level. However there still remains significant room for improvement, as many primary schools across India remain without important resources.<sup>xxxi</sup> Therefore deficiencies of infrastructure and material inputs, although improving, continue to impede the quality of public primary education,

especially in public schools.

Third, the issue of student teacher ratios (STR) continues to provide a challenge to public school quality. In 1956 the average STR in primary schools was 36. Forty years later, in 1996, this ratio had climbed to 50, with an average of 83 pupils in each classroom.<sup>xxxii</sup> Although STRs in primary schools in general are high, once again the situation is even worse in the public system. In his study on schools in Hyderabad, Tooley et al. reported an STR in public schools nearly doubling that of private schools.<sup>xxxiii</sup>

Although the government has expanded options for education at the primary level, the overall improvements to education have not been significant. Public schools are hindered due to the poor quality of teaching, poor material inputs, and high student-teacher ratios. Nonetheless, they continue to be the only option for many children in India. Hanushek aptly argues, “simply attempting to expand access and attainment, say through starting a large number of low-quality schools, will be self-defeating to the extent that there is a direct reaction to the low quality that affects the actual attainment results.”<sup>xxxiv</sup> This quote, although intended for the developing world in general, describes the central flaw in the expansion of primary education in India. The focus so far has been on quantity, and in this they have succeeded. Conversely, issues of quality have been ignored and policies have suffered.

### **Sources of Failure of Expansion**

This section will explain causal mechanisms in the failed primary education expansion. Two factors have contributed to its failure: First, the lack of coordination between state and central governments and; second, the political strength of teachers. First, the lack of coordination between the state and central governments keeps public funding from reaching its goals. According to the Indian constitution, both the state and central governments have the ability to pass legislation regarding education.<sup>xxxv</sup> This enables different approaches to funding at each level of government. Thus, as the central government has called for the expansion of schooling facilities, most state governments have actually reduced their share of public expenditure on education in an attempt to improve fiscal discipline.<sup>xxxvi</sup>

Even if the central government increases its expenditure on education, the overall level of expenditure may fall, depending on the behaviour of state governments. This has limited the capabilities of the central government to pursue its policy of expanding primary education.

Second, the political influence of teachers in India has been the single most important factor in explaining the poor quality of public education. Their political strength is the root of two significant problems with the public system: high teacher

salaries and the lack of teacher accountability. Teachers in India are a large and politically active segment of society, and they have successfully influenced legislation regarding education. For example Kingdom and Muzammil explain that the legislation related to education in Uttar Pradesh (UP) “has often been framed under immense lobbying pressure from teachers”.<sup>xxxvii</sup> Teachers unions, similar to other trade unions in India, emerged in the 1920s in response to the poor working conditions under the British.<sup>xxxviii</sup> Since the 1960s, they have been a prominent force and have used frequent strikes and ‘agitations’ to advance their demands to the state and central governments.<sup>xxxix</sup> However, rather than being a movement strictly from below, teachers have managed to penetrate the state governments of India and gain significant representation in both the upper and lower house.

At the village level, school teachers often represent some of the few educated and influential people, and are thus elected to the state Legislative Assemblies (LA) in large numbers.<sup>xl</sup> For example, in UP, teachers have been present on virtually every ‘council of ministers’ since 1952.<sup>xli</sup> Furthermore, among those states that still have an upper house in the state government, known as the Legislative Council (LC), the representation of teachers is even stronger.

Because of a concerted effort by the writers of the constitution to minimize the influence of landlords and capitalists in state politics, the criteria for representation in the LC moved away from the economic and commercial basis of the British system. The result is a system that gives two different ways for teachers to gain access to the upper house of state governments. An emphasis on professional representation in the LC provides the first avenue for teacher representation. Specific reservations for those with special knowledge of literature, science and art provides the second.<sup>xlii</sup> Therefore, historically, teachers have had especially strong representation in government, enabling them to influence legislation.

Political strength among teachers is not inherently a negative thing. In theory this phenomenon should, in fact, lead to improvements in an education system. Kingdom and Teal provide a useful framework to explain this paradox.<sup>xliii</sup> According to them, when used as a collective voice to demand proper inputs, teachers’ political power can positively affect the education system. However, when used as a means of rent-seeking, it will only focus on issues that directly affect teachers, such as their salaries. This will inevitably lead to a worsening of the education system.

In India, teachers groups have almost exclusively pursued legislation for their own benefit, and almost never on issues that would benefit the education system at large. The issues that teachers have campaigned for, above all others, have been the

improvement of teacher salaries and increased job security.<sup>xliv</sup> Because of their size and political strength, political parties have had immense difficulty in opposing teacher demands. For example, as Kingdom and Muzammil explain, with regards to Uttar Pradesh, “the number of teachers in primary education is so large in the state and their presence so significant [...] that no political party in a democratic set-up has the courage to ignore them.”<sup>xlv</sup> As a result, both teacher salaries and job security have increased dramatically since independence. Because private school salaries are based on market forces, and not a centrally dictated wage, the problem of teacher lobbying is restricted to the public sector.<sup>xlvi</sup> By 2007, regular public school teacher salaries were already 2.5 to 3.5 times the size of salaries in private schools.<sup>xlvii</sup> This demonstrates the magnitude of changes.

Public school teacher salaries are steadily increasing in India, both in absolute terms and as a share of total expenditure. In Uttar Pradesh, “between 1973 and 1996, the real teacher salary rate grew at 5% per annum.”<sup>xlviii</sup> Thus, despite large increases in overall government spending, the share of recurrent public expenditure in education going towards teachers salaries steadily increased. Whereas in 1960 this figure was 88 per cent, by 2009 it represented a baffling 95 per cent.<sup>xlviii</sup> In fact, Dreze and Sen note that the rise in spending throughout the 1980s, during the apogee of public expenditure on education, was almost entirely due to increases in teachers’ salaries.<sup>i</sup> The biggest increase in many states came in 2009 with the publishing of the Sixth Pay Commission’s recommendation for further salary increases. Uttar Pradesh, for example, saw a near doubling in the salaries of regular public school teachers.<sup>li</sup> In 2004, the average wages of teachers (both regular and para-teachers) in India were already five times the average GDP per capita of India; meaning that public school teachers were five times as affluent as the average citizen.<sup>lii</sup> Considering the increases due to the Sixth Pay Commission, this same ratio could now be as high as 10:1.<sup>liii</sup>

The emergence of para-teachers also has its roots in this problem. Due to teacher’s high salaries, state governments can no longer afford to hire any more. Despite thousands of trained and available teachers, vacancies in public schools often go unfilled. Para-teachers are hired instead, to pick up the slack. This leads to the reliance on para-teachers, both as a means of expansion and to reduce the STR.

The lack of teacher accountability in the public stream is due to the lack of effective mechanisms to ensure their productivity. The government of India acts on the belief that large teacher salaries alone could be enough to ensure teacher motivation. For example, the stated objective of the Sixth Pay Commission was to attract more talented personnel and keep them well motivated.<sup>liv</sup> This belief falls in line with ‘Efficiency

Wage' theory, in labour economics, that says "that employers can get higher productivity from a worker by paying her more."<sup>lv</sup> However, this theory relies on a 'credible threat of dismissal'.<sup>lvi</sup> Unfortunately, public school teachers in India face no such threat.

Thus, the significant strength of teachers groups in influencing legislation has led to both the inflated salaries paid to public school teachers and the lack of teacher accountability. However, the government, in failing to respond to this, must be considered equally at fault.

### **Impact of Low-Cost Private Schools**

As previously mentioned, much of the expansion in private education has come in the form of low cost-private schools, which provide a low-cost alternative to public schools.<sup>lviii</sup> Some analysts of India's education system believe this option to be harmful to the greater cause of primary education because of the assumed low quality of low-cost private schools. Shukla and Joshi, for instance, argue that because these schools are only a business for their proprietors, they do not try to offer quality education. Instead, what is offered is the appearance of quality education.<sup>lix</sup> Therefore the economic success of these schools rests on their ability to market themselves. This is apparently done through such tactics as displaying a computer in the school, advertising English language instruction, and merely assigning a heavier workload of homework to students.<sup>lx</sup> Shukla and Joshi argue that because these schools focus on the appearance of quality education without providing it, children who attend these schools are disadvantaged. Moreover, Shukla & Joshi claim that these tactics have been carried over to public schools. In other words, the advent of low-cost private schools has doubly weakened the state of primary education: first by providing a lower quality of education to all those enrolled in the schools, and second by influencing and worsening the quality of public schools.

However, there are significant flaws in this argument; foremost, the assumption that the quality of education in low-cost private schools is necessarily bad. A 2007 survey by Tooley et al. demonstrates this belief to be inaccurate.<sup>lxi</sup> First, the material inputs in private schools are actually better than public schools. For all the materials examined in the study, low-cost private schools outscored public schools for all but two categories, for which there was no significant difference between the two.<sup>lxii</sup> Second, the STRs in low-cost private schools are much better than public schools. In the study, the STR among the low-cost private schools was 21.63, with 42.35 among public schools. Superiority in both of these factors (inputs and STRs) is brought about by the differences in teacher salaries between these types of schools. Due to the high wages paid to public school teachers, low-cost private schools can operate on a fraction of the budget of public schools. Money becomes more available to be spent on material inputs and hiring enough

teachers to maintain a decent STR.

Third, the teacher motivation in these schools appears to be superior to those in public schools. The study found that fewer teachers were absent in low-cost private schools than public schools and, among the teachers present, more were found to be actively teaching than in public schools.<sup>lxiii</sup> Moreover, this study challenges the belief that the motivating logic behind these schools is profit maximization. Low-cost private schools on average reserve 8.1 per cent of their seats for free, and provide another 14 per cent at concessionary rates. Therefore, the assumption that low-cost private schools offer a necessarily inferior quality of education than public school is unfounded.

The government of India has attempted to provide universal primary education through its policy of expansion. However, this section has demonstrated that not only is much of the physical expansion due to private expansion, but the quality of education offered in the public stream was very low. Public school quality has suffered from poor teaching quality, low levels of material inputs and high STRs. These problems are a result of two fundamental flaws: poor coordination between state and central governments, and the political strength of teachers. The argument that the rise in private schools has hurt the quality of primary education was shown as flawed. Low-cost private schools in fact provide a quality of education that is, in many ways, superior to public schools.

### **III. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION POLICIES IN EDUCATION**

The system of affirmative action in India has sought to uplift the traditionally discriminated and underprivileged groups in Indian society by ensuring their inclusion in higher education.<sup>lxiv</sup> This has been attempted through the reservation of places in post-primary education as well as remuneration programs to defray the costs of education.

<sup>lxv</sup> Although this system of compensatory discrimination has been in place since independence, it has failed to produce improvements in the educational situation of disadvantaged groups. This section of the paper will demonstrate the failure of affirmative action as a means of social transformation by evaluating the effects of the policy since its inception. It will then demonstrate that the use of caste as the sole indicator of eligibility for affirmative action has been the principal reason why this policy has failed.

#### **Characteristics of Affirmative Action**

India has one of the longest histories of affirmative action in the world,<sup>lxvi</sup> with the roots of its current policy dating back to the colonial era.<sup>lxvii</sup> At independence, the existing system was adopted and then expanded into its current form under the constitution.<sup>lxviii</sup> It now consists of two types of programs –reservation and remuneration. The ‘reservation system’ consists of set quotas for positions in secondary and higher

education, as well as positions in the civil service.<sup>lxix</sup> Three groups are targeted by this program: Scheduled Tribes (STs), Scheduled Castes (SCs), and Other Backward Castes (OBCs). STs refer to indigenous tribal groups, whose historical disadvantage was not directly related to the Hindu caste system and consist primarily of the adivasi. SCs refer to those groups who have historically been at the bottom of the Hindu caste hierarchy. Most prominent of these are the ‘untouchables’, or dalits. OBCs are those groups whose disadvantage stems from the Hindu caste system but whose hierarchical position places them above SCs. The ‘remuneration programs’ attempt to defray the cost of education for disadvantaged groups. They consist of scholarships, fellowships, midday meals, and the financing of material inputs –such as textbooks and uniforms, for individual students.<sup>lxx</sup>

These systems have expanded both in scope and cost since independence. For example, government spending on affirmative action has more than tripled from the fifth Five-Year Plan in 1974 to the ninth, in 1997.<sup>lxxi</sup> Furthermore, the number of castes accepted into the target groups (SCs, STs, and OBCs) has vastly expanded since its inception, due in part to ambiguities in their definitions in the constitution.<sup>lxxii</sup> In some states these quotas have reached incredible levels. For example by the 1980s, in Tamil Nadu, 68 per cent of all public university positions were reserved.

In terms of increasing the number of SCs and STs in higher education, this policy has been modestly successful. Both groups have increased their representation in higher education over the period of affirmative action. Between 1979 and 2005, the proportion of students enrolled in higher education that were from SCs increased from 6.88 per cent to 9.86 per cent. The proportion of college graduates who were SC and ST increased from 2.18 per cent and 1.20 per cent in 1983 to 4.83 per cent and 4.94 per cent respectively in 2000,<sup>lxxiii</sup> giving a combined proportion of SCs and STs among graduates of 9.77 per cent.

These statistics represent improvements across the board for SC and ST groups. However, there is certainly reason to question the significance of these results. To begin with, the size of these gains has been very modest. The share of SC and ST in higher education, and especially among graduates, remains far below their reserved level.<sup>lxxiv</sup> What is more, the share of SC and ST in the larger population has actually increased since the inception of the reservations in the 1940s.<sup>lxxv</sup> Thus, even if the proposed reservation rate of 22.5 per cent were it actually to be met, it would still under-represent the SC and ST population. Therefore, with the share of graduates at only 9.77 per cent, the gains have indeed been modest.

In terms of social mobility, the results, although positive, are equally modest. In a study on social mobility, between 1971 and 1991, both adivasi and dalits managed

to increase their representation in higher levels of society. Dalits were found to have increased their representation in the 'salariat' from 5.0 per cent in 1971 to 10.9 per cent in 1991.<sup>lxxvi</sup> The adivasi share in this category moved from 2.7 to 6.9, per cent over the same period. However, the vast majority of both of these groups remain among the lowest strata of society (manual or agricultural laborers).<sup>lxxvii</sup> Therefore, although the targeted groups have been upwardly mobile, the gains have been small. Furthermore, the gains of these disadvantaged groups do not imply gains for all disadvantaged groups.

Muslims have been one important group that remains outside of the targeting system of affirmative action. Despite a "substantial progress in the sum total socio-economic conditions of people in the country, the socio-economic conditions of Muslims have worsened."<sup>lxxviii</sup> In the same study on social mobility as above, between 1971 and 1991 the share of Muslims in the 'salariat' decreased from 14.6 per cent to 10.7 per cent, while their share in the lower levels of society (manual or agricultural labour) increased from 43.8 per cent to 66.9 per cent.<sup>lxxix</sup> Furthermore, the educational attainment levels of Muslims remain stagnant under affirmative action. Overall literacy rates among Muslims are lower than Hindus, and Muslims are now less likely to both enter and stay in school than even SCs or STs, for each level of schooling.<sup>lxxx</sup> Despite higher average incomes and a more urban population than dalits, Muslims have been falling behind the other 'scheduled' groups over time.<sup>lxxxi</sup>

Another disadvantaged group in terms of education are females. The attainment levels for women are lower than men for every social category of the population.<sup>lxxxii</sup> Estimates show that literacy rates for women in India are even worse than those in sub-Saharan Africa.<sup>lxxxiii</sup> With a literacy rate of less than 50 per cent, it remains 25 percentage points behind the male literacy rate. While dalits and adivasis have been able to narrow the educational gap, Muslims and women have made no such progress.<sup>lxxxiv</sup>

Despite sixty years of commitment and enormous amount of spending, affirmative action has had little effect on the structure of Indian society. Some disadvantaged groups, namely Muslims and females, remained disadvantaged or even had their situation worsened under the existing policies. The following section explains the failing of affirmative action.

### **Inappropriate Indicator**

Since its inception, caste membership has been used as the sole criterion for targeting beneficiaries under the reservation system. Thus, membership in a traditionally low caste implies eligibility for reservations while membership in a traditionally high caste implies ineligibility. On first impression this criteria makes sense, as the historic correlation between caste and socio-economic standing has been strong.<sup>lxxxv</sup> However, the

use of caste as an indicator of eligibility has led to the failure of affirmative action as a policy for three reasons; its exclusion of disadvantaged groups, its inaccuracy in targeting beneficiaries, and its politicization of caste.

First, the use of caste as an indicator excludes some disadvantaged groups from the benefits of affirmative action. Inequalities in India exist across several axes, such as caste, religion, and gender.<sup>lxxxvi</sup> Since the affirmative action policies have primarily targeted beneficiaries by caste, the inequalities across religion and gender have been ignored. Therefore, the use of caste as the sole indicator in the reservation system only partially addresses the nature of inequalities in Indian society. Meanwhile, because other bases of inequality are ignored, there is an effective exclusion of certain disadvantaged groups, such as Muslims and females. This exclusion only furthers the relative deprivation of the groups outside the target group.<sup>lxxxvii</sup> Therefore, because of its exclusionary nature, the reservation system, although providing benefits to some groups, has left others deprived. Second, there is a significant amount of inaccuracy with the use of caste to target beneficiaries for affirmative action. This problem explains the limited social mobility among those targeted by affirmative action policies. Upon closer inspection, caste does not appear to be the most effective indicator of socio-economic standing. In a study analyzing data from the Indian Censuses, Sanjay Kumar examined determinants of social mobility in India. Kumar found that ‘class destination’, in other words one’s socio-economic standing, was most strongly determined by ‘class origin’ –specifically the socio-economic standing of one’s parents.<sup>lxxxviii</sup> This implies that barriers to upward social mobility are not structured around caste based discriminations. Instead, they are based on ‘class origins’, meaning the socio-economic status one is born into. This indicates that affirmative action policies have been acting on faulty assumptions, and have therefore been inaccurate in their targeting.

This inaccuracy in targeting created a disconnect between those in need and those who benefit. This has led to a phenomenon known as ‘creaming’—the tendency for the more well-off members of a group to receive the benefits of affirmative action.<sup>lxxxix</sup> For example, although the majority of dalits have achieved only low socio-economic status, they have a minority presence at all levels of society.<sup>xc</sup> Their common membership in a low caste implies common eligibility for benefits through affirmative action. However, those with greater resources are often the most attractive candidates as they have already received the benefits of quality education.<sup>xc1</sup> This inaccuracy in targeting leads to the inappropriate allocation of benefits and a decrease in the utility of the programs. This explains why we have not seen a greater change in the situation of targeted groups under affirmative action.

The third factor in the failure of affirmative action has been the continual expansion of the policy to include more qualifying groups. As more castes gain OBC status, the ability of the system to identify and target those in need is once again reduced.<sup>xcii</sup> With more potential candidates competing for the same positions, the ability of the system to pick out those most in need, suffers. Once again, the selection of caste as the indicator for affirmative action has played a key role in this problem.

Generally people will seek to be included in groups that are subject to benefits.<sup>xciii</sup> In India, this means people vie for the government to recognize their caste as backwards. Evan Osborne argues that caste offers an ideal structure for pressure group formation. Pressure groups are defined as groups with a common economic interest, who unite to influence the government.<sup>xciv</sup> Caste groups in India, when mobilized, have used “voting, either alone or in coalition with other groups, to acquire additional reservations at the state and national levels.”<sup>xcv</sup> The effectiveness of this tactic can be seen through the expansion of groups eligible for affirmative action. Rent seeking behavior is understandable due to the amount of benefits awarded through affirmative action. However, because of the ease with which caste can be transformed into pressure groups, affirmative action has been expanded beyond its utility. Thus, the politicization of caste enabled the massive expansion of qualifying groups.

Therefore, as has been shown, the use of caste as an indicator has caused significant problems with the policies of affirmative action. It has ignored inequalities along non-caste lines as well as the disparities within them. It has also enabled the politicization of this policy.

### **Advocacy for Muslim Inclusion**

Affirmative action critics in India consider the problem to lie in the limits of the policy. There has been considerable advocacy for the further expansion of affirmative action in India, to include those groups excluded under its current form.<sup>xcvi</sup> Therefore, the limited results of affirmative action are interpreted as being a result of an overly limited implementation. This argument has been put forth primarily by Muslim groups, whose point of view is conditioned by their presence outside the system.<sup>xcviii</sup> Their advocated expansion specifically demands the inclusion of Muslims into the affirmative action system. This argument has gained considerable support within India, and its supporters have become more vocal since the 1990s. For instance, in 1994, the Association for Promoting Education and Employment of Muslims (APEEM) publically demanded that the entire Muslim community be included in the reservation system. For them, correcting the inadequacies of affirmative action policies merely involves expanding the scope of the policy to include one more disadvantaged group.

This paper has acknowledged that the exclusionary nature of affirmative action in India has been one of its major problems; however, the extension of this policy to more groups must not be interpreted as the solution. This line of thought is short-sighted and lacks an understanding of the underlying problem of affirmative action in India. First, this type of response would merely expand all of the problems inherent to the current system. Because religion, like caste, involves much internal heterogeneity, the use of it as an indicator would have many of the same problems as the existing system. The significant variation of socio-economic status among Muslims would be ignored leading to inaccuracy in the indicator, and potential creaming. Moreover it would continue to exclude, and thereby deprive, other disadvantaged groups –creating still new winners and losers. Finally, religious identity, like caste identity, may become further politicized, and potentially factionalized, in the pursuit of benefits.

It may be tempting to consider the inclusion of Muslims in affirmative action, especially when considering how they have been disadvantaged by the policy. However, Muslim inclusion would merely widen the scope of an already deeply flawed system. The central flaw in the design of affirmative action is using caste to indicate eligibility. This feature has caused the exclusion, inaccuracy, and politicization that have characterized the failure of affirmative action. Affirmative action has created both winners and losers out of the disadvantaged in India. However, in this case, even the winners have gained little.

#### **IV. CONCLUSION**

This paper has shown that the public policies, regarding education, have not significantly decreased the inequalities of opportunity in India. Both policies have merely shifted the nature or basis of the inequalities. In the case of primary education, what has occurred is not a reduction in inequality, merely the institutionalization of it. Exclusion from primary education was the old source of inequality; inclusion in public education is the new one. Public primary expansion has managed to widen the scope of primary education in India. However, the quality of this schooling is so inferior to the private stream that those who study under it are still significantly disadvantaged. With affirmative action, new winners have emerged under the policy. However, this policy has created new losers as well. Policies have not decreased the inequalities in post-primary education; they have only altered the composition of those excluded.

Second, this paper has demonstrated that the failure of these policies lies with their implementation. With regards to the expansion of education,, the failure is the result of the lack of coordination between state and central governments, as well as the disproportionate political strength of teachers. For affirmative action, the biggest flaw has been the use of caste as the sole basis of eligibility for the programs.

In both of these cases the problems are fixable. However, rather than directly addressing the problems, the government has only found ways to work around them. To deal with the shortage of teachers, the government chose to support the use of para-teachers. Alternatively, by decreasing teacher wages, they could have addressed the problem at its root. For affirmative action, rather than changing the indicator from caste, the government has merely increased the number of those eligible for the policy. This complacency on the part of the government has only created more problems, while sustaining the status quo. The government of India is therefore responsible for the lack of results in reducing the inequality of opportunity in education since independence. This situation has two possible remedies. The first would see the current system staying in place, with the government playing the central role in creating and directing the educational opportunities in the country. However, this would require the government to address the fundamental problems existing in its policies. Without these changes the policies will never have the desired effect. The second option sees a significant retreat of the state from the education sector. This situation would see the government playing a supervisory role in facilitating an equitable and efficient private education system. Private education is widely perceived as a source of stratification. Ironically, in the Indian context, it may represent the best solution to reducing the gross inequalities in the education system. One of the only bright spots in the recent years has been the rise of quality education to the disadvantaged through the onset of low-cost private schools. If the government could harness the efficiency of this system, the reduction of the inequality of opportunity in India may be possible.

#### Endnotes

<sup>i</sup> Jean Dreze and Amartya Sen, *India: Development and Participation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 1.

<sup>ii</sup> Claudia Buchmann and Emily Hannum, "Education and Stratification in Developing Countries: A Review of Theories and Research," *Annual Review of Sociology* 27 (2001): 80.

<sup>iii</sup> Geeta Kingdom, "The Progress of School Education in India," *Oxford Review of Economic Policy* 23 No. 2 (2007): 171. Under the constitution the government set the goal of providing "free and compulsory education to all children to the age 14 by 1960."

<sup>iv</sup> Dreze and Sen, *India: Development and Participation*, 166.

<sup>v</sup> Kingdom, "Progress of School Education," 171. For instance the ASER 2006 survey found that 93.4% of all children aged 6 to 14 were enrolled in school.

<sup>vi</sup> James Tooley, Pauline Dixon, and S.V. Gomathi, "Private Schools and the Millennium

Development Goals of Universal Primary Education: A Census and Comparative Survey in Hyderabad, India,” *Oxford Review of Education* 33 No.5 (2007): 544.

vii Dreze and Sen, *India: Development and Participation*, 152-9. Dreze and Sen argue that low attendance is due to what they call the ‘discouragement effect’, that parents are so discouraged by the poor quality of education that they see no utility in sending their children to the public schools.

viii Dreze and Sen, *India: Development and Participation*, 148. India’s 1995-6 gross enrollment ratio at the primary level, was 104 per cent, with 112 percent enrolment of SCs. The current rate of primary enrollment Nagaland is 127 per cent, and 131 per cent in Gujarat.

ix Kingdom, “Progress of School Education,” 185.

x Dreze and Sen, *India: Development and Participation*, 166. This rate is generally accepted to be the level which will accomplish this goal among developed countries. However many countries, including China, have achieved universal primary education with only 4% expenditure.

xi Kingdom, “Progress of School Education,” 185.

xii Saroj Pandey, “Para-teacher scheme and quality education for all in India: policy perspectives and challenges for school effectiveness,” *Journal of Education for Teaching* 32 No.3 (2006): 321.

xiii Kingdom, “Progress of School Education,” 178. The results of the first census in 1951 presented literacy rates of 27% among men 9% among women. By 2001 these rates were 75.6% among men and 54.0% among women.

xiv Kingdom, “Progress of School Education,” 169. Brazil (88.6%), Russian Federation (99.4%), China (90.9%), developing countries (76.8%), sub-Saharan Africa (60.2%).

xv Dreze and Sen, *India: Development and Participation*, 153.

xvi *Ibid.*, 159.

xvii Tooley et al., “Private Schools,” 540.

xviii Eric A. Hanushek, “School Policy: Implications of Recent Research for Human Capital Investments in South Asia and Other Developing Countries,” *Education Economics* 17 No.3 (2009): 302.

xix Kingdom, “Progress of School Education,” 171.

xx *Ibid.*, 182.

xxi Michael Kremer, Nazmul Chaudhury, F. Halsey Rogers, Karthik Muralidharan, and Jeffrey Hammer, “Teacher Absence in India: A Snapshot,” *Journal of the European Economic Association* 3 No.2 (2005): 659.

xxii Pandey, “Para-teacher scheme,” 320.

- <sup>xxiii</sup> Kingdom and Sipahimalani-Rao, "Para-Teachers in India," 59.
- <sup>xxiv</sup> Pandey, "Para-teacher scheme," 321.
- <sup>xxv</sup> Kingdom and Sipahimalani-Rao, "Para-Teachers in India," 61.
- <sup>xxvi</sup> *Ibid.*, 66. It was found that the learning outcomes were similar for children taught by para-teachers and those taught by regular teachers. However, because regular teachers have a higher rate of absenteeism than para-teachers, this result may simply demonstrate that both types of teachers in the public stream have disadvantages.
- <sup>xxvii</sup> Pandey, "Para-teacher scheme," 324. By 2006 there were over 100,000 registered para-teachers employed in India.
- <sup>xxviii</sup> Buchmann and Hannum, "Education and Stratification," 86.
- <sup>xxix</sup> Kingdom, "Progress of School Education," 182. The Probe Team's Public Report on Basic Education "found very poor school infrastructure, e.g. 26 per cent of schools did not have a blackboard in every classroom, 52 per cent had not playground, 59 per cent no drinking water, 89 per cent no toilet, 59 per cent no maps or charts, 75 per cent no toys, 77 per cent no library, and 85 per cent no musical instruments."
- <sup>xxx</sup> Dreze and Sen, *India: Development and Participation*, 158.
- <sup>xxxi</sup> Kingdom, "Progress of School Education," 182. Two such donor assistance programs are the District Primary Education Project (DPEP) and its successor Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan. In terms of improvements, these programs increased the ratio of schools with access to drinking water from 41 per cent in 1991 to 66 percent in 2006
- <sup>xxvii</sup> Dreze and Sen, *India: Development and Participation*, 167.
- <sup>xxviii</sup> Tooley et al., "Private Schools," 545.
- <sup>xxiv</sup> Hanushek, "School Policy," 294.
- <sup>xxv</sup> Pandey, "Para-teacher scheme," 325.
- <sup>xxvi</sup> Dreze and Sen, *India: Development and Participation*, 168.
- <sup>xxvii</sup> Geeta Kingdom and Mohd Muzammil, "A Political Economy of Education in India I: The Case of UP," *Economic and Political Weekly* 36 No.32 (2001): 3053.
- <sup>xviii</sup> *Ibid.*, 3059.
- Ibid.*, 3061. Types of action included in under the term 'agitations' includes the following: public awareness campaigns, meetings with government representatives, sit-ins, demonstrations, collective fasting, writing postcards to the government, disturbing sessions in the legislature, and boycotts.
- <sup>xxix</sup> *Ibid.*, 3053.
- <sup>xl</sup> *Ibid.*, 3057. There has been only a single cabinet in Uttar Pradesh that has not featured a teacher among the ministers. This was in 1967 and only lasted for a period of 15 days.
- <sup>xli</sup> *Ibid.*, 3054.

- <sup>xliii</sup> Geeta Kingdom and Francis Teal, "Teacher Unions, teacher pay and student performance in India: A pupil fixed effects approach," *Journal of Development Economics* 91 No.2 (2010). Although their study deals specifically with the unionization of teachers, this framework can easily be applied to the more general issue of political power of teachers, of which unionization is a subset.
- <sup>xliiii</sup> Kingdom and Muzammil, "Political Economy of Education," 3063.
- <sup>xliv</sup> *Ibid.*, 3053.
- <sup>xlv</sup> Geeta Kingdom, "The Impact of the Sixth Pay Commission on Teacher Salaries: Assessing Equity and Efficiency Effects," *Research Consortium on Educational Outcomes and Poverty RECOUP Working Paper No.29* (2010): 7.
- <sup>xlvi</sup> Tooley et al., "Private Schools," 549.
- <sup>xlvii</sup> Kingdom, "Sixth Pay Commission," 6.
- <sup>xlix</sup> Kingdom, "Sixth Pay Commission," 8.
- <sup>1</sup> Dreze and Sen, *Economic Development and Social Opportunity*, 122.
- <sup>li</sup> Kingdom, "Sixth Pay Commission," 1. The entrance salary of regular public school teachers increased by 115 per cent, and the salary of experienced teachers increased by 76 per cent, for an average increase of 92 per cent.
- <sup>lii</sup> *Ibid.*, 3. The ratio of regular public school teachers' salary to the GDP per capita would likely be significantly larger, considering the effect of the low wages paid to para-teachers on the above ratio.
- <sup>liii</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>liv</sup> *Ibid.*, 9.
- <sup>lv</sup> *Ibid.*, 10.
- <sup>lvi</sup> *Ibid.*, 10.
- <sup>lvii</sup> Tooley et al., "Private Schools," 543.
- <sup>lviii</sup> Dreze and Sen, *India: Development and Participation*, 170.
- <sup>lix</sup> Subir Shukla and Priti Joshi, "The International Context –India," in *Low-cost private education: impacts on achieving universal primary education*, ed. Bob Phillipson, (London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 2008): 41.
- <sup>lx</sup> Shukla and Joshi, "The International Context," 57.
- <sup>lxi</sup> Tooley et al., "Private Schools."
- <sup>lxii</sup> *Ibid.*, 557. Low-cost private schools outscored public schools in terms of drinking water, toilets for children, library for use by children, television, desks, chairs or benches for children and electric light. The two categories with 'no significant difference' were computers for children's use and playgrounds.
- <sup>lxiii</sup> Tooley et al., "Private Schools," 550. 95.6 per cent of teachers present in low-cost

private schools were engaged in teaching activity, as oppose to 74.6 per cent in public schools.

<sup>lxiv</sup> Sonalde Desai & Veena Kulkarni, "Changing Educational Inequalities in India in the Context of Affirmative Action," *Demography* 45 No.2 (2008): 252.

<sup>lxv</sup> *Ibid.*, 252.

<sup>lxvi</sup> Mohd Sanjeer Alam, "Social Exclusion of Muslims in India and Deficient Debates about Affirmative Action: Suggestions for a new Approach," *South Asia Research* 30 No.1 (2010): 51.

<sup>lxvii</sup> Christophe Jaffrelot, "The Impact of Affirmative Action in India: More Political than Socioeconomic," *India Review* 5 No.2 (2006): 174. The British created several safeguards to compensate the Dalits and Adivasis against discrimination. Several schools for Dalits were established in 1892, and by 1944 there was a five year budget of 300,000 rupees set aside to fund their education. The British also established reservations in the civil service and positions for political representation for these groups.

<sup>lxviii</sup> *Ibid.*, 175

<sup>lxix</sup> For the sake of this paper only the reservations relating to education will be examined.

<sup>lxx</sup> Desai and Kulkarni, "Changing Educational Inequalities," 252.

<sup>lxxi</sup> *Ibid.* The proportion of expenditure of the five year plans directed towards affirmative action policies increased from 0.6 per cent of all spending from 1974-1978 up to 1.97 per cent from 1997-2002.

<sup>lxxii</sup> Evan Osborne, "Culture, Development, and Government: Reservations in India," *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 49 No.3 (2001): 670. For example, in 1951 the Government of India estimated the size of the OBC population to be 1.2 per cent. By 1979, the Mandal Commission estimated this figure to be 52 per cent and promoted a reservation quota of 27 per cent for OBCs.

<sup>lxxiii</sup> Desai and Kulkarni, "Changing Educational Inequalities," 250.

<sup>lxxiv</sup> Rana Hasan and Aashish Mehta, "Under-representation of Disadvantaged Classes in Colleges: What do the Data Tell Us?" *Economic and Political Weekly* 41 No.35 (2006): 3794.

<sup>lxxv</sup> Chauhan, "Education and Caste in India," 221. The combined portion of SC and ST in the total population has now reached 24%.

<sup>lxxvi</sup> Sanjay Kumar, Anthony Heath, and Oliver Heath, "Changing Patterns of Social Mobility: Some Trends over Time," *Economic and Political Weekly* 37 No.40 (2002): 4095. The 'salarit' represented the highest socio-economic category in the study.

<sup>lxxvii</sup> *Ibid.* 83.8% of Dalits are still found in these strata (down from 90.6% in 1971) and 89% of adivasi are still working as manual or agricultural laborers (down from 96.7%).

- lxxviii Alam, "Exclusion of Muslims in India," 49.
- lxxix Kumar et al., "Changing Patterns of Social Mobility," 4095.
- lxxx Desai and Kulkarni, "Changing Educational Inequalities," 257.
- lxxxi Desai and Kulkarni, "Changing Educational Inequalities," 258. Average income and urban population are generally indicators of higher educational attainment.
- lxxxii Chauhan, "Education and Caste in India," 221.
- lxxxiii Dreze and Sen, *India: Development and Participation*, 163.
- lxxxiv Desai and Kulkarni, "Changing Educational Inequalities," 267.
- lxxxv Chauhan, "Education and Caste in India," 220. The use of caste as the criterion for eligibility into the reservation system was established by the Backward Classes Commission in 1953. The commission identified some 2400 castes as backward. This number was later expanded to 3700 under the Mandal Commission of 1979.
- lxxxvi Dreze and Sen, *India: Development and Participation*, 149.
- lxxxvii Desai and Kulkarni, "Changing Educational Inequalities," 252.
- lxxxviii *Ibid.*, 2987
- lxxxix Chauhan, "Education and Caste in India," 229-230
- xc Kumar et al., "Determinants of Social Mobility," 2986.
- xci Chauhan, "Education and Caste in India," 230.
- xcii *Ibid.*, 229.
- xciii Frank De Zwart, "The Logic of Affirmative Action: Caste, Class and Quotas in India," *Acta Sociologica* 43 (2000): 243. This behaviour has been witnessed in India before. Prior to affirmative action, in the colonial era, caste leaders sought inclusion in higher ranks so as to be eligible for government jobs. As soon as the policy of affirmative action was established, however, the opposite behaviour became evident. Also many of the converts to Islam have historically been low caste Hindus. By converting to Islam they were able to avoid some of the hardships of the caste system.
- xciv Osborne, "Culture, Development, and Government," 660. Pressure groups are defined as pre-existing groups with a common economic interest who have banded together in order to put pressure on the government.
- xcv *Ibid.*, 667.
- xcvi Alam, "Exclusion of Muslims in India," 44.
- xcvii *Ibid.*, 51.
- xcviii *Ibid.*, 52.



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