THE CHALLENGE OF DEVELOPMENT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Conflict Resolution
Democratic Governance
and Education

RAPPORTEUR’S REPORT
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Executive Summary

This conference was intended to mark the renewal of McGill University’s commitment to understanding the challenges of development in Africa, and to forge new partnerships with governmental, non-governmental and academic research actors to assist this continent’s countries in responding to these challenges. The focus was on the role of democratic governance and participation in addressing the specific development challenges posed by political violence, conflict resolution and peace building, inclusion and difference, public health, and science technology and education.

**Political Violence and Underdevelopment:** In socially fragmented societies, democratic institutions serve to minimize the probability of civil strife, as well as the negative effects of such conflicts on economic growth. It is clear that in Sub-Saharan Africa the high levels of social fragmentation, related in particular to ethnic diversity, the risks of political violence are, a priori, relatively high. However, the level of democracy seems to be the most stable determinant of violence. It is for that reason that democratic consolidation and participation are extremely important in the region, in order to reduce political violence and to provide the conditions for stable economic growth.

**The Multiple Dimensions of Conflict and its Resolution:** In post-conflict societies, the challenge is to balance the demands for criminal prosecution with the need for consensus building, inclusion and relations of trust among all stakeholders. While prosecution of human rights violators provides the necessary disincentives for armed insurrection and the dimension of restorative justice, this needs to occur simultaneously with a peace building process wherein previously enemy groups can rebuild a democratic society that will be less likely to return to civil strife. In that sense, democratic governance is again an important tool to avoid conflict, as evidenced by the counterexample of the “resource curse”, wherein rentier states become unaccountable to their citizens and are therefore more likely to create clientelist networks of patronage. The resulting inequality makes it more likely that grievances will translate into a violent conflict, especially when the resource producing regions are not the ones that benefit the most from rents.

**African Public Opinion on Social and Political Issues:** To address the challenges of development, democratic governance structures seem all the more suited for Africa in that public opinion surveys reveal that the most important development goals seem to be the alleviation of poverty and hunger, along with the HIV/AIDS epidemic. While most Africans seem to have a lot of faith in the international donor community, there is an important if seemingly paradoxical view of the role of government in addressing these issues. In their majority, Africans are not satisfied with the current performance of their governments, but they continue to hold aspirational views of the government.

**Inclusion and Difference:** The challenge of difference and inclusion is particularly salient in Sub-Saharan Africa, where social fractionalization along ethnic, religious and cultural lines is embedded since colonial times and was exacerbated in the postcolonial period in the search for “nation-building”. However, the growth of democratic forms of government, especially the development of an active civil society, is beginning to address the need for decentralization, grassroots participation and minority representation.
Importantly, women have become increasingly active political participants, with enormous gains in at least nominal representation in political institutions. This is mainly the result of the mobilization of women’s groups in the aftermath of conflict, which has benefitted also from the discourse of democratization. The conflict in Darfur is a good example of the transformation of political and economic exclusion into armed conflict, based as it is on the efforts of a weak state seeking to consolidate its power in an important resource rich region. Power and resource sharing seem again to be important building blocks in the resolution of this conflict.

**Public Health:** The impact of good governance on public health suggests that democratic principles are crucial for dealing effectively with health crises. Public health is an important platform through which to create an orientation toward consensus, respect for the rule of law, equity and collaboration, both within the public health sector itself and beyond. This is evidenced in a number of experiences dealing with childhood nutrition and health, which show that addressing these problems in the context of creating food security, developing sustainable livelihoods and community partnerships with extension workers, universities and private sector companies. Such arrangements should provide a solid foundation to address the key health challenges in Africa, which are linked to lack of resources (human and financial), mismanagement of resources and lack of management capacity. Greater accountability, rooted in mass participation, should help to strengthen the continent’s health systems.

**Science, Technology and Education:** In Africa, education is the key to inclusion not only of disadvantaged groups of the continent itself into the international economy. While basic formal education is important, the challenge is to integrate it into a secondary and post-secondary education system that provides not just academic knowledge but also job skills and civic-mindedness. The provision of safe spaces in schools, particularly for girls, and the development of a science and technology component to education should allow the creation of a more diverse and skilled workforce capable of developing solutions to the continent’s development challenges.

The challenges of development in Sub-Saharan Africa are clearly multidimensional and will require the active involvement of the continent’s population through democratic institutions and practices, as well as the commitment of governments, regional institutions, international organizations, educational institutions and the private sector. As far as Canada’s contribution is concerned, the mobilization of public opinion would be an important step, as would the identification of potential constructive partnerships between academic institutions and the science and technology community to contribute to building infrastructure and human capital. Furthermore, the current trend towards governmental and corporate transparency presents a real potential for synergy. The key for ensuring the sustainability of Africa’s democratization and for a lasting end to civil conflict is clearly people’s ownership of their government institutions.
The Challenge of Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: Conflict Resolution, Democratic Governance, and the Promotion of Development through Education

Conference Report

Thursday, March 29, 2007

Opening Remarks: Philip Oxhorn, Director, CDAS.
Rt. Hon. Joe Clark, McGill University.
H.E. Abraham S. Nkomo, South African High Commissioner.

This conference is intended to mark the renewal of McGill University’s commitment to understanding the challenges of development in Africa, and to forge new partnerships with governmental, non-governmental and academic research actors to assist this continent’s countries in responding to these challenges.


This presentation is a contribution to a larger World Bank research project on the economics of civil wars. The objective is to analyze the development and economic growth impact of organized political violence through the use of the stochastic growth model, a multinomial model of political violence, and dynamic panel regressions on economic growth outcomes. This study unapologetically celebrates democracy.

Upon analyzing results, the findings are that political violence has a major impact on economic development. The main findings of this study are as follows:

- Overall, the effect of organized political violence is likely higher than the direct capital destruction impact.
- Democratization, social division and history are important predictors of the three forms of conflict. This is one of our most important findings.
- The risks of civil war and violent riots reduce growth.
- Ethnic fractionalization has negative and direct effects on economic growth, mediated by democracy. More generally than ethnic fractionalization, it is social fractionalization that is important.
- Sub-Saharan Africa is disproportionately affected by the risk of civil war and widening income differential relative to East Asia. Ultimately, the East Asian model is non-transferable to Sub-Saharan Africa.
- The estimated cumulative cost of Sudan’s civil war is $23 billion US.

It is always important to understand the general context in which violence takes place. Many African military coups are highly fractional—and tend to be dominated by tribal and sub-national groups. Here are some other important factors in terms of understanding intrastate wars in Africa: In 2000, 30 major conflicts, 10 of the 23 civil wars taking place worldwide, were located in Sub-Saharan Africa. In that same year,
these conflicts cost $138 billion and caused approximately four million deaths. Between 1980 and 1992, intrastate wars caused the displacement of 16-40 million people. Finally, Sub-Saharan Africa is the most violent region in terms of sustaining the most wartime deaths per decade.

Ultimately, this study attempts to understand the relationship between economic growth and violent conflict. That is, it measures the direct impact of political violence on human, natural and physical capital and assesses the general equilibrium costs of the risk of violence. When violent conflict reduces individual and community physical security, we find that this affects social capital and changes preferences. In addition, it shortens the planning horizons of agents. That is, when society is faced with impending violence, the planning horizon becomes short because actors are consumed with fighting to survive.

In these situations, resources are allocated to address the immediate concerns of the day and are less likely to be allocated to education, the creation of infrastructure, or the strengthening of social capital. These economic setbacks have devastating effects on societies; for instance, excessive resources are devoted to security, and too few to education, health, and social services. Ultimately, this type of planning leads to a short-circuited democratic politics. The Arab-Israeli conflict is an excellent example of this.

The severity of economic problems caused by political violence ultimately depends on how strongly economic agents are averse to economic setbacks. If faced with high levels of risk, individuals will exhibit behavior that is risky and reckless.

In the civil war literature, war is understood as an isolated phenomenon that is robustly associated with low and stagnating incomes, high dependence on natural resources, large and highly dispersed populations, and rough geographical terrain. The older literature on violence tends not to distinguish between different types of violence—and different causal factors leading to violence. We do know that, where there are large concentrations of poor and uneducated males, the opportunity cost of war is low. Reliance on primary resource production can make states vulnerable, as can the existence of a hostile external power. In addition, a Diaspora that is keen to support conflict can feed violence, as can technology that supports insurgency. To mount a stable and sustainable insurgency, you must have a substantial power base. If society is fragmented, it’s difficult to recruit a substantial number of people and maintain relative cohesion.

In these models, grievance factors are not important; rather enabling factors are the most important. Grievance is just an incipient feeling, not an enabling factor. Fearon and Laitin argue that a lack of income is important, not because it makes insurgency recruitment cheaper or easier, but because it is a proxy for a weak state. That is, low income means that the state cannot maintain an exclusive monopoly on organized violence.

The older literature also understood violence as an integrated process that could be moved from one form to another—and was caused by a failure of cooperation among social groups. The literature did not focus on civil war in isolation from other types of violence, it did not attempt to quantify violence and it was not empirical. Lately, this literature has been overtaken by new literature that focuses on civil war in isolation. This paper goes back to that old literature, but in an empirical context. For the purposes of this paper, the study of civil war is subsumed into the larger phenomenon of organized political violence. This violent contestation of political power can take the form of civil war, coup, or violent riots/demonstrations.
It is not realistic to assume that a typical African country can quickly become a fully-functioning democracy. But what effects might the existence of a partially-functioning democracy have on the risk of violence? Ultimately, we wanted to know whether a partial democracy can have a positive effect on reducing the risk of violence.

First, the study looked at social fractionalization using a two-way classification distinguishing between ethnic and cultural fractionalization. We created indexes based on these distinctions. We also distinguished between societies which are very homogeneous in terms of ethnicity and culture and societies which are cross-cutting, partially diverse, uniform, partially homogeneous, or diverse.

We used a multinomial model which estimates the three types of political violence coding civil wars, riots, and coups together. We noticed that grievance is important and that any aggrieved small minority can take a country to task in very long civil war. In fact, the median size of most rebel armies is between 1000 and 3000 people; it is not necessary to have large scale violence the way Collier had suggested. In addition, we found that the risk of civil war is very high in societies that are ethnically diverse. By contrast, the risk of riots is high in societies which are homogeneous. In ethnically cross-cutting societies the risk of coups is high.

Civil wars in post-independence Africa are usually perpetrated by aggrieved minorities. That socially fractionalized societies in Sub-Saharan Africa face a high risk of civil war seems to be consistent with other regions. However, the predictive power of social fractionalization is greater for Africa than for the other regions. In fact, the number of countries experiencing a high probability of civil war outside of Africa is quite small.

Economic outcomes such as growth and per capita income are endogenous to economic and political institutions. This begs the question: are political institutions effective in minimizing the risk of violence? The results from the multinomial model suggest that political violence has the most profound effects on growth in cases of riots and civil wars, but less for coups. It also shows a negative relationship between democracy and fractionalization. Economic growth is influenced by political violence, and political violence is independent of the economic factors. Moreover, political violence has an independent, negative effect on growth. However, democracy in general has a positive effect on growth. Social fractionalization has a negative effect on growth, but is not really a very important determinant. Partial democracy is as bad for the economy as autocracy.

In conclusion, the main findings of this study are as follows: First, political violence does affect general equilibrium growth. Coups, violent riots, and civil wars serve as the instruments for organized political violence. Risks of violent rioting and civil war reduce economic growth. Ethnic fractionalization also reduces growth but is mediated by non-factional democracy. In Sub-Saharan Africa, ethnic diversity suggests future risks of political violence. Moreover, there is an important relationship between violence and the level of democracy. Indeed, violence is likely in a partial democracy, but unlikely in a strong autocracy. However, very strong autocracies increase the risks of civil war. The level of democracy seems to be the most stable determinant of violence.

This means that it is very important for democracy to be consolidated. We cannot expect socially fractionalized societies to pursue a stable growth process as long as they are open to high political violence and are non-democratic. Even once they become democratic, consolidation and participation are extremely important. Ultimately, it is
important to have these specific political and social characteristics in place, as they advance development.

**Question and Answer Period:**

In response to a question regarding whether the impact of the informal economy can make up for the growth model, Mr. Elbadawi noted that during the Ugandan civil war, economic activities declined, but subsistence activities thrived, a hedging mechanism that communities deploy to avoid attracting violence. In post-conflict societies, the informal sector tends to expand because people disengage from subsistence and move toward market-based activities. However, he noted that this dimension is far too specific to be covered in this macro-oriented study.

With regards to the predicting power of the model, raised by Mr. Clark, in particular with regards to situations such as that of Cameroon, Mr. Elbadawi replied that many African countries are socially fractionalized and that many are also ruled by authoritarian regimes which are likely to be causing a lot of harm. The outcome of autocratic rule does not serve the society’s best interests, and therefore many governments have been persuaded to succumb to some of the basic characteristics of democratic society—such as basically free and fair elections. The problem arises in that this sort of partial democratic government can never be developmental. The fact of the matter is that upon looking at the social characteristics discussed here, exceptions are very difficult to find, and therein lies the predictive dimension of the study.

Regarding the potential response of the international community to the results of this study, Mr. Elbadawi expressed his hope that the intergovernmental development institutions will find ways of rewarding good governments rather than focusing solely on economic performance. The error of the current approach can be highlighted by the experience of Uganda, whose economic performance seemed to be successful in the 1990s, but which never experienced a genuine democratic transition, and is currently experiencing severe setbacks to development. Tanzania, on the other hand, was experiencing a genuine democratic transition, which was not recognized because of the focus on economics. Mr. Elbadawi added that it may be likely that Tanzania will ultimately be a much more stable example of the developmental state than Uganda.

**Friday, March 30**

**Panel: The Multiple Dimensions of Conflict and its Resolution**
Panel Chair: Daniel Douek, McGill University
Discussant: Rt. Hon. Joe Clark, Centre for Developing-Area Studies


The conventional approach to peace- and democracy-building can be frustrating, since most countries involved in conventional peace accords return to war. We therefore need to understand the missing links between peace-building and democracy-building. The argument presented here is that this missing link is the collaborative capacity among leaders, and the level of ownership of the peace process.
The conventional wisdom assumes that the principal challenges are rational and structural, and that the “right institutions” will lead to stability and security. This approach is rooted in an adversarial paradigm which assumes that the competition among ideas will lead to the best policy. Furthermore, the peace-building process is understood to mean that moral and political pressure, combined with legal sanctions, will effectively deter bad behavior.

There are two major problems with this approach: the conventional wisdom misunderstands democracy, because it fails to recognize that it requires an underlying set of agreements with regard to the meaning and composition of the national community, the rules of the game and styles of communication. That is to say, democracy relies on cooperation as well as on competition. Also, the conventional wisdom neglects the attitudinal dimension of divided societies, which stems from a weak sense of national identity and community, and this is certainly the case in Sub-Saharan Africa.

The problem of democratization is not one of values, but one of perceptions with regards to the rules of the political game and the meaning of the national community, in that the leaders often see the problem as a zero-sum game. There is little agreement on these issues, and a general lack of trust, which reduced the sense of predictability and makes collaboration impossible.

There are four imperatives for sustainable peace and democracy:

- to transform the zero-sum paradigm to induce the possibility of collaboration;
- to restore trust and to build relations among fractured groups;
- to build a new consensus on the rules of the game; and
- to strengthen the participants’ communication and negotiation skills.

The challenge in Africa is exemplified by the case of Burundi, a site of humanitarian disaster that left a traumatized society, a polarized leadership a huge gap between the leaders and the population, combined with a very unequal distribution of resources and a fractured peace process. Our response was to try to identify the leaders of society in politics, in the army, within the rebel groups, in civil society, in academia and in the media. We sought to identify about a hundred leaders both from the political class and from the masses and train them in collaborative decision making.

The process began in March 2003, when we approached some of the leaders to seek to identify other people who they believed should be part of the process, within certain parameters. This was organized in the “Burundian Leadership Training Program 95”. Ultimately the program created an opportunity to deal with fear and stereotyping. It was such a success in creating a collaborative environment that there was a request for providing similar training for leaders of the government army and the rebel army, and following further successes there we were asked to train trainers in the military academy.

When the recent elections were approaching, there was a concern that there would be rioting and massacres. In response, the leaders that had received the training organized a similar process for the party leaders, and in the end they had put together a code of conduct for the elections and issued a joint communiqué to the people to ensure that the process would be peaceful. As a result of all of this collaboration, elections in Burundi were successful. Currently, Burundi’s new president and his cabinet are being trained in order to increase their collaborative capacity. A similar process is underway in the Democratic Republic of Congo, another in Liberia and one in East

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Timor is being planned. Furthermore, similar training processes are being implemented at the grassroots level.

Our experience suggests that there are several processes in common for successfully building collaborative capacity. First, the program is process-centric. It is crucial first to build confidence within the group that this process can actually work; this is accomplished by providing individuals with the skills needed to talk about issues. Once this is established, then it is useful to turn to the substance. In addition, the process is interactive, experience-based, and reliant on interest based negotiations.

In conclusion, our experience emphasizes the importance of addressing the dimensions of leadership and process in post conflict reconstruction. Furthermore, it is crucial to distinguish between technical institutional capacity and capacity in collaborative decision making. In the end, there is a need for synergy between the efforts of diplomats and those of collaboration trainers: Diplomats don’t know conflict resolution skills, while trainers don’t have access to government—and should.


The fundamental question we need to ask in these cases is where do we draw the line between diplomacy and criminal justice? The so-called peace vs. justice debate is important in Africa, if for no other reason than because most international criminal tribunals are taking place there. These include the Rwanda Tribunal, a mixed tribunal for Sierra Leone, a tribunal addressing the atrocities committed by the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda, and tribunals for the Democratic Republic of Congo and for Darfur.

This discussion will be based on the lessons from the Yugoslav War Tribunal. When this was set up, it was seen as a paper tiger, in that it seemed to be contrary to the agreement of partition. In fact, the same paradigm of judicial intervention as a substitute for peace-keeping or enforcement is still being used in the African cases. In the former Yugoslavia, the tribunal was initially symbolic, because many felt that it would be an obstacle to the peace process. The question was how could we indict the leaders and negotiate with them at the same time? The argument was that it was more important to stop the killing than to pursue idealistic justice.

In spite of the fears that the tribunal would be an impediment to the peace process, it actually had a very marginal impact on the military situation in the country. That war criminals were indicted did not mean that there could be no peace agreement. The effects are the same in the case of the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda, where the impending defeat of one party has led them to be willing to negotiate.

In the case of Yugoslavia, the basic understanding was that extremists should be marginalized for the possibility of post-conflict peace-building, since it was their manipulation of ethnic conflict that had led to the mass mobilization that made the massacres possible. It is felt that it is important to send the message to hate-mongers that they may be indicted and internationally delegitimized, and even prosecuted.

What effect can such tribunals have in Africa? From a governance perspective, the justification for these types of tribunal is the notion of deterrence and incapacitation. The question is how to achieve deterrence when there is no habitual lawfulness and when crime is no longer a deviance but is instead seen as heroism. It is important to understand the inverted morality that is created in situations of conflict, so that we can understand
deterrence not naively but as part of a process of political transformation through the flow of moral propaganda emanating from the tribunal process, to send a message of disapproval.

First, it is important to facilitate deterrence and to send the message that crime does not pay. There has been a culture of impunity for too long. Leaders in the Khmer Rouge have not been prosecuted and in fact, the Khmer Rouge was included in the United Nations as a legitimate party until 1993. The relatively recent prosecutions of Milosevic and Charles Taylor represent a shift in the bounds of power and legitimacy. Although this may not represent an immediate deterrent, it may encourage the inhibition of such behavior.

We need to also consider the dimension of restorative justice that these tribunals represent, in that they serve to vindicate the suffering of victims, to air the truth. These are fundamental processes for any effort of social reconstruction through a process of “doing justice”.

Sometimes, there is a temptation within the international community to sweep past abuses under the rug in the name of “political realism”. One need only consider the example of Foday Sanko in Sierra Leone to grasp this point. After being handed the vice presidency, he and the RUF army besieged Freetown and took five hundred UN peacekeepers hostage. Clearly, amnesty in these cases sends the message that something can indeed be gained by armed rebellion. If there is a threat of eventual arrest, this legitimacy is removed.

In the case of Uganda, we see a very interesting instance of classical incapacitation. There is certainly something to be said for locking up pathological killers. The Lord’s Resistance Army, led by Joseph Kone, has abducted tens of thousands of children and has forced them to commit atrocities that make it impossible for the children to leave the organization. In the presenters view, there is very little to negotiate with such a group.

The international community has been pressuring the government of Uganda to negotiate because there is no willingness within the international community to engage in this conflict. It is, of course, important to be realistic about what is and what is not possible. In general, the LRA has been reduced to an ineffective military force, and the conflict in Northern Uganda has largely come to an end. It is only now that the LRA are interested in negotiating and extracting amnesty. When leaders realize their time is over, they are most likely then to try to negotiate amnesty. At times like this, the international community has a chance to stand up and show that it will not tolerate atrocities.

**Terry Karl, Stanford University, “Oil, Democracy and War”**

In trying to understand the difference in growth between South East Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America, I wrote a book called *The Paradox of Plenty*, in which I consider the reasons why oil rich countries are poor and why resource poor countries are rich. The key idea is that there is a lack of democracy, an inability to build states based on the rule of law, which is related to the phenomenon of rents. Rents represent the notion of extracting high excess profits by “reaping what one does not sow”.

The idea is to theorize the fact that many resource rich countries are institution poor. They are resource rich in that they depend on the export of a primary commodity. Although the Middle East is a much more dramatic story, oil dependence is also important for Africa, specifically in Chad, Sudan, Nigeria, and West Africa in general.
Governance problems are a result of rents, because rents are about two separate processes. First, they involve negotiation between these states and international oil companies in terms of which party gets which proportion of the rents. But there are also internal negotiations as to who gets what the state gets from the previous negotiation, among different ethnic groups, regions and levels of government.

Such a process is dangerous to institution building, in that most countries extract resources from their populations then redistribute these resources to the same population. This process of taxation causes requirements for accountability, in what may be termed a “resources for institutions” bargain. However, rentier states avoid taxation, which breaks the link that requires state building and more democratic consultation with the citizenry. No taxation means no representation. Instead, there are negotiations about how to collect money from the international sector, and there is no transparency in this process.

We cannot measure market relations in these conditions. We have no idea what the supply is because it is in everyone’s interest to hide the supply and keep the first round of negotiations secret. During the second set of negotiations, it is also in the actor’s interests to be vague. The state has to hide the inequality in the way money is distributed. Rulers partially hide the rents and then distribute them according to patronage links such as religion, family, or ethnic group. This form of distribution of resources keeps the ruler in power without many pressures to democratize, in that it weakens demands for representation.

Ultimately, oil is associated with authoritarian rule. In fact, oil hinders democracy. Of the 290 major oil exporters in the year 2000, only Mexico and Venezuela were democracies. The money that is spent on patronage is intended to keep rulers in power and to maintain a happy power base. When this happens, the state gets patronage networks and corruption in the classic sense. It is difficult to know when patronage starts and corruption begins. In addition, such trends also affect growth and distribution. We know that corruption spreads more rapidly in oil states than in other states. What are the results of this corruption?

The resource curse refers to an inverse association between growth and natural resource abundance, especially minerals and oil abundance. The standard of living in oil countries is much lower than most people realize. Citizens live in state of permanent expectations, becoming accustomed to a semi-permanent passivity and conviction that this wealth will always come to them. This should not be equated with greed, because there are genuine grievances among the poor in these resource rich countries. For instance, oil excavations can devastate habitats and cause extreme environmental damages—these are causes of very palpable grievances. Agricultural lands, fishing lands, and water are systematically ruined. These kinds of grievances lead to militarization on the side of the government. Moreover, when resources are insufficiently distributed, grievances have a tendency to become violent. When faced with violence, the government will increasingly meet violence with violence. The result is a more militarized state.

Oil is a magnet for war—especially for civil war. This is an odd paradox: In the long term, an authoritarian regime may be associated with stability, but violence results when the government is faced with these grievances. Oil states are much more subject to dramatic collapse and much more likely to have civil wars than countries that do not have oil. Moreover, civil wars accompany oil price volatility. Rent dependent countries are
more likely to have poor economic development and high expectations, long-term durability with rapid disintegration because of the lack of institutions, and they are more likely to have secessionist wars if the groups who live in oil producing areas are not the same as the groups in power.

The example of the Chad-Cameroon pipeline shows us that it is not possible to address poor governance without addressing the negotiations between the governments and the multinational oil companies. Reducing opacity around the rents themselves is imperative in order for accountability to actually exist.

**Discussant: Joe Clark, Centre for Developing-Area Studies, McGill University**

With regards to the International Criminal Court, it is clear that in Western democracies public opinion is an important factor in whether or not prosecution of war criminals take place, and also in regards to intervention. This is because there is a scarcity of peacekeeping resources. The question is: what can the international community do with people who are seen as evil? Is it practical to proceed without the cooperation of these groups? In other words, there are pragmatic issues involved in the decision to prosecute or not, beyond the notion of a culture of impunity.

With regards to the peace-building process, is scale an issue? Does the program work differently is small Burundi and in the very large Democratic Republic of Congo? Does the level of scrutiny affect the process?

The question of opacity and transparency is very interesting. Over the past fifteen to twenty years, transparency has increased throughout the world. Does this transparency penetrate to important negotiations between rentier countries and multinational companies?

**Responses from the Panelists**

Mr. Wolpe highlighted that we need to be concerned with the issue of sequencing in the peace vs. justice debate. All elements need to be brought into the political process in order to give any prosecution process the required legitimacy among all groups involved. It is important to be pragmatic because judicial processes can get in the way of peacebuilding.

With regards to the training process, Mr. Wolpe indicated that the results on the ground and the process itself have not been significantly different in the Democratic Republic of Congo than they were in Burundi. The only real difference is that in the DRC the focus has been on crisis prevention rather than capacity building.

Professor Karl emphasized that the issue of how to build justice is a fundamental one, and that her own experiences in Chile, El Salvador and South Africa suggest that there are no easy answers and that an intimate familiarity with the conditions of each country should be the primary guiding line in seeking to address this issue.

In addition, the issue of governance before and after these wars is of paramount importance. It raises questions about how to construct the rule of law, as well as more democratic institutions. Rents make it extremely difficult to engage in state-building and create a strong civil service. When there are no incentives to build a strong civil service, it is easier for leaders to cement their political base.

As for the issue of transparency and opacity, Professor Karl noted that the markets and prices in rentier bargains are not transparent. The bargain is all about speculation
about risk—and about how to avoid the increased volatility of prices. Ironically, one of
the main reasons for volatility is the secrecy. It should also be noted that although there
are increasing trends toward transparency, climate change and militarization around
petroleum is undermining this shift.

Professor Akhavan noted that the issue of sequencing in peace processes is indeed
important, but that we should be careful also not to negotiate too early, and not only not
to prosecute too soon. We need to understand prosecution as part of a larger strategy and
not as incompatible with negotiation and collaboration. In fact, the same thing could be
said about the issue of corruption; it will be interesting to see how UN convention plays
out in implementation. If we look at corruption, we have not been passive actors in the
process. The problem of crime paying has to do with our willingness in the name of
pragmatism to sweep things under the carpet and continue business as usual.

He also emphasized that we cannot make judicial intervention a substitute for
justice and that although one always has to look at the local realities, the starting point
should always be this question: How can we look at this reality and modify it with a view
to implementation?

Question and Answer Period:

In response to a question about the regime of ownership of oil and how it might
affect transparency and reconstruction, specifically, as to the possible effects of
privatization on democratization, Professor Karl indicated that ownership of oil does not
seem to be the issue; the problem is about rents. Privatization in fact often simply moves
the rents from the public to the private sector. As the case of Russia shows, the private
rentiers can become a catalyst for conflict in the future. What is important is the control
of rents and their fair allocation.

In response to a question regarding the reasons why Botswana has not fallen into
the trends of rentier states in spite of its reliance of diamonds, Professor Karl emphasized
that: Botswana is the exception that proves the rule. More specifically, she reminded the
audience that rents are about two processes of allocation: one between states and
multinational companies, and one within the states. In Botswana, negotiations between
the state and De Beers led to a deal where the crux issue was over the control of the
amount of diamonds extracted, and it was in the interest of both parties to keep the price
of diamonds high and therefore to limit production. This unusual situation led to high
levels of cooperation between the two parties. In terms of the internal negotiations, the
institutions that needed to be built had to serve a very homogenous population. In
addition, the proximity of South Africa helped to create very strong links between the
government and citizens. The presence of natural resources does not mean that it is
impossible to build institutions, but it does mean that the negotiations and deals
surrounding these resources have to be made transparent.

With regards to sequencing, Professor Karl noted that one argument maintains that
Africa’s resources should be developed in a protectorate-like arrangement to ensure the
safe extraction of these resources. Her preferred position is one that holds that that
sequencing was arranged poorly in the Chad Basin—that a pipeline should not be started
until certain democratic institutions are built from the bottom up. This argument supports
a plan to slow the progress of the pipeline in order to first strengthen institutions of
accountability.
In response to a question as to whether the leadership training program is country specific, Mr. Wolpe remarked that we need to distinguish between methods of training and the specific strategy pursued in a specific country. He believes that the techniques have universal application. The strategy, however, will vary from country to country. We need to identify and incorporate the key players in each case, and personal relations as well as institutional legitimacy will play different roles in establishing the initial set of players in each case.

The question was raised by Mr. Elbadawi, as to whether oil can be the glue that holds countries together in a federalized system that stipulates that revenue must be shared in an objective way? Might oil be an agent for peace in the context of Iraq? What are the institutional contexts that could make this possible?

In response, Mr. Wolpe remarked that this might be a useful policy, but that the fundamental problem is not how to manage oil revenues; rather the problem is that people do not trust each other. Therefore, these policies will be fragile and tenuous in the absence of processes that could try to build confidence, trust, and collaborative capacity.

For her part, Professor Karl noted that such an arrangement is no longer possible in Iraq, partly because of the lack of trust, and partly because of the secrecy of the oil agreements themselves, which compounds the problem of trust.


Discussant: Rt. Hon. Joe Clark, Centre for Developing-Area Studies

One thing that has become clear in the work of Globescan is that managing perceptions is everything. Public opinion polls and surveys are one tool that we use in order to measure these perceptions. Essentially, we work with “bad” companies such as the oil and mining sectors in order to help them better relate to communities. Our project was first launched in December 2004. By 2006, we had expanded to ten countries: Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe. Our work in Angola and Ethiopia gave us the opportunity to pursue this work in an urban setting.

First we ask the question, “What is the most important problem facing your country?” The top response that we have received is poverty. People then most frequently listed unemployment, a poor economy, government corruption, and hunger as the most important problems facing their countries. Interestingly, education was ranked at the bottom in all countries. This result was slightly less extreme in the case of South Africa, where people ranked the HIV/AIDS prevalence as an important factor.

When asked to identify the biggest obstacles to poverty-reduction in Sub-Saharan Africa, the majority of people noted government corruption. In invoking the government, many mentioned a lack of political will and capacity to overcome poverty. Finally, a lack of education was the third most mentioned weakness in government. HIV/AIDS was also mentioned as a barrier to poverty-reduction throughout the region. In all of these countries, people are convinced that the government serves its own interests at the expense of citizens. When we asked who people believed was responsible for their country’s problems, people overwhelmingly cited the government.

The second question we asked attempted to get a sense of the general level of optimism in the region—including the degree to which people think about and plan for
the future. We found strong optimism and even confidence in system. In general throughout the region, this optimism was particularly pronounced just before elections.

Over the course of our research, we found the prominent belief that Africa’s problems can be solved by Africa alone. We asked the question, “How much do you trust each of the following to operate in our society’s best interests?” We included government officials, religious leaders, civil society actors, and other state actors. With the exception of Tanzania, we found less optimism within countries—and, actually, noted declining trust in government. Religious groups were the most trusted actors, while NGOs and multilateral institutions also enjoyed high levels of trust.

Overall, there was little trust in domestic institutions; instead, people were more likely to trust institutions with less influence on day to day life. Tanzania is one country in which perceptions have changed quite a lot; indeed, perceptions of corruption there are decreasing, while there is an opposite trend in Kenya.

Overall, citizens in these countries did not provide a strong endorsement of government performance in solving national issues. However, even though there is not a great deal of faith in the capacity of government, people continue to hold aspirational views of the government.

Next, we asked out what issues people want their governments to prioritize. The majority of respondents first chose job creation. Because poverty is so salient, people really want jobs.

Also, we attempted to understand out how people view companies in these societies. There is some disapproval of companies that prioritize economic gain without investing any resources into the society. There is a widespread expectation that these companies will go beyond profit-making and invest in the social welfare of societies. Asked about the nature of this involvement, people expressed a desire for charities that will work to alleviate poverty.

More than elsewhere, a strong desire was expressed that the companies in South Africa should be South African. South Africans exhibited national pride in their own institutions and proved to have stronger anti-globalization sentiments than Africans in other countries.

Asked who should be responsible for improving the lives of the global poor, most respondents answered that they believe that global companies should shoulder this responsibility more than governments. Except in the mining and oil industries, there is generally less cynicism about multinational corporations in Africa than in North America and Europe.

Throughout Africa, there is very low awareness of development through multilateral institutions. The most important developmental goals seem to be the alleviation of poverty/hunger and HIV/AIDS. There is a lot of faith that the G8 countries will keep their commitments to eradicating poverty, which suggests faith in the international system. South Africa is the only country in which a majority of people suggest that their government is more responsible than any other actors for improving the lives of the poor.

Throughout Africa, there is a dissonant view of government: people view it as fundamentally flawed, but they still want it to be part of the solution.
Question and Answer Period:

In response to a question as to who uses the information generated by Globescan, Mr. Jimenez noted that since it represents a cost-effective way of understanding public attitudes, his organization’s information is provided to their clients on a syndicated basis. He added, however, that they seek to make it available to key political actors and that the Commission of Africa has used it.

With regards to the question of whether there were significant differences in the responses of people of different faiths and if there is a surge of religiosity in Africa, Mr. Jimenez offered to provide that information directly, as it was not part of his presentation. He noted, however, that the trend toward trust in religious groups to help alleviate suffering is a growing trend all over the world. This may be a reaction to globalization and to perceptions of Americanization.

To the question of how respondents’ trust is gained and how the accuracy of the results is verified, Mr. Jimenez indicated that in addition to using local people to conduct the surveys, Globescan consulted with its partner organizations in order to create a field plan to try to guard against potential biases. In order to make sure that these interviewers took the time they needed to gain accurate results, they were also asked to record the amount of time they spent on each interview.

A member of the audience suggested that Mr. Jimenez’s interpretation of globalization as explanatory seemed to contradict the amount of respect allotted to multinational corporations in these countries. To clarify, Mr. Jimenez suggested that globalization is one possible explanation, but that it probably has a lot more to do with the type of companies. Pharmaceutical companies were seen as unique in that they were seen as part of the solution to health care concerns, and they were trusted by 75% of the population. With other companies, there are aspirations for these companies to play a role in development, but there is not nearly as much trust.

Panel: Democratic Governance I: Inclusion and Difference
Panel Chair: Kristin Rawls, McGill University
Discussant: Kathleen Fallon, McGill University

Emmanuel Gyimah-Boadi, University of Ghana. “Difference, Inclusion Deficits and Democratic Governance in Africa”.

This presentation is intended to review the challenge of difference and inclusion and to make some suggestions as to how to address it.

African societies carry some of the worst characteristics of badly managed difference. Colonial policies and the development structures that they put in place carry some responsibility for the severe cleavages and exclusion that exist in Africa, and can be exemplified by the carelessly drawn boundaries, the introduction of Christianity and the relocation of former slaves, all of which led to the subversion of existing power relations and to the creation of economic enclaves which deepened pre-existing inequalities. States emerged, therefore, largely without a common social or cultural heritage.

These cleavages were reinforced and increased by the policies of postcolonial states, especially during the first 30 years after independence, which saw a desire to suppress differences in order to “combat subversion”. The new states used groups such as political brokers and entrepreneurs to concentrate power to the exclusion of all other
groups. They tended to rely on cooptation and repression, and they lacked incentives to base their relationship with their citizens on the trust and accountability that are needed for peace- and democracy-building. As a result, we see in Africa a process of over-centralization followed by a bad process of decentralization, which have combined to limit the development of civil society.

Currently, there is an emphasis on democratization and good governance in many African states, which leads to the question of how to address these historical problems in a context of democratic politics. The premise of this presentation is that democracy represents the best chance to mediate fractionalization, but we need to recognize the challenges that will be faced, and difference represents a real challenge to inclusion.

The good news is that even partial democracy helps. The ballot box has replaced coups, and the majority of adults have a direct stake in their own government. Democracy also has the virtue of affirming the equality of all and providing some protection of fundamental rights. The return of popularly elected governments is also helping to reduce the gap in popular representation. The emergence of an independent media and civil society represent an opportunity to begin to foster accountability and responsiveness, which are the necessary starting point to begin to address the problem of exclusion.

However, there are still outstanding deficits. Africa’s democratic projects are occurring against a background of authoritarianism, mistrust of government, polarization and violent conflict. This allows for the persistence of political, social and economic exclusion, in spite of the proscription of discrimination against women and minorities, and in spite of the affirmation of state secularity. In certain cases, citizenship rules are still exclusivist. In addition, political parties are often organized along sectarian lines, and patterns of voting as well as civil society organizations are often politically ethnicized. The media themselves often engage in sensationalism. Furthermore, the recent authoritarian past still evokes bitterness among the political opposition, which means that these parties are not always willing to be accommodating towards those favored by the former regime, and the normal approach to politics is one of mutual loathing and a zero-sum understanding of election results. National reconciliation processes are also often perceived as political vendettas.

In this context, we need to find ways to achieve and enhance accommodation and inclusion. It is clear that it is important to sustain popular commitment to the democratic process. There are currently some very creative experiments in pro-democratic engineering in Africa, such as in Nigeria and South Africa, among other examples. These are all good experimentations in the direction of promoting inclusion. Other possible approaches would be to deepen the devolution of authority to the regions to increase participation at the grassroots and secure minority participation. Power-sharing and consociational arrangements are other options that need to be explored more seriously, as are public interest litigation for the enforcement of anti-discrimination provisions, and maybe even the banning of ethnic parties.


In the efforts to challenge the patterns of exclusion in Africa, there are some interesting trends such as the rise of female political leaders in Rwanda, where today 43% of the seats in the legislature are held by women. Similarly, in Africa today, one third of
parliamentary seats are held by women in many countries, and in others the figure reaches nearly 50%. In comparison, in Canada this is only 21% and only 16% in the United States. Speakers of the House, candidates for the president and now the President of Liberia are also women. This indicates a trend of women asserting themselves politically in Africa, and this is a direct consequence of the mobilization of women. They are now prime ministers and governors of subnational entities; they hold key cabinet positions in defense, finance and foreign affairs. Women in Africa are forming and heading political parties at unprecedented levels. We are even seeing changes at the Pan-African level: the president of the Pan-African Parliament is a woman, as are half of the Commissioners of the African Union, where they hold key portfolios.

We are also seeing a new phenomenon, where women often outnumber men as voters, activists and demonstrators, and in the pro-democracy movements. In part, women are still relegated to the women’s wing of these movements and continue to be in a subservient position. However, since the 1990s, women are participating in political leadership in a more significant manner.

All of these developments are significant given the constraints that women face for action in the public realm, such as cultural prohibitions against speaking in public places or entering certain spaces. There is still a high level of social stigma that places additional strains on marriages, with the corresponding low levels of spousal support for these activities. Similarly, single and divorced women face different sets of stigmas.

In this context, how can we explain the upsurge in female legislators? We can find the explanation in part in the influence of both domestic and international women’s movements, in the institution of quotas, the actions of development agencies and the end of major armed conflicts. Arguably, this rise in female representation is not directly linked to democratization, because it should be noted that in non-democratic countries there are often quotas for the representation of women. But the rise of women’s movements is indeed linked to the processes of democratization. This becomes evident in the case of Africa because such mobilization is not very common outside of Commonwealth countries, which suggests a link to changing international norms, which help to energize national campaigns.

Furthermore, the introduction of quotas is often tied to the pressure exerted by women’s movements. This in turn is tied to the evidence that quotas are an effective tool for increased female representation. About 20% of African countries have such quotas, and these have managed to double women’s representation.

The end of armed conflicts has provided important opportunity structures for women’s movements to push for these measures. Indeed, these contexts provide a leveling effect, in that there are no male incumbents, and it is in these junctures that new constitutions and new rules of governance are being put in place, providing a clean slate of sorts. Women have also been involved in recent peace negotiations which gives added legitimacy to their claims for representation.

Women have made huge strides since the 1990s, but there have been no significant payoffs so far, due to a lack of resources and the slow change of popular perceptions, but these changes are nonetheless important. The lesson to be learned from this experience is that the level of democracy does matter in translating increased representation into greater equality.
Khalid Medani, McGill University. “The Darfur Crisis and the Challenge of Democracy in Sudan”.

This presentation is intended to provide a sense of the contours of the Darfur crisis, by considering the notion that the absence of democracy has sparked conflict in Darfur. We will discuss also the roots of the conflict and the role that oil has played in determining the timing and pattern of the conflict.

We need to understand that there are some problems created by certain myths in the international community, such as the framing of the conflict as a genocide which means that the conflict is understood as an Arab-African conflict in the region of West Sudan, whereas it is really a national problem which is linked to the earlier war in South Sudan and to other internal conflicts. There can be no solution to the conflict in Darfur without this understanding of its broader meaning.

Is this a genocide or a proxy war? Legally, it may well be a genocide, but analytically, it is a case of a weak state trying to consolidate its power through a proxy militia. There is a real humanitarian crisis, which stems from the combination of a real state and a resource curse, with the state essentially scavenging for rents in the region. The state is seeking to use its own oil to maintain patronage networks.

The conflict is further fuelled by the effects of environmental degradation and a long drought that pits nomad groups against sedentary ones, and by the fact that historically this region has been the most neglected in the country. Indeed, the initial conflict arose as a violent demand for the allocation of some revenue from the state. The severity of the government’s response was unexpected and misunderstood by its victims. It devastated livestock—the most important resource in terms of wealth, status and livelihoods—and caused enormous displacement of population.

We also need to address the issue of identity as a cause in this conflict and understand the meaning of the designation of “Arab” or “African” in the region. Essentially, pastoralists are constructed as “Arabized”, and sedentary groups are constructed as “Africanized”. There is also no essential notion of identity in this area. Historically, indeed, conflict resolution among these groups has taken the form of intermarriage and cohabitation along with shared livelihoods. For the people involved, this is a political, not an ethnic or racial conflict. However, the state has contributed to the politicization of these cultural, ethnic differences.

We also need to remember that the oil factor is very important. The conflict is linked to the South Sudanese peace agreement in three ways. This agreement between the north and the south was an agreement between two non-democratic warring parties. The demand from the Western region to be included in the pact marked the beginning of the conflict in Darfur. Since the 1980s, the government has pursued a scorched-earth policy, tied to the production of Sudanese oil in the South in 1999. Within two years, oil came to represent 42% of revenue (from 0% in 1999), and 40% of the budget of the military. The volume of production increased as rents decreased with the oil prices, so the government wanted to increase production especially in the South and with massive oil concessions in Darfur, which not coincidentally overlap with the regions affected by the government’s “pacification” campaigns.

The solution to the conflict in Darfur should come from more inclusive forms of power-sharing, resource sharing, and the enforcement of security agreements.
Discussant: Kathleen Fallon, McGill University

All of these presentations highlight the importance of the idea of the nation state and its institutions, and how these may contribute to exclusion and/or to the recreation of institutions which, while still based on Western notions, have sometimes allowed for some additional inclusion. All of this serves to work toward a better understanding of the idea of democratic governance. When we look at the issue of democracy, we need to begin by examining how best to get there from where we are at the moment. This is important because we tend to rely on what we already know about democracy, and it seems that we might need to start by challenging our own notions when we try to apply these concepts elsewhere. We need to remember also that even advanced democracies have so far not been able to fully solve the problem of inclusion. In that sense, democracy may well represent the first step in the process of inclusion, but clearly that is not sufficient.

Question and Answer Period:

Professor Karl inquired as to the issue of religious differentiation in the discussion on Sudan, and whether the argument presented was that the pattern of depopulation can be explained by a clearing of oil producing areas. In response, Professor Medani explained that while religion is a very important part of people’s identities in the region, it does not explain the political conflict in Darfur. Indeed, he noted that one important reason for the conflict was an internal split within the Islamist government itself. He further remarked that discussions of the issue of religion may in fact serve to obscure the issue of the actual political competition causes of the conflict. It is clear also, he added, that oil sets the context for the conflict in that it creates an interest in pacifying the region to prevent it from seceding.

In response to a question regarding the actual effects of increases in female representation and how long it may be before we can assess its impact, Professor Tripp responded that it is yet too soon to tell and that the relevant research is not yet done. However, we do know in the case of Uganda, the country with the longest record of increased female representation, that the results so far are not very good. There is an increase in the presence of women but in terms of key legislation, when it has been passed, it has been vetoed by the president in order to safeguard the clan system. It appears therefore that women are so far used mostly for patronage and that greater democratization will be needed for their increased presence to translate into significant change.

With regards to the conflict in Darfur, Mr. Elbadawi remarked that the success of peace building will be determined by both local and external competency and on the characteristics of the war itself. Because the process is deliberately confined to the combatants, it will be important to ensure that the rest of the Darfurian community, which is currently not represented in any peace talks, find a way to define their own common agenda. He further noted that the existing political establishment will have to play an important role here as well. In response, Professor Medani agreed that local competence would be very important, and that the process of peace building seemed to have been rushed by external actors for political purposes. He further noted, on a separate point, that there seems to be a reluctance to recognize that places like Sudan have the potential to
democratize, and that civil society can still participate in this process in spite of the on-going conflict.

A member of the audience commented that in spite of the fact that most constitutions now have provisions for inclusion, in practice the levels of exclusion do not seem to have abated, and then inquired to what extent weak civil societies and cultural and traditional elements contribute to hindering inclusion. Mr. Gyimah-Boadi responded that it would be inaccurate to state that civil societies in Africa are all weak, and that many types of civil society organization are in fact quite strong, such as those that have organic roots. He did note that sometimes these are the very organizations that serve to hinder inclusion. He argued that the real problem is the weakness of cross-cutting civil society organizations. It is important to note that the previous situation of authoritarianism and co-optation was much worse, and that therefore democratic openings are in fact making a positive contribution.

**Panel: Democratic Governance II: Public Health**

Panel Chair: Mónica Treviño, McGill University
Discussant: Myron Echenberg, McGill University

Lee-Nah Hsu, UNDP. “The Pivotal Role of Democratic Governance and Public Health for Development”.

Viruses do not discriminate. And they do not respect territorial boundaries. This presentation considers the impact of good governance on public health and suggests that democratic principles are crucial for dealing with health crises. Do health pandemics suggest an impenetrable clash of cultures, or are they an opportunity to build multilateral partnerships? I want to consider the debate around tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS. In the past, tuberculosis (TB) was handled through a paternalistic medical approach, and it seems that it is more difficult to apply democratic principles to the TB pandemic than to HIV/AIDS because the latter is a disease that does not discriminate according to class or race, this is particularly evident. In combating the HIV/AIDS pandemic, it is important to ensure an equity principle such that everyone has a right to health care that is protected as a universal human right in a participatory and transparent state. We need a higher level of transparency from pharmaceutical companies and accountability that is performance-based.

Activists in South Africa are increasingly demanding access to information and participation; this has resulted in the availability, access, and appropriateness of services and has ultimately strengthened public health effectiveness. After a lot of negotiations between activists, NGOs, and government officials, a new AIDS strategy was adopted last week in South Africa. There is a great deal of hope that this strategy will make up for weaknesses in the past strategy and that adequate education and technology will be integrated into a responsible policy. By inserting democratic principles into public health, as in this South African example, it is possible to facilitate sustainable development, ultimately reducing vulnerability to and building resilience against disease.

Many are critical about the possibility of inserting democratic principles into public health. Some suggest that, there are so many social problems in Africa, that it is unfeasible to address public health in a democratic way. They lament that it is too difficult to reach consensus and also suggest that limited resources make democratic
principles unrealistic. They argue that the insertion of democratic principles makes public health policy too complicated.

One example of what I have in mind as a response to these critics was intended as a response to the problem of orphans and vulnerable children in Asia. A field was set up in which children could raise crops for their food and attend a school that provided them with valuable life skills. This project created empowerment by maintaining responsiveness, strategic vision, participation, equity, effectiveness, transparency, and respect for the rule of law. The project resulted in a situation of sustainable food security for the children, enabling them to improve their quality of life and safeguard their mental and physical health. The democratic governance principle was inserted into this practice of securing food and livelihood for these children and resulted in successful outcomes.

Democracy is not a static process. No country in the world is fully and perfectly democratic. Public health is an important platform through which to create an orientation toward consensus, respect for the rule of law, equity, and collaboration. These recommendations may also have the potential to reduce conflict.

Good governance is a crucial element of forging such democratic openings as increased participation and civil society partnerships. Because multiple sectors should be involved, it is also important to promote partnerships with non-health sector. Public health can be improved through democratic elements within societies. One of the biggest new challenges on the horizon is a highly pathogenic strain of avian influenza. In order to combat the spread of this disease, health systems must be strengthened and an early warning rapid response system must be developed. The best way of doing this is through democratic processes.

Although HIV does not discriminate, it is possible to consider the ways that we have been racist in our response to it. In order to get past the inequalities, broadly democratic governance principles must be inserted into the health care system. One place to look is the UNDP, which has a much broader perspective on the meaning of democracy than the World Bank. To learn more about some of the work that activists are doing, please see our website at http://www.hivdevelopment.org.


UNICEF’s conceptual framework for child nutrition suggests that the immediate proximal factors causing poor nutrition are poor diet and disease. In order to ensure that children are protected, I believe that we need interventions at all levels of government. Moreover, I suggest that adequate nutrition should be a fundamental component of all development goals. Sub-Saharan Africa is doing a poor job in meeting the UN Development Goals, which include halving the percentage of the world’s hungry between 1990 and 2015. The reason for the importance attributed to nutrition has to do with the damaging consequences associated with malnutrition. Some of these include: an increased risk of child death, stunted early development (physical, social, and cognitive), diminished productivity in adulthood, increased risks with reproduction, and increased risk of chronic diseases. In addition to these individual costs, these effects negatively affect communities by diminishing their potential.
I want to talk today about a project that I have been involved with called ENAM (Enhancing Child Nutrition through Animal Source Food Management). This project is also ongoing in Eastern Uganda, but I want to talk today about its work in Ghana. The project is committed to a participatory approach that obtains data through interviews and focus group discussions on the barriers to child nutrition and on animal source food (ASF). Many key actors were involved in this process, including the regional and national managers of agriculture and health ministries, various NGO staff, and extension service workers. Usually, it is a challenge for these groups to find the resources to go into village communities to assess needs.

In order to comprise our group of participants, we approached community leaders and key informants. We asked all of these people to help us understand the specific factors that limit the utility of ASF for improving child nutrition in Ghana. The primary limitation cited was low income. Nevertheless, it is important to stress that low income alone is not the sole causal factor. Other impediments to nutrition include limited knowledge about the dietary needs of young children; cultural practices that discourage eating some of these foods; a lack of institutional and financial resources; and a lack of opportunities for the training of women.

One of our main goals in this project was to help women improve income and food security for their families through support for income generating activities. We hoped to enhance the institutional and human resource capacity in the area to address child nutrition. We followed the Heifer International model, which involves giving a gift of a cow or chickens to a group or family; when these animals reproduce, they are passed on to another family or group. We also followed some aspects of the model used by Freedom from Hunger—this organization works through private rural banks to provide loans and vocational training through banks equipped to work with low income communities. Individual community residents are an important player in this international process, as they help to ensure good placements that lead to more lucrative businesses.

Although this is a nascent project, we have obtained positive results that we hope mean that we will see continued successful interventions in the future.

Currently, intakes of ASF in Ghana are tied to household wealth. We have engaged different partners in this process because we hope to develop sustainable interventions. The government of Ghana needs to take on the responsibility of extension funding and should also look for opportunities to forge partnerships with the various private sectors. We hope that this program has become strong enough to face questions and challenges as they arise, working with NGOs to sustain rural banks that are interested in working and expanding their services into the other regions.

Yogan Pillay, Chief Director of Strategic Planning in National Department of Health in South Africa. “Key Health Challenges in Africa”.

Today, there was an article in the Globe and Mail which says that 42% of medical graduates in this province in 2006 were foreign. This brings me to one point that I want to make today: brain drain needs to be taken into consideration in policy planning. At the same time, I would argue that we should not be overly simplistic in placing judgment on governments; instead, we need to understand the context of what they are trying to do.

Between April 9 and 13, 2007, African ministers of health will be meeting in Johannesburg to discuss health challenges in Africa and to create African health care
strategies. This meeting presents both challenges and opportunities, but I would argue that we have some basis for optimism. Here I will provide a brief introduction to health concerns in Sub-Saharan Africa, as well as some context on the great burden of disease. I will also discuss some of the challenges that we have had in procuring sufficient resources to combat the problem, as well as some of the additional problems that have beset those involved in governance and management, and monitoring and evaluation. I will end with some important policy recommendations and considerations.

Public health problems in Sub-Saharan Africa—and particularly in South Africa—are well known. Some recent publications have attempted to place these problems in context. One notable finding of the WHO suggests that a child born in Africa has more than a fifty percent chance of being malnourished and is also at high risk of being HIV positive at birth. The African child is also at high risk of death due to malaria, diarrheal diseases, and acute respiratory disease.

The burden of disease in Sub-Saharan Africa is extreme: Africans are affected by the triple burden of disease risk in the context of poverty, high unemployment, and violent conflict. Sub-Saharan Africans constitute just about ten percent of the world’s population and shoulder some of its worst poverty. In Africa, maternal mortality is the highest of anywhere in the world. In addition, the African region of the World Health Organization comprises ten to eleven percent of the world’s people, but 60% of the world’s HIV/AIDS-infected population.

Despite the challenges for public health, some progress has been made. River blindness in Sub-Saharan Africa has been eliminated, and the continent has seen a 97% reduction in guinea worm infestation. Leprosy and polio are close to being eliminated in the continent, and 37 African countries have immunized at least 60% of their populations against measles.

Africa lacks sufficient resources to effectively meet the public health challenges it faces. Forty-five percent of Africans live below the world poverty level; family and community resources are meager; and many lack access to clean water and sanitation. In addition, there are not enough health workers in Africa.

We face many challenges to meeting the Millennium Development Goals. Some of these include poor governance, national poverty traps, and pockets of poverty. Some of the most damaging governance issues include corruption and a lack of the capacity required to effectively manage resources. African countries need a more stable environment that facilitates greater accountability and mass public participation. In order to accomplish the needed changes, Africa needs skilled and accountable workers.

It has been difficult to implement the needed changes in the absence of a competent monitoring and evaluation system. There are simply not sufficient resources to accomplish these things. As a result of scarce resources, most African countries do not have adequate health information systems, although Eritrea, the Gambia, Niger, and Tanzania have generally proven an exception to this rule.

According to available statistics, ninety percent of health research worldwide benefits ten percent of the world’s population. Although a great deal of money is spent on clinical trials in the world, there are also few African researchers participating in this work. Because of these disparities, it is crucial to consider research ethics—and to work to translate research findings into practice in Sub-Saharan Africa.
There are many policy prescriptions that can help to meet the Millennium Development Goals. First, it is crucial to alleviate poverty by growing the economy throughout Africa. It is also important that we work to strengthen health systems and to improve governance across the region by rooting out corruption. Three major tasks that must be accomplished are the elimination of civil conflict, the empowerment of women, and containment of the brain drain.

In closing, I want to list several principles that I believe are key to the development of African health strategy. First, health is a developmental concern requiring a multi-sectoral response. Second, it is crucial to operate under the assumption that access to quality, affordable health care is a human right. Third, equity in health care should be a foundation for all health systems. Fourth, effectiveness and efficiency are central to realizing the maximum possible benefits from available resources. These principles can provide the basis for a sound health practice.

**Discussant: Myron Echenberg, McGill University**

More and more, we are learning that the price victims pay upon surviving diarrhetic diseases is much greater than previously believed. Children who suffer these diseases up to the age of two may later experience serious cognitive problems. So, when we consider these diseases, we must keep in mind that this is an issue of nutrition. We are also talking about water, which brings us into a realm of problems experienced in many countries. Addressing the issue of access to clean water requires vigilance.

In order to tie all of these concerns together, I want to consider the South African literature—because it is the best developed of the literature on the region. The apartheid regime did not show goodwill toward black Africans in the realm of public health. Although the issue of nutrition has been poorly served in the social sciences, a book by Diana Wiley called *Starving on a Full Stomach* documents the disregard that South African health workers displayed toward black Africans.

Dr. Hsu’s claim that health was handled in a paternalistic way brings to mind the fact that in the case of South Africa, it was far worse than a case of benign neglect. Even so, I do endorse your notion that we have a good early warning system now.

Dr. Marquis has presented a good study in process, reflecting some of what we know from social science research from Ghana—namely, that women’s entrepreneurship is an old and successful vocation on the coast. Income generating activities have gone a good job of picking up on initiatives that integrate and are sensitive to local culture.

The statistical perspective that Dr. Pillay provided is also useful. It is no secret that we need partnerships between academia and government; obtaining the cooperation necessary to forge these partnerships is another matter.

**Question and Answer Period:**

In response to a question as to whether he was speaking just about the clinical and technical aspects of public health which also noted that the focus on the management of resources did not seem to equal good governance, Dr. Pillay responded that there is an acknowledgement that we must manage the resources that currently exist, and that the current question is how to accomplish this. Donor support will be crucial for improving health systems in Africa, as will be operational financial management and high skill
levels of managers. One key to this problem is to figure out how to hold African governments accountable.

A member of the audience asked whether engaging the Diaspora might serve to address the problem of the brain drain, and whether any policies are in place to attract high skills workers from other parts of the world. Dr. Pillay responded that African leaders are in fact trying to find ways of attracting human resources for health care. He also noted that it is important to understand brain drain in context, because the middle classes leave because they feel unsafe and want better education opportunities, and that we need to come up with creative interventions to keep people there, hopefully through a more consolidated response to the problem. A member of the audience, with regards to the issue of the Diaspora, noted that the Rwandan government is allowing people in the Diaspora to come back in order to provide training, which sometimes entices people to return.

In response to a question on how to improve public health without becoming paralyzed by the many different government ministries, Dr. Hsu noted that we need to get people to take these issues on as their own rather than passively relying on assistance. By instilling good governance principles, we stress that it is up to these populations themselves to determine whether or not they will have a future. This requires that we engage with them to persuade them to take initiative on their own and recognize that their children can have a positive future.

On the same topic, Dr. Marquis noted that in countries that have an extension system there are people regularly in contact with the community. These contacts provide opportunities to train people both to grow cash crops and to maintain their health. In Ghana, there is a growing interest within the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Agriculture, and the university system in training people to provide that kind of training and education to rural communities.

Saturday, March 31
Panel: Science, Technology and Education
Panel Chair: Mathabo Khau, University of KwaZulu-Natal
Discussant: Philip Oxhorn, CDAS

Claudia Mitchell, McGill University. “Every Voice Counts: An Assets-Based Approach to Addressing the Challenges of Rural Education in South Africa in the Age of AIDS”.

This presentation attempts to frame education within a development framework and provides a case for looking at gender violence in and around schools. It explores issues that I believe are critical in rural education and begins to map out an asset-based approach. I argue that gender issues are a key concern of education and development. Girls comprise the majority of students in South Africa and are some of the most extreme victims of poverty and the spread of HIV. Indeed, women and children are among the most vulnerable populations with regard to these trends. My project attempts to think about creating safe spaces for women and children, and how such achievements can affect the rest of these communities in a positive way.

First, it is important to frame education within a development framework, in line with the Millennium Development Goals, which stress education for all as an important
goal. The Convention on the Rights of a Child also supports equity in education, as does the 2006 Secretary General’s Study on Violence Against Children. The latter looks at the way that schools can be safe havens; places where we can embark on creating a conflict free society. We must ensure that children learn in safe environments and that they acquire tools for conflict transformation.

My study focuses on South Africa, where the state constitution also supports the goals set forth by the international community. Despite the progressive legal framework within which its schools operate, Human Rights Watch in 2001 claimed that women face particularly egregious human rights abuses while at school. Inequity and abuses in schools have also been reported elsewhere. Many reports have found some rather staggering realities. Up to 57% of schools lack electricity; 69% are without adequate toilet facilities, and 55% lack an adequate supply of clean, running water.

The first initiative in which I was involved in KwaZulu-Natal was called the Learning Together Project. This project used participatory methodologies in order to invest in the community. We focused on training teachers in three secondary schools and community health workers in one clinic. We made sure the clinic was very well-resourced and could become a hub to bring the school communities together. Finally, we asked these teachers what they felt were the biggest challenges students faced in school; many suggested that they felt that there were many challenges involved in addressing the problem of HIV/AIDS.

We used a multi-media approach and made video and film available. We placed cameras in the hands of young people, teachers, health workers, and others. We asked them to consider how they might visualize the problems their communities face. Participants did the planning and data analysis on this project themselves. Some of these photographs are particularly poignant. We also worked to put together a video documentary that was put together by teachers, health workers, parents, and learners who participated in these workshops. The documentary shows pictures of gender-based violence and has been widely-requested for showings in the area.

The second project that we became involved with was called Every Voice Counts. This program was sponsored by the National Research Foundation (NRF) and the Research Niche Area Program. The project would last five years and would target the Faculty of Education at the University of KwaZulu-Natal in five main study areas. The goal was to create partnerships that the NRF and other internationally funded projects on rural education could help to facilitate. In order to be successful, we needed multi-sector planning. The plan was to help train people to teach development, while allowing South African researchers themselves to do the research.

The asset-based model used here targeted various study areas, employing reflexive research methodologies in studying the teachers’ lives. We also explored the areas of school leadership and management, youth as knowledge-producers in addressing HIV/AIDS, and school and community partnerships to address gender-based violence. We attempted to assess the impact of gender-based violence on women—including pregnancy, school drop out rates, and psychological trauma. The teachers had to be on the ground to do this work, and needed support. The entire community ended up getting involved, including men and boys as well as many faith-based organizations.

In conclusion, we believe that an intensification of work with faculty in one or two districts of the area is of key importance, as is the establishment of long term funding
sources. It is also crucial to continue developing partnerships between rural community development, health care workers and the Department of Education. We need to continue to devise creative approaches to sustaining hope.


Today, I will consider financing institutions that provide resources to developing countries in Africa. We want to promote the use of technology in Africa as a link to better education, and to do this, we are trying to build a critical mass of science-trained Africans to develop technology. This presentation will consider Africa in context, addressing the new importance of science and technology and the role that the African Development Bank can play in promoting science and technology and in the creation of an appropriate policy framework.

In the African context, it is extremely important to work for empowerment. Africa has a lot of catching up to do to reach the level of technology in other parts of the world. We need massive investments in human capital in order to move forward. Science and technology are growing in importance throughout the world. In the development community, there is increased attention to scientific innovation and technological advances as a tool for accelerating development. For example, at the African Union Summit of Heads of State in January 2007, leaders dedicated themselves to promoting both science and technology in Africa, discussing science and technology in the African Diaspora, the role of African scientists and policy makers, and ways of popularizing science in Africa.

The question is how to harness science and technology for the purpose of development in Africa. First, it is important to increase investment. There is a positive correlation between the advancement of science and technology and investment in the area. In order to improve this situation, it is crucial to tap into people in the Diaspora, who can help to revise educational curricula, enhance the links between science and industry, take initiatives to reinvigorate higher education, and introduce science and technology innovations in Africa. Our bank is still participating in basic education, but we would like to scale up our work to create a critical mass of human resources to help close the technology gap.

Sub-Saharan Africa has been beset by a long legacy of economic stagnation, which has contributed to a lack of funding for education, minimal investment in science and technology, civil unrest, warfare, and mismanagement of funds. Africa lags behind all other continents in education—and this fact is particularly striking in the areas of science and technology. Our bank is involved in a policy dialogue and engages countries directly by providing technical assistance or by making money available for technical assistance and help with project design. Moreover, our research department is engaged in research and knowledge-creation on science and technology in Sub-Saharan Africa.

The current education policy paper was approved in 1999; it emphasizes the impact and sustainability of educational outcomes. One particular strategy that amplifies one of the paper’s policy directives to promote higher education is under development. This strategy, called HEST (Higher Education in Science and technology), is concerned with the promotion of Science and Technology in Sub-Saharan Africa. The strategy will be used by the Bank as a framework for scaling up our financial support for science and
technology. We plan to put a great deal of effort into soliciting feedback. To accomplish
this, we will follow several guiding principles. First, we will support Centres of
Excellence and Regional Integration to encourage a holistic approach. In this context, we
will stress the links between the different components of the education system,
specifically those between basic education, vocational education and specific training.
We will engage in selectivity—that is, maintain a focus on foundational issues, with
hopes of supporting the emergence of an environment conducive to reforms and links
between higher education and the economy. In order to accomplish this, we will have to
have more people in the sciences—and must work hard to create partnerships to
coordinate actions.

Three strategic pillars inform our approach. First, in the process of building
infrastructure, we seek to upgrade and rehabilitate existing infrastructure, with priority
given to inter-state centers. Second, we will work to link higher education science and
technology with the productive sector—including the extractive industries, tourism, and
ICT (Information and Communications Technology). Finally, we will work to strengthen
and support higher education science and technology policies in African states. We feel
that we can take on a leadership role especially in building infrastructure.

We are also trying to support science and technology at the secondary level. We
have financed a number of laboratories, provided textbooks, and otherwise found ways
to give teachers the skills they need to teach science. Finally, we also work to support
science and technology at the tertiary level.

Through this work, we have learned several important lessons. Too often, support
has had an ad hoc quality that is not guided by a strategic approach. More economic and
sector work will have to be done if support for science and technology is to be scaled up
in an inclusive manner, increasing the number of girls who participate. We have also
come to recognize that the reinvigoration of science and technology at the tertiary level
requires regional cooperation.

**Discussant: Philip Oxhorn, McGill University**

Education provides a microcosm of the many problems that development entails.
The liberal Enlightenment popularized the notion that everyone has the right to a basic
education. The North has been working on this for hundreds of years, and the rest of the
world has been involved in a process of catching up at different paces, and time is a real
issue in this process. In the US in the 1960s, schools became mechanisms to feed, give
healthcare and social skills to children. The case of Africa shows how this has to become
more complex than the US model. In this case, education is the key to inclusion not only
of disadvantaged groups within Africa itself, but of the continent’s inclusion in the
international context.

Education has two roles: a functional one related to becoming productive members
of society, and another which is deciding what kind of society people will be a part of,
which is the idea of a civic education first developed by Tocqueville. The urgency of the
situation is particularly clear in Africa. This leads us to considering an important paradox
in education. Universities are at the center of these challenges and not, as we often think,
are they a matter only of basic education, because the teachers in primary schools need to
be trained, and because, more than ever before, science and technology are crucial. In the
information age it is no longer enough to be literate; people must also be computer
literate. This requires high levels of human investment and advanced physical infrastructure.

This leads me to two questions: For a long time, academics and the development community framed the issue of education as one of trade-offs, where one could invest in either primary or secondary education, but not in both. Is it really an issue of one or the other, and if so how should we balance priorities? Second, where can international assistance be the most effective—at the university level, primary level, or elsewhere? And what can Canada do best?

**Question and Answer Period**

Ms. Hamer commented that over the past 20 years, there has been some success in progress toward the Millennium Development Goals, with some countries having considerably expanded access to education. To address the ongoing problem of the quality of this education, the Bank has been focusing on rapidly increasing investments in secondary schools to ensure that children complete these programs. Overall, the Bank works to increase the quality of education at all levels. In response to a query from the Chair as to what the African Development Bank plans to do about the problems of girls’ vulnerability, Ms. Hamer noted that the Bank is assisting in the construction of dormitories for girls to make it more possible for girls to attend schools away from home. It is also important to advocate for accountability in school settings.

Professor Mitchell added that there are ongoing debates about where best to place funding, but noted that she believes that the improvement of higher education is crucial. The types of challenges that universities are experiencing require tremendous resources, and thus the best approach is to help these countries to do the kind of teaching and research they want to do in university settings. With regards to girls’ vulnerability, she noted that the issue can be linked to the issue of science and technology. To address the problem of a very high drop out rate among women in a particular science program in Africa, her team began to interview people to figure out why women were not staying in science and technology, and found that it was very often related to a hostile learning environment that many women experienced. So it is important to examine the teaching methods and styles that are creating such a hostile environment.

A member of the audience asked why the focus seems to be on universities rather than on the vocational training that seems to have contributed so much to the development of countries like Korea. Mr. Gyimah-Boadi commented that in Ghana, administrative jobs seem to pay better, and scientists move away to something other than being real scientists. In thinking about education policy and where to invest, some thinking has to go into the incentive framework at domestic level.

Ms. Hamer noted that there is a great deal of interconnectivity between various levels of education, and concurred that the demand in African countries is much greater for vocational education since those countries are interested in poverty alleviation. From the Bank’s perspective, the paradigm has shifted a bit with regard to higher education, in that it now focuses on creating a regional approach rather than building national universities in each country. With regards to Mr. Gyimah-Boadi’s comment, Ms Hamer agreed that we need to make these projects market responsive.

With regards to market responsiveness, it was noted that wage and income policies are domestic issues, and the question emerged as to the extent to which the AfDB takes
the issue of human resource development into account. Ms Hamer responded that this is precisely what NEPAD calls for: significant human resource development with the goal of closing the digital divide.

Regarding a question on the AfDB’s provision of hard and soft loans, Ms. Hamer replied that the Bank definitely needs to build its own capacity in this respect rather than continue to rely on external consultants. When it decides how to allocate money, education has to compete with other sectors for that money, but there has been a great deal of interest in the Bank housing a trust fund on higher education, science and technology. The ability of states to access it would depend on their microeconomic standing—and whether or not they would require a loan or a grant.

It was noted that with regards to the issue of the brain drain, the biggest loss of capacity is currently due to the effects of HIV/AIDS and that the priority should be to help children stay healthy in order for them to be able to stay in school and actually learn science and technology. On this note, the question arose as to the promotion of science and technology in relation to entrepreneurship. Ms. Hamer responded that some of this will necessarily be market-driven, and that maybe the Bank should look at science and technology training as a vehicle for the creation of entrepreneurship, perhaps by providing lines of credit. Professor Mitchell added that to address the issue of the brain drain we should consider the tools of development around mainstreaming gender, and think more strategically about how a science and technology initiative can begin to address social inequalities.

In response to an audience question about the role of the private sector in the provision of education, Ms. Hamer noted that partnerships with such actors is at the forefront of the Bank’s strategy.

Wrap Up Session

Joe Clark, McGill University

After thanking all the participants for their excellent contributions, Mr. Clark noted that it is important to follow up on this excellent start. One of the characteristics of McGill University is the extraordinary amount of work going on—and the lack of internal coordination that is so common in so many places. There is clearly a need to identify and mobilize existing assets. It is also increasingly evident that we need a great deal more clarity as to what good governance means.

Next, there needs to be follow-up to this conference—and a process of priority-setting based on what we can do and what needs to be done. Potential areas of synergy need to be considered. There is a burgeoning donor interest in governance—not just among public agencies, but private ones as well. These agencies are just as imprecise as we are in defining governance. It seems therefore important to facilitate discussion between donors—particularly in the private sector—and academic communities that can help to suggest real priorities. We should be focusing on innovation. There is also an immense opportunity to remove gender issues from the field of “women’s issues”, since women are often at the grassroots and can participate in the process of bringing citizens back into political processes, which allows us to reframe women’s issues as citizens’ issues.
We must also work to define our focus and determine where the needs are great and where there is a disposition to pick up on action and innovation. Africa-wide organizations could provide guidance and leadership based on their experiences of the models that are working.

The issue of the resource curse is very important; it is clearly not simply about investment, or even directly about environmental impact. Terry Karl has suggested that it is about secrecy, and this is in fact a solvable problem, as the work of Transparency International has demonstrated. People and corporations are increasingly compelled to get on board with demands for transparency. This is of course not an easy process, but it is important to recognize that it is a solvable problem.

It is also important to consider the issue of mobilizing Western opinion. Canada’s International Development Agency has seen its funding cut without particular outcry from the population. And yet women’s organizations should be interested in these issues, and universities have an obligation to enter into partnerships to ensure that wealthy countries actually provide the assistance that they promise. There is an open door with regard to corporate social responsibility, which provides an opportunity to marry research and the corporations’ current disposition towards corporate responsibility. Furthermore, churches and religious groups should also be brought on board. We also need to bring in the science and technology community, which should have a direct interest in addressing these concerns. Finally, the Diaspora offers a great opportunity to aggregate some of their cash-flows into larger development projects.

Howard Wolpe, Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars

One of the challenges is to find ways to mobilize people for progressive international policy by tapping into people’s sense of self-interest, which is also a central challenge to development itself. With regards in particular to the issue of donors that was raised throughout the conference, we need to recognize that often the rhetoric is in the right place but does not translate into a reality. How can we understand the political challenges to development? They are not a matter of cultural diversity, but rather of badly managed diversity. It is also a matter of inequalities between ethnic groups which cause problems. These are not “traditional” conflicts, ancient hatreds, or a matter of conflicting values or cultures.

Unless we deal with the fundamental challenges—such as the reconstruction of national communities—all of the technical skills we have and provide will be useless; the difficulty is in meeting political challenges. There is a tendency for governments to be held captive to a particular ethnic community—and to ignore others. These are political challenges, not technical or economic ones. The problem is also one of using governance tools to prevent conflict. We should not think of capacity building in only technical terms; we need to strengthen the state. The real challenge is to try to improve governance; and in order to do that, it is important to think about what circumstances lead a ruler to think that patronage is an acceptable form of governance. We are off to a bad beginning if we keep framing things in a judgmental normative fashion.

We should also begin to deal with violence in a preventive fashion, and focus much more attention and resources on the subject of conflict prevention, building partnerships with governments to train leaders in the techniques of nonviolent problem solving. This gives people greater capacity to satisfy the interests of all. If we can help governments to
get beyond the sovereignty trap and to let someone inside who can help to resolve conflicts peacefully, we have the opportunity to prevent violence before it starts. Unless people begin to change their paradigm, none of these methods will work. This notion of shifting the paradigm should be central to everything we do.

**Philip Oxhorn, McGill University**

One of the themes that has emerged with most force in this conference is the multidimensionality of the issue of development. It is clear that all different issues need to be addressed simultaneously in order to achieve sustainable progress. It is also clear that elites must play a part in this process, but it must not be at the expense of excluding the poor and other traditionally excluded groups. A real problem is that elites and grassroots often do not meet. We therefore need to think of increasing the representation of those who are affected by policies and by the assistance that foreign donors provide. These donors also need to respect the people they are supposed to assist, and this is also true for the governments’ who must respect the rights of the people they are supposed to protect.

When we talk about connecting the top and bottom layers of society, we’re also really talking about civil society in addition to democracy. Historically, this didn’t start in government but in civil society. Groups are only included in so far as they demand their own inclusion. People that were excluded have to assert their own interests, and we have to listen to them. But even more than demanding accountability, it is important to recognize that solutions won’t take place unless society, and civil society in particular, works with the state and the private sector to be able to address these multiple dimensions in the short and long term. In terms of education, one reason we have near 100% immunization of children is what takes place in schools—this shows that schools represent a tremendous institutional mechanism for reaching out.

**Terry Karl, Stanford University**

In terms of how to move forward from this conference, it is clear that people’s ownership of their government seems to be a very important factor. This is particularly salient if we compare public opinion data from Latin America and from Africa, which show that Latin Americans have much less faith in their governments as part of the solution to their problems. Given Africans’ positive views of the potential of their own governments, this seems like a good place to start. It also seems that we should focus on trying to identify best practice in Africa. Again in comparison to Latin America, in that region mayors seem to be doing the most innovative things in terms of promoting the participation of citizens in decision making. Perhaps these experiences provide a basis for innovation in Africa.
The Challenge of Development in Sub-Saharan Africa:  
Conflict Resolution, Democratic Governance and the Promotion of Development through Education

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