International Air Carrier Liability
for Death & Personal Injury:
To Infinity and Beyond

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To what damages do the Warsaw regime and the Montreal Convention apply?

Carrier liability for:

- Passenger death, bodily injury or delay;
- Air freight and baggage loss, damage, or delay;
- In international carriage, for compensation.

The Convention does not address liability of the airport, ANSP or aircraft manufacturer, or liability for surface damage.
What is international air carriage?

The place of departure and place of destination are:

- both in "Warsaw System" or M99 States
- in the same "Warsaw System" or M99 State with an agreed stopping place in another State

And both States have ratified a common liability Convention or Protocol.

You look for the “highest common denominator” treaty between the origin and destination State.

In round-trip transportation, the origin and destination State are the same.
Which Legal Regime Applies?

- The original Warsaw Convention of 1929, unamended;
- The Warsaw Convention as amended by Montreal Protocol No. 1 of 1975;
- The Warsaw Convention as amended by the Hague Protocol of 1955;
- The Warsaw Convention as amended by the Hague Protocol and Montreal Protocol No. 2 of 1975;
- The Warsaw Convention as amended by the Hague Protocol and Montreal Protocol No. 4 of 1975;
- The Montreal Convention of 1999, or
- Domestic law, if it is deemed that the transportation falls outside the conventional international law regime, or if the two relevant States have failed to ratify the same liability convention.
Chubb & Son v. Asiana Airlines


Because the US and South Korea were “not in treaty relations with regard to the international carriage of goods by air”, federal subject matter jurisdiction was deemed not to exist. The court concluded that “no precedent in international law allows the creation of a separate treaty based on separate adherence by two States to different versions of a treaty, and it is not for the judiciary to alter, amend, or create an agreement between the United States and other States.”
THE IMPACT OF CHUBB

- Chubb holds that the nation of the origin and destination of the passenger’s itinerary must have ratified the identical treaty. Korea and the U.S. were held to have ratified different treaties – the Hague Protocol and the Warsaw Convention, respectively. Hence, no liability convention was common to both States.

- The U.S. ratified Montreal Protocol No. 4, which entered into force for the United States on March 4, 1999. Though it principally addresses cargo issues, it brings the US under the Hague Protocol of 1955. Just to be sure, the U.S. separately ratified the Hague Protocol, nearly half a century after it was drafted.

What are the purposes of Warsaw?

"Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air"

- To unify certain rules of International Air Law
- To provide a uniform procedure, documentation and regime of substantive law applicable worldwide
- To limit carrier liability so as to foster growth of the nascent commercial airline industry.
Which local laws are not harmonized?

Under Montreal 1999:

- Articles 6 and 16 — the consignor must furnish information and documents, including a document indicating the nature of the cargo, as required by local “customs, police and any other public authorities”;
- Article 22(6) — in addition to the liability caps for delay, baggage and cargo, the court also may award court costs and other litigation expenses “in accordance with its own law”;
- Article 28 — advance payments must be made in death or personal injury actions “if required by its national law”;
- Article 29 — an action for damages can only be brought subject to the terms of the Convention “without prejudice to the question as to who are the persons who have the right to bring suit and what are their respective rights”;
- Article 33(4) — procedural questions “shall be governed by the law of the court seized of the case”;
- Article 35(2) — the two-year period of limitations “shall be determined by the law of the court seized of the case”;
- Article 45 — if an action is brought against only the actual carrier or the contracting carrier, that carrier may require the other carrier to be joined in the action, “the procedure and effects being governed by the law of the court seized of the case;” and
- Article 56 — if a State has more than a single territorial unit in which different systems of law are applicable (such as the Peoples Republic of China vis-à-vis Macau and Hong Kong, for example), that State may declare the Convention applicable to all or only some of its territorial units.
Venue

The four *fora* of the Warsaw Convention are:

1. the domicile of the actual carrier;
2. the actual carrier's principal place of business;
3. a place of the carrier's business through which the contract was made; or
4. the place of destination.

To these four, three additional *fora* have been added by the Montreal Convention (the latter two of these were also included in the Guadalajara Convention):

5. in death and personal injury litigation, the place in which the passenger has his principal and permanent residence if the carrier operates passenger services there either on its own aircraft or through another carrier's aircraft through a commercial agreement;
6. the domicile of the contracting carrier; or
7. the contracting carrier's principal place of business.
Forum non conveniens

- Both Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention and Article 33(1) of the Montreal Convention provide, *inter alia*, that “[a]n action for damages must be brought, at the option of the plaintiff”, in one of four specified fora.

- Article 28(2) of Warsaw provides that “[q]uestions of procedure shall be governed by the law of the court to which the case is submitted”, while Article 33(4) of the Montreal Convention provides that “[q]uestions of procedure shall be governed by the law of the court seized of the case”.

The Warsaw Convention of 1929 capped liability for personal injury at $8,300, unless the carrier engaged in willful misconduct or issued improper documentation; the carrier could avoid liability if it had taken “all necessary measures” to avoid the loss, or it was impossible to do so.

The Hague Protocol of 1955 doubled liability to $16,600 and clarified what was meant by “willful misconduct” as “intent to cause damage or recklessly and with knowledge that damage would probably result”;

The Montreal Agreement of 1966 raised liability to $75,000.

Montreal Protocol No. 1 reset Warsaw liability at 8,300 SDRs.

Montreal Protocol No. 2 reset Warsaw/Hague liability at 16,600 SDRs.

IATA Intercarrier Agreement of 1995 waived Warsaw’s ceilings on liability up to 100,000 SDRs; and

The Montreal Convention of 1999 imposes strict liability up to 100,000 SDRs, and presumptive liability beyond.

Compensation has always been the problem.
THE MONTREAL CONVENTION OF 1999

Incorporates most of the liability provisions of the IATA Intercarrier Agreements, establishing a two-tier liability system, with strict liability for death or bodily injury up to 100,000 SDRs, and presumptive liability in an unlimited amount;

- The carrier’s liability may be discounted by the claimant’s negligence or wrongful act;
- If the claimant’s damages exceed 100,000 SDRs, the carrier has two defenses: (1) freedom from fault; or (2) the damage was solely caused by a third person;
- “Punitive, exemplary or other non-compensatory damages” are not recoverable;
- No provision was made for recovery of emotional damages;
- Carriers must maintain “adequate insurance” to cover their liability;
- The Convention’s liability limits shall be reviewed every five years and adjusted for inflation;
- The claimant may recover court costs and attorney’s fees if the amount of damages awarded exceeds any written settlement offer made within six months of the accident but before suit is commenced;
- The Convention establishes a “fifth jurisdiction” (the passenger’s principal and permanent residence) for personal injury or death (but, oddly, not cargo and baggage) actions; and
- The Convention incorporates the Guadalajara Convention extending liability to both the actual and contracting carrier.

PASSENGERS
THE MONTREAL CONVENTION OF 1999

AIR FREIGHT

• The Convention incorporates many of the provisions of MP4 relating to cargo;
• Unless special value is declared, loss and damage and delay of baggage results in maximum liability of 1,000 SDRs; destruction, loss, damage, or delay of cargo results in liability capped at 17 SDRs per kilogram; cargo liability ceilings cannot be broken;
• There is no carrier penalty for noncompliance with the new documentation requirements; and
• Arbitration clauses may be included in cargo air waybills.
Under Montreal, liability limits now are adjusted for inflation every five years by ICAO.

**Inflation Adjustments Effective 2010**

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LIABLITY CONVENTION RATIFICATIONS

- UN Members – 192 States
- The Chicago Convention – 191 States
- The Warsaw Convention – 152 States
- The Hague Protocol – 137 States
- The Guadalajara Convention – 86 States
- Montreal Protocol No. 4 – 58 States
- The Montreal Convention of 1999 – 103 States

* As of June 1, 2012
See http://www.icao.int/secretariat/legal/Lists/Current%20lists%20of%20parties/AllItems.aspx for an up-to-date listing of High Contracting Parties.
The Montreal Convention of 1999 made no significant change to Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention:

“The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of the death or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by a passenger, if the accident which caused the damage so sustained took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking.”
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Issues arising under Article 17

- What kind of "accident" must have occurred?
- What types of injuries are contemplated by the term "damage sustained in the event of death or bodily injury"?
- Where does one draw the line at "embarking or disembarking"?
Several passengers claimed to have suffered mental distress when their aircraft, bound for the Bahamas, lost power in all three engines and began a sharp and terrifying descent. The flight crew informed the passengers that it would be necessary to ditch the plane in the ocean. Almost miraculously, the pilots managed to restart the engines and land the jet safely back at Miami International Airport.

The U.S. Supreme Court held that Article 17 does not allow recovery for purely mental injuries. This conclusion was based on the French translation (interpreting "lesion corporelle" to mean "bodily injury"), and on the primary purpose of the Warsaw Convention -- limiting liability in order to foster growth of the infant airline industry. Writing for the majority, Justice Marshall concluded:

“The narrower reading of 'lesion corporelle' also is consistent with the primary purpose of the contracting parties to the Convention: limiting the liability of air carriers in order to foster the growth of the fledgling commercial aviation industry. . . . Whatever may be the current view among Convention signatories, in 1929 the parties were more concerned with protecting air carriers and fostering a new industry than providing full recovery to injured passengers, and we read 'lesion corporelle' in a way that respects that legislative choice.”
Emotional Injury: The Alternatives:

- No recovery allowed for emotional distress;
- Recovery allowed for all emotional distress, so long as bodily injury occurs;
- Emotional distress allowed as damages for bodily injury, but distress may include distress about the accident; and
- Only emotional distress flowing from the bodily injury is recoverable.

*Jack v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.*, 854 F. Supp. 654 (N.D.Cal. 1994) embraced the fourth alternative, and has been widely followed.
Facts: a passenger lost her hearing in one ear after a routine depressurization of an Air France aircraft landing normally at Los Angeles.

The definition of an accident under Article 17 should be flexibly applied after assessing all the circumstances surrounding the passenger's injuries;

The “event or happening” that caused the passenger's injury must be abnormal, "unexpected or unusual";

The event must be "external to the passenger", and not the passenger's own "internal reaction" to normal flight operations; and

Where the evidence is contradictory, the trier of fact must determine whether an accident, so defined, has occurred.

in Saks, the U.S. Supreme Court noted that liability extends under Article 17 "only if a passenger's injury is caused by an unexpected or unusual event or happening that is external to the passenger."
Exclusivity of Remedies

What is the impact of having a claim fall under the Warsaw or Montreal Convention, and the Convention does not provide a remedy? May the plaintiff sue under domestic tort law?
Exclusivity of Remedies

Article 24 of the Warsaw Convention provides:

1. In the cases covered by Articles 18 and 19 any action for damages, however founded, can only be brought subject to the conditions and limits set out in this Convention.

2. In the cases covered by Article 17 the provisions of the preceding paragraph also apply, without prejudice to the questions as to who are the persons who have the right to bring suit and what are their respective rights.

Article 29 (Basis of Claims) of the Montreal Convention provides:

- In the carriage of passengers, baggage and cargo, any action for damages, however founded, whether under this Convention or in contract or in tort or otherwise, can only be brought subject to the conditions and such limits of liability as are set out in this Convention without prejudice to the question as to who are the persons who have the right to bring suit and what are their respective rights. In any such action, punitive, exemplary or any other non-compensatory damages shall not be recoverable.
Sidhu v. British Airways

Ms. Sidhu was aboard a British Airways flight from London to Kuala Lumpur via Kuwait. The aircraft made a refuelling stop in Kuwait five hours after Iraq invaded the country, and all passengers and crew were taken prisoner. They were removed to Baghdad, and Sidhu was detained there by Iraqi forces for nearly a month. She suffered psychological injury as the result of being held in captivity, and the stress of being separated from her family, causing her bodily injury in the form of loss of weight, eczema and excessive menstrual bleeding.

The UK House of Lords noted that the Convention “is designed to set out all the rules relating to the liability of the carrier which are to be applicable to all international carriage of persons, baggage or cargo by air to which the Convention applies”. Hence, the rights and remedies provided there are meant to be exclusive.

In Article 23, “the drafters prohibited the carrier from limiting its liability via contract, in exchange for Article 17 restrictions on the types of claims for which recovery would be allowed. The purpose of Article 17 was “to prescribe the circumstances — that is to say, the only circumstances — in which a carrier will be liable in damages to the passenger for claims arising out of his international carriage by air”. Thus, whether or not a passenger has a claim under Article 17, he is not allowed to maintain any other (common law) claim against the carrier arising out of the same incident.
Ms. Tsui Yuan Tseng alleged emotional injury because of a security search at JFK in which she was forced to drop her jeans to mid-hip and was wanded by a female security guard.


And it was not clear that Ms. Tseng suffered an Article 17 “accident” under *Air France v. Saks*, 470 U.S. 392 (1985), which defined an accident as “an unusual or unexpected event or happening . . . external to the passenger.”

Nevertheless, in *Tseng*, the Supreme Court held that Warsaw “precludes a passenger from maintaining an action for personal injury damages under local law when her claim does not satisfy the conditions for liability under the Convention.”

In other words, recovery for an injury occurring on an international itinerary, on board the aircraft or in the course of embarking or disembarking, “if not allowed under the Convention, is not available at all.” Under such circumstances, Warsaw provides the exclusive remedy, and no separate common law cause of action exists.

In a footnote, the Supreme Court observed, “It is questionable whether the Court of Appeals ‘flexibly applied’ the definition of ‘accident’ we set forth in *Saks*.”
What constitutes an “accident”? 
Fumbling for his recline button, Ted unwittingly instigates a disaster.
Three hours into a flight from Seoul to Los Angeles, Brandi Wallace “awoke in the darkened plane to find that Mr. Park [the male passenger seated next to her] had unbuckled her belt, unzipped and unbuttoned her jean shorts, and placed his hands into her underpants to fondle her.”

The Second Circuit concluded this act of sexual predation was an Article 17 accident, whether or not an accident must be an incident of air travel.
The court in Wallace wrote:

- “[I]t is plain that the characteristics of air travel increased Ms. Wallace’s vulnerability to Mr. Park’s assault. When Ms. Wallace took her seat in economy class on the KAL flight, she was cramped into a confined space beside two men she did not know, one of whom turned out to be a sexual predator. The lights were turned down and the sexual predator was left unsupervised in the dark. . . .

- “[I]t is undisputed that for the entire duration of Mr. Park’s attack not a single flight attendant noticed a problem. And it is not without significance that when Ms. Wallace woke up, she could not get away immediately, but had to endure another of Mr. Park’s advances before clambering out to the aisle.”
Deep Vein Thrombosis and Air Travel Group Litigation,

The Master of Rolls of England’s Court of Appeal concluded, “I cannot see, however, how inaction itself can ever properly be described as an accident. It is not an event; it is a non-event. Inaction is the antithesis of an accident.”

Qantas Ltd. v. Povey

The appellate division of the Supreme Court of Victoria, Australia concluded that “a failure to do something . . . cannot be characterized as an event or happening . . . .” The court went on to opine that a pilot’s failure to drop the landing gear would not constitute an Article 17 accident, but the resulting crash of the aircraft would.
Olympic Airways v. Husain

- Recovery allowed for the death of an asthma-suffering passenger exposed to second-hand smoke.
- The refusal of a flight attendant to assist a passenger who requested assistance constitutes “an unexpected or unusual event or happening” under Saks.
- Both the passenger’s exposure to the second-hand smoke, and the refusal of the flight attendant to assist the passenger, contributed to Husain’s death.
- Inaction can be an accident irrespective of the conclusions of appellate courts in England and Australia.
- The Guatemala City Protocol would have substituted the word “event” for the narrower term, “accident”.
- But it has received only 7 ratifications and 5 accessions, well short of the 30 needed to enter into force.
The Australian High Court
Povey v. Qantas Airways

- McHugh: “With great respect for the U.S. Supreme Court . . . the Saks definition of “accident” does not exhaustively define the scope of Art. 17. . . . In Saks, it would have made no sense for the Court to describe the operation of the pressurization as “a happening that is not . . . intended.” The system operated independently of any actor who could have formed an intention to do an act that had consequences that were not intended or expected.

- “With great respect to the Supreme Court in Saks, it went too far in insisting that the harm-causing occurrence must always be “caused by an unexpected or unusual event or happening that is external to the passenger.”

- “An omission may . . . constitute an ‘accident’ when it is part of or associated with an action or statement. . . . But a bare omission to do something cannot constitute an accident.”

- Kirby: “In ordinary parlance, the absence of a happening, mishap or event may be an ‘occurrence’. However, depending on the context, it will not usually qualify as an ‘accident’.”

- Callihan: “mere inaction could not constitute an event or an accident.”
House of Lords in
In re Deep Vein Thrombosis and Air Travel
Group Litigation

- Scott: “It is not the function of the court in any of the Convention countries to try to produce in language different from that used in the Convention a comprehensive formulation of the conditions which will lead to article 17 liability. The language of the Convention itself must always be the starting point. . . . [A] judicial formulation of the characteristics of an article 17 accident should not, in my opinion, ever be treated as a substitute for the language used in the Convention.

- I venture . . . to express my respectful disagreement with an approach to interpretation of the Convention that interprets not the language of the Convention but instead the language of the leading judgment interpreting the Convention. This approach tends, I believe, to distort the essential purpose of the judicial interpretation, namely, to consider what “accident” in Article 17 means and whether the facts of the case in hand can constitute an article 17 accident.
Hence, the U.S. Supreme Court’s reliance on the Saks’ definition of “accident” in Husain constituted flawed jurisprudential methodology. Instead of asking whether the inaction of a flight attendant was an “unusual or unexpected event of happening external to the passenger”, the Court instead should have asked whether the flight attendant’s inaction was an “accident.” Lord Scott observed that two requirements identified in Saks – that an event that is no more than the normal operation of the aircraft in normal conditions is not an “accident”, and that to be an accident, the event that caused the damage must be external to the passenger – ruled out recovery for DVT.

Both DVT and PTSD cases generally have not fared well in the courts, but on sharply different grounds. In DVT cases, airlines have prevailed because there was no “accident”. In PTSD cases, airlines have prevailed where there was no physical injury.

But note the sharp divisions between the analytical approaches of the highest courts in the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia. The U.S. courts ask whether an injury occurring on board a flight constitutes an “unusual or unexpected event or happening external to the passenger.” The U.K. and Australian Courts ask whether the injury was caused by an “accident.” While the U.S. Supreme Court concludes that inaction can constitute an “unexpected event or happening”, the U.K. and Australian courts conclude that inaction cannot constitute an “accident.” These are great ships passing in a foggy night, hearing only their horns blowing in the distance, warning of potential collision.
What constitutes “bodily injury”? 
The issue of whether emotional damages are recoverable has long troubled common law courts. The jurisprudence on this issue reflects several major concerns: (1) that emotional harm can be feigned, or imagined; and (2) some harm is the price we pay for living in an industrial society; (3) emotional damages are difficult to measure; and (4) unconstrained liability could impede industrial and economic growth.

Turning now to Private International Air Law, courts that have examined the *travaux preparatiorres* of the Warsaw Convention of 1929 have concluded that there was no discussion of whether recovery for emotional damages was contemplated by its drafters. They also have concluded that recovery for emotional damages was not permitted by most civil or common law jurisdictions prior to 1929.
The explicit imprecision and ambivalence of the Supreme Court's dictum in *Floyd* -- “we express no view as to whether passengers can recover for mental injuries that are accompanied by physical injuries” -- left the door ajar for all sorts of litigation.

For example, to recover under Article 17, need the emotional injury result from the physical harm, or may the physical harm result from the emotional injury? In other words, may the physical injury simply be the physical manifestation of emotional harm (e.g., what if plaintiff was not physically touched, but suffered hives, diarrhea, or hair loss because of her fright), or must there instead be some direct physical contact which produces a bruise, lesion, or broken bones causing emotional harm?
US Federal District Court in Jack v. Trans World Airlines

- Does Warsaw cover a passenger who suffers emotional distress accompanied by bodily injury? Jack explored the issue identified several alternatives:
  - No recovery allowed for emotional distress;
  - Recovery allowed for all emotional distress, so long as bodily injury occurs; and
  - Only emotional distress flowing from the bodily injury is recoverable.
- While agreeing that mental injuries flowing from physical injuries are recoverable, several U.S. Courts of Appeals have disagreed with the *dicta* in Jack, holding that a plaintiff may not recover under Article 17 for physical manifestation of emotional harm.
The UK House of Lords in Morris v. KLM

- While agreeing that pain caused by physical injury is recoverable, also Lord Steyn, "would hold that if a relevant accident causes mental injury or illness which in turn causes adverse physical symptoms. . . ."
- The issue was whether a 16-year-old girl could recover for the clinical depression she suffered after being fondled by another passenger aboard a flight from Kuala Lumpur-Amsterdam. Lord Nicholls wrote, "The expression ‘bodily injury’ or ‘lesion corporelle’, in article 17 means, simply, injury to the passenger’s body.” However, he observed that the brain too, is part of the body, and sometimes subject to injury; the question as to whether the brain has suffered an injury is a question of medical evidence.
- The inference is that when medical science has advanced to the level that it can point to an injury in the brain causing clinical depression, then such damages may be recoverable.
- Though Lord Steyn concluded that Article 17 does not allow one to recovery for emotional damages absent physical injury, he would allow recovery under two circumstances: (1) pain and suffering resulting from physical injury; and (2) in cases where there is physical manifestation of emotional harm: “if a relevant accident causes mental injury or illness which in turn causes adverse physical symptoms, such as strokes, miscarriages or peptic ulcers, the threshold requirement of bodily injury under the Convention is satisfied.”
In an exhaustive review of the negotiating history of the question of potential recovery of emotional damages in the Montreal Convention, the court concluded that there was no consensus or common understanding among the delegates on the issue of whether, and under what circumstances, recovery should be allowed for mental damages.

The U.S. delegate at the conference erroneously asserted that the state of Article 17 jurisprudence in U.S. courts at the time allowed recovery for mental injuries even when such injuries were not caused by physical injuries, and sought to include legislative history to the effect that M99 was not intended to disturb that jurisprudence. The court held that those views were wrong, and that prevailing American jurisprudence required that, to recover for emotional damages, those emotional damages must have been caused by physical injury.

Three U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals in Terrafranca, Lloyd, and Carmeu have held that physical manifestation of emotional harm is not recoverable under Article 17, while the U.K. House of Lords in Morris v. KLM concluded that they were. Though the U.S. Supreme Court has not yet had occasion to rule on the issue, the stage is set for jurisprudential confrontation yet again between the Titans of Law.
CONCLUSION

- Issues of what constitutes an “accident” and under what circumstances emotional damages are recoverable under Article 17 have proceeded under different jurisprudential paths in the U.S., U.K. and Australia.

- That the highest courts in all three of these influential jurisdictions have disagreed so fundamentally, is troubling.

- This *Clash of the Titans* does not square well with a Convention intended for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air.
What does this phrase mean: *in the course of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking*?

1. What was the activity of the passengers at the time of the accident;

2. What control or restrictions was placed on their movement by the carrier;

3. What was the imminence of their actual boarding; and

4. What was the physical proximity of the passengers to the gate?
Areas of Conflict Remain

Coupling the expansive interpretation given an “accident” in Wallace (to an act of sexual predation) and Husain (to a failure of a flight attendant to assist a passenger) inspired by the unsavory exclusiveness mandated by Tseng,

with the entry into force of the Montreal Convention of 1999,

the airline industry is now subject absolute liability up to 113,000 SDRs, and presumptive liability beyond, for a wider array of “unusual or unexpected” events or happenings than at any time in the history of commercial aviation.

Article 21 The carrier shall not be liable for damages arising under paragraph 1 of Article 17 to the extent that they exceed for each passenger [113,000] Special Drawing Rights if the carrier proves that:

(a) such damage was not due to the negligence or other wrongful act or omission of the carrier or its servants or agents; or
(b) such damage was solely due to the negligence or other wrongful act or omission of a third party.

Moreover, Montreal 99 did not clarify whether an “accident” must be an incident of air travel, and the circumstances under which recovery may be had for emotional damages.

Hence, there is much fertile soil for lawyers to plough.
Plaintiff Advantages of M99

- No proof required of carrier negligence ... need only prove the injury resulted from an “accident”
- Strict liability up to 100,000 SDRs for bodily injury or death
- Nearly certain recovery beyond (to the extent of provable damages)
- Ability to file suit in home country
- But . . . No recovery if only damages were emotional, and no recovery of punitive damages.
Carrier Defenses

- The transportation was not “international carriage” (in which case, domestic law applies)
- The event occurred before embarkation or after disembarkation (domestic law applies)
- The event was not an “accident”
- The damage did not constitute “bodily injury”
- The plaintiff was contributorily negligent (liability discounted by π’s fault)
- Above 100,000 SDRs, the carrier was not negligent, or the damage was “solely” caused by a third party.
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