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UID:20260510T110307EDT-755530v7hh@132.216.98.100
DTSTAMP:20260510T150307Z
DESCRIPTION:'Delegation in Strategic Environments and Equilibrium Uniquenes
 s'\n	 \n\nFedor Sandomirskiy (Princeton University)\n	Friday\, April 24\, 20
 26\n	10:00-11:30 PM \n	Leacock 429\n\nHost: Larry Epstein \n	Field: Miroecono
 mic Theory\n\nAbstract:\n	We ask when a normal-form game yields a single eq
 uilibrium prediction\, even if players can coordinate by delegating play t
 o an intermediary such as a platform or a cartel. Delegation outcomes are 
 modeled via coarse correlated equilibria (CCE) when the intermediary canno
 t punish deviators\, and via the set of individually rational correlated p
 rofiles (IRCP) when it can. We characterize games in which the IRCP or the
  CCE is unique\, uncovering a structural link between these solution conce
 pts. Our analysis also provides new conditions for the uniqueness of class
 ical correlated and Nash equilibria that do not rely on the existence of d
 ominant strategies. The resulting equilibria are robust to agents’ informa
 tion about the environment\, payoff perturbations\, pre-play communication
 \, equilibrium selection\, and learning dynamics. We apply these results t
 o collusion-proof mechanism design.\n
DTSTART:20260424T140000Z
DTEND:20260424T153000Z
LOCATION:Room 429\, Leacock Building\, CA\, QC\, Montreal\, H3A 2T7\, 855 r
 ue Sherbrooke Ouest
SUMMARY:Fedor Sandomirskiy (Princeton University)\, Delegation in Strategic
  Environments and Equilibrium Uniqueness
URL:https://www.mcgill.ca/economics/channels/event/fedor-sandomirskiy-princ
 eton-university-delegation-strategic-environments-and-equilibrium-uniquene
 ss-366296
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