sustainability

MDPI

Article

Inclusion in Global Environmental Governance: Sustained Access, Engagement and Influence in Decisive Spaces

Natalia Aguilar Delgado [1,*] and Paola Perez-Aleman [2]

[1] Department of International Business, HEC Montreal, Montreal, QC H3T 2A7, Canada
[2] Desautels Faculty of Management, McGill University, Montreal, QC H3A 0G4, Canada; paola.perez-aleman@mcgill.ca
* Correspondence: natalia.aguilar-delgado@hec.ca

Abstract: With increased participation of non-state actors in global governance, the inclusion of vulnerable groups in making sustainability regulations remains a relevant challenge requiring more research. Based on an ethnographic study on creating the Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-Sharing of biological resources and knowledge, we advance a new multi-dimensional view of inclusion that integrates sustained access, involvement, and influence in the intergovernmental negotiation meetings. We elaborate the concept of decisive spaces, that is, less accessible settings where diverse actors interact in a deliberative way to co-produce recommendations and solutions to an issue that highly influence the regulatory and governance decisions. We argue that the inclusion of vulnerable actors depends on their continuous access to and involvement in these decisive spaces for creating and implementing transnational regulations. Our findings advance the understanding of inclusion for addressing challenges facing transnational governance of environmental, equity, and social justice issues.

Keywords: global environmental governance; inclusion; institution building; indigenous peoples; non-state actors; decisive spaces

check for updates

Citation: Aguilar Delgado, N.; Perez-Aleman, P. Inclusion in Global Environmental Governance: Sustained Access, Engagement and Influence in Decisive Spaces. *Sustainability* **2021**, *13*, 10052. https://doi.org/10.3390/su131810052

Academic Editor: Axel Marx

Received: 4 August 2021
Accepted: 4 September 2021
Published: 8 September 2021

Publisher's Note: MDPI stays neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Copyright: © 2021 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).

1. Introduction

Recently, negotiations of global regulatory processes shifted from being exclusive to states to increasing the participation of non-state actors (NSAs) in issues at the intersection of human rights, social justice, and the protection of the environment [1–6]. Defined broadly, NSAs include participants from nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), business firms, expert and scientific bodies, associations, and civil society [7–9]. Prominent examples of NSA participation in global sustainability governance are in the United Nations Frameworks on Climate Change (UNFCC), in the United Nations Global Compact (UNGC), and in the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). For example, as the CBD's concern with biodiversity conservation overlapped with Indigenous peoples' struggles for social and environmental justice, NSAs including Indigenous organizations mobilized to address equity and the distribution of benefits in this international agreement [6,10,11]. Studies indicate continued exclusion from decision-making [12–16], and low impact on the process and the outcomes [9,17,18], despite the significant participation of key stakeholders in transnational regulation-making. These stakeholders bear unevenly the negative effects of decisions in these fora, reinforcing inequalities in the local and global governance of environmental resources [14,16].

Although previous research captures increased NSA participation, understanding on how inclusion works in transnational regulation-making is still limited [5,8,9,19,20]. First, the literature usually equates inclusion with representation of diverse stakeholders [19]. Other authors indicate that inclusion is about engaging diverse ways of knowing in deliberations that affect the decision-making process [21,22]. Second, the literature

considers inclusion to denote involvement of key stakeholders in the processes of creating the regulation [19]. This suggests the need to better understand NSA participation and the role of negotiation meetings in affecting inclusion. These meetings are spaces defined as critical sites where actors come together to negotiate policy, organize resistance, or promote organizational goals [23]. The existing literature, however, mainly focuses on the major conferences such as the Conference of the Parties, though there are many types of meetings to decide crucial aspects of regulation-building. Bridging this gap is particularly important for understanding the inclusion of those historically marginalized communities that bear the costs of negative impacts from unethical exploitation of their natural resources in a wide range of industries, and relevant for sustainability and equity in global governance [6,24–27].

In this paper, we address the question: how do spaces for decision-making affect the inclusion of vulnerable NSAs in global environmental governance? This study investigates the interactions between governments and Indigenous peoples in the decision-making meetings of the Nagoya Protocol, a regulation that addresses longstanding injustices against these vulnerable groups. Created under the CBD, the Nagoya Protocol combines a concern for the conservation of biodiversity with countering misappropriation of Indigenous knowledge and biological resources by requiring fair and equitable benefits of the derived commercial products to the communities [6,28,29]. As an international legally-binding regulation, the Nagoya Protocol establishes fair access and benefit-sharing agreements aiming to address distributive injustices and redress the balance in favor of the disadvantaged Indigenous peoples and local communities, historically among the deprived social groups [5,11]. One example is the 2019 Rooibos Benefit-Sharing Agreement between the San and Khoi peoples of Southern Africa and industry, which recognizes their traditional knowledge and biological resource rights in any commercial and industrial use of Rooibos, used for health and cosmetic products [30]. Since its inception, the Nagoya Protocol acknowledged the important role of Indigenous peoples and their participation has been a hallmark of the CBD negotiations [31,32].

We analyze the inclusion of Indigenous peoples in the negotiation meetings to shape the implementation of the Nagoya Protocol over a period of four years, from 2011 to 2014. Based on participant observation, interviews, and archival data, our study follows a process analysis [33] of distinct interconnected meeting spaces through which decisions evolved over time. While most literature usually looks at a fixed point in time, or examines those meetings most accessible to NSAs [5,34,35], our study captures the whole sequence of interrelated negotiation spaces. Based on our findings, we build a new integrated view of inclusion combining levels of access, involvement, and influence in the negotiation meetings. We show that increased presence does not guarantee inclusion of those most vulnerable in regulatory and governance decision-making. Our analysis demonstrates that inclusion is achieved through sustained access to spaces that serve as turning points in a regulation-building process. We show how the connections between the variety of these spaces and the corresponding ability to influence a decision affect and shape the interactions between governments and vulnerable NSAs. Inclusion in transnational governance must be constantly created through access to and involvement in the influential spaces where actors co-produce regulation—what we call decisive spaces. We argue that inclusion depends on the vulnerable actors' continuous access to deliberations in these decisive spaces, where their diverse ways of knowing influence the decision-making process. By advancing understanding of inclusion in sustainability governance, our study is relevant and applicable to environmental and social justice issues, as well as other contexts where vulnerable groups are key stakeholders.

2. Literature Background

2.1. Participation and Inclusion of Non-State Actors in Global Governance

As international negotiations are processes that involve government and diverse NSA [36], existing studies highlight increased NSA participation for bringing diverse

expertise to reach agreements that are more effective [37–39], or more legitimate [19,40]. With globalization and the rise of transnational regulations, some regulatory functions engage the state with diverse stakeholders shifting the emphasis to governance, as policy-making no longer exclusively occurs at the national level [41]. Governments and NSAs negotiate agreements that regulate business activities and environmental and social justice issues [3,42]. With NSA mobilization for greater voice [43], their delegates sometimes are the majority of the participants, particularly in global environmental governance meetings [5,44]. Calls for transparency and accountability also drove efforts of the United Nations (UN) and other transnational actors to promote NSA participation [9,39,45]. For example, the number of accredited NGOs in consultative status at the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations grew dramatically after 1990 [39]. Similarly, NSAs participate as observers, presenters, or advisors in meetings for agreements on environmental or human rights issues, such as the Arctic Council and the Aarhus Convention [46] and at the United Nations Global Compact [47].

The inclusion of NSAs is a relevant dimension to discussions of the legitimacy of new transnational norms [19,48]. Inclusion means the engagement of those affected by the issues in the structures and processes that create the regulation [19,49]. A key question is whether representative and important stakeholders are excluded from the decision-making process, since their participation is essential to achieving inclusiveness and legitimacy [19]. Institutions may become more inclusive through the "all-affected principle", defining affected as those whose basic interests are at stake [49], this principle being particularly salient in environmental governance, as in the 1992 Rio UN Declaration. Given structural contradictions that regulations address, there are different positions on how to design them to confront social problems, and distinctive ways in which some actors or groups are included or excluded in the contested process involving different social, economic, and political forces in governance [50].

Lack of inclusion due to unequal NSA access and absence of affected groups is a common criticism of many global initiatives, including inter-governmental, multi-stakeholder, and private-led. The issue of access refers to who participates in the decision-making process, who is selected, and who is an eligible participant [51]. For instance, the Forest Stewardship Council, an initiative that created transnational rules on sustainable wood with NGOs and business actors of the North and the South, is criticized for insufficiently including indigenous communities living in the forests in their council [19]. Similarly, European initiatives to provide water in Sub-Saharan Africa privileged the participation of European actors to the detriment of African actors most affected by water deprivation [19]. Some attribute unequal NSA access to lack of funding to attend meetings [52,53], linguistic and educational barriers, and limited leverage with their respective local governments [54]. In addition, NSAs that have access to resources valuable for global advocacy are more likely to sustain their political activities [55]. Economically powerful and well-funded organizations tend to have easier access to negotiations in comparison with vulnerable groups from developing countries [15]. However, the highlighted importance of access to meetings is insufficient for understanding inclusion in intergovernmental negotiations [5,44,45].

A second dimension of inclusion in the decision-making process and policy-making outcomes concerns involvement procedures: how participants share information and make decisions. The most basic form of involvement is attending and listening as spectators, followed by expressing views that are not necessarily taken into account in the decision process [51]. A higher degree of involvement is negotiating pre-existing positions in a give-and-take process. Previous research also highlights the catalytic role of deliberations in achieving more inclusive governance, as participants from distinct groups debate proposals, learn, and revise their views in light of reasons given by others [19,24,49,56]. Deliberation affects regulatory effectiveness and legitimacy by allowing the affected stakeholders to have a voice in the decision-making process [19,48,57].

Some research on transnational governance focusing on vulnerable groups raises a third dimension of inclusion: the difference between participation and influence in global

decision-making [5,44]. Influence refers to impact on the decisions and the ability of a group of actors to incorporate their ideas and affect the decision-making process [5]. Paradoxically, increased participation (numbers, size, and diversity) does not in itself mean influence on the regulation-making process [5,15,44]. Influence is lowest when the state receives information but does not take that input seriously. Governments may also invite opinions through consultation, providing NSAs with another form of potential influence [51]. A higher level of influence is co-production, where relevant stakeholders join with officials to directly make plans and rules, or to develop strategies for public action and implementation [58].

Some studies show that despite increased participation in global sustainability governance and moments of influence in negotiations, Indigenous peoples remain a vulnerable group [5,54]. For example, in the Climate Convention, increased stakeholder participation still limited inclusion of Indigenous peoples [13,35]. While the UN Declaration on Indigenous peoples recognizes them as rights-holders [59], their participation in the negotiations of the Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD) mechanism remains indirect and weak [13,60]. Although REDD programs create incentives for changing use of forest resources, the outcomes of the program did not incorporate Indigenous peoples' views and concerns [13], producing regulatory outcomes with questionable legitimacy [19,61], and less effective implementation [9,24,38]. Embedded in complex political relations, the perspectives and knowledge of these actors often collide with dominant discourses and are discredited on the basis of lack of "scientific expertise" [14,16]. Efforts to create solutions and new orders that aim to rebalance society and increase global and local justice create scope for marginalized actors to have influence [50]. Increased participation of vulnerable actors calls for understanding how they are able to influence and achieve inclusion in the regulatory decision-making process and outcomes that affect them, particularly in current spaces for regulations promoting sustainability.

2.2. The Role of Spaces for Decision-Making

Examining inclusion in decision-making on global regulations brings in the role of the meetings where negotiations take place and where governments and NSAs interact [5,11]. We refer to these meetings as spaces, defined as critical sites where dispersed actors come together to negotiate policy, organize resistance, or promote organizational agendas [23]. These meetings convene negotiation spaces in which "rules and norms of engagement sanction particular actions" [23]. Meeting spaces are political arenas of decision-making [51] and their organization has impact on the negotiation process [35,62].

The conceptualization of spaces as formal and informal is prevalent in the literature [34,36,62]. The plenary is an example of formal space where only states can amend a negotiation text [34]. The corridors of a conference meeting are an example of informal spaces, where NSAs freely disseminate information [43]. This literature explores how corridors and side events of official meetings allow indirect forms of NSA influence [36,43]. As this previous literature focuses on informal meetings tied to large events, a better understanding of inclusion requires more attention to the ways NSAs participate and interact with states in different formal spaces.

Previous literature also differentiates spaces in terms of their openness and size, with small and selective spaces favoring efficiency and problem resolution [62,63]. Focusing on the small and informal qualities, "protected spaces" allow for more open and constructive discussion [64], while the concept of "experimental spaces" refers to closed settings where divergent actors share experiences without fear of public backlash [65]. However, this literature also notes that formal decisions in large and open arenas produce procedural transparency, even if lacking active debate [62]. Closed meeting sessions in this context are known for "hammering-out" deals that might negatively impact excluded groups [15]. Closer examination of participation in the closed formal spaces that feed the draft decisions to the open arenas is necessary.

Another important dimension is the interaction of meeting spaces and time. Most empirical studies that acknowledge the importance of meetings in regulation-building examine negotiations in mega conferences, the Conference of Parties (COPs), which are open to the public [23,34,35]. However, these studies fail to recognize that decision-making in these settings follows a long process that evolves through a chain of interlinked formal negotiation spaces, including intersessional meetings that produce the proposed texts to be negotiated at COPs. We understand little of how this process that links multiple spaces over time affects the inclusion in transnational governance.

Our study addresses the research gap on inclusion of vulnerable actors in the different types of meeting spaces convened during transnational regulation-building. We focus on Indigenous peoples as a particular vulnerable group of stakeholders relevant for improving environmental, social justice, and equity practices. We examine inclusion by using a multi-dimensional approach encompassing three dimensions: access, involvement, and influence in different decision-making spaces (Figure 1).



Figure 1. A Multi-Dimensional View of Inclusion: Access, Involvement and Influence. Source: Own elaboration.

3. Methods

This study draws on a longitudinal and embedded single case [66] based on the implementation phase of the Nagoya Protocol from 2011 to 2014. This Protocol is part of the CBD, a multilateral environmental agreement created at the 1992 UN Summit in Rio de Janeiro, where the Climate Change and Desertification conventions were also adopted. This is an ideal case for three reasons. First, it is representative of a global regulation negotiated in an intergovernmental institution that involves governments and NSA participation. Second, it allows us to examine the inclusion of a historically marginalized actor [5,11]. Third, this case focuses on issues of social justice and environmental conservation related to traditional knowledge, natural resource ownership, and economic and social benefits, which are relevant for addressing the societal impact of global environmental regulations [11]. The CBD is considered a breakthrough in global policymaking as it combined concern for the environment with a commitment to addressing human injustices [30]. Given its relative openness to Indigenous peoples' participation, this representative case allows us to

observe attempts to include a vulnerable group in the process of building a transnational regulation that highly affects them.

The Nagoya Protocol, the focus of our study, is an effort to achieve the third goal of the CBD, namely, the fair and equitable sharing of genetic resources. With 116 signatories of the 196 members in the CBD, the regulation was adopted in Nagoya in 2010 and became effective in 2014. Before the CBD, a business could exploit a natural genetic resource and develop commercial products without permission and without sharing any benefits [6]. For example, Merck Pharmaceuticals patented a treatment for glaucoma derived from biological material found exclusively in the Amazon region, but Indigenous peoples and local communities did not receive benefit from the commercial product [30]. To promote equitable and sustainable use, the Nagoya Protocol establishes that benefits from the use of genetic resources must be shared with the holder of traditional knowledge, particularly Indigenous peoples [28]. They hold knowledge on thousands of plants used for medicinal purposes [67]. The knowledge and innovations of Indigenous peoples embody traditional lifestyles pertinent to the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity [59]. However, most new products developed using traditional knowledge did not involve their prior informed consent or share the benefit fairly and equitably with them [59].

Given their important traditional knowledge in the context of biodiversity conservation, Indigenous peoples are a highly relevant stakeholder group in the CBD and the Nagoya Protocol negotiations. They continue to face challenges to their inclusion in transnational policy-making [5,11,68], and are often excluded from state-led decision-making processes at the national level. They are disadvantaged at the international level where decisions directly affect their existence [69]. The UN regulatory context having been an important forum for the claims of Indigenous peoples in global environmental governance [54], we examine their inclusion in the CBD. Indigenous peoples are represented there under an advocacy alliance, the International Indigenous Forum on Biodiversity (IIFB), a collection of representatives from Indigenous governments, non-governmental organizations, scholars and activists [70].

Our unit of analysis is the meetings convened to negotiate the regulation, since they are the crucial spaces where participants debate issues, promote ideas, discuss different approaches, and decide on texts for agreements [5,23,35,68]. They are windows on the making of environmental governance because they provide "opportunities for researchers to observe and document policy-making processes as they unfold in time-condensed settings" [23]. In the implementation phase of the Nagoya Protocol, parties discussed the means to put in practice the mandated rules. Our longitudinal study examines all the formal meeting spaces convened between 2011 and 2014, describing the different types: virtual, plenary, contact group, expert group, and advisory committees (see Table 1).

Encompassing both public and restricted UN gatherings, this study examines all 10 meetings of the Nagoya Protocol that took place between 2011 and 2014, after its adoption in 2010 and its implementation phase. For data triangulation and validation, we draw on three different sources of data: participant observation, interviews, and documents. From June 2011 to October 2014, the first-listed co-author observed 205 h of meetings, focused on shadowing the mobilization of Indigenous peoples in negotiation spaces. In addition, the first-listed co-author conducted an internship at the CBD Secretariat for three months in 2013 and acted as a consultant for six months in 2014, allowing us privileged access to otherwise closed spaces (limited to invited actors). Moreover, between 2011 and 2015, we conducted a total of 51 formal interviews, with NSA representatives, government delegates, and the Secretariat staff. The semi-structured interviews lasted from 15 to 90 min and most were recorded and transcribed. Questions varied according to the stakeholder group, but focused on the evolution of Indigenous peoples' participation in negotiations at the CBD, and challenges and strategies for greater inclusion.

Concerning the archival data, all the official reports of meetings are available on the CBD website for public consultation. We used the 65 official UN documents relevant to issues for the period analyzed, including notifications, compilations of views, expert

reports, recommendations, and the reports of intergovernmental meetings, for a total of 654 pages. Another source of primary data is the collection of statements read in the plenary by Indigenous peoples' representatives and their newsletter. In addition, the daily coverage of intergovernmental meetings is available through the Earth Negotiations Bulletin (ENB), a source deemed neutral and credible, and thus used extensively for research in these settings [35].

Table 1. Characteristics of Meeting Spaces.

Space	Characteristics
Plenary	• Public space used to formalize a decision in intergovernmental meetings.
Contact groups	• Spaces formed within intergovernmental meetings outside the main Plenary to bring governments with an interest in a particular issue of a legal text that caused disagreement.
Virtual	• Spaces created in between intergovernmental meetings for the submission of views via electronic statement or to address specific questions previously mandated by governments.
Expert groups	• Spaces requested by governments to clarify ambiguous issues in between intergovernmental meetings, providing recommendations for Parties.
Advisory committee	• Spaces created to assist the Parties and the Secretariat in solving issues for the development of programs and tools for the implementation of a protocol, providing recommendations for Parties.

The data analysis included four stages. First, we reviewed all the materials to understand the sequence of events [33]. We built narratives for all of the meetings in the period of analysis, identifying the agenda topics that were most controversial and presented higher stakes for Indigenous peoples. The second stage of analysis involved a longitudinal investigation of how the different issues evolved over time and how the focal actors under study were included or not, emphasizing the expectations and outcomes for the vulnerable NSA group. Using visual mapping [33], insights emerged on how the meetings impacted the inclusion of vulnerable actors.

For the third step, we selected two illustrative "issues" to map the whole process of decision-making over time related to central topics under negotiation in different interlinked sequential meeting spaces. The number of different spaces created to debate them reflected the degree of actors' attention and efforts. The variation of spaces was privileged in theoretical sampling based on the greater depth of understanding it afforded [71]. We show the evolution of each issue and of inclusion as it moved through the different interconnected spaces over the analyzed time period. In the fourth phase, in an iterative process between data and literature, we developed an analytical framework to make sense of the distinction between spaces. We revisited existing literature on participation and inclusion to guide the analytical induction and categorization of the different spaces along three key dimensions: access, involvement, and influence (Figure 1), which we used to develop our concept of decisive spaces.

4. Results

We highlight two cases of decision-making process on salient issues of the Nagoya Protocol's implementation phase (2011–2014): the creation of a platform for information exchange and monitoring (Issue 1) and the compliance mechanism (Issue 2), both equally important for governing the Protocol. The platform is part of a strategy for governments at global and national levels to share and use resources and to collect diverse and distributed efforts while implementing the Protocol. Compliance mechanisms support and advance the implementation of binding transnational agreements. Our findings reveal differences between the two cases, with more inclusion of Indigenous people shown in the compliance rather than the platform issue.

4.1. Decision-Making Process for Creating a Platform for Information Exchange (Issue 1)

In this decision-making process, the lack of access for Indigenous peoples to an Advisory Committee limited NSA inclusion. Issue 1 refers to the creation of the Nagoya Protocol Access and Benefit-sharing Clearing-House (ABS-CH), a global platform enabled by digital technology for sharing information related to access and benefit-sharing and for monitoring compliance. The global Protocol translates into practice through national level ABS agreements. This issue is relevant to governments and Indigenous peoples alike because the Clearing-House aims to facilitate transparency and legal enforcement, enabling the tracing of national ABS permits and transforming them into internationally recognized certificates of compliance. Creating access to easily understood information and to national structures that accommodate their needs is pivotal to equip vulnerable groups for negotiating beneficial ABS agreements at the local level. The implementation of this international agreement occurs at the country level, and the platform governance is a crucial resource for national negotiations and cross-national sharing of information and learning.

Indigenous peoples' attempts to improve their inclusion in the platform implementing the Protocol were frustrated. They proposed the creation of a commissioner responsible for indigenous affairs in the ABS platform at the national level. An Indigenous representative explained:

> *"If we take into account the linguistic and cultural diversity of Indigenous peoples, we could create a mechanism that contemplates a greater representativeness"* (Interview 1, June 2011).

The Amazon Cooperation Network expressed:

> *"In light of the significance that traditional knowledge has for Indigenous peoples . . . and the prominent place it occupies in the Nagoya Protocol, the treatment of this issue and the participation of Indigenous people must be given the same degree of importance in the Clearing House by . . . fully and effectively engaging representatives of local communities and their organizations"* [72] (p. 19).

Despite their successful participation in the Expert Group meeting, a consultative and deliberative space, their requests did not carry over to the subsequent meetings, as governments established an Informal Advisory Committee that did not give access to NSA actors, thereby denying Indigenous involvement in a highly determinant space for the final decisions of this interlinked chain of meeting spaces (See Figure 2).



Figure 2. Process Mapping of Meeting Spaces for Issue 1: Information Clearing-House Platform. Source: Own elaboration based on ethnographic data.

4.1.1. Meeting Space 1—Expert Group Meeting on the ABS-CH (2011)

An Expert Group meeting convened in 2011 to consider how to construct this platform (Figure 2). Of 45 experts invited, three representatives of Indigenous peoples joined the meeting as observers, with expenses paid by the Convention. Facing linguistic and technological communication challenges, Indigenous peoples' representatives proposed the creation of an "indigenous peoples focal point" dedicated to serving as a bridge between their communities and the platform. The Indigenous representative participating in this 2011 Expert Group meeting, explained:

> *"This focal point would be a government official mandated to help communities transmit their relevant information, through instruments such as informed consent for access to traditional knowledge and models of contractual clauses for ABS contracts established with communities"* (Interview 4, June 2011).

Similarly, the Assembly of First Nations of Canada argued for an indigenous focal point:

> *"This article [ABS-CH] must be implemented in a manner that provides an opportunity for Indigenous peoples to provide the information which most accurately reflects their genetic resources that they hold as well as their associated traditional knowledge"* [73].

Access to this Expert Group meeting and participation in discussions enabled the Indigenous peoples to integrate their proposal for a focal point into the final report as expert advice, which was forwarded to Parties to be reviewed in later meetings.

4.1.2. Meeting Space 2—Plenary of the First Intergovernmental Meeting (2011)

Later in that same year (June 2011), governments considered the alternatives proposed by the 2011 Expert Group (EG) (Figure 2). Governments agreed in Plenary to implement the ABS-CH in a phased manner for the pilot phase based on the EG outcome document (Field Observation Notes). Regarding the question of creating an Indigenous peoples focal point, Parties decided in Plenary to continue considering a possible role for an Indigenous peoples' "contact point", but did not provide a definitive answer.

> *"The Métis National Council urged developing the process for submitting information with ILCs in an inclusive manner, respecting community protocols, confidentiality and MAT. She also noted that Indigenous focal points do not have authority to grant access to community resources, since this authority rests with the communities"* [74].

Indigenous peoples advocated for their inclusion at the national level, specifically in the "focal points" that would ensure their ongoing involvement in the governance and monitoring of the Nagoya Protocol and specific local ABS agreements. With access to the First IG meeting, their participation in the discussion to create the ABS-CH platform meant they could argue for their representation in the national implementation.

4.1.3. Meeting Space 3—Plenary of the Second Intergovernmental Meeting (2012)

There were few representatives of Indigenous peoples at this 2012 meeting, only four of 150 participants. The modalities of operation of the ABS Clearing-House were a priority on the agenda (Figure 2). All the alternatives that Indigenous peoples proposed in the 2011 Expert Group meeting, including the creation of an Indigenous "contact point", were not addressed in Plenary. Despite having access, Indigenous peoples had little involvement in the Plenary discussions. Governments agreed on the need to establish an Informal Advisory Committee that could include three to five representatives per region, and potentially observers, and would provide guidance and technical assistance to the CBD Secretariat in developing the clearing-house platform [75]. The Malaysian government delegate proposed including representatives of Indigenous peoples in this Informal Advisory Committee that would help shape the ABS-CH. Since other Parties did not support Malaysia's request, Indigenous peoples did not get access to the subsequent Advisory Committee that would develop the recommendations for the platform's operation.

> *"We have issues when they go and negotiate something key to us and we are not invited to participate. Despite all the advances in participation, remember, from our perspective we have to be fully included in the whole negotiation process"* (Interview ILC representative, 2013).

4.1.4. Meeting Space 4—Informal Advisory Committee on the ABS-CH (2013)

Indigenous peoples did not have access and were not present in this Advisory Committee (IAC) meeting space (Figure 2). The meeting started with several presentations from experts, nominated by government delegates, on previous experiences of the CBD and other UN conventions in establishing clearing-houses (Field Observation Notes). These presentations were followed by deliberations on the document prepared by the Secretariat with the draft modalities of the ABS-CH platform.

> *"Some points remained contentious . . . One expert from a developing country raised the question of the role of different stakeholders in the platform, in particular the possibility of Indigenous peoples to designate a competent authority that would publish their records at the clearing-house. The suggestion was not dismissed, but no other expert supported it. The compromise achieved between the experts was that the Secretariat could request submission of views of governments and stakeholders on the possible role for Indigenous Peoples on the platform before ICNP3"* (Field Observation Notes, 3 October 2013).

As they did not participate in the IAC deliberations, Indigenous peoples could not explain to other experts the rationale for having a dedicated channel through a focal point with their representatives to ensure their rights, promote capacity building, and information sharing in the platform governance (Figure 2).

4.1.5. Meeting Space 5—Plenary of the Third Intergovernmental Meeting (2014)

Governments discussed in Plenary the progress in implementing the pilot phase of the ABS-CH, taking note of its modalities of operation developed in the previous 2013 meeting of the IAC. Once again, representatives of Indigenous peoples suggested in Plenary that governments could appoint "a national focal point to help address the communication gap with Indigenous peoples" [76]. Once again, this request was not supported. Governments agreed, however, to mandate the Secretariat to collect views on the possible role for Indigenous peoples on the ABS-CH by submission of statements through a Virtual Space.

4.1.6. Meeting Space 6—Virtual Submission of Views (2014)

Only one online proposal was submitted through the Virtual Space, from an Indigenous peoples' organization in Latin America. This concerned their potential role in the ABS-CH platform (Figure 2) and contained suggestions regarding the functions, roles, and selection of representatives for a "focal point" in the governance structure of the platform to support national level actions:

> *"A national authority should work with an inter-cultural team that would include representatives from different Indigenous and local communities and have the financial and technical capacity to carry out its functions in a sustained and transparent manner; A competent authority should have ABS expertise and combine both western and indigenous perspectives, and should communicate with indigenous and local communities in a transparent and culturally appropriate manner, including in indigenous languages; A competent authority [for the ABS-CH] should be selected by the indigenous and local community's authorities and be recognized by the local, regional and national authorities as well as the competent Ministry"* [77].

Since there were no other submissions by Parties to the Nagoya Protocol, the Secretariat was unable to prepare a synthesis document, which meant there were no stated perspectives on the issue. Thus, the proposal from the Latin American Indigenous representatives did not move forward as a document with concrete proposals for future discussion by governments on the ABS-CH platform. Therefore, while the virtual space was accessible,

it produced no guidelines on this key issue, depriving Indigenous peoples of influence on the future inter-governmental meeting.

4.1.7. Meeting Space 7—Plenary of the Conference of the Parties (COP-MOP1) (2014)

In this meeting where decisions became legally binding, governments in the Plenary meeting did not discuss the representation of ILC in the platform, there being no synthesis document with recommendations from the 2014 virtual submissions. The IIFB read a statement in Plenary:

> *"The IIFB draws your attention to Article 14 paragraph 3 (a) regarding the additional information on competent authorities of the IPLCs that will be provided to the Communication Exchange Mechanism. That is why we call on the states parties to consider the full and effective participation of IPLCs in the processes for the publication of their genetic resources and associated traditional knowledge in this Mechanism"* (IIFB Statement Read in Plenary COP-MOP1, 2014).

In the end, governments did not accept the Indigenous peoples' proposal for facilitating their integration into the ABS-CH platform governance, arguing that "the designation of competent authorities and the specific roles of Indigenous peoples are subject to national arrangements" [78]. Subsequent deliberations about the ABS clearing-house continued within the Informal Advisory Committee space, but did not give access to representatives of Indigenous peoples (Field Observation Notes, 2014). Lacking access and involvement in these influential spaces, Indigenous peoples were excluded from deciding how to structure, coordinate, support, and monitor the implementation of the Nagoya Protocol at the international and national levels, and deprived of impact in shaping the concrete mechanisms that would enable their wanted "full and effective participation" in the Protocol implementation (IIFB, Statement read in Plenary, COP-MOP1 2014).

4.2. Decision-Making Process for Creating a Compliance Mechanism (Issue 2)

Indigenous peoples struggled to be included in the compliance mechanism of the Protocol, being created to make decisions on matters of compliance (Figure 3). Compliance is a crucial issue given the decentralized nature of the CBD, where each country determines its own access to genetic resources. As the ABS component has hard and unconditional clauses, the Nagoya Protocol's success depends on achieving compliance with the legal requirement to share the benefits. On the compliance issue, Indigenous peoples representatives stated:

> *"Indigenous peoples, as rights-holders, often have more detailed and more specialized information regarding implementation challenges experienced 'on the ground.' They may also have innovative solutions to compliance issues based on experiences at the community, sub-national or national levels (. . .) Successful implementation of the Protocol is dependent upon full and effective participation by indigenous peoples and local community providers . . . A transparent and representative compliance mechanism will build confidence in the benefit sharing regime. Involving indigenous peoples in the operation of a compliance mechanism would likely address some of the ongoing concerns . . . The full and effective participation of indigenous peoples, as rights holders, must be respected in the development and implementation of the compliance mechanism"* [73] (pp. 3–7).

In the Issue 2 case, Indigenous peoples participated in all the series of meeting spaces devoted to discussing the compliance mechanism. In particular, they had access to the Expert Group in 2012 and also the Contact Groups established in 2014 (Figure 3). An Indigenous peoples' representative, the main negotiator over compliance discussions, describes the importance of participating in particular spaces, such as advising in Contact groups:

> *"Contact groups are the closest to the decision, and it's in the contact groups that you're making your arguments over the actual language and decision itself. And as we saw*

with the contact group on compliance, there are a lot of ideas that have been fed into that through previous meetings, like the expert meeting and the ICNP" (Interview 50, Indigenous peoples' Representative).



Figure 3. Process Mapping of Meeting Spaces for Issue 2: Compliance Mechanism Source: Own elaboration based on ethnographic data.

Having access to and continued involvement in the whole series of Issue 2 meetings, Indigenous peoples' representatives achieved recognition for their expertise and potential contributions to the compliance issue (Figure 3). Governments became more inclined to accept a critical change in the composition of the Advisory Committee on compliance to integrate diverse ways of knowing. According to the rule established for the Committee, Indigenous representatives continued to be observers with no voting rights. The inclusion of an NSA, and specifically Indigenous peoples, in an intergovernmental compliance committee is unusual, giving rise to the expectation that this Advisory Committee will open the way for co-production and sustained collaboration between governments and vulnerable NSAs.

4.2.1. Meeting Space 1—Plenary of the First Intergovernmental Meeting (2011)

In this meeting, the Plenary was the only space available for negotiation on the controversial compliance issue. While Indigenous peoples had access to this meeting, their representatives had minimal involvement since they were consistently denied the right to address the Plenary (Field Observation Notes). When finally allowed to speak in the Plenary, Indigenous peoples made a statement requesting participation in Expert Group spaces (Figure 3):

> *"The Indigenous Forum wants to insure full and effective participation of Indigenous peoples and local communities in all the discussions that take place on the matter of compliance, therefore we request that in the text of paragraph 3, the following be added after [where it reads] "convening an expert meeting," 'with the participation of Indigenous and Local Communities and the representation of distinct regions'"* (IIFB Statement read in ICNP1 plenary, 9 June 2011).

During that meeting, we asked one of the Indigenous representatives how they could effectively contribute if they were to be included in the compliance discussions:

> *"The only way to ensure compliance to the Nagoya Protocol in the national level is through the respect of the rights of Indigenous peoples, by involving representatives in the negotiation of mutually agreed terms that consider our customary laws regarding traditional knowledge. We know of cases where the rights of our communities were violated by users of traditional knowledge, and we need to help governments in preventing but also identifying those"* (Interview 10, Indigenous representative).

Governments decided in this meeting to request the virtual submission of views on the topic and convene an Expert Group before the next intergovernmental meeting.

4.2.2. Meeting Space 2–Virtual Submission of Views (2012)

In response to requests for online submissions of views on compliance, 12 Parties (including collectively from the "African Group" and another from the "European Union") and three relevant stakeholders, including representatives from two Indigenous peoples' organizations, submitted suggestions [79]. The CBD Secretariat produced a synthesis of the views on elements to develop the compliance procedures and mechanisms. Indigenous peoples' representatives raised two points: first, that a compliance body should include indigenous experts with expertise in indigenous rights; and second, that if an assertion of non-compliance is validated, affected Indigenous peoples should be involved in the development of measures to address cases of non-compliance. These points were contemplated in the appendix of the document, serving as a suggestion based on the views expressed for review and consideration by the Expert Group Meeting (Figure 3).

4.2.3. Meeting Space 3—Expert Group Meeting on Compliance (2012)

The CBD Secretariat invited two representatives of Indigenous peoples, covering expenses. The experts reviewed the document created by the Secretariat based on previous experience and the submission of views. The final report of the 2012 Expert Group described the results of the deliberation on the inclusion of Indigenous peoples in a formal Advisory Committee to monitor compliance with the Protocol as follows:

> *"There was a discussion about whether it was appropriate for indigenous and local communities to be able to nominate members to the committee, or serve on the committee and if so, whether as a full member or as an observer. The procedures for nominating representatives of indigenous and local communities were also discussed. A range of views were expressed, with some suggesting that given their prominence in the Protocol, indigenous and local communities should have representation on the committee"* [80].

4.2.4. Meeting Space 4—Contact Group of the Second Intergovernmental Meeting (2012)

As controversy continued over the compliance issue, a Contact Group (CG) space was convened, in addition to the 2012 Plenary meeting (Figure 3). Despite the high stakes, Indigenous peoples remained as mere spectators in the Contact Group (Field Observation Notes). With only four representatives, Indigenous peoples' engagement in this meeting was low:

> *"Although ILCs themselves were not vocal at this meeting due to the small number of representatives present, possibly resulting from a combination of visa issues and funding shortages, certain countries put forward a variety of possible avenues to ensure a community "voice" in the compliance mechanism. Options ranged from a community trigger of the procedure, to enabling community representatives to participate in the compliance committee as members or as observers, to the possibility for communities to submit information directly to the compliance committee, or the possibility for the committee to directly consult with relevant communities"* [75].

4.2.5. Meeting Space 5—Contact Group of the Third Intergovernmental Meeting (2014)

Representatives of Indigenous peoples were invited to join the Contact Group since discussions on this issue were not held in the 2014 Plenary, once again due to the adversarial

views between governments (Figure 3). This time, their larger delegation, with seven representatives, advocated for Indigenous membership on the Compliance Committee:

> *"Indigenous peoples and local communities believe the serious nature of the Compliance Committee requires assurance that any proposed structure of the committee is inclusive of Indigenous peoples and local communities and is determined in collaboration with ILCs"* (IIFB Statement read in Plenary at ICNP3 on Compliance Issue, page 2).

> *"The IIFB recommended: including in the compliance committee ILC representatives from each UN region; establishing regional ILC committees to advise and support ILC submissions to the compliance committee; and enable ILCs to make submissions to the compliance committee independently from national authorities"* [76].

The Indigenous peoples' representative sat at the main table in the Contact Group space (Field Observation Notes) and presented arguments for their previously made request in Plenary:

> *"Governments gave us time to build narratives around the need for Indigenous expertise at the compliance committee. We received support from the governments of Ecuador and Mexico, longtime allies. However, Canadians were pretty much against our proposal because of concerns they have of the standing of Indigenous peoples in their internal political system"* (Interview 49, Indigenous Peoples representative).

The NSA proposal received support by two governments, but it was vetoed by one government, so the Indigenous suggestions did not result in viable alternatives at that time and remained in brackets for further discussions.

4.2.6. Meeting Space 6—Contact Group in Conference of the Parties (COP-MOP1) (2014)

Governments once again convened a Contact Group space to continue, among other things, the negotiation on the composition of the Compliance Committee (Figure 3). Only government delegates sat at the central table, except for one Indigenous peoples' representative consulted on issues related to Indigenous peoples' participation in the compliance mechanism (Field Observation Notes). Government delegates requested stronger justification for including Indigenous representatives in the Compliance Committee (Field Observation Notes). Discussion of the modalities of Indigenous participation in the committee continued throughout the week. In the sixth session of the contact group, the delegates decided the following:

> *"Many delegates welcomed the agreement that the committee's composition will include two permanent spots for ILC observers, who are self-nominated, and that issues brought to the committee can be decided by a majority vote. The COP/MOP also agreed that compliance procedures might be triggered by parties against other parties, by parties seeking assistance with compliance, and by the COP/MOP. ILCs may submit information for consideration by the compliance committee through the CBD Secretariat"* [78].

In the end, Indigenous inclusion amounted to two seats as self-nominated permanent observers to co-produce decisions in this Compliance Committee (Figure 3). In practice, this meant they would be the sole stakeholder group with a guaranteed place in the deliberations, a point confirmed by a Secretariat staff:

> *"ILCs had a major win in this meeting, because now they have a different status in comparison to other stakeholders. Because they are elected by COP, they hold a term and have earned continued involvement in compliance issues"* (Interview 51, Secretariat staff).

As observed in Issue 2, Indigenous peoples sought greater inclusion in compliance-related matters through guaranteed access to the Advisory Committee, where they would be involved in deliberating and co-producing decisions. These examples illustrate the important effect of multiple access to particular spaces for engagement in a sustained way to co-produce recommendations. The varying trajectories regarding different meeting spaces in Issue 1 and Issue 2 illustrate different degrees of access, involvement, and ability

to influence the decisions on the platform governance and compliance mechanisms, with implications for inclusion, discussed next.

4.3. Comparing Varieties of Spaces: Integrating Access, Involvement, and Influence Dimensions of Inclusion

Three major findings emerge from the comparison among the meeting spaces and between the two longitudinal cases on key issues. First, both cases reveal that spaces differ significantly in terms of access, involvement, and influence in the decision-making process, affecting inclusion of vulnerable stakeholders in regulation and governance. Second, given the variety of meeting spaces, inclusion cannot be adequately assessed solely in terms of access and representation in general or at a fixed point in time. What matters is how stakeholders become involved over time and in which spaces. Third, in contexts that promote vulnerable NSA participation, limited access to spaces that most affect a decision hinders inclusion in governance, both in the decision-making process and the outcome. We discuss each in turn.

First, the different decision-making spaces are distinct in terms of access to participation, sharing of information, and influence on decision-making (see Figure 4). For example, while the Plenary and the Virtual spaces have the highest level of accessibility, involvement therein is reduced to attendance and expression of views, rather than deliberation (see Figure 4). In addition, the widely accessible Virtual Space offers opportunity for consultation, but is weak for co-producing a decision. Similarly, the Plenary space is accessible to diverse stakeholders but their involvement in the decision-making process is mostly limited to attending, expressing views, and getting information. As is evident in Issue 1, Indigenous peoples' participation occurred mainly in Plenary Space, which was insufficient for achieving inclusiveness in the regulatory decision process and outcome.



Figure 4. Varieties of Spaces and Inclusion in Regulation Building. Source: Own elaboration based on ethnographic data.

By contrast, participants in less accessible spaces, such as Advisory Committees, engage in deliberation and co-production of influential proposals on regulation content, structures and governance (Figure 4). Vulnerable stakeholders' higher levels of involvement in discussions on the issues, and concomitant opportunities for substantive contribution, create strong potential for inclusive regulatory and governance decisions. The use of deliberations in the selective closed Expert and Advisory spaces creates opportunities

for presenting alternative views and for shaping the proposed rules and structures. In Expert spaces, the consultation role is taken as "expert alternatives" on an issue that then contribute to shape a decision.

In addition, the comparative analysis reveals that having access to more influential spaces, wherein actors co-produce the proposed rules and structures that get voted on, is key to achieving inclusion of vulnerable NSAs, as these are also the least accessible (Figure 4). For example, recommendations to be ratified by governments voting in Plenary are shaped in the closed meeting spaces of Contact Groups and Advisory Committee. Given the important role of these influential selective spaces, the vulnerable NSA actors mobilized successfully to be included in the Advisory Committee for shaping the compliance mechanism (Figure 3). In the Advisory Committee, actors achieve technical consensus through deliberations, creating conditions for shifting views, and harnessing innovation to co-produce important aspects of regulation and governance.

Second, the longitudinal comparison between Issue 1 and Issue 2 shows that the effect on inclusion depends on vulnerable NSAs having access to those spaces where participants have high-level involvement in discussions as well as high-level impact on the decisions reached on proposed regulation and governance (Figures 2 and 3). Reliance on observations at a single point in time, such as participation in one Plenary meeting, is insufficient for assessing inclusion. Our study is unique in capturing the whole sequence of meetings over time, allowing us to trace the chain of decision-making spaces and the links between them that lead to the outcome. Longitudinal examination of inclusion in regulatory and governance decisions demonstrates that access to spaces that afford high involvement and influence fosters inclusive decision-making process and outcomes.

Finally, the examination of both Issue 1 and Issue 2 reveals that continuous access in the decision-making process is fundamental to achieving an inclusive negotiation and outcome. Involving vulnerable actors on an ongoing basis in the different meeting spaces creates more potential for inclusion. In Issue 1, for example, the vulnerable NSAs were excluded from participating in the Advisory Group space, which had a decisive role in shaping the ABS-CH platform (Figure 2). Continuity of involvement in deliberations in the different interconnected spaces, particularly the less accessible and more influential ones, creates enabling conditions for more inclusion of vulnerable actors.

5. Discussion

Emerging from a comparative analysis of the whole sequence of different meetings, our study is unique in integrating three key dimensions of inclusion to characterize the spaces for decision-making in transnational regulation-making: access, involvement, and influence (see Figure 1). Within each dimension, different practices contribute to more or less inclusion (see Figure 4). Like other studies [51], we see access to participation in a continuum from high to low access based on whether participation is open to all, or only to selected stakeholders. Previous work studied representation in the most accessible spaces, such as the Plenary and side events for negotiating the creation of regulation [5,34,35]. Our findings, however, indicate that the diversity of representatives in Plenary spaces and side events is an insufficient indicator of NSA inclusion [5], because other dimensions such as involvement and influence complement inclusive practices.

Our study supports existing literature on transnational governance emphasizing that deliberations as a form of involvement facilitate more interactions of different perspectives, facilitating the emergence of new options and reaching agreements on what participants value [56]. Spaces that involve participants in deliberation increase the chances of NSAs having their voices heard and are relevant for achieving input and output legitimacy [3,19,24]. Given our unique longitudinal perspective, our study adds to this literature that the potential for inclusiveness of vulnerable actors depends on sustaining temporal openness, which is related to their access to spaces over time. This includes guaranteeing continued future involvement in the development and implementation of government regulation or policy [58]. For example, in our findings, Indigenous peoples

were continuously involved in all the meeting spaces to decide on Issue 2, whereas they were left out of key deliberation spaces in Issue 1. Our study further demonstrates that deliberation in the side events or informal spaces, often highlighted in the existing environmental governance literature, is insufficient for an inclusive process, leading to our third relevant dimension.

This third dimension, influence, emerges as crucial for inclusive processes and outcomes as we show that meeting spaces differ in terms of what effect they have on what will be done with governance and regulation decisions (Figure 4). We also show the highest level of influence is achieved when vulnerable groups engage in co-production, which occurs when relevant stakeholders join with officials to directly make plans and rules, or to develop strategies and recommendations for public action and implementation [21,22]. We argue that the possibilities for inclusion are strongest when vulnerable groups participate in such spaces since they produce the content of what is later negotiated in the highly accessible public events that are usually the focus of existing studies. With vulnerable NSAs and the state jointly and directly affecting decision-making and policy outcomes, co-production facilitates fundamental change. While inclusion remains an unfinished process in the context studied, the concept of decisive spaces contributes to highlight qualitative differences that make global environmental governance more or less inclusive.

Our study also contributes to advance understanding on the interactions between inclusion and meeting spaces by integrating three dimensions of inclusion to appreciate the variety of spaces. We argue that the inclusion of vulnerable groups in regulation-building depends on having access to what we call decisive spaces, defined as less accessible settings that allow diverse actors to be involved in deliberations to collaboratively produce a solution that substantively impacts the regulatory and governing decisions (Figure 4). Specifically, our study shows that the vulnerable NSAs strive to be part of decisive spaces to directly influence the proposals that will be presented at the Plenary spaces where final voting on agreements occurs. Our notion of decisive spaces and their central role in achieving inclusion of vulnerable actors goes beyond current understanding of both spaces and inclusion in global regulation and governance in four ways.

First, we contribute to a better understanding of the role of formal spaces in the inclusion of NSAs. Previous literature categorizes spaces in these settings as formal and informal [15,34,36] emphasizing informal spaces as the critical sites where NSAs communicate their agendas and try to persuade governments [15,34,36]. In contrast, we privilege the examination of formal spaces, showing that having access to formal spaces varies over time and across issues, which impacts the potential inclusion of vulnerable actors. These findings are crucial because they reveal the importance of accessing more influential but previously overlooked types of spaces, decisive spaces where NSAs can directly ensure their views and concerns have impact on the resulting decisions.

Secondly, we add to this literature in examining the interaction between the different forms of spaces in decision making over time. In particular, certain works acknowledged the different outcomes reached with closed and open meeting spaces [62,63], claiming that open meetings have a higher potential for procedural equity [62]. By adopting a processual approach, we shed light on the underappreciated dynamic between COPs' Plenaries, as the main open negotiation arenas where decisions are finalized [23,35], and other restrictive intersessional and closed spaces that can also be important to ensure equity [15]. For NSAs to accomplish change in a global regulation, one could argue it is only necessary to participate in COPs to persuade Parties to accept their agendas [35]. However, the findings presented here demonstrate that the potential for procedural equity of open spaces is also affected by sustained access to decisive spaces, which can be more influential than the open Plenary spaces for NSAs.

Third, we propose the new concept of decisive spaces for understanding the inclusion of vulnerable groups, extending current views accounting for increased NSA participation in transnational governance [9,19,20]. We show that the co-production of an institution may well occur prior to open formal events. Our concept differs from the emphasis on

informal deliberations in "experimental spaces" [65] or "protected spaces" [64] where distinct stakeholder groups openly discuss without fear of backlash. Instead, our notion foregrounds the influence dimension, giving attention to whether vulnerable actors have continued access to participate in deliberations of high impact in the decision-making process and outcomes. Views discussed in "protected spaces" may not have an effect when the concerned actors are not participating in decisive spaces and, thus, are not involved in the deliberations that actually produce the plans, strategies, and structures regulating and governing environmental and social justice issues. This finding adds a political dimension to the notion of spaces, in the sense that the sites in which the debates between stakeholders take place are important in defining how decisions will be implemented.

Furthermore, this study addresses the evolving relations between states and diverse stakeholders, including traditionally marginalized and excluded actors, in the global processes to create regulations that affect national levels, which has been central to analysis of the state and social relations [41,50]. The spaces of policymaking analyzed in this study unveil coordination between governments and vulnerable groups at the international level where social relations reflect existing social, political and economic contradictions [50]. This study contributes to this literature by showing that the scope for more inclusive processes and outcomes depends on the sustained access, engagement and influence of those traditionally excluded in the decision-making spaces that produce state policies and regulations, locally and globally. The spaces associated with the new regulations for promoting sustainability and social justice could reproduce existing inequalities despite increased presence and representation of vulnerable actors, particularly when they do not have sustained engagement and influence as co-producers of the regulations and policies. decisive spaces in transnational organizations affect the creation of inclusive governance to promote local and global justice tied to efforts to achieve more sustainable economies.

Finally, our study contributes to advancing discussions on platform governance, which is recognized as having distributed participation and mobilization [81]. Since platforms support action at both the transnational and national levels, they are arenas that serve to engage diverse actors transnationally and locally. As these government platforms serve to foster participation, they configure communication channels and interactions, and distribute resources and tools. As a platform may serve to extend participation opportunities, the inclusion of vulnerable actors is crucial, particularly on issues of equity, justice, and environmental sustainability. Our study shows that lack of access to decisive spaces limits the possibilities for creating inclusive governance platforms and for achieving the objectives of equitable benefits and environmental justice sought by transnational regulation, such as the Nagoya Protocol. Furthermore, our contribution shows that as the platform governance aims to generate ideas and share experiences, the lack of involvement of vulnerable groups in co-creating its structure will limit its generative possibilities, reducing what it can accomplish and leverage from the national and transnational levels. In this sense, our work goes beyond the thinking highlighted in the "experimentalist governance" literature [56], as decisive spaces matter for achieving inclusion in governance at both central and local levels.

6. Conclusions

Our study corroborates the idea that inclusion of vulnerable actors requires the sustained involvement and influence of those affected by the issues in the structures and processes that create a transnational regulation. Our study elaborates this perspective by pointing out that access and increased presence are relevant, but insufficient. We examine the sequence of meetings to provide a longitudinal processual perspective on the inclusion of vulnerable groups, in contrast to studies based on a fixed point in time focused on large meeting events. From this emerges the new concept of decisive spaces, settings characterized by limited access, high-level deliberation, and high-level impact on the resulting regulation and governance structure decisions. Even with increased participation by the traditionally marginalized in accessible diverse meeting spaces, the exclusion of

key vulnerable stakeholders in both the process and outcome can continue. Our study concludes that their access to and continuous participation in the decisive spaces in global governance processes facilitates inclusiveness.

Our study has implications for addressing inclusion in other types of international agreements for sustainability. The challenge of inclusion is relevant for private and multi-stakeholder global regulations [2,19], in which civil society actors participate at the local, national, and transnational levels [24]. Private regulatory initiatives for sustainability also promote the inclusion of stakeholders, including corporations and civil society actors, in the governance of global value chains, such as the Roundtable for Sustainable Palm Oil [82]. However, business actors and NGO-dominated initiatives may continue to exclude affected vulnerable groups [17,61,83]. Previous research suggested that, to live up to the hopes and expectations of intended beneficiaries, these arrangements must work to actively engage potential beneficiaries in the management of global regulations. Transnational regulations affect commercial activities in multiple areas [1,2,4,12], which could also benefit from exploring further inclusion of vulnerable actors. Future work could examine barriers to access of vulnerable groups to decisive spaces for creating private standards and governance decisions with business, and whether outcomes reflect the needs and specialized knowledge of the traditionally marginalized groups. Building on our understanding of decisive spaces, future studies could investigate the mechanisms that reduce barriers and foster inclusion in influential meetings for different types of transnational regulatory initiatives. In doing so, a question to explore is how the nature of the different issues brought into discussion might affect the potential for influence of vulnerable groups.

Another implication of our study is for achieving inclusion in other types of international agreement that rely on distributed and decentralized governance related to poverty alleviation, environmental sustainability, and global health. As global regulations get translated into national and local agreements, the lack of inclusion in the governance system will limit the spaces for Indigenous peoples and other vulnerable groups to be involved, exercise influence, and ensure the benefits are distributed justly and sustainably. Platforms such as the UN Climate Change Adaptation and the UN Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction rely on distributed actions. As these platforms attempt to connect diverse actors in policy deliberations and actions, they face the challenge of including the traditionally marginalized. Without access to and involvement in decisive spaces, the intended impact on regulation and governance, and the justice and sustainability envisioned, will not be achieved. As our study indicates, inclusion depends on the sustained access of vulnerable or discriminated groups to decisive spaces, where diverse actors connect to share information, knowledge, deliberate, negotiate, and generate new solutions that directly impact the actions and agreements to address social problems. An issue to explore further is how influence in spaces at the international level affects power relations between states and vulnerable groups at the national level, and how it affects local governance.

Previous studies and experience indicate that without Indigenous peoples and local communities, the plans and implementation of global environmental governance will likely fail. Ensuring their inclusion is an important but understudied challenge in transnational governance, particularly the interaction between the global and local actions [24,26,61,84]. Indigenous peoples hold rights and manage 36% of forest landscapes that are crucial for climate change mitigation [85] and global marine conservation [86]. They are a heterogeneous group facing different environmental and social injustice while living in regions with prized natural resources and ecosystem biodiversity [86,87]. Their traditional knowledge is embedded in a political ecology of discourses that undervalues lived experience and other forms of knowledge that are "non-scientific", reinforcing their exclusion and marginalization [14]. However, their inclusion in the governance of natural resources is central to addressing distributive injustices, redressing the balance in favor of the disadvantaged, protecting biodiversity and tackling climate change for "building back better" as the world heals from the coronavirus pandemic. Future studies could expand understanding of the varieties of spaces and practices that facilitate inclusion of these vulnerable communities

in governance issues concerning their knowledge, rich resources, property rights, and sustainable development goals.

Author Contributions: Data collection was conducted by N.A.D. and both authors contributed equally to conceptualization, data analysis, and manuscript writing. Both authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.

Funding: This work has been generously funded by the Fonds Québécois de Recherche Société et Culture and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada through two doctoral scholarships.

Institutional Review Board Statement: The study was reviewed with the requirements of the McGill University Policy on the Ethical Conduct of Research Involving Human Subjects and with the Tri-Coucncil Policy Statement: Ethical Conduct of Research Involving Human Beings, and approved by the Research Ethics Board of McGill University (File number: 210-1211 on 12 March 2012).

Informed Consent Statement: Informed consent was obtained from all subjects involved in the study.

Data Availability Statement: Data supporting reported results can be found at www.cbd.int, accessed on 15 July 2021.

Acknowledgments: We would like to thank participants at various meetings and conferences where previous versions of the article were presented: the Society for the Advancement of Socio-Economics (SASE) in 2018; the Academy of Management Meeting (AOM) in 2019; and seminars at HEC Montreal and McGill University.

Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest.

References

1. Bartley, T. Transnational governance and the re-centered state: Sustainability or legality? *Regul. Gov.* **2014**, *8*, 93–109. [CrossRef]
2. Eberlein, B.; Abbott, K.W.; Black, J.; Meidinger, E.; Wood, S. Transnational business governance interactions: Conceptualization and framework for analysis. *Regul. Gov.* **2014**, *8*, 1–21. [CrossRef]
3. Overdevest, C.; Zeitlin, J. Assembling an experimentalist regime: Transnational governance interactions in the forest sector. *Regul. Gov.* **2014**, *8*, 22–48. [CrossRef]
4. Toffel, M.W.; Short, J.L.; Ouellet, M. Codes in context: How states, markets, and civil society shape adherence to global labor standards. *Regul. Gov.* **2015**, *9*, 205–223. [CrossRef]
5. Witter, R.; Marion Suiseeya, K.R.; Gruby, R.L.; Hitchner, S.; Maclin, E.M.; Bourque, M.; Brosius, J.P. Moments of influence in global environmental governance. *Environ. Politics* **2015**, *24*, 894–912. [CrossRef]
6. Wynberg, R.; Schroeder, D.; Chennells, R. *Indigenous Peoples, Consent and Benefit Sharing: Lessons from the San-Hoodia Case*; Spinger: Berlin, Germany, 2009.
7. Andonova, L.B.; Mitchell, R.B. The rescaling of global environmental politics. *Annu. Rev. Environ. Resour.* **2010**, *35*, 255–282. [CrossRef]
8. Djelic, M.-L.; Sahlin-Andersson, K. *Transnational Governance: Institutional Dynamics of Regulation*; Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK, 2006.
9. Steffek, J. Explaining cooperation between IGOs and NGOs–push factors, pull factors, and the policy cycle. *Rev. Int. Stud.* **2013**, *39*, 993–1013. [CrossRef]
10. Berlin, B.; Berlin, E.A. Community autonomy and the Maya ICBG project in Chiapas, Mexico: How a bioprospecting project that should have succeeded failed. *Hum. Organ.* **2004**, *63*, 472–486. [CrossRef]
11. Suiseeya, K.R.M. Negotiating the Nagoya Protocol: Indigenous demands for justice. *Glob. Environ. Politics* **2014**, *14*, 102–124. [CrossRef]
12. Green, J.F. Transnational delegation in global environmental governance: When do non-state actors govern? *Regul. Gov.* **2018**, *12*, 263–276. [CrossRef]
13. Schroeder, H. Agency in international climate negotiations: The case of indigenous peoples and avoided deforestation. *Int. Environ. Agreem. Politics Law Econ.* **2010**, *10*, 317–332. [CrossRef]
14. Banerjee, S.B. Who sustains whose development? Sustainable development and the reinvention of nature. *Organ. Stud.* **2003**, *24*, 143–180. [CrossRef]
15. Banerjee, S.B. A climate for change? Critical reflections on the Durban United Nations climate change conference. *Organ. Stud.* **2012**, *33*, 1761–1786. [CrossRef]
16. Escobar, A. Whose knowledge, whose nature? Biodiversity, conservation, and the political ecology of social movements. *J. Political Ecol.* **1998**, *5*, 53–82. [CrossRef]
17. Bexell, M.; Tallberg, J.; Uhlin, A. Democracy in global governance: The promises and pitfalls of transnational actors. *Glob. Gov. A Rev. Multilater. Int. Organ.* **2010**, *16*, 81–101. [CrossRef]

18. Green, J.F. Private Authority on the Rise: A century of delegation in multilateral environmental agreements. In *Transnational Actors in Global Governance: Patterns, Explanations and Implications*; Jönsson, C., Tallberg, J., Eds.; Springer: Berlin/Heidelberg, Germany, 2010; pp. 155–176.
19. Mena, S.; Palazzo, G. Input and output legitimacy of multi-stakeholder initiatives. *Bus. Ethics Q.* **2012**, *22*, 527–556. [CrossRef]
20. Djelic, M.-L.; Quack, S. *Transnational Communities: Shaping Global Economic Governance*; Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK, 2010.
21. Feldman, M.S.; Quick, K.S. Generating resources and energizing frameworks through inclusive public management. *Int. Public Manag. J.* **2009**, *12*, 137–171. [CrossRef]
22. Feldman, M.S.; Khademian, A.M.; Quick, K.S. Ways of knowing, inclusive management, and promoting democratic engagement: Introduction to the special issue. *Int. Public Manag. J.* **2009**, *12*, 123–136. [CrossRef]
23. Corson, C.; Campbell, L.M.; MacDonald, K.I. Capturing the personal in politics: Ethnographies of global environmental governance. *Glob. Environ. Politics* **2014**, *14*, 21–40. [CrossRef]
24. Overdevest, C.; Zeitlin, J. Experimentalism in transnational forest governance: Implementing european union forest law enforcement, governance and trade (FLEGT) voluntary partnership agreements in Indonesia and Ghana. *Regul. Gov.* **2018**, *12*, 64–87. [CrossRef]
25. Suiseeya, K.R.M.; Caplow, S. In pursuit of procedural justice: Lessons from an analysis of 56 forest carbon project designs. *Glob. Environ. Chang.* **2013**, *23*, 968–979. [CrossRef]
26. Vieira, A.C.A.; Quack, S. Trajectories of transnational mobilization for indigenous rights in Brazil. *Rev. Adm. Empresas* **2016**, *56*, 380–394. [CrossRef]
27. Reimerson, E. Between nature and culture: Exploring space for indigenous agency in the Convention on Biological Diversity. *Environ. Politics* **2013**, *22*, 992–1009. [CrossRef]
28. Robinson, D.F. *Biodiversity, Access and Benefit-Sharing: Global Case Studies*; Routledge: London, UK, 2014.
29. Avilés-Polanco, G.; Jefferson, D.J.; Almendarez-Hernández, M.A.; Beltrán-Morales, L.F. Factors that explain the utilization of the nagoya protocol framework for access and benefit sharing. *Sustainability* **2019**, *11*, 5550. [CrossRef]
30. Schroeder, D.; Chennells, R.; Louw, C.; Snyders, L.; Hodges, T. The Rooibos benefit sharing agreement–Breaking new ground with respect, honesty, fairness, and care. *Camb. Q. Healthc. Ethics* **2020**, *29*, 285–301. [CrossRef] [PubMed]
31. Bavikatte, K.; Robinson, D.F. Towards a people's history of the law: Biocultural jurisprudence and the Nagoya Protocol on access and benefit sharing. *Law Env't Dev. J.* **2011**, *7*, 35.
32. Orsini, A. The role of non-state actors in the Nagoya Protocol negotiations. In *Global Governance of Genetic Resources*; Oberthür, S., Rosendal, K., Eds.; Routledge: London, UK, 2013; pp. 60–78.
33. Langley, A.; Smallman, C.; Tsoukas, H.; Van de Ven, A.H. Process studies of change in organization and management: Unveiling temporality, activity, and flow. *Acad. Manag. J.* **2013**, *56*, 1–13. [CrossRef]
34. Hardy, C.; Maguire, S. Discourse, field-configuring events, and change in organizations and institutional fields: Narratives of DDT and the Stock-holm Convention. *Acad. Manag. J.* **2010**, *53*, 1365–1392. [CrossRef]
35. Schüssler, E.; Rüling, C.C.; Wittneben, B.B. On melting summits: The limitations of field-configuring events as catalysts of change in transnational climate policy. *Acad. Manag. J.* **2014**, *57*, 140–171. [CrossRef]
36. Schroeder, H.; Lovell, H. The role of non-nation-state actors and side events in the international climate negotiations. *Clim. Policy* **2012**, *12*, 23–37. [CrossRef]
37. Steffek, J. Public accountability and the public sphere of international governance. *Ethics Int. Aff.* **2010**, *24*, 45–68. [CrossRef]
38. Tallberg, J.; Sommerer, T.; Squatrito, T.; Jönsson, C. *The Opening Up of International Organizations*; Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK, 2013.
39. Tallberg, J.; Sommerer, T.; Squatrito, T.; Jönsson, C. Explaining the transnational design of international organizations. *Int. Organ.* **2014**, 741–774. [CrossRef]
40. Djelic, M.-L. From the rule of law to the law of rules: The dynamics of transnational governance and their local impact. *Int. Stud. Manag. Organ.* **2011**, *41*, 35–61. [CrossRef]
41. Jessop, B. Globalization and the national state. In *Paradigm Lost: State Theory Reconsidered*, 1st ed.; Aronowitz, S., Bratsis, P., Eds.; University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis, MN, USA, 2002; pp. 185–220.
42. Djelic, M.-L.; Quack, S. Globalization and business regulation. *Annu. Rev. Sociol.* **2018**, *44*, 123–143. [CrossRef]
43. Betsill, M.M.; Corell, E. *NGO Diplomacy: The Influence of Nongovernmental Organizations in International Environmental Negotiations*; MIT Press: Cambridge, MA, USA, 2008.
44. Fisher, D.R. COP-15 in Copenhagen: How the merging of movements left civil society out in the cold. *Glob. Environ. Politics* **2010**, *10*, 11–17. [CrossRef]
45. Fisher, D.R.; Green, J.F. Understanding disenfranchisement: Civil society and developing countries' influence and participation in global governance for sustainable development. *Glob. Environ. Politics* **2004**, *4*, 65–84. [CrossRef]
46. Mason, M. Information disclosure and environmental rights: The Aarhus Convention. *Glob. Environ. Politics* **2010**, *10*, 10–31. [CrossRef]
47. Hengevoss, A. Assessing the Impact of Nonprofit Organizations on Multi-Actor Global Governance Initiatives: The Case of the UN Global Compact. *Sustainability* **2021**, *13*, 6982. [CrossRef]

48. Steffek, J. Deliberation and global governance. In *The Oxford Handbook of International Political Theory*; Oxford University Press: Oxford, UK, 2018; pp. 440–452.
49. Young, M. *Inclusion and Democracy*; Oxford University Press: Oxford, UK, 2000.
50. Jessop, B. Revisiting the regulation approach: Critical reflections on the contradictions, dilemmas, fixes and crisis dynamics of growth regimes. *Cap. Class* **2013**, *37*, 5–24. [CrossRef]
51. Fung, A. Varieties of participation in complex governance. *Public Adm. Rev.* **2006**, *66*, 66–75. [CrossRef]
52. Nanz, P.; Steffek, J. Global governance, participation and the public sphere. *Gov. Oppos.* **2004**, *39*, 314–335. [CrossRef]
53. Levy, D.L.; Newell, P.J. *The Business of Global Environmental Governance*; MIT Press: Cambridge, MA, USA, 2005.
54. Dahl, J. *The Indigenous Space and Marginalized Peoples in the United Nations*; Springer: Berlin/Heidelberg, Germany, 2012.
55. Hanegraaff, M.; Vergauwen, J.; Beyers, J. Should I stay or should I go? Explaining variation in nonstate actor advocacy over time in global governance. *Governance* **2020**, *33*, 287–304. [CrossRef]
56. Sabel, C.F.; Zeitlin, J. Experimentalism in the EU: Common ground and persistent differences. *Regul. Gov.* **2012**, *6*, 410–426. [CrossRef]
57. Scherer, A.G.; Palazzo, G. Toward a political conception of corporate responsibility: Business and society seen from a Habermasian perspective. *Acad. Manag. Rev.* **2007**, *32*, 1096–1120. [CrossRef]
58. Quick, K.S.; Feldman, M.S. Distinguishing participation and inclusion. *J. Plan. Educ. Res.* **2011**, *31*, 272–290. [CrossRef]
59. Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). *Traditional Knowledge and the Convention On Biological Diversity*; CBD: Montreal, QC, Canada. Available online: https://www.cbd.int/abs/infokit/revised/web/factsheet-tk-en.pdf (accessed on 15 July 2021).
60. Dawson, N.M.; Mason, M.; Fisher, J.A.; Mwayafu, D.M.; Dhungana, H.; Schroeder, H.; Zeitoun, M. Norm entrepreneurs sidestep REDD+ in pursuit of just and sustainable forest governance. *Sustainability* **2018**, *10*, 1726. [CrossRef]
61. Schouten, G.; Leroy, P.; Glasbergen, P. On the deliberative capacity of private multi-stakeholder governance: The roundtables on responsible soy and sustainable palm oil. *Ecol. Econ.* **2012**, *83*, 42–50. [CrossRef]
62. Depledge, J. *The Organization of Global Negotiations: Constructing the Climate Change Regime*; Routledge: London, UK, 2005.
63. Falkner, R. A minilateral solution for global climate change? On bargaining efficiency, club benefits, and international legitimacy. *Perspect. Politics* **2016**, *14*, 87–101. [CrossRef]
64. Mair, J.; Hehenberger, L. Front-stage and backstage convening: The transition from opposition to mutualistic coexistence in organizational philanthropy. *Acad. Manag. J.* **2014**, *57*, 1174–1200. [CrossRef]
65. Zietsma, C.; Lawrence, T.B. Institutional work in the transformation of an organizational field: The interplay of boundary work and practice work. *Adm. Sci. Q.* **2010**, *55*, 189–221. [CrossRef]
66. Yin, R.K. *Case study Research: Design and Methods*; Sage publications: Thousand Oaks, CA, USA, 2013.
67. Aguilar, G. Access to genetic resources and protection of traditional knowledge in the territories of indigenous peoples. *Environ. Sci. Policy* **2001**, *4*, 241–256. [CrossRef]
68. Suiseeya, K.R.M.; Zanotti, L.; Haapala, K. Navigating the spaces between human rights and justice: Cultivating Indigenous representation in global environmental governance. *J. Peasant. Stud.* **2021**, 1–25. [CrossRef]
69. Wallbott, L. Indigenous Peoples in UN REDD+ Negotiations: "Importing Power" and Lobbying for Rights through Discursive Interplay Management. *Ecol. Soc.* **2014**, *19*. [CrossRef]
70. International Indigenous Forum on Biodiversity. Available online: https://iifb-fiib.org/ (accessed on 28 November 2017).
71. Eisenhardt, K.M.; Graebner, M.E. Theory building from cases: Opportunities and challenges. *Acad. Manag. J.* **2007**, *50*, 25–32. [CrossRef]
72. Amazon Network. Statement Submitted to the ICNP1. 2011. Available online: https://www.cbd.int/abs/doc/protocol/icnp-1/redcam-en.pdf (accessed on 15 July 2021).
73. Assembly of First Nations. Statement Submitted to the ICNP1. 2011. Available online: https://www.cbd.int/abs/doc/protocol/icnp-1/assembly-first-nations-en.pdf (accessed on 15 July 2021).
74. Earth Negotiations Bulletin (ENB). ICNP1 Summary Report. 5–10 June 2011, p. 5. Available online: https://enb.iisd.org/biodiv/icnp1/ (accessed on 15 July 2021).
75. Earth Negotiations Bulletin (ENB). ICNP2 Summary Report. 2–6 July 2012, pp. 7–15. Available online: https://enb.iisd.org/biodiv/icnp2/ (accessed on 15 July 2021).
76. Earth Negotiations Bulletin (ENB). ICNP3 Summary Report. 24–28 February 2014, pp. 7–15. Available online: https://enb.iisd.org/biodiv/icnp3/ (accessed on 15 July 2021).
77. Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). *Report on Progress Made and Feedback Received in the Implementation of the Pilot Phase of the Access and Benefit-Sharing Clearing-House*; CBD: Montreal, QC, Canada, 2014; pp. 9–10.
78. Earth Negotiations Bulletin (ENB). *Summary Report Pyeongchang Meetings of the CBD and Its Protocols*. 6–17 October 2014, pp. 14–31. Available online: https://enb.iisd.org/events/cbd-cop-12/summary-report-6-17-october-2014 (accessed on 15 July 2021).
79. Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). Submissions to the Expert Meeting on Cooperative Procedures and Institutional Mechanisms to Promote Compliance with the Nagoya Protocol. Available online: https://www.cbd.int/abs/submissions-compliance/ (accessed on 15 July 2021).
80. Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). *Final Report Expert Meeting on Compliance*; CBD: Montreal, QC, Canada, 2012; p. 6.
81. Ansell, C.; Miura, S. Can the power of platforms be harnessed for governance? *Public Adm. Rev.* **2020**, *98*, 261–276. [CrossRef]

82. Diprose, R.; Kurniawan, N.I.; Macdonald, K. Transnational policy influence and the politics of legitimation. *Governance* **2019**, *32*, 223–240. [CrossRef]
83. Perez-Aleman, P.; Sandilands, M. Building value at the top and the bottom of the global supply chain: MNC-NGO partnerships. *Calif. Manag. Rev.* **2008**, *51*, 24–49. [CrossRef]
84. Roome, N.; Wijen, F. Stakeholder power and organizational learning in corporate environmental management. *Organ. Stud.* **2006**, *27*, 235–263. [CrossRef]
85. Fa, J.E.; Watson, J.E.; Leiper, I.; Potapov, P.; Evans, T.D.; Burgess, N.D.; Molnár, Z.; Fernández-Llamazares, Á.; Duncan, T.; Wang, S. Importance of Indigenous Peoples' lands for the conservation of Intact Forest Landscapes. *Front. Ecol. Environ.* **2020**, *18*, 135–140. [CrossRef]
86. Parsons, M.; Taylor, L.; Crease, R. Indigenous Environmental Justice within Marine Ecosystems: A Systematic Review of the Literature on Indigenous Peoples' Involvement in Marine Governance and Management. *Sustainability* **2021**, *13*, 4217. [CrossRef]
87. Kraemer, R.; Whiteman, G.; Banerjee, B. Conflict and astroturfing in Niyamgiri: The importance of national advocacy networks in anti-corporate social movements. *Organ. Stud.* **2013**, *34*, 823–852. [CrossRef]