

The Road to Pydna Philip, Perseus and the Romans, 191-171

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The Third Macedonian War, which ended the Antigonid dynasty and the aura of promise which followed the declaration at the Isthmus in 196, came about not because Perseus had inherited the war from Philip, or because the new Macedonian King deliberately sought conflict with Rome. Rather, the war was caused by the atmosphere of mutual distrust which had arisen between Philip and the Senate after the hostilities with Antiochus and which continued to grow on the accession of Perseus, whom the Senate immediately regarded with suspicion. The policies of Perseus were not calculated to foster enmity with Rome, but they were not always pursued with tact. They affected Rome's influence in Greece and, of greater importance, the position of Eumenes of Pergamum. Inevitably, the Senate was more ready to listen to Eumenes than a monarch who was, in their view, perfidious, belligerent and too independent for their liking.

Polybius believed that Perseus inherited the war from his father, Philip, comparing it with Philip II's projected invasion of Persia and Alexander's realisation of it.¹ Whether Philip was planning a war or not, Perseus *did* inherit the suspicions of the Senate.² During the war with Antiochus, Philip had been an exceptionally accommodating ally, providing financial and logistical support, building bridges and roads, and escorting the Roman forces in their passage through Thrace. He had turned down an alliance with Antiochus and even allowed his people to fight for the Romans if they wished to.³ After the war, however, Philip's desire to re-secure Macedon upset the Roman settlement which had drawn the Macedonian boundary along the old royal road to Paroreia in Thrace. Outside of this zone were two cities of the Thracian Chersonesus, Aenus and Maronea, which were, among others, intended to act as buffers between Eumenes and Philip. The Macedonian King, aware that this wide and ostensibly independent area of land would provide an easy entry point for the Thracian tribesmen, and believing the cities to rightfully belong to him, seized and occupied them.⁴

¹ Polyb. 22.8; cf. Dudley, *Roman Society*, p. 74. ² cf. Livy 39.25.1; Adams, 'Perseus and the Third Macedonian War,' p. 237.

³ Gruen, 'The Supposed Alliance Between Rome and Philip V of Macedon,' p. 132; Polyb. 20.5.7; App. Mac. 9.9.5-7; Livy 39.28 ff.

⁴ Walbank, Philip V, p. 223; Green, *Alexander to Actium*, p. 424; Polyb. 22.9; Livy 39.24-33.

Philip had also received parts of Thessaly, Perrhaebia and Athamania by the treaty which ended the war with Antiochus, during which it was tacitly understood that whatever he captured from the Aetolians he would be allowed to keep.⁵ Thus he considered these northern Greek cities his, since many of them had previously been under Aetolian control, while these cities claimed that since they had been absorbed by the Aetolians and were originally independent, they should not be Macedonian possessions.⁶ Keen to be released, therefore, they complained to Rome in 186-5 and did not exclude a full report of the seizure of the Thracian cities by Philip, a fact which was repeated by the envoys from Pergamum.⁷ Eumenes had fought against Philip in the Second Macedonian War and certainly retained a measure of distrust which was exacerbated by the occupation of Aenus and Maronea, which he felt should be his as they were 'appendages' to Lysimacheia and the Chersonese which he had received after Apamea.⁸ More importantly, he was a trusted and voluntary ally of Rome, while Philip had found his alliance forced upon him by his defeat in 197. It is very likely that the Pergamene embassy's corroboration persuaded the Romans to investigate the matter further by sending a commission headed by Q. Caecilius Metellus.⁹

At the Tempe conference Philip faced a barrage of charges from his Thessalian, Athamanian, and Perrhaebian accusers. After Cynoscephalae, they said, he had shown 'poor character' by sacking Thessalian cities before returning them, and by 'enslaving' five hundred young Thessalians. They also charged that Philip had diverted trade away from Phthian Thebes to Demetrias, a city in his possession, which he denied on the grounds that he could not be held responsible for the decisions of merchants. There were objections about Aenus and Maronea, as well as more lurid accusations: he had arranged the assassination of some Thessalian ambassadors while journeying to meet Flaminius, a situation which perhaps recalled memories of the First Illyrian War. Philip answered this by remarking ironically on the number of envoys bearing complaints about him to Rome which had not been attacked.¹⁰ Met with objections which he regarded as unfair and ludicrous, and probably designed to hem him in, he was unable to control his temper. Livy reported that Philip,

carried away by anger...added that the sun of all his days had not yet gone down, — a menacing statement that the Romans, as well as the Thessalians, took as a threat...¹¹

The Tempe decision, brokered by the Romans, was little short of a direct attempt to weaken Philip: the harsh terms handed down by the commissioner required him to remove the Macedonian garrisons in the occupied cities, and more damaging, to be restricted to the ancient boundaries of Macedonia, the exact opposite of Philip's policy. This judgment was so vague that complaints against Macedon were essentially invited.¹² Philip did not make an immediate effort to evacuate the disput-

⁵ Livy 39.22.3; 39.23.2-3; Shuckburgh, *A History of Rome*, p. 502.

⁶ Walbank, Philip V, pp. 226-227.

⁷ Walbank, Philip V, p. 226; Polyb. 22.9.1. ⁸ Livy 39.27.1.

⁹ Green, *Alexander to Actium*, p. 424; Polyb. 22.9.1; Livy 39.24.

¹⁰ Livy 39.25-26; Walbank, Philip V, pp. 226-229.

¹¹ Livy 39.26.1; cf. Reiter, *Aemilius Paullus*, p. 120; Plutarch *Arat.* 8.2-9; Diod. Sic. 29.16.1.

¹² Badian, *Foreign Clientelae*, p. 93; Livy 39.27.1; Walbank, Philip V, p. 232; Gruen, 'The Last Years of Philip V,' p. 228; FN.

ed cities, but while the Thessalians could be ignored, in the final analysis Eumenes, the person most affected by Philip's occupation of Aenus and Maronea, could not. With the demise of a friendly Antiochus the Great, he underwrote the *status quo* in the Hellespont-Asia Minor area.¹³

The diplomatic bickering between Rome and Macedon worsened as Philip continued to argue for his right to the Thracian cities - what right did Eumenes have to them, when they were not handed to him after Apamea? He complained bitterly about the Romans' attempt to remove territory which he believed had been granted by them to begin with. He had been helpful during the war with Antiochus and expected to be rewarded, not chastised. His appeals were in vain; Aenus and Maronea were to be independent.¹⁴ But Philip, forced from Thessaly and now from Thrace (and "extremely annoyed, because he regarded his kingdom as being now curtailed on every side") was determined to have the last word. He introduced a band of Thracian mercenaries into Maronea by night to slaughter the inhabitants (184).¹⁵ Philip told the legate Appius Claudius that he was not responsible, but the Roman simply replied that he "and his colleagues...required to hear no defence, for they were well aware of what had happened, and who was the cause of it." Philip also confided in his chief friends, Apelles and Philocles, that he was now "clearly conscious that his quarrel with Rome had become serious, and that it could no longer be concealed."¹⁶ Despite these feelings, he continued to pursue his policy of strengthening the borders of Macedon in ways which would irritate Eumenes and the Romans. He offered military help to Byzantium, which was threatened by the Thracians but uncomfortably close to Pergamum. He pushed for an alliance with the Bastarnae, a Danubian tribe who were intended to migrate west, eliminate the troublesome Dardanians and settle on their land as a friendly border tribe, a policy which would return to haunt Perseus. Philip also went after the Thracians, even founding a new city which he named Perseis for his heir (182). But he created dissent by transporting people en masse from the coast to the Paeonian frontier, 'Macedonising' the Axios valley, and replacing the coastal population with Thracians who would be loyal to him alone - a worrying thought for Eumenes.¹⁷

Philip, quickly realising that his recent actions would not endear him to the Senate, sent his son Demetrius to Rome, where he was known and liked, to defend Macedonian interests.¹⁸ It soon became clear that Demetrius was a beneficiary of Roman favour and goodwill: perhaps they saw him as a second Eumenes, a pliable client. Philip was angry when one of his sons whom he had sent to exonerate him, became a Roman favourite, and when a new commission sent to Macedon to investigate once more the matter of the occupied cities impertinently told the king that he owed all his 'good fortune' to his son.¹⁹ Demetrius increasingly became the man of the moment in Rome.

¹³ Gruen, 'The Last Years of Philip V,' pp. 229-231; Adams, 'Perseus and the Third Macedonian War,' p. 241; Badian, *Roman Imperialism in the Late Republic*, p. 2; Shuckburgh, *A History of Rome*, p. 501

¹⁴ Walbank, *Philip V*, p. 233; cf. Livy 39.22-23 & 39.26-29; Polyb. 22.15.1; App. *Mac.* 9.9.6.

¹⁵ Polyb. 22, 17, 1; Livy, 39.34.1. ¹⁶ Polyb. 22, 17-18; Walbank, *Philip V*, pp. 234-235.

¹⁷ Walbank, *Philip V*, pp. 237-245; Shuckburgh, *A History of Rome to the Battle of Actium*, p. 502.

¹⁸ Gruen, 'The Last Years of Philip V,' p. 233; Walbank, *Philip V*, pp. 237-239; Polyb. 23.2.6-11; Livy 39.47.5-11; Edson, 'Perseus and Demetrius,' pp. 191-193.

¹⁹ Walbank, *Philip V*, pp. 239-241; Edson, 'Perseus and Demetrius,' p. 193; Plut. *Arat.* 54.2; Aem. Paul. 8.2-6; Polyb. 23.3 f.

Flamininus, in a policy which was to have disastrous consequences, apparently suggested to Demetrius that the Romans intended him to be next in line for the Macedonian throne. Flamininus was presumably not acting without the approval of the Senate,²⁰ and with this approach to Demetrius, Roman policy moved from 'petty persecution' to outright interference.²¹ The nascent rift in the Antigonid family widened, and was further increased when Flamininus dispatched a letter to Philip asking him to send Demetrius and a number of his friends to Rome.²² It was not long before this fracture developed into open conflict in the family. Some historians suggested that the blame for Demetrius' subsequent demise lay with Philip and Perseus; but in fact the Romans themselves shouldered a large portion of the responsibility.²³

After a purification of the Macedonian army Perseus was invited to a dinner given by his brother. Declining, he sent a spy, who was detected and beaten. Demetrius, drunk and angry, took a group of friends to Perseus' house, but nothing came of it. The following morning, however, Perseus accused his brother of an attempt on his life, and Demetrius apparently told his companion, Didas, that he was contemplating fleeing to Rome (182).²⁴ With unfortunate timing, a letter purporting to be from Flamininus arrived in which the Roman disconnected himself from Demetrius' apparent "desire to rule."²⁵ The authenticity of the letter is doubtful, and was even thought to be a forgery in antiquity,²⁶ but real or not, Demetrius *had* listened to Flamininus and had not told his father of the Roman intrigue. It is difficult to gauge the extent of the Roman interference, but the opportunity to destroy "the power of Macedon with one bold blow" was, it seems, too good to miss.²⁷ Unfortunately, the Senate's clumsy policy ruined Demetrius: on the evidence before him, Philip made his decision and Demetrius was murdered at Herecleia (181).²⁸

Philip died shortly after his son, and Perseus, succeeding with little trouble, immediately sent envoys to Rome to renew the *φιλία* (179).²⁹ But he would soon be in trouble, for Livy caught half of the truth when he claimed that Philip "would have urged...war himself, if he had lived longer." Livy grasped the sense of Philip's frustration and anger with the Romans, though it is perhaps a stretch to claim that Philip was overtly planning a conflict.³⁰ Philip had good reason to strengthen his kingdom, as the Senate had consistently tried to weaken Macedon by arbitration before they finally resorted to intrigue and open interference. It appeared as if Rome, having hemmed Philip in

²⁰ Polyb. 23.3, f.; Edson, 'Perseus and Demetrius,' pp. 193-194 & pp. 200-201.

²¹ Badian, *Foreign Clientelae*, p. 94; see Polyb. 23.3, f. for Demetrius in Rome.

²² Livy, 39.53.2; Polyb. 23.3.; Plut. *Arat.* 54.1-3; Edson, 'Perseus and Demetrius,' p. 194.

²³ cf. Livy 40.24.1; to a lesser extent, Polyb. 23.3.

²⁴ Livy, 40.7 ff., esp. 40.23.

²⁵ Livy, 40.23.

²⁶ cf. Livy 40.24.1.

²⁷ Badian, *Foreign Clientelae*, p. 94.

²⁸ Edson, 'Perseus and Demetrius,' pp. 195-199; Livy 40.24; Walbank, *Philip V*, p. 251; Gruen, 'The Last Years of Philip V,' p. 243; Polyb. 23.7.

²⁹ Livy 40, 58, 1; Polyb. 25, 3; cf. Diod. *Sic.* 29, 30, 1-2.

³⁰ Livy 39, 25, 1; so Walbank, *Philip V*, p. 273.

by ruling against him in Thrace and Northern Greece (and, more insidiously, by attempting to split the Macedonian royal family), was planning Philip's destruction.³¹ To the Romans, of course, Philip's northern policy, which did not threaten them directly, did portend a stronger Macedon which could tap into the Balkan manpower reserves and which had already shown itself belligerent on two occasions, a menace to Eumenes, and interested in territorial acquisition in Northern Greece. These misgivings combined with the disastrous murder of the Roman candidate for the Macedonian throne and Philip's less than delicate arbitration to produce an aura of distrust which continued unabated in Roman relations with Perseus and played no small part in the initiation of the Third Macedonian War in 171.³²

Even had it not been for their suspicion of him, Perseus pursued a number of policies bound to aggravate the Romans. Before he could really establish himself, the new king was, ironically, almost an immediate victim of one of his father's plans. The Bastarnae, perhaps ignorant of their sponsor's death, had crossed the Danube and set out for Dardanian territory. The hapless Dardanians dispatched an embassy to Rome which connected Perseus to the disturbances: they reported that while they feared the Bastarnae, they were more terrified of the King himself; the Thessalians volunteered to corroborate the Dardanian reports. This was not calculated to improve matters between Rome and Perseus, and while the Senate delivered a warning to abide by the treaty, a commission was sent which, even though it decided nothing, "observed that Macedonia was strongly fortified and had abundant war material" (176-175).³³ A later annalistic tradition found in Livy asserted that the sponsored action of the Bastarnae was intended to form a springboard for a Macedonian invasion of Italy.³⁴ Such fears during the Second Punic War had provided justification for Roman intervention in Greece (the First Macedonian War), but at this juncture they were certainly a fabrication.³⁵ The closing years of Philip's reign provided this paranoia, with apparent credibility, and Livy linked the fear of an imminent war with Perseus and the Bastarnae.³⁶

Perseus also indulged in a number of other activities which increased the simmering suspicion at Rome. He continued Philip's policy of buttressing the Thracian border by expelling one Abrupolis, who unfortunately turned out, in later tradition at any rate, to be a 'friend' of the Romans.³⁷ To the south Polybius described Perseus' actions as "intriguing in Greece" but they were rather directed at strengthening Macedon. He issued an amnesty to exiled debtors, pardoning people convicted or suspected of treason and even generously offering the restoration of property to all exiles. He posted these proclamations at Delos and Delphi, providing wide publicity. Rome sup-

³¹ Walbank, Philip V, p. 273; App. Mac. 9, 9, 6; Plut. Aem. Paul. 8.3-4; Reiter, Aemilius Paullus, pp. 119-120; Gruen, 'The Last Years of Philip V,' p. 222; Badian, Foreign Clientelae, p.93.

³² cf. Adams, 'Perseus and the Third Macedonian War,' p. 239; Walbank, Philip V, p. 273.

³³ App. Mac. 9, 11, 1; Polyb. 25, 6, 2-6; Adams, 'Perseus and the Third Macedonian War,' p. 240; Shuckburgh, A History of Rome, p. 503; Livy 41.19.1-2 & 40.57.1-2.

³⁴ Livy 40.57.1 ff.; Adams, 'Perseus and the Third Macedonian War,' p. 239.

³⁵ Plut. Aem. Paul. 9.3-4; Reiter, Aemilius Paullus, p. 125; Adams, 'Perseus and the Third Macedonian War,' p. 240.

³⁶ Livy, 41.19.1 & 42.11.1-2; Adams, 'Perseus and the Third Macedonian War,' pp. 240-241.

³⁷ Polyb. 22.8; Livy 42.13.1; Reiter, Aemilius Paullus, p. 124; Shuckburgh, A History of Rome, p. 503.

ported the conservative aristocrats in Greece and Perseus' 'revolutionary' measures threatened to subvert the *status quo*.³⁸

There was worse to come. Massinissa (perhaps falsely) reported that Perseus had sent an embassy to Carthage, and though this was probably only intended to establish friendly relations, it was certainly "injudicious."³⁹ In addition, the Dolopi, under Macedonian control, now created trouble by proposing that Rome and not Macedon should be their arbitrator. Perseus responded to this affront by leading a punitive expedition against them, explaining to the inquisitive Senate that the Dolopians were his own subjects and, besides, they had murdered their governor.⁴⁰ Perseus also made a gesture which, perhaps intended to show a strong and stable Macedon to the Greeks, also gave precisely that impression to Rome - which did not wish to see it. Having "some religious scruples on his mind" he travelled to Delphi with his army in full attendance, which, while breaching no treaty, was unexpected and aroused further suspicion.⁴¹ On his return through Thessaly and Phthiotic Achaea he sent out letters or agents "to ask that the people should no longer remember the quarrels that had existed between them and his father" (174).⁴²

This policy of *rapprochement* was not simply aimed at the Northern Greeks. Perseus particularly wanted to regain the trust and friendship of the Achaean League, which had joined Athens against Philip during the Second Macedonian War. The Achaeans had banned Macedonians from their territory, and a result of this policy had been that escaped Achaean slaves found a haven in Macedon. Perseus, with exceptional good faith, now returned the escaped slaves to their owners. As a result of this and his other lenient policies, he was rewarded with widespread pro-Macedonian feeling (174/3).⁴³ This was also used against him: when pro-Roman landowners in Aetolia, for example, became "embroiled" with debtors, the policies of Perseus (and the king himself) were inevitably blamed, even though he had had little to do with the problem.⁴⁴

An inscription of 178 listed Perseus as a recognised member of the Amphictyonic council, a position which reflected a certain degree of recognition by other Greeks.⁴⁵ The Romans, however, were not happy to have a Macedonian King courting his southern neighbours, as had been implied by the Second Macedonian War. Now, more than before, the Romans wanted to keep Macedonia and Greece apart. The person who would gain the most from this policy, other than the Romans themselves, was Eumenes, but he had become unpopular in Greece, and especially in Achaea, where his benefactions were considered unwelcome and pompous.⁴⁶ The growing prestige of Perseus in

³⁸ Gruen, 'Class Conflict,' p. 29; Polyb. 25.3 ff.; Adams, 'Perseus and the Third Macedonian War,' p. 246; Giovanni, 'Les Origines de la 3e Guerre de Macedoine,' p. 861.

³⁹ Adams 'Perseus and the Third Macedonian War,' p. 247. * App. Mac. 9.11.6; Livy, 41.22.1.

⁴⁰ cf. Livy 42.22.1-2 & n. 3, p. 489 (Penguin ed.). * Livy 41.22.1-3.

⁴¹ Livy 41.22-23 ff.; cf. App. Mac. 9.11.1; Shuckburgh, A History of Rome, p. 503.

⁴² Green, Alexander to Actium, p. 427; cf. Livy 42.2.1-3 & 42.40.1-2; App. Mac. 9.11.3; Gruen, 'Class Conflict,' p. 30; Walbank, 'The Causes of the Third Macedonian War: Some Recent Views,' p. 87; Polyb. 25.3-4.

⁴³ Syll. 636 in Walbank, 'The Causes of the Third Macedonian War: Some Recent Views,' p. 90.

⁴⁴ Shuckburgh, A History of Rome, p. 504; Reiter, Aemilius Paullus, pp. 118-119.

Greece was almost certainly as offensive to Eumenes as it was to the Romans, and threatened to isolate the Pergamene from his patrons.

Eumenes' fears had been heightened by another Hellenistic expediency which was once again intended to strengthen Macedonian standing. While the degree of malice in Perseus' actions was doubtful, his poor diplomatic choice was somewhat blatant and, historically at least, was too close for comfort. He proceeded to make an alliance with Prusias II of Bithynia and Seleucus IV, the new King of Syria, who gave his daughter to Perseus in marriage. Since Perseus had only a small navy and Seleucus was not permitted by treaty to sail past Cape Sarpedon, the Rhodians offered to transport Perseus' new bride, Laodice, themselves, and went on to hold a grand naval review, "the fact being that a vast quantity of timber for ship-building had been presented to them by Perseus." The king made lavish displays of his own, presenting gold to the upper-deck rowers on the boat which bore Laodice (178).⁴⁷ It did not require a fertile imagination to link this new entente with the 'Syro-Macedonian Pact' between Philip V and Antiochus, and the Rhodian connection threatened a pro-Macedonian navy - a potential threat to Rome's settlements after Cynoscephalae and the war with Antiochus. Matters were not improved by the great number of embassies which arrived to congratulate Perseus on his new marriage and the gift of his daughter to Prusias, son of the king who had sheltered Hannibal after the defeat of Antiochus (184-182).⁴⁸

The actions of Perseus had so far been intended as a sequel to Philip's policy of reviving Macedonian strength. Unlike Philip, Perseus was not given to angry threats or the slaughter of civilians, but in his attempted *rapprochments* he fell afoul of the pro-Roman party in Achaëa, and of Eumenes of Pergamum, who felt threatened by a resurgent Macedon. In Greece, the Achaean politician Callicrates claimed that Perseus' intention was clearly "to make an alliance, whereby the treaty with Rome, on which our whole future is based, would be violated."⁴⁹ Callicrates succeeded in turning the League towards Rome and away from an alliance with Macedon (175), and Roman influence, bolstered by the removal of pro-Macedonian Achaëans, grew to the point that a Roman envoy was able to illegally summon the Achaean League Assembly on a whim.⁵⁰ The concerns of the anti-Roman party for the continued internal "independence" and security of the Achaean League were seemingly borne out by later events in Boiotia, where elements of that League had shown themselves well-disposed to Perseus, who made a treaty with them.⁵¹ Recognising that a pro-Macedonian Greece would be a serious encumbrance if a war with Macedon became a reality, the Romans launched a diplomatic offensive under Q. Marcius Philippus to ensure the primacy of the pro-Roman party. By taking advantage of 'separatist impulses' and by insisting that each city should

⁴⁷ Polyb. 25.4 ff.; Livy, 42.12.1.

⁴⁸ Livy, 39.51.1-2 & 42.12.1; cf. Polyb. 23, 8; Walbank, 'The Causes of the Third Macedonian War: Some Recent Views,' p. 91; cf. Bikerman, 'Notes sur Polybe,' p. 503.

⁴⁹ Livy, 41.23.3; Reiter, Aemilius Paullus, p. 82.

⁵⁰ Scullard, A History of the Roman World, p. 265.

⁵¹ cf. Livy 42.42.1 ff.

send a separate delegation, the mission split the Boiotian League into its component parts and thus destroyed the potent popular credibility of the Macedonians there (171).⁵²

While the Romans might be irritated by Perseus' Greek diplomacy, the real obstacle to peace was the threat which Perseus posed to Eumenes.⁵³ In 172 the Pergamene King travelled to Rome in person to deliver charges against the Macedonians and "to urge the Senate...to take counter-measures against the designs of Perseus."⁵⁴ He claimed that Perseus had killed Demetrius for being pro-Roman, that he had helped Philip to re-arm, had continued that policy after Philip's death, and was "conciliating the Greeks in every way."⁵⁵ Eumenes also pointed to Macedonian control of Thrace and the vast reserves of that land, "a never-failing spring," and provided some disturbing figures: Perseus, it was claimed, had ten years' worth of grain for 30,000 foot soldiers and 5,000 horses, and enough money to pay 10,000 mercenaries for ten years.⁵⁶ There were, of course, other charges — the threat that the marriage alliances posed ("the coalition of kings"), the attack on Abrupolis, and the sheltering of the assassins of Arthetaurus of Illyria, another Roman "friend," because Perseus "had discovered some written communication from him" to the Romans.⁵⁷ Perseus had aided the Byzantines once more against the Thracians, which was apparently a treaty violation.⁵⁸ Eumenes also indulged in fictions, pandering to latent Senatorial fears by decrying Perseus for creating "general confusion and disorder in Thessaly and Perrhaëbia by the prospect of abolition of all debts, so that he might overthrow the aristocracy with the help of a mob of debtors under obligation to him."⁵⁹

Other, more sensational, stories were asserted. Lucius Rammius of Brundisium, a leading citizen who looked after Roman officials on their way in and out of the country, had been suborned by Perseus as his guest friend to poison some of them. The king had even offered a new untraceable poison, and Rammius, "afraid that if he refused he might be the first subject of an experiment," apparently told it all to Gaius Valerius, the Roman commissioner who also found "evidence" of Eumenes' charges in Macedon itself.⁶⁰ Eumenes stopped at nothing, and even manufactured charges out of "the industry and sobriety of life which [Perseus] showed at such an early age, and the widespread popularity and praise which he had quickly attained." Finally, the Pergamene King "urged

⁵² Polyb. 27.2; Livy 42.18-44, esp. 44; Reiter, Aemilius Paullus, pp. 82 & 122-125; Gruen, 'Class Conflict,' p. 47; Giovanni, 'Les Origines de la 3e Guerre de Macedoine,' p. 859; cf. Syll.3 646, Austin 78; Badian, Foreign Clientelae, p. 95; App. Mac. 9.11.1, on Perseus' 'nearness to the Greeks.'

⁵³ Walbank, 'The Causes of the Third Macedonian War: Some Recent Views,' p. 94.

⁵⁴ Livy, 42.11.1.

⁵⁵ App. Mac. 9.11.1.

⁵⁶ Livy 42.11-13; Plut. Aem. Paul. 8.5.

⁵⁷ Livy 42.11-13; App. Mac. 9.11.2.

⁵⁸ Livy 42.13.1 & p. 503 n.8 (Penguin ed.); cf. 42.40.1-2.

⁵⁹ for the treaty, interestingly, cf. Gruen, 'The Supposed Alliance Between Rome and Philip V of Macedon,' *passim*; Livy 42.13.1; the class issue: Gruen, 'Class Conflict and the Third Macedonian War,' p. 48.

⁶⁰ Livy 42.17.2 & 42.40.1-2; Green, Alexander to Actium, p. 427; Reiter, Aemilius Paullus, p. 86.

the Senate to beware of a youthful enemy so highly esteemed and so near to them."⁶¹ The charges were considered important enough to be inscribed and set up at Delphi (172-171).⁶²

The Macedonian envoys did not stand a chance, not only because the Senate was more disposed to listen to a trusted ally than one of whom they were already suspicious, but also because Eumenes had reached them first. The Macedonians were not even allowed an opportunity to refute their accuser face-to-face, and their subsequent loss of patience angered the Senate.⁶³ Further suspicion was cast on Perseus by the "assassination attempt" on Eumenes at Delphi, whilst on his way home - "if mass poisoning in Italy, why not well-aimed rocks in Greece?"⁶⁴ The Cretan Evander, who apparently perpetrated the crime, reappeared at Perseus' court. The rumour of Eumenes' death reached Rome, and Valerius brought back a certain Delphian named Praxo, at whose house the "assassins" of Delphi had stayed.⁶⁵

Perseus refuted the slander of Eumenes with ease.⁶⁶ He had armies, not to be directed at Rome, but because he was bound to protect his kingdom; besides, the Romans let others (for example, Eumenes) have armies. He had acted against Abrupolis in self-defence after an attack on Pangaeum; the war with the Dolopians had been an internal matter and, in any case, they had tortured his governor to death. He had expelled the murderers of Arthetaurus when they sought haven in Macedonia, and had provided military aid to the Byzantines against others, not Rome (and his ambassadors had even advised Rome about it). As for the poisoning charges, they were quite absurd. He finished up with an exhortation to the Senate "not to make nearness, sobriety and preparation causes for complaint," since it would not do for the Senate 'to be stirred by envy or fear like Eumenes.'⁶⁷ But the Senate had already made up its mind.

From this point on war was inevitable, and the reasons which the Senate provided for their actions were borrowed directly from Eumenes.⁶⁸ A Roman commission, snubbed by the king, reported vigorous preparations for war in Macedonia, and the news of the "alliance" between Perseus and Genthius the Illyrian supported their account.⁶⁹ Eumenes was prevaricating when he told the Senate that he had no personal gain from his accusations; he was, in fact, the chief advocate of a war with Macedon, and it is certainly significant that Roman suspicion did not seem to boil over into war until he came to the Senate in 172. Cato slyly noted that he was "an excellent man

⁶¹ App. Mac. 9, 11, 2.

⁶² Syll.3 643, Austin 76; L&R 71.

⁶³ Livy 42.14.1; App. Mac. 9.11.3; Plut. Aem. Paul. 23.3-4; Adams, 'Perseus and the Third Macedonian War,' pp. 244-245 & 252.

⁶⁴ Green, Alexander to Actium, p. 427.

⁶⁵ Livy 42.15-17 ff.; App. Mac. 9.11.4; Diod. Sic. 29.34.2; Shuckburgh, A History of Rome, pp. 504-505.

⁶⁶ Livy 42.41.1 ff. - during a meeting with Q. M. Philippus; App. Mac. 9.11.6 ff.

⁶⁷ App. Mac. 9.11.5-7; Livy 42.42.2.

⁶⁸ App. Mac. 9.11.5; see once again Syll.3 643, Austin 76; L&R 71

⁶⁹ Livy 42.18.1 & 42.25.1 & 42.26.1; Walbank, 'The Causes of the Third Macedonian War: Some Recent Views,' p. 93; Scullard, A History of the Roman World, p. 268; Burn, History of Greece, p. 381; Badian, Foreign Clientelae, p. 95; cf. App. Mac. 9.11.1.

and a friend of Rome...but the animal known as King is by nature carnivorous."⁷⁰ Accustomed to vilifying Macedonians, he skillfully took Macedonia's anti-Pergamum stance and transformed it into an anti-Roman one.⁷¹ Interested in the Hellespont region, he was threatened by the new ties between Perseus, Seleucus and Prusias, as well as Perseus' attempts to win Rhodes onto his side; Rhodes had been a stalwart friend of Rome during the Second Macedonian War, but not always the best of friends with Pergamum. Eumenes' apparent involvement in the assassination of Seleucus IV—and his rapport with Antiochus Epiphanes—certainly suggests that he wanted Pergamum and Syria in alliance, and Perseus threatened this.⁷² Though it is difficult to be sure about Senatorial matters at this time, vacillations in Roman politics probably also played a role. The demand of C. Popilius and P. Aelius, the consuls for 172, that Macedonia be declared a province, even though it was still officially a friend, do suggest a certain amount of war-mongering. C. Cassius Longinus, consul in 171, called for Macedonia as his province, but was so frustrated to receive Italy that he attempted to reach Macedon through Illyria.⁷³

The war, which ended in the battle at Pydna in 168, destroyed the Antigonids and any semblance of the leniency which followed Cynoscephalae.⁷⁴ Perseus adorned the celebration of Aemilius Paullus and languished in an Italian jail for the remainder of his days. Ultimately it is hard to resist Appian's sober conclusion that

the Senate, in reality because they did not choose to have on their flank a sober-minded, benevolent King, an hereditary enemy to themselves, attaining eminence so suddenly, but ostensibly on the grounds of Eumenes' allegations, decided to make war on Perseus.⁷⁵

From the Roman point of view, it is possible that Perseus' alliance with Seleucus did threaten a "coalition of kings" and perhaps reminded them of Philip V and Antiochus. Contacting Carthage was certainly a diplomatic blunder (if it happened), and while Perseus' policies in Greece threatened Roman control there it cannot be convincingly argued that Italy was ever at risk. What did threaten Rome was the possibility of a Greece controlled by Macedon, where the pro-Romans like Callicrates might be submerged and where the Greeks would send their embassies to Pella and not the Curia.⁷⁶ In the years that followed the visit of Eumenes, Perseus showed his commitment to peace on several occasions, sending three embassies to Rome, offering reparations, proposing to end the war on favourable terms after the Romans had suffered a significant cavalry defeat, and even falling for the blatant duplicity of a truce put forward by Q. Marcius Philippus, who knew well that

70 Plut. Cat. Mai. 8.7-8; Livy, 42.11.2-3 & cf. 42.29.1; Gruen, 'Class Conflict,' p. 47.

71 Adams, 'Perseus and the Third Macedonian War,' p. 251.

72 Green, Alexander to Actium, pp. 426-428; Reiter, Aemilius Paullus, p. 128; Adams, 'Perseus and the Third Macedonian War,' pp. 246-247; later Rhodian-Pergamene enmity: cf. Polyb. 27.7.

73 Livy 42.9-10 & 43.1.4-12; Walbank, 'The Causes of the Third Macedonian War: Some Recent Views,' p. 93; Adams, 'Perseus and the Third Macedonian War,' p. 249; cf. Badian, Roman Imperialism in the Late Republic, pp. 10-11

74 see Gruen, 'Macedonia and the Settlement of 167 BC,' pp. 257 ff.

75 App. Mac. 9.11.2-3.

76 Reiter, Aemilius Paullus, p. 129; Adams, 'Perseus and the Third Macedonian War,' pp. 247-248.

the Romans had no intention of cancelling hostilities: they were simply not ready (171).⁷⁷ An even more abject example of Roman double-dealing came soon afterwards, when the Macedonian envoys, sent to secure peace, were kept waiting in Rome until the last possible minute. By the time that they were seen and rebuffed, the army was on its way.⁷⁸

The real crime of Perseus was to try and act as Rome's equal, and to cement the independence of Macedonia. He did not inherit the war, and certainly did not plan one. He never once indulged in a policy which was seriously anti-Roman, but he trod on the Senate's toes in Greece, suggested the spectre of an independent Balkan power, threatened Eumenes in the East, and, by the time of Eumenes' visit in 172 with a stack of flimsy pretexts, he could not be tolerated.⁷⁹ The startling defamation of Perseus in the Roman tradition as expressed by Livy provides us with a monster whom Rome could legitimately fight, but what we know of Perseus proves that he was not demented, was not merciless, and certainly did not drive Rome to war.⁸⁰ The Senate, suspicious of him from the start as a result of the activities of Philip and the murder of Demetrius, merely saw what they wanted to believe when Eumenes addressed them in 172.⁸¹ From that point onwards Perseus did not have any choice in the matter.

⁷⁷ Polyb. 27.8; Livy, 42.39-43; Adams, 'Perseus and the Third Macedonian War,' p. 256; Badian, *Roman Imperialism in the Late Republic*, p. 3; Walbank, *Philip V*, pp. 226-227; Walbank, 'A Note on the Embassy of Q. Marcius Philippus,' pp. 91-93.

⁷⁸ Walbank, 'A Note on the Embassy of Q. Marcius Philippus,' p. 93.

⁷⁹ cf. Plut. *Aem. Paul.* 7.2-3; Walbank, 'The Causes of the Third Macedonian War: Some Recent Views,' p. 94.

⁸⁰ Livy 42.25.1-13; Plut. *Aem. Paul.* 8, 6-7; Reiter, *Aemilius Paullus*, pp. 81-87; cf., entertainingly, Plut. *Arat.* 54, 3; Edson, 'Perseus and Demetrius,' p. 202.

⁸¹ Walbank, 'The Causes of the Third Macedonian War: Some Recent Views,' p. 94.

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