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UID:20260829T183905EDT-9943SMZNPK@132.216.98.100
DTSTAMP:20260829T223905Z
DESCRIPTION:Dynamic Games and Applications Seminar\n\n\n	Speaker: Pegah Rokh
  Foroz – School of Electrical and Computer Engineering\, University of Teh
 ran\, Iran\, and ETH Zurich\, Switzerland \n\n\n\n	Zoom link\n		Webinar ID: 9
 62 7774 9870\n		Passcode: 285404\n\n	We consider a centralized multi-agent op
 timization problem with coupling constraint among agents\, where the infor
 mation is distributed between agents who are strategic\, selfish and have 
 the private value functions. To achieve a global optimal solution\, we pro
 pose an incentive mechanism based on a message space and payment function\
 , which makes a non-cooperative game among agents where an individual util
 ity function of each agent aligns with the centralized optimization proble
 m. We construct a family of payment function\, which leads to a potential 
 game among agents and ensures the strongly Nash implementation\, budget ba
 lance and individual rationality of the induced mechanism using the linear
  matrix inequality approach.\n\n
DTSTART:20210204T160000Z
DTEND:20210204T160000Z
LOCATION:CA\, ZOOM
SUMMARY:Incentive mechanism design using linear matrix inequality approach 
URL:https://www.mcgill.ca/cim/channels/event/incentive-mechanism-design-usi
 ng-linear-matrix-inequality-approach-328180
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