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UID:20261011T005800EDT-6329ToNPVu@132.216.98.100
DTSTAMP:20261011T045800Z
DESCRIPTION:\n	\n		Dynamic Games and Applications Seminar\n\n		Speaker: Vladimir
  Mazalov – Karelian Research Center\, Russia \n\n		\n\n		Abstract: We consider
  a single-server queueing system with strategic users. The customers (play
 ers) log into the service system with certain rules during a fixed time in
 terval [0\, T]. There are many such service systems\, it can be a bank\, a
  ticket office\, lunch in a cafe\, etc. Queueing theory provides the metho
 ds for the evaluation of the waiting times\, delays\, and other costs. At 
 the same time\, the flow of service requests is initially set in the form 
 of some random process with some initially set intensity. We are consideri
 ng a model where the queue itself is formed as a result of the actions of 
 the visitors themselves. The customers choose the time of entry into the s
 ervice system themselves. Thus\, a game is formed between the visitors of 
 the service system. We demonstrate how game theory can be applied to optim
 ally select the instant of entry into the service system using the example
 s of a service with pre-emptive access and a queueing system with retrials
 .\n	\n\n
DTSTART:20230126T160000Z
DTEND:20230126T170000Z
LOCATION:CA\, ZOOM
SUMMARY:Equilibrium in Queueing System with Strategic Users
URL:https://www.mcgill.ca/cim/channels/event/equilibrium-queueing-system-st
 rategic-users-351776
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