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UID:20260514T075638EDT-1482keLZ7x@132.216.98.100
DTSTAMP:20260514T115638Z
DESCRIPTION:Virtual Informal Systems Seminar (VISS)\n	Centre for Intelligent
  Machines (CIM) and Groupe d'Etudes et de Recherche en Analyse des Decisio
 ns (GERAD)\n\nZoom Link\n	Meeting ID: 845 1388 1004\n	Passcode: VISS\n\nSpea
 ker: Giacomo Como\, Professor\, Department of Mathematical Sciences\, Poli
 tecnico di Torino\n	\n	Abstract:\n	We study a network formation game where n 
 players\, identified with the nodes of a directed graph to be formed\, cho
 ose where to wire their outgoing links in order to maximize their PageRank
  centrality. Specifically\, the action of every player i consists in the w
 iring of a predetermined number d(i) of directed out-links\, and her utili
 ty is her own PageRank centrality in the network resulting from the action
 s of all players. We show that this is a potential game and that the best 
 response correspondence always exhibits a local structure in that it is ne
 ver convenient for a node i to link to other nodes that are at incoming di
 stance more than d(i) from her. We then study the equilibria of this game 
 determining necessary conditions for a graph to be a (strict\, recurrent) 
 Nash equilibrium. Moreover\, in the homogeneous case\, where players all h
 ave the same number d of out-links\, we characterize the structure of the 
 potential maximizing equilibria and\, in the special cases d=1 and d=2\, w
 e provide a complete classification of the set of (strict\, recurrent)  Na
 sh equilibria. Our analysis shows in particular that the considered format
 ion mechanism leads to the emergence of undirected and disconnected or loo
 sely connected networks. This is a joint work with Costanza Catalano\, Mar
 ia Castaldo\, and Fabio Fagnani.\n	\n	Biography:\n	Giacomo Como is  a  Profes
 sor at  the Department  of  Mathematical  Sciences\, Politecnico di Torino
 \, Italy. He is also a Senior Lecturer at the Automatic Control Department
 \, Lund University\, Sweden. He received the B.Sc.\, M.S.\, and Ph.D. degr
 ees in Applied Mathematics  from  Politecnico  di  Torino\,  in  2002\,  2
 004\, and 2008\, respectively. He was a Visiting Assistant in  Research at
  Yale  University in 2006--2007 and a Postdoctoral Associate at  the  Labo
 ratory  for  Information  and  Decision  Systems\,  Massachusetts  Institu
 te of Technology\, from 2008 to 2011. He  is  recipient  of  the 2015  Geo
 rge S. Axelby  Outstanding Paper Award.  His  research interests  are in  
 dynamics\,  information\,  and  control  in  network  systems  with  appli
 cations to  cyber-physical  systems\,  infrastructure  networks\,  and  so
 cial and economic networks.\n	 \n
DTSTART:20231013T140000Z
DTEND:20231013T150000Z
LOCATION:CA\, ZOOM
SUMMARY:On a Network Centrality Maximization Game
URL:https://www.mcgill.ca/cim/channels/event/network-centrality-maximizatio
 n-game-351745
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