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UID:20260830T122709EDT-4869m4h44v@132.216.98.100
DTSTAMP:20260830T162709Z
DESCRIPTION:Dynamic Games and Applications Seminar\n\nSpeaker: Francesca Pa
 rise – School of Electrical and Computer Engineering\, Cornell University\
 , United States\n\n\n\nAbstract:\n\nUnderstanding the role of network inte
 ractions is fundamental for improving efficiency\, resilience\, and welfar
 e in many socio-economic settings. The large size of these systems (e.g.\,
  involving billions of users in the case of social platforms) however intr
 oduces some challenges from the perspective of a planner that aims at regu
 lating interactions. In fact in many cases\, collecting exact network data
  is either too costly or impossible due to privacy concerns. In these case
 s however it might be feasible for the planner to collect statistical info
 rmation about agents' interactions that can be used to infer a random grap
 h model. A key question is then whether knowledge of such a random graph m
 odel is sufficient to infer relevant features of the realized network or t
 o control a dynamical process evolving over it. This question has been add
 ressed in a number of recent works by focusing on network games with uniqu
 e Nash equilibrium. Yet\, many relevant networks may exhibit multiple equi
 libria. In this talk\, we will present novel results in this direction. Sp
 ecifically\, we will present a convergence theory for graphon games with m
 ultiple equilibria and algorithms for learning in time-varying settings.\n
DTSTART:20230914T150000Z
DTEND:20230914T160000Z
LOCATION:CA\, Zoom
SUMMARY:Network games with large populations: non-uniqueness and learning d
 ynamics
URL:https://www.mcgill.ca/cim/channels/event/network-games-large-population
 s-non-uniqueness-and-learning-dynamics-351602
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