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UID:20260901T073812EDT-5753jB7oFi@132.216.98.100
DTSTAMP:20260901T113812Z
DESCRIPTION:Dynamic Games and Applications Seminar\n\n\n	Speaker: Hassan Ben
 chekroun – McGill University\, Canada \n\n\n\n	Webinar link\n		Webinar ID: 84
 1 3695 9888\n		Passcode: 120834\n\n	We study efficiency-inducing taxation of 
 common-pool resources in oligopoly. In contrast with the existing literatu
 re\, we consider a novel tax scheme where the tax bill paid by a firm depe
 nds only on the current resource stock. The regulator does not need to hav
 e information about firmsè individual outputs. We establish two main resul
 ts. First\, effciency can be achieved by means of a less informationally d
 emanding tax than the per unit tax usually considered in the literature. S
 econd\, the intuitive lessons obtained for a per unit tax may no longer be
  valid when the tax depends only on the resource stock.\n\n
DTSTART:20220331T150000Z
DTEND:20220331T160000Z
LOCATION:CA\, ZOOM
SUMMARY: On the Optimal Taxation of the Commons 
URL:https://www.mcgill.ca/cim/channels/event/optimal-taxation-commons-33880
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