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UID:20260610T163545EDT-34893Cr9xH@132.216.98.100
DTSTAMP:20260610T203545Z
DESCRIPTION:Dynamic Games and Applications Seminar\n\nSpeaker: Ratul Lahkar
 \, Ashoka University\, India\n\nWebinar link\n	Webinar ID: 881 6070 4034\n	P
 asscode: 095916\n\nWe consider affirmative action in large population Tull
 ock contests. The standard Tullock contest is an equal treatment contest i
 n which agents who exert equal effort have an equal probability of success
 . In contrast\, under affirmative action\, agents with equal cost of effor
 t have equal probability of success. We analyze such contests as generaliz
 ed aggregative potential games and characterize their Nash equilibria. We 
 show that affirmative action equalizes equilibrium payoffs without causing
  any loss of aggregate welfare. It enhances the welfare and effort levels 
 of agents facing high effort cost. Thus\, affirmative action engenders equ
 ality without having any detrimental effects on efficiency\, at least when
  the number of agents involved are large. It does\, however\, reduce aggre
 gate effort in society.\n
DTSTART:20210513T150000Z
DTEND:20210513T160000Z
LOCATION:CA\, ZOOM
SUMMARY:Affirmative action in large population contests
URL:https://www.mcgill.ca/cim/channels/event/affirmative-action-large-popul
 ation-contests-330797
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