BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 PRODID:-//132.216.98.100//NONSGML kigkonsult.se iCalcreator 2.20.4// BEGIN:VEVENT UID:20260602T034617EDT-0978vhFzVF@132.216.98.100 DTSTAMP:20260602T074617Z DESCRIPTION:Nymisha Bandi\n\nIncentivizing Healthy Food Choices Using Add-o n Bundling: A Field Experiment\n\nRetailers can use price\, convenience\, and taste to incentivize customers to make healthier food choices\, but th ese options are often expensive and infrequently promoted. Recent efforts in deploying healthy nudges to incentivize customers toward healthier food choices have been observed. We conducted a field experiment with a global convenience store chain to better understand how different add-on bundle promotions influence healthy food choices. We considered three types of ad d-on bundles: (i) an unhealthy bundle\, (ii) a healthy bundle\, and (iii) a choice bundle. In addition to our field experiment\, we conducted an onl ine lab study to strengthen the validity of our results.\n\nHossein Hejazi an\n\nThe Impact of Hospital and Patient Characteristics on Psychiatry Rea dmissions\n\nA widely observed phenomenon in operations management is ``pr actice makes perfect''\, which constitutes a positive volume-outcome relat ionship. The nature of this relationship\, however\, may change in people- centric environments\, such as health systems. We study the operational ch aracteristics of hospitals contributing to the re-admission of psychiatry patients\, shortly after being discharged. We propose that the length of s tay (LOS) in the inpatient ward mediates the effects of hospital character istics on the risk of readmission. Moreover\, we reveal how patient charac teristics can moderate these effects. We utilize a data set of about 15\,0 00 psychiatry patients admitted to 25 hospitals in Quebec\, Canada. We use a clustered-error probit model which is corrected by the instrumental var iable method to perform a causal analysis. We find that the number of pati ents admitted to a hospital annually increases the risk of readmission\, w hereas this risk reduces with the hospital specializing in certain diagnos is classes. These relationships are moderated by patients' intensity of re source usage at the emergency department. Moreover\, we find a nonlinear r elationship between LOS and the risk of readmission. This relationship aff ects the extent of the impact of hospital characteristics on the risk of r eadmission. We provide evidence on the negative volume-outcome and nonline ar LOS-outcome relationships. Our results provide insights for policymaker s to manage the burden imposed on the health systems by unplanned readmiss ions from patients with chronic disorders. Our empirical analysis provides potentially helpful insights for managing the flow of psychiatric patient s.\n\nGuillaume Lapierre-Berger\n\nPolitical Power\, Party Allegiance\, an d the Operations of Public Projects\n\nContractors manage multiple project s concurrently\, and allocate (limited) resources across them. In this pap er\, we show that this allocation is often driven by opportunism and polit ical allegiance. Firms and political parties create alliances—firms donate to political campaigns and\, in turn\, are favored in future project acqu isitions when the candidate is elected. Hence\, contractors will overalloc ate project resources projects in districts where their political ally is expected to win re-election (or stay in power). Simultaneously\, contracto rs will under-allocate resources to districts where their political allies are expected to lose re-election or resign. To substantiate this hypothes is\, we assemble data from four sources: (i) the largest dataset on public projects in the U.S.\, incorporating hundreds of thousands of infrastruct ure projects\, (ii) political races data for the U.S. House of Representat ives\, (iii) political scandals data\, and (iv) political donations data. We use a diff-in-diffs analysis\, exploiting politician scandals\, resigna tions\, and deaths as exogenous shocks. We show that (i) when a political shock (e.g.\, a scandal) dooms an incumbent’s popularity or leads to a res ignation\, then contractors performing projects in the congressional distr ict of the incumbent reallocate their resources—from projects in this dist rict to projects in “favorable” districts (i.e.\, where the incumbent will remain in power)\, and that (ii) this exacerbates public projects delays in the original district. Our findings help us expose a political mechanis m under which project delays occur and encourage a discussion on how to re gulate the allocation of government contracts.\n\nZichun Liu\n\nSustainabl e Joint Pricing and Inventory Policies for Perishable Food\n\nSubstantial amount of food is produced but not consumed has non-negligible negative im pacts environmentally\, socially\, and economically. In the research\, we address the simultaneous determination of pricing and inventory control fo r perishable food. The optimal policy is computationally intractable due t o the curse of dimensionality. Thus\, we develop a heuristic policy to max imize profit and prove our policy is asymptotically optimal under several parameter regimes. Compared with several benchmarks\, we show theoreticall y and numerically that our heuristic policy not only increases profit but also decreases waste.\n\n \n DTSTART:20230512T140000Z DTEND:20230512T153000Z LOCATION:Room 245\, Bronfman Building\, CA\, QC\, Montreal\, H3A 1G5\, 1001 rue Sherbrooke Ouest SUMMARY:Operation Management PhD Talks: May 12\, 2023 URL:https://www.mcgill.ca/channels/channels/event/operation-management-phd- talks-may-12-2023-348271 END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR