

ETHNIC COEXISTENCE IN DEEPLY DIVIDED SOCIETIES: The Case of Arab Athletes in the Hebrew Media

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This article examines the various elements affecting reconciliation and coexistence in deeply divided societies through the case of Arab soccer players in the Israeli media. We analyze the discourse surrounding the concept *du-kium* (coexistence) in the Israeli media between the years 2002 and 2008. Our findings reveal that Jewish journalists and public figures interpret coexistence as Arab citizens' complete acceptance of the Jewish perspective and narrative. Arab soccer players are expected to underplay their Palestinian identity, master Hebrew, and identify with the Jewish narrative and views. We contrast the Israeli case with two other cases of prolonged conflict—Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The study highlights that cognitive perceptions and schemes may hinder genuine reconciliation even when various groups reject overt racism and profess candid desire for coexistence.

The term *du-kium* (coexistence) is often used in Israeli public discourse to designate a desired goal regarding the relationship between Arabs and Jews in Israel. It is portrayed as an alternative to a state of animosity and violence between the two groups, and is therefore high on the list of state agencies and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that view prejudice, discrimination, and hostility between Jews and Palestinians as a major social problem. During the last two decades, many projects have sought to promote coexistence, but academic studies and news reports indicate an ongoing decline in the state of the relations between the Jewish and Arab citizens of Israel (Abdo and Lentin 2002; David 2007; Shenhav and Yona 2008; Shapira 2009). How can efforts to encourage greater coexistence improve? How would we expect Arab and Jewish citizens to treat one another when coexistence is achieved? And what can the Israeli case teach us about the prospects of coexistence in deeply divided societies?¹

In this article, we examine the meanings attached to the concept *du-kium* in the Israeli political discourse, seeking to contribute to the sociological literature on conflict management and peace building. We focus on one field in which the coexistence between Arab and Jewish Israelis seems most likely to succeed—Israeli soccer. We use

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systematic critical discourse analysis to examine the coverage of Israeli Arab soccer players in the sport sections of major dailies and TV sport broadcasts between the years 2002 and 2008. Our findings show that while professing coexistence to be one of the most important and sought-after goals of the Israeli society, many Jewish journalists and commentators interpret it as Israeli Arabs' complete acceptance of the Jewish perspective. Arab soccer players are expected to refrain from celebrating (or even referring to) their national (Palestinian) identity and to underplay their connection to Palestinians in the occupied territories and in exile. Furthermore, writers often expect them to master Hebrew, to be familiar with Jewish religious practices and national symbols, and most tellingly to identify with the Jewish narrative and views of the Palestinian–Jewish conflict. Understanding these unilateral expectations of Jewish Israeli public opinion may contribute to our understanding of the difficulty in moving toward greater reconciliation and mutual recognition.

We examine the similarities and differences between the Israeli case and two other prominent cases of interethnic relations in deeply divided societies—Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Through this comparison, we try to identify the variables that enable, or thwart, mutual recognition and contribute to the sociological understanding of these issues. Our findings suggest that the conditions in deeply divided societies often preclude the development of fuller coexistence, one in which the fear of recurring violence is reduced, and the other side's differences, way of life, and collective narrative become legitimate, if not adopted.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Reconciliation and Coexistence

During the last two decades, a considerable body of literature has analyzed the relations between groups involved in a violent conflict following a political solution (e.g., Halpern and Weinstein 2004; Buckley-Zistel 2006a,b; Tam et al. 2008; Hadler 2012). *Reconciliation* and *coexistence* are two key terms in this context, often used by academics, practitioners, media people, and public figures. While there is no consensus on what these terms mean and how they should be promoted, some believe that an ideal, or “thick,” reconciliation should include most of the following: dialogue, justice, truth-telling, apology and forgiveness, mutual recognition and trust, respect, empathy, and coming to a shared view of both the past and the future (Lederach 1997; Halpern and Weinstein 2004; Amstutz 2005; Haider 2011).

Coexistence, for many, is a less ambitious goal than reconciliation—a more “realistic” or “thin” reconciliation (Stefansson 2010). It does not presume to achieve harmony, justice, truth, forgiveness, and compensation for past sufferings, or to resolve deep-seated hatreds and structural and economic inequalities (Chayes and Minow 2003; Bar-Tal and Bennink 2004). Rather, it is simply a process of repairing intergroup relations and learning to live together in peace, maintaining a low level of positive intergroup relations, along with tolerance, mutual recognition, and legitimization (Kriesberg 1998a; Bar-Tal 2004). In this interpretation, coexistence is a more modest,

perhaps more realistic, goal than reconciliation, or as Ross (2000) calls it, “a good enough conflict management.” It is, nevertheless, an important first step, which can prepare the groundwork for higher-level reconciliation processes (Weiner 1998).

Even scholars adhering to this minimal definition agree that coexistence should, at the very least, include a shared state of mind that includes rejection of violence and recognition and legitimacy for the other group’s right to exist peacefully *with its differences*. These may include differences of goals, values, ideology, nationality, ethnicity, religion, and culture (Bar-Tal 2004). Gavriel Salomon (2004) argues that even under a “thin” definition, coexistence education should strive for the gradual legitimization of the other side’s collective narrative. While this does not mean that a group should accept and agree with the narrative of the opponent group, it should at least acknowledge the narrative’s right to exist.

In order to better understand the success of coexistence efforts, we have to pay close attention to the circumstances under which it is sought after. In some cases, encounters among groups take place after the conflict had already been resolved or at least considerably abated. Often, there is also some agreement regarding the side that carries most of the blame. The most obvious case is that of Nazi Germany and the Holocaust. Once the horrors of the Nazi regime have become common knowledge among Germans, the issue of reconciliation between Germans and their victims has become a question of perpetrators learning to deal with guilt and victims learning to forgive (Maoz and Bar-On 2002; Bar-On and Kassem 2004). As horrible as the past is, the physical distance between most Jewish victims and Germany and the lack of daily conflict over the allocation of resources in the same country make reconciliation more feasible.

South Africa is another example of a society where reconciliation is being sought following a political solution to the conflict and a wide agreement regarding the responsibility of the Apartheid regime for the conflict and the ensuing suffering. Unlike the case of Germans and Jews, the various groups that make up the South African society had to find ways to live together following decades of hard repression of the black population. Exposing and punishing thousands of people involved in exercising atrocities would have crippled the attempt to reach a new pact, but ignoring the harsh memories was also unthinkable. The solution was establishing special tribunals, the truth and reconciliation commissions, where perpetrators face their victims. The idea of remembering, sharing, and documenting past evils without potentially controversial punishing has facilitated some reconciliation even if tension and interracial conflict persist. Similar commissions operated, or are still operating, in Liberia, Rwanda (Clark and Kaufman 2009), the United States (Bermanzohn 2007), Canada (CBC News 2009), and elsewhere.

Coexistence in Deeply Divided Societies: Rwanda, Bosnia, and Israel

The cases discussed above share two key features: First, in all of them, reconciliation has been attempted following the resolution of the violent conflict. Second, most of the major actors agree on who were the victims and who were the victimizers. But the question remains whether coexistence or reconciliation can be achieved under

less auspicious conditions, when the conflict is still intense and both sides claim to be the victims. Interethnic relations in two such societies—Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovina—have been widely studied in recent years.

Susanne Buckley-Zistel (2006a,b) has written on reconciliation and coexistence efforts in postgenocide Rwanda. She describes a top-down state-induced forced reconciliation, where all ethnic references are eradicated from the public discourse in order to create a new Rwandan nationhood. While these attempts have so far been successful in preventing further mass violence, peace is largely induced by fear. The anger and resentment that sustain the cleavages between Hutu and Tutsi have been perpetuated. Many Rwandans feel like they are being forced to forgive and forget when they have no desire to do so (Lemarchand and Niwese 2007). According to Buckley-Zistel (2006a), this forced unity without reconciliation, and the removal of ethnic identity leaves the victims with a sense that their tragedy has been negated. After all, Tutsis were killed because they were Tutsis. While this “chosen amnesia,” as she calls it, allows Rwandans to exist side by side, it also prevents a sense of closure and sustains a daily life full of rumors, allegations, and mistrust. The forced discourse of unity prevents the citizens of Rwanda from developing a culture that is able to accommodate plurality and differences, and allows preexisting tensions to grow again (Freedman et al. 2008).

One of the key issues standing in the way of true reconciliation in Rwanda is the limited ability of both sides to empathize with the other. Both Tutsis and Hutus maintain a narrative of victimhood. While the genocide of the Tutsis is well known, many Hutus were also killed—moderate Hutus were murdered by Hutu extremists, and Tutsi rebels who fought back targeted all Hutu. Yet, under the Tutsi-led government of Paul Kagame, postconflict justice in Rwanda has targeted only Hutu perpetrators, absolving all Tutsi (Lemarchand and Niwese 2007; Straus 2007).

A similar discourse of victimhood is evident in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Since the Balkan wars ended without a clear winner, there was no national leadership that could impose a hegemonic model of “truth” and reconciliation. Thus, each of the various ethnic groups in Bosnia believes that it was the primary victim of the war. The Serbs, who belong to the ethnic group that perpetrated most of the violence, feel little remorse or empathy for the suffering of the other groups. They concentrate on what they consider as the harms and mistreatment they suffered, and view the war as vital to their survival as a nation (Stefansson 2010). Today, most ethnic groups in Bosnia live in ethnic enclaves. One can find very limited coexistence, mainly in the form of economic cooperation, while fear and mistrust predominate and old friendships have not been renewed (Brio et al. 2004; Halpern and Weinstein 2004; Stefansson 2010).

One of the interesting aspects in both Rwanda and Bosnia is the existence of “collective silence.” Divisive political and moral issues related to the war, genocide, and the political situation are generally avoided and not talked about. While some see this collective silence as evidence for the lack of mutual empathy (Halpern and Weinstein 2004), Stefansson (2010) interprets it as an expression of unarticulated empathy because it shows that Bosnians are keenly aware of the different feelings, attitudes, and

worldviews of the other and make a conscious effort to abstain from challenging them. While they do not accept the other group's worldview, they are well aware of it and make an effort not to hurt the feelings of the other.

Israel represents another case of an ongoing struggle, in which each party claims to be victimized by the other. This case is admittedly different from the cases of Rwanda and Bosnia. One notable difference is that the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, while certainly severe, has not produced the type of genocidal atrocities found in Bosnia and Rwanda. Another unique aspect of the Arab–Israeli conflict is the fact that Israel is surrounded by Arab countries. This contributes both to a siege mentality among Jews and a perception of the Arab minority in Israel as a rival or even enemy, as a result of its cultural and social ties with the wider Arab world. Nevertheless, some similarities exist (in particular, the mutual sense of victimhood) that make these cases interesting to compare and contrast.

The Israeli–Palestinian conflict is most intense in the struggle over the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, but another arena of the conflict is within Israel itself between the Jewish and Arab citizens. In the wake of the 1948 war, the Arab citizens of Israel turned almost overnight from the indigenous majority of British-ruled Palestine into a minority in a Jewish state. At present, they are about 17.3 percent of the Israeli population.² They have full citizenship rights but lack collective rights. Furthermore, the state is officially defined as Jewish, and Jews enjoy several privileges, including immigration rights, land allocation, and cultural and symbolic recognition (Rouhana and Ghanem 1998; Smootha 1998, 2002; Ghanem 2001; Or 2006; Yiftachel 2006; Jamal 2007; Shor 2008a,c). Arab Israeli communities receive less attention and fewer resources from state agencies than Jewish ones (Falah 1990; Rosenhek 1999), and they are also discriminated against as individuals by both private and public employers. Consequently, the Arab citizens occupy the lowest rung in the Israeli stratification system (Kraus and Yonay 2000; Haberfeld and Cohen 2007; Levanon and Raviv 2007).

Arab and Jewish citizens generally have little daily contact. Most Palestinian–Israelis live in separate towns and villages, and mixed cities are highly segregated (Falah 1996). Schools are officially segregated (Al-Haj 1995), and few Arabs serve in the Israeli army (Kanaaneh 2009). Arabs and Jews, thus, meet only in universities and colleges, at work, and during leisure time activities. Surprisingly, relationships in these spaces have hardly been studied (Darr 2009), and the few studies conducted reveal little interaction between the two groups and substantial mutual suspicions (e.g., Erdreich and Rapoport 2002; Hertz-Lazarowitz 2003; Arieli and Hirschfeld 2010).

Concerns about mounting expressions of overt anti-Arab racism brought several NGOs to establish programs intended to facilitate coexistence and reconciliation between Israeli Arabs and Jews. These programs aim at bringing the two groups together to special workshops, camps, and university courses, where they would learn to know and respect each other. Most of these planned encounters have received either lackadaisical support or a cold shoulder from state agencies (Rouhana and Korper 1997; Abu-Nimer 2004; Halabi 2004; Maoz 2004).

Two general approaches to the management of Palestinian–Jewish encounters were identified in the literature (Abu-Nimer 2004; Maoz 2004; Suleiman 2004). The first seeks to enable each group to learn about the other and to change false perceptions and negative attitudes toward the other group. In order to achieve this goal, workshop participants have been encouraged to notice what they have had in common and avoid tough controversial issues. Researchers report that the dynamics in such workshops tend to reflect the power relations in the wider society. Palestinian participants talk less, have less control of the topic, and have difficulties in expressing themselves in Hebrew.³ Such workshops may strengthen Jewish participants' images of Palestinians as passive, less competent, and hostile. Palestinians leave such workshops frustrated because they feel that they cannot express their views freely (Rouhana and Korper 1997; Halabi 2004).

The second approach is more direct, putting the political issues on the table and encouraging participants to discuss their conflicting views explicitly (Halabi 2004; Maoz 2004; Suleiman 2004). The use of Arabic is encouraged in spite of the time needed for translation, and facilitators are instructed to encourage Arab participants to talk. Halabi and Zak (2006) report that Palestinian participants in workshops conducted according to this approach feel empowered and satisfied with their ability to voice their grievances, but most Jewish participants find such workshops confusing and troubling.

The sense of outrage that characterizes the response of Jewish participants to Palestinians' views is especially revealing in the context of the present study. It shows that Jews in Israel are by and large exposed only to dominant narratives about the history of Palestine/Israel and are emotionally committed to this narrative and to a sense of moral superiority. The strength of such sentiments is also evident in studies of those Jews who are perhaps most committed to full equality of Arabs and Jews in Israel, such as those living in joint Arab–Jewish communities (Feuerverger 2001) and those studying in bilingual schools (Bekerman 2004; Nahir 2013).

In most protracted and violent struggles, resistance to coexistence and reconciliation efforts is attributed to deep-rooted feeling of hatred and dehumanization of the other party. But the Palestinian–Israeli conflict highlights an additional component—a strong and prevalent feeling of righteousness among many in the more powerful Jewish group. These convictions hinder the ability of those who seek fairness and object to racism to even tolerate the claims of the other side. Our study illuminates these tendencies by analyzing a public discourse of coexistence in the medium of sports journalism, which is often assumed to be apolitical and removed from controversial political issues. We show how Jewish understandings and perceptions of coexistence may actually thwart sincere and deep forms of such coexistence between Jews and Arabs.

The Role of the Media and Sports in Promoting Coexistence

Various scholars have emphasized the role of the media in achieving successful and viable coexistence (Bar-Tal 2004; Ben-Ari 2004; Salomon 2004; Bratić 2008; Haider 2011). According to Bar-Tal (2002), coexistence education must be spread through the media and the political discourse to create a culture of peace. While historically the

media has often been used to dehumanize opposing groups (such as in the cases of the Holocaust and the genocide in Rwanda), it also has the potential to be an effective tool in rehumanizing these groups by countering stereotypes, depolarizing attitudes, emphasizing stories of intergroup cooperation, and promoting empathy by portraying similarities with the “other” (Haider 2011). Unlike other coexistence initiatives (e.g., coexistence classes), the media has the ability to reach large audiences within a relatively short time, and media programming initiatives have been shown to promote ethnic coexistence in various countries (Hieber 2001; Bratić 2008).

The field of sports also offers a promising terrain in which coexistence may be initiated and built. Some approaches in the sociology of sport see sport as a neutral, apolitical field, one devoid of structural constraints, in which it is the athletic aptitude of an individual that makes the difference rather than her or his socioeconomic, ethnic, or national background. In this view, sport is therefore a field that encourages intergroup harmony, integration, and coexistence, through intergroup contact (Carrington 1986; Shor 2008b; Schulenkorf 2010; Vat Kamatsiko 2010).

While the media coverage of sports often provides ethnic minorities with high visibility, research shows that this is also a field where biased representation is highly prevalent (e.g., Gruneau 1989; Hoberman 1997). Still, in Israel, sport is one of the few fields in which Arabs and Jews interact on a regular basis, and where the Arab minority receives media exposure within a relatively favorable context. Commonly, Arab citizens are ignored. Alternatively, they are mentioned mainly in relation to security and political issues, often portrayed as a “threat” for the “Jewish state” (Aburaiya, Avraham, and Wolfsfeld 1998). In soccer, however, the Arab players are members of teams, including the national team, that include both Jews and Arabs. This is a notable and well-celebrated fact, as it presents a unique opportunity for Jewish–Arab interactions and suggests that discrimination in this field may play a lesser role than in other public spheres and occupations. One could expect such circumstances to also foster mutual understanding, empathy, respect, and even friendship, or in short *du-kium*. This makes the Hebrew media coverage of Arab athletes a strategic research site for examining the way coexistence is conceived of and constructed in the Israeli Jewish discourse. Indeed, previous studies have highlighted the potential of sports-related initiatives and interactions in fostering interethnic and international friendships and in promoting coexistence. Examples of such initiatives and interactions are joint sports clubs of Serb and Croat youth (Haider 2011), and cross-border sport (cricket) tourism between India and Pakistan (Beech et al. 2005).

As noted above, many Israeli Arabs have reached the highest level of Israeli soccer. During the years 2002 to 2008, in which our study was conducted, 15 to 30 Arabs played each season in the top league in Jewish clubs, that is, clubs owned, run, and supported mainly (but not exclusively) by Jews. In addition, three Arab teams, Hapoel Taibe, Maccabi Akhi Nazareth, and Bnei Sakhnin, played at least one season in that league, with the latter reaching notable achievements including the National Cup in 2004 (Sorek 2007; Shor and Yonay 2010, 2011). These clubs usually have more Arab players than Jewish ones, but they also have a substantial number of Jewish players.

METHODOLOGY

We conducted a systematic qualitative critical discourse analysis (van Dijk 1988; Fairclough 1995) to examine the Hebrew media coverage of Jewish–Arab coexistence in the field of sports. Critical discourse analysis is based on the assumption that the content of news articles constructs rather than merely reflects actual events, taking into account dominance and inequality, social power, and the relative position of groups and individuals. In this approach, media content is viewed as a site of public conversation, where hegemonic conceptions are not unequivocal, but are nevertheless often discernible and draw on common discourses (Fairclough 1995; Allan 1998; Reimers 2007). We organized the various articles by major themes following the constant comparative method for qualitative content analysis (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Maykut and Morehouse 1994). The coding process was carried out by the second author (E.S.), who read each of the articles and assigned a code to sentences, paragraphs, or sections. These codes represented a theme or idea with which each part of the data was associated. Although some of these themes only appeared sporadically, this does not necessarily mean that they were not important or only held by a minority of writers.

The data for the study were systematically gathered over the period between July 2002 and June 2008 (i.e., six consecutive playing seasons). During this period, we scanned the daily media sources detailed below, collecting all the articles and interviews dealing with Arab players in the major Israeli men soccer league. This inclusive approach was adopted in order to achieve the widest set of media content available. Our final data set includes 243 reports, articles, and interviews from the written press, television, and Internet Web sites. In addition, during the years 2002 to 2005, we watched over 400 broadcast sports news programs (we watched these on a daily basis and were able to watch most of them during these years) and about 100 full soccer matches, including all the matches of the Israeli national team and the major matches of the Israeli major soccer league, broadcast once every week. While these TV shows were not systematically coded, they assisted us in tracing the dominant media and public discourse surrounding Arab players.

Data were systematically gathered from the following media sources:

1. Daily newspapers. All relevant articles and interviews from the three major Hebrew daily newspapers, *Yedioth Ahronoth*, *Maariv*, and *Haaretz*, were collected. In addition, all the local weeklies associated with *Maariv* (about eight, but the number changed somewhat between years; all were freely available online at the time) were thoroughly screened for relevant articles.
2. Television channels. Articles and interviews were gathered from the following channels: Channel 1, Channel 2, Channel 5, and Channel 5+. The first two were the most commonly watched TV channels at the time, broadcasting daily sports news and carrying major soccer and basketball games. Channels 5 and 5+ are sports channels, both broadcasting daily half-hour sports news magazines (nearly all of which we watched during the years 2002 to 2005), in addition to local and international matches.

3. Internet Web sites. Daily articles and interviews from the following Web sites were examined: Sport5.co.il, One.co.il, Ynet.co.il, NRG.co.il, and Haaretz.io.il. The first two sites on this list are exclusively devoted to sport. The last three are general news sites, corresponding with the three major printed Israeli newspapers, but not identical to them. Each of these Web sites includes a substantial section dedicated to sports.

FINDINGS

“Soccer Proves that Arabs and Jews Can Live Together”: The Soccer Field as a Model

Quite surprisingly, the soccer field is an autonomic bubble, isolated from the dire Israeli reality. . . . Contrary to its common image, the soccer field—a hotbed of extremity—serves as a rare pasture of harmony and coexistence. (Peled 2002:C-16)

This quote, taken from an article in Israel’s most well-read newspaper, *Yedioth Ahronoth*, is just one of many that extol the contribution of sport, especially soccer, to the coexistence between Jews and Arabs in Israel, or at least refer to the presence of Arab players and teams in Israeli soccer using mostly positive terms. Thirty-four out of 36 articles, interviews, and reports in our sample that explicitly addressed coexistence adopted a positive tone about it (the remaining articles problematized the issue, but still maintained a positive tone). These articles often present soccer as an integrating field that fortifies Arab–Jewish coexistence and enhances ethnic equality. Following the promotion of two Arab teams to the premier Israeli soccer league, in June 2003, journalist Itzik Ahaban wrote in *Yedioth Ahronoth*:

It took 55 years, but the promotion of Sakhnin to the premier soccer league sets an indisputable fact: there is one area in the Israeli state in which Israeli Arabs have acquired full equality; Soccer. . . . This proves that soccer is ahead of the game. All that Israeli Arabs could not achieve in economy, politics and law . . . they took in the one field where equal opportunities actually exist. (Ahaban 2003:D-2)

Consistent with this approach, all 22 articles which directly addressed soccer clubs in which Jews and Arabs play side by side take a positive tone and emphasize equality, harmony, and fraternity, suggesting that the Israeli society in general should learn from the soccer field: “[N]owadays, when the relationships between Jews and Arabs exacerbate and bridging the rift seems impossible, soccer shows that things can be done differently” (Zcharya 2002). The Arab players and coaches by and large cooperate with these media messages (we could find no cases in which players explicitly challenged them). Soccer player Ashraf Suliman, who was playing for the Arab team Akhi Nazareth alongside a few Jewish players said, “If the ministers of the government would come down here to Akhi Nazareth and see how people of different religions work it

out, they would find a way to make peace within five minutes” (Porat 2003:D-8). The late Azmi Nasser, who served as Nazareth coach at the time, agreed: “Soccer proves that Arabs and Jews can live together” (Gal 2003:E-6).

If soccer is the forerunner of Israeli Jewish–Arab coexistence, the Arab players are expected to serve as the torchbearers of this coexistence, as articulated by publicist Moshé Elad: “They are the *kasharim* [both midfielders and links in Hebrew] not only on the field, but also in Israeli reality” (Elad 2005). As torchbearers, the players are expected to act “responsibly” and refrain from any behaviors that may damage the delicate fabric of the Jewish–Arab relations. They should always watch their tongue and avoid political debates, as everything they say or do may be interpreted as a deliberate provocation. One article in *Haaretz* newspaper tells the story of Ally Otman, the first Arab to play in Israel’s premier soccer league, in Hapoel Jerusalem. Reuven (Ruby) Rivlin, who at the time of the interview served as Israel’s Minister of Communication, told the reporter that “the fans of Betar Jerusalem [the local staunch rival, whose fans are known for their anti-Arab views] did not like Otman, and his [political] remarks have not contributed to reconciliation” (Goldberg and Bergfreund 2003:A-15). This quote demonstrates a dominant ideal of coexistence in Israeli Jewish discourse, one in which Arabs must adapt to the needs and wishes of the Jewish public. Although the fans of Betar Jerusalem are well known for their hostility toward Arabs, the minister chose to blame the player for the animosity of the fans. We should note here that there were also two articles in our sample in which journalists explicitly denounced the racist approaches of Betar and its fans (in later years, not included in the current sample, such denunciations have become more common).

And yet it is clear that many in the Israeli media and public see Arab players as accountable for maintaining the Jewish–Arab coexistence. Another example for this notion, which was never really contested in any of the articles in our sample, is an article on Hapoel Jerusalem soccer team, in which Jews and Arabs play side by side. Shai Aaron, one of the team’s Jewish players, talked about his Arab teammate Amar Salman: “Sometimes I forget he is Arab. He does everything in Hebrew, his habits are the same as ours, and he even looks the same” (Yelon 2002:E-6). Aaron does not say it explicitly, but his words imply that for coexistence to be possible, the Arab players must change, become similar to the Jews, and adopt the latter’s culture and language. Similar views appeared in 17 other articles in our sample, and none of the remaining articles really challenged them. The contribution of the Jewish players to the success of the coexistence is mainly in their willingness to accept the Arab players even though they are not Jews.

“Sometimes I Forget He’s Arab”: Paths to Blending In

In order to assimilate into the Jewish Israeli collective and fulfill the ethos of coexistence, the Arab players must blend in and toe the line. The Hebrew media and the Jewish public outline the path that Arab players must take if they wish to prove that they are not a threat to the Jewish Israeli collective. They must avoid politics and keep silent about the political demands and interests of their fellow Arab citizens. Moreover, they are

sometimes asked to disguise salient Arab characteristics (most notably the language), and perhaps most remarkably actively demonstrate their identification with the Jewish majority by singing the national anthem and proudly carrying the Israeli flag. In the current study, we found that the Jewish majority's interpretation of "coexistence" and its expectations from the Arab players go beyond the denial of the right to express rival political views. "Coexistence" is understood by many in the dominant Jewish group as repressing the mere presence of Arab existence and keeping it to a bare minimum.

Renouncing Arab Heritage

One way outlined by the media discourse for Arab players to contribute to coexistence is hiding obvious Arab characteristics, especially the Arab language. In five of the articles, reporters commented on the players' command of the Hebrew language and on their Arab accent while speaking Hebrew. While most articles do not engage with this issue, it is not necessarily because it is considered unimportant, but rather because most reporters may feel that it is politically incorrect to talk about it or they simply write about other issues. An article on Salem-Abu-Siam, who played for Maccabi Tel Aviv, demonstrates this tendency:

When he speaks Hebrew, his excellent diction is noticeable. He uses a lot of Hebrew slang, and lives in an all-Jewish neighborhood. His little brothers also speak fluent Hebrew, and *you can hardly guess that their native tongue is Arabic*. Abu-Siam ascribes this to the fabric of relationships between Jews and Arabs in his City. "You cannot find better coexistence than in Ramla and Lod," he says. (Zcharya 2002, italics added)

The command of the Hebrew language and the lack of an Arab accent serve to obscure Abu-Siam's Arab identity. They help reduce the perception of the player as a potential threat for Hebrew readers. The reporter is impressed with the good command of Hebrew and applauds it as an exemplary model of coexistence. His approach adheres to the view that in order to maintain the coexistence and be accepted into Israeli collective, the Arab players must adopt Jewish manners. This demand includes not only commanding Hebrew, but also disguising elements of their identity or behavior (such as accent and appearance), which may be perceived as threatening by the Jewish public. While most reporters do not often engage in such tests (most only conduct short and informative interviews), this practice does not seem to be contested by either media people or the players themselves (Jews or Arabs).

In fact, when the Arab players do not conform to the demand to disguise their threatening identity, the masking may be done for them even without their consent. In the 1970s, when Rifaat Turk first came to play in Hapoel Tel Aviv Soccer Club, the club's managers and players sought to camouflage his Arab identity. One of Turk's former teammates presents it as a gesture to Turk: "We never mentioned the fact that he is an Arab. We accepted him as if he was one of us" (Rapaport and Yehoshua 2003:C-26). Since the effort to "forget" and disregard Turk's otherness is presented as a

gesture, the player was expected to cooperate with the concealment of his identity. According to the common view among Jewish Israelis, it is quite unlikely that someone will actually want to make their Arab identity conspicuous. In order to obscure the Arab–Palestinian identity even further, the people in Hapoel Tel Aviv also decided to nickname Turk “Jimmy.” Ze’ev Segal, Hapoel’s former coach, explains:

Jimmy, unlike what many think today, was not the name he received in the neighborhood. It came from Hapoel Tel Aviv. I can’t remember who gave him this name; I think the guys decided to call him that. I also called him Jimmy, to make it more convenient. . . . After all they [the team’s fans] called him Arafat [a mispronunciation of Turk’s first name, “Rifat.” It alludes to Yasser Arafat, who at the time was the head of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)]. This was most inconvenient. (Rapaport and Yehoshua 2003:C-26)

When Segal claims that Jimmy was “more convenient,” one may ask “for whom?” Was it indeed Turk himself who was spared? Or was it simply a convenient solution for the team’s managers, players, and supporters, as well as for the reporters and media people who covered the team and gladly adopted the new name? In an interview for the same article (Rapaport and Yehoshua 2003:C-26), Turk answers this question. He describes his objection to the new name and his desire to keep being called Rifat. His will was denied. Jimmy, after all, has a different aroma, English, amiable, and devoid of any Arab or Palestinian connotations. It helped neutralize the uneasiness involved in acknowledging Arab–Palestinian names.

Singing the Anthem

Nation-states ascribe great importance to national symbols, most notably to the flag and the anthem. These two modern totems, although highly uniform across many nations, are often perceived as embodying the spirit of the nation (Billig 1995; Sorek 2007). They are especially evident in the sport field. In Israel, they appear in each and every international sports competition, and recently they have become increasingly evident in local matches as well. The Israeli anthem, *Hatikva* [The Hope], written in 1878 and officially adopted as the anthem of the Zionist movement in 1933, expresses the hope of Jews to return to their homeland and establish their freedom there. For Arab citizens singing this anthem, and even respecting it by standing up when it is sung, is difficult: Not only is it not *their* hope, it is also a hope that has been realized to a large extent at their expense (Rouhana and Ghanem 1998). Yet many in the Hebrew media show no sensitivity, and often demand that the Arab players demonstrate their loyalty to the Jewish state by joining the singing during national matches and ceremonies. This demand appeared in 31 out of the 38 articles that mentioned this issue, with only a minority among the writers sympathizing with the players’ tough position. Beyond the emotional difficulty for Arab players to comply with such a demand, they also face pressures from their own national group: The Arab public and media expect them to remain silent while the anthem is sung.

Arab players are not only watched during actual events when *Hatikva* is played; they are also repeatedly (31 instances in our sample) asked about it in interviews, and journalists speculate about how they would behave. The discomfort felt by the players when the issue is brought up is evident. When asked about it, they usually attempt to evade the issue, claiming that they are unfamiliar with the lyrics (e.g., Salah Hasarma, see Goldsmith 2002) or cannot sing well (e.g., former national team player Rifat Turk, see Zilkha 2002). In other cases, they simply refuse to answer the question “to avoid complications” (e.g., another prominent national team player Walid Badir, Channel 2, April 15, 2003). Such responses teach us that the Arab players have learned that refusal to sing the anthem or questioning the exclusivity of the Jewish ethnicity in the Israeli anthem are likely to invoke severe criticism from the Jewish public. For example, one article describes the treatment of Rifat Turk, the first Arab soccer player to play for the Israeli national team, during the 1976 Olympic Games in Montreal: “Turk drew hostile looks from his friends when he did not recite [the line from the anthem] ‘The soul of a Jew Yearns’ ” (Pohoriles 2002:A-13).

Player Abbas Suan of Sakhnin adopted a different approach. In March 2005, following a game of the Israeli national soccer team against Ireland, in which he excelled and scored a dramatic last-minute equalizer, Suan was asked if he sang the anthem during the game. He replied: “I did sing it. I have a lot of friends in the team and I respect them, so I sang the anthem” (Porat 2005:D-8). The late publicist Uri Dan saw Suan’s consent as “a hope for successful coexistence between Jewish citizens and other citizens in Israel” (Dan 2005:A-47). Ignoring Suan’s clear discomfort with the need to sing an anthem which he has no place in and his willingness to sing it only for the sake of his friends, Dan went on and equated Suan to Druze and Bedouin citizens who serve in the Israeli army:

During [the second Intifada], the dedication and heroism of Druze and Bedouin soldiers and commanders stood fast for four years in the face of vicious Palestinian terrorism. When standing face to face with the Irish ball, just like when facing the bullets of the enemy [in Hebrew “ball” and “bullet” are the same word, *kadur*] Suan’s heart saved Israel from the shame of defeat. The fact that Suan sang the Israeli anthem, even if not wholeheartedly, just like the oath of allegiance of Druze and Arab soldiers to the Israeli flag, are the right steps in the way to their full integration into Israeli life. (Dan 2005:A-47)

Reserve army Colonel Moshe Elad, an orientalist studying the Palestinian society, sees things in much the same way. In an op-ed in *NRG*, Elad wrote:

Bit by bit, the Israeli public goes back to trading, fixing, and eating in the Arab villages. This may be attributed to people like Abbas [Suan] and [Walid] Badir [who also scored an important equalizer for the Israeli national team]. . . . This is beyond sport. When Abbas Suan, a Muslim representing the entire Arab sector, dares to declare that he sang the Israeli anthem—it sends a message to every Israeli Jew.

[T]his represents a significant changeover in the tolerance level of a proud Arab citizen. . . . [Suan also] congratulated the Israeli people on [the Jewish holiday of] Purim and called the people of this country “one nation.” (Elad 2005)

Both Dan and Elad associate the performance of Arab players in the national team to the army service of non-Jews and to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. On the one hand, their vision is indeed one of acceptance. Non-Jewish citizens can buy their way into the Israeli collective by contributing to the “national effort.” On the other hand, this is a narrow, limited, and conditional acceptance. The Jewish majority in this view is not expected to make any sacrifices or concessions beyond the generous willingness to accept those among the Arab citizens who “behave well.” The Arabs, on their part, are demanded to be tolerant, with the vague promise that this may be later reciprocated by the Jewish majority. Although the Arab citizens are a disadvantaged minority, they are the ones who are expected to make the concessions, accept the majority group, and pledge alliance to the symbols that represent this ethnic majority. While not all Israeli Jews subscribe to this notion, we found very few examples in our sample of writers who actively contest it.

“First We Need Existence; Coexistence Will Naturally Follow”: The Empty Promises of Excellence and Success

The unilateral vision of coexistence described above was epitomized and elucidated in the media and public reactions to two dramatic events starring Arab players and teams that occurred during our study: (1) the historical achievement of the Arab soccer team, United Sons of Sakhnin, which won the Israeli State Cup in May 2004; and (2) two Arab players, who only four days apart scored two crucial equalizers, saving the Israeli national team from home losses in March 2005.

An Open Door or a Narrow Crack?

On the evening of May 18, 2004, the Arab soccer team, United Sons of Sakhnin (*Ittihad Abna' Sakhnin* in Arabic), became the first Arab team to win the Israeli National Cup. During the days that followed, the Hebrew media, which routinely ignores the Arab sector almost completely, was inundated with a flux of reports on the city of Sakhnin and interviews with players, fans, politicians, and Arab public figures. In the day following the game, the headlines of the two most highly circulated Hebrew newspapers, *Yedioth Ahronoth* and *Maariv*, included a rare Arabic writing alongside the Hebrew one. The achievement was hailed as Israeli Arabs' Day of Independence, a dream that came true, and a revolutionary event. However, a closer look at the content of the articles and interviews reveals a close similarity to the patterns described earlier in this article.

First, both Jewish and Arab speakers were unanimous regarding the importance of the game to Jewish–Arab coexistence. Sakhnin's players (both Jews and Arabs), its managers, and the media people repeatedly declared that the team is a symbol of true coexistence, and suggested that people in Israel, especially politicians, should learn

from the team how they can live side by side. Newspaper publicists, many of whom Arab, agreed. They stated that the team is “an excellent model for bridging the divides and promoting true fraternity between the peoples” (El-Qasim 2004:D-1), and that “sport succeeded where the education system failed: in promoting the values of coexistence” (Bahloul 2004:A-2).

In these celebratory commentaries, coexistence was understood in accordance with the principles we elaborated above. The Hebrew media was largely engaged with the questions of Arab citizens' attitudes and behavior toward the national symbols of the flag and the national anthem. During the days that preceded the game, the reporters repeatedly asked Arab players from both Sakhnin and Hapoel Haifa, its rival in the final, whether they planned to sing the anthem or not. The reporters were also concerned that Sakhnin's fans would not respect the anthem when played before the game. Following the game, publicist Jojo Abutbul wrote a column entitled “The door has been opened.” In order to keep the door open, Abutbul had an advice for Sakhnin: “Let us lead together the waving of the national flag . . . toward a future of happiness” (Abutbul 2004:D-5). In Abutbul's vision, the happy future does not include adjusting the Israeli symbols to encompass Arab citizens as well. Rather, it is the Arabs who are expected to adjust and willfully adopt Jewish symbols that leave no room for them. Ehud Olmert, who then served as the Israeli Minister of Treasury (and later on, Israel's centrist prime minister), conveyed a similar sentiment when talking about the game a few months later: “I see the achievements of Sakhnin as a chance to create cooperation and coexistence in this country. Seeing the players of Sakhnin excitedly and joyfully running with the Israeli flag after winning the state cup is the embodiment of coexistence” (Ganor 2005). Once again, one has to acknowledge that this is an important and favorable vision of inclusion. But the terms of this inclusion are limited and conditional upon toeing the line.

On Equalizers and (In)equality

One year later, in March 2005, two Arab citizens playing for the Israeli national team, Abbas Suan and Walid Badir, scored dramatic equalizers in two consequent home games in the World Cup qualifiers. Suan and Badir were instantly hailed by many in Israeli media as the new hope for coexistence, the ultimate candidates for providing the link between Jews and Arabs. They were called *giborei yisrael*, a biblical phrase meaning heroes or saviors of Israel, and the writers talked about the goals that are going to open up the gates for Israeli Arabs.⁴

But have things really changed? Only a week later, during a game between Sakhnin and Betar Jerusalem, Suan was welcomed first officially with flowers, only to be treated later by catcalls from Betar's fans, who greeted him with profanities and a large sign saying “Abbas Suan—you do not represent us.” Some of the fans added the chanting of a slogan, “*Abbas Suan Hole Sartan*,” Abbas Suan has cancer, a disease chosen only to rhyme with the player's name. As mentioned above, Betar and many of its fans represent an extreme (although by no means negligent) view in Israeli politics, a view that is often racist and overtly anti-Arab and anti-Muslim. Many Jews reject this view and

publicly condemn the team and its fans. Nevertheless, one may still wonder whether the goals of Suan and Badir really opened up the gates for the Arab public as a whole. Have they changed the common interpretation of coexistence from a unilateral to a bilateral process? Mahmud Ralia, the editor of the local Arab newspaper *al-Ahali*, was at first swept into euphoria by the events of March 26, 2005:

Never, never, not in my life, have I supported the Israeli national team. I always supported the team playing against it. I wanted to sit with the Irish fans, but the police would not allow it. So I sat within a sea of blue and white [the colors of the Israeli flag]. *All* I could see was blue and white. Somehow, the sense of unity made me feel that a change is coming. But when they shouted “*el el Israel*” [the common chanting of the Israeli national team supporters], I shouted “*Abbas Suan neshama*” [Abbas Suan is [in] my soul]. Then Abbas went up on the field. It seemed like the fans did not want him. But then he scored that goal. He went down on his knees and prayed, and all the fans jumped on me, hugged me, kissed me, and carried me on their shoulders. I felt like a part of these people, like I was one of them. I went back to Sakhnin with a blue and white scarf on my neck. And then in the morning, when I woke up and saw these colors in my bed, I said to myself: “how did that happen?” (Kasl and Klushandler 2005a:D-15)

Ralia’s touching confession reveals the desire of many in the Israeli Arab public to be embraced by the Israeli collective and feel like an integrative part of it. Letting his defenses down, Ralia allowed himself to be swept away and believe, if only for a few hours, that Suan’s goal brings closer the realization of this dream. He went to sleep with “the enemy” and woke up the next day knowing that he might regret it. Indeed, only a week later, following the way in which Suan was received by the fans of Betar Jerusalem, Ralia sounded painfully sober:

This was the reality check for my dream . . . a blessed wake up call. . . . The dream of a new and wonderful reality became a nightmare. On second thought, I prefer the nightmare. The dream of the majority in Israel about me is that I agree with their reality, the reality in which we are not really accepted, not really wanted in this country, unless we are willing to play by their rules. . . . The game with Betar made me realize why I was not happy with this dream of coexistence and acceptance. My dream is a vision of existence and acceptance as we are, not as the majority in this country would have liked us to be. (Kasl and Klushandler 2005a:D-15)

Abbas Suan’s father, Said, echoed Ralia’s statement: “We did everything we were asked to do, and even more, to be accepted. Now it is up to them, what they do, the way they lead things from now on” (Kasl and Klushandler 2005a:D-15). Ralia adds that “unfortunately, life is not just a soccer game. . . . Many may believe in true equality on the turf for 90 minutes, but after the final whistle is heard we realize that the national team continues to belong to the majority and we must settle for the margins of the

national field” (Kasl and Klushandler 2005b:D-17). Ibrahim Bushnak, the publisher of a local Arabic sports newspaper, concludes: “Only existence can promise coexistence. . . . [True] coexistence does not resemble the one between a horse and its rider. Our goal should be life together, shared existence, side by side. I cannot live in coexistence with someone who rides me” (Kasl and Klushandler 2005b:D-17).

These expressions communicate a common feeling among many (although not all) Israeli Arabs. Many of them are eager for a true opportunity to become an integral part of the Israeli collective and to be able to feel a sense of belonging. However, they also realize that in order for the Jewish majority to allow them in, they must betray their tradition and renounce much of their cultural heritage, national identity, and political beliefs. But even if they do all that, being Arab in a Jewish state, they realize that they will remain second-class citizens.

DISCUSSION

Sense of Possession and Lopsided Coexistence

The present study sought to examine the meanings attached to the concept *du-kium* in the Israeli political discourse, through following the Hebrew media’s coverage of Arab athletes. Our findings reveal that the term “coexistence” is largely understood by Jews as the Arab acceptance of the Jewish position. Sport journalists, columnists commenting on sport events, and politicians speaking about the success of Arab athletes expect the latter to accept the Jewish narrative on the conflict and relinquish, even denounce, Arab views regarding the suffering of Arab citizens and the Palestinians in the occupied territories. Furthermore, the Arab citizens are expected to behave and speak like Jews as much as possible in order to be (partially) accepted into the Israeli collective. Arab athletes are aware of these expectations. When interviewed for the Israeli media, they are very careful not to challenge the political worldview of the Jewish majority.

This unilateral nature of the Jewish–Arab relationship can be contrasted with the cases of Bosnia and Rwanda. While coexistence and explicit empathy toward the other were hard to achieve in Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovina, as in Israel, the former cases share an interesting similarity—a practice of “collective silence” (Stefansson 2010) or “chosen amnesia” (Buckley-Zistel 2006a). In both Bosnia and Rwanda, the rival groups refrain from speaking about the conflict and from challenging the other group’s narrative and political views. According to Stefansson (2010), this suggests that at least some level of empathy has been achieved, allowing people to know on which subjects they should keep silent in order to spare the feelings of individuals from the other.

Are Israeli Jews less able to feel empathy than Bosnians and Rwandans? Our analysis shows that, to some degree, this may be the case as a result of the deep belief of Jews that justice is completely on their side. Every party to a conflict thinks that its claims are more valid than its rival’s claims, but it seems that there is something unique in the belief of many Israeli Jews that their case is so strong that it must convince even the Palestinians (Jamal 2000). This is why Jewish media people and public figures quoted

by the media often use moral language in order to educate the Arab minority while caring little about the latter's feelings and sensitivities.

To understand the Israeli perception of coexistence, it may be helpful to think about another model of an intercultural encounter, namely immigration. Immigration seems to fundamentally differ from "coexistence" because it does not (typically) involve conflict and violence between members of the two cultures, at least not prior to the act of immigration. Yet the reality of living together raises similar questions of accepting the other, tolerance, and shaping the public space. When people with a distinct culture move to another society, they are perceived as outsiders who benefit from the benevolence of the receiving societies. The common understanding in the case of immigration is that the hosts have no commitment to accept the immigrants' culture. The latter, on the other hand, often accept the demand to assimilate, at least partially, and often feel that it is to their advantage to become part of the mainstream, maintaining only some degrees of symbolic practices to connect them to their unique past.⁵ When, in contrast, two national ethnic groups clash and claim the same land as theirs, or when one group subjugates another, their expectations from each other are diametrically opposed.

The view of many Israeli Jews concerning their fellow Arab citizens is interesting because it is similar to the views of host societies toward immigrants. Arab citizens in Israel are often treated as if they were foreigners whose belonging to the land is provisional and conditional. Interestingly, people do know that most Jews in Israel are either immigrants or descendants of immigrants, whereas many of the Palestinians have lived in what is now Israel for centuries. The return of Jews to Zion is a well-known fact, officially celebrated and taught in schools. And yet the Zionist ideology asserts the belonging of the country to Jews, and conceals, removes, or devalues signs of Arab-Palestinian presence (Rabinowitz 1993; Benvenisti 2000; Ram 2009). That is why sports commentators, like most other Israelis, talk as if Arabs were the foreigners and expect them to behave, talk, and even think like Jews. Much like Germans, who tell Germans of Turkish origin (even those who are second and third generation) that they may leave anytime and go back to their home country if they do not wish to conform to German customs and culture (Ehrkamp 2006), many Israeli Jews hold that Arab citizens should leave Israel if they are not willing to "play by the rules." They refuse to acknowledge that the Arabs are an indigenous minority and that coexistence must be found in accepting the Arab presence as a legitimate part of the Israeli public space.

Our study demonstrates the importance of cognitive schemas in reaching genuine coexistence. A sense of sole ownership over the country, supported by an entrenched sense of victimization, allows moderate Jews to support coexistence while not making any substantive concession to please Arab citizens' demands (see also Jamal 2000). The writers in our study, thus, feel generous for merely accepting the Arab citizens when the latter behave "appropriately." In this respect, Israel is different from other countries originating with colonialism, but also from other cases of severe conflict, such as Rwanda and Bosnia. In the latter, the conflicting parties do not speak about the conflict and avoid challenging the other group's political views and narratives (even though they clearly do not agree with many of these views). In contrast, Israeli Jews are often

happy to talk about the conflict. Many expect the Arab citizens to fully accept the Jewish narrative, and to reject the narrative and views of their own people (see also Jamal 2000; Maoz 2000; Halabi and Zak 2006).

This moral discourse of superiority is enhanced by the prolonged and violent conflict between Jews and Palestinians. The Jewish–Arab conflict is often classified by scholars as an “intractable conflict”—a conflict that is intense and violent, lasts for many years, and leads to substantial intergroup animosity (Kriesberg 1998b; Bar-Tal 2004; Ben-Ari 2004). The Arab minority in Israel is perceived by many Jews—including both laypersons and official experts—as a demographic and a security threat. This is largely because of the common view that many Arab citizens see themselves first and foremost as Arab–Palestinians, and that their allegiance and sense of identity often lie with the Arab world and the Palestinians in the occupied territories.

Suspensions, delegitimization, a sense of moral superiority, and a perceived sense of victimhood are common features in many deeply divided societies. However, the case of the Palestinian–Jewish conflict is also characterized with a substantial imbalance of power. In Rwanda, the Hutu are the clear majority in terms of numbers, but a Tutsi-led government has been in power since the 1994 genocide. In Bosnia, the Serbs, who were the main perpetrators of violence during the war, are now a large minority in a country defined as Bosnian, in which none of the ethnic groups constitute more than 50 percent of the population. The imbalance of power in Israel, on the other hand, is very clear, with the Jewish side maintaining clear political, military, and economic dominance, allowing it to disregard the feelings and desires of the minority and hold a narrow perception of coexistence (Rouhana and Korper 1997; Maoz 2004; Suleiman 2004).

Salomon (2004) maintains that in a conflict it would make more sense for the powerful majority to gradually come to accept the legitimacy of the discriminated minority’s collective narrative, rather than the other way around (see also Kivisto 2012). However, in Israel, the Jewish position of power and dominance is combined with the dominant narrative of unquestionable moral superiority (Jamal 2000). To these, one might add a perceived sense of victimhood (Bar-Tal et al. 2009) and a persistent feeling of existential threat, which is largely fueled by the vivid presence of the Holocaust and its memory in Israeli discourse. This perception of threat creates insensitivity among many Israeli Jews to the adversities of the Arab citizens. It allows them to reject any concessions while expecting the Arab minority to make these concessions. It also points toward the tough work necessary to reach at least a modest level of genuine *du-kium*: It requires Jews to understand Arab citizens’ claims and accept the legitimacy, if not the validity, of voicing those claims.

NOTES

¹Guelke (2012) uses the term “deeply divided societies” in reference to societies that suffer from major ethnic or religious strife and substantial political polarization, often resulting in political violence. Notable examples can be found in Sri Lanka, Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Sudan, Rwanda, South Africa, Northern Ireland, Bosnia & Herzegovina, and elsewhere. Such societies

have received substantial interest from political sociologists, international relations scholars, and policymakers who seek to understand the conditions under which durable peace, reconciliation, integration, and coexistence may be achieved.

²Some studies provide even higher figures. However, these studies include Palestinians from East Jerusalem among Israel's residents, although those Palestinians, about 275,000, are not considered as Israelis by international law.

³Such workshops are conducted in Hebrew because all Palestinian pupils learn Hebrew extensively from a young age. Yet this is a second language, not used daily in their communities. For Jews, Arabic study is optional and the level of study is commonly very low.

⁴In Hebrew the term "Shearim" means both goals scored in a soccer game and gates. Thus, the writers expressed their hope that by scoring goals for the Israeli national team the Arab players would improve radically the status of Arabs in Israel.

⁵The difference in the moral expectations between the two contexts of cultural encounters is related to a specific moral discourse that has evolved in the global arena around nation-states and immigration. According to this discourse, countries belong to nations, and immigrants should feel gratitude for their acceptance and adjust to the norms of their receiving nations. There are alternative discourses that challenge this dominant conceptualization of immigration policies. It has been argued, for example, that as a result of centuries of colonial exploitation and continuing economic dominance of the West, immigrants from the Third World have legitimate claims in their migration destinations and should not be expected to relinquish their culture in return for full citizenship and acceptance (e.g., Ong 1996).

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