

Ifield, Sussex in 1667, was vicar of Slougham from 1679 to 1692, became rector of Plympton and prebendary of Chichester in 1690, and vicar of Cowfold in 1692. He was a friend of MORE, RUST (whose *Remains* he edited), CUDWORTH and WORTHINGTON.

In Hallywell's *A Discourse of the Excellency of Christianity* (1677) innate ideas are defined as 'nothing but reason, or that Power in man which teaches him to distinguish and put a difference between Good and Evil' (p. 5). The soul of man has a perceptive and a plastic part: God has copied out the whole of nature into rational agents, so far as they were capable of receiving it, and Revelation confirms this. All Hallywell's works show a general conformity with Cambridge Platonism. Indeed, *Deus justificatus* (1668), which was published anonymously, was commonly assumed to be by Cudworth. Hallywell also wrote separate tracts on the use of reason and on morals, familialism and revealed religion.

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Philosophy, he read over in a manner all Classick Authors that are extant; and upon the more considerable wrote, as he passed, scholia and critical emendations' (Fell, 1661, p. 8). Hammond graduated BA in 1622, MA in 1625 and was elected a Fellow of Magdalen, where he was appointed reader of the natural philosophy lecture and at the same time immersed himself in theological studies. He became a deacon of the Church of England in 1629 and was ordained presbyter later the same year. Hammond graduated BD in 1634 and DD in 1639; he was appointed canon of Christ Church and chaplain to Charles I in 1645. In the 1630s he was a member of the Great Tew Circle, that *concupivum philosophicum et theologicum* which met at the Oxfordshire estate of Lucius CARY, Viscount Falkland. Hammond edited Falkland's writings and wrote an extended defence of his *Discourse of the Infallibility of the Church of Rome* (see *Works*, 1847–50, vol. 2, pp. 567–628). He supported various students, including William Fulman of Corpus Christi College, who became his amanuensis following his expulsion from the University by the Parliamentary Visitors in 1648. Fulman eventually published Hammond's complete works (1684–9). Like other members of the Great Tew Circle (such as John HALES and William CHILLINGWORTH), Hammond was a rationalist, a moralist and an irenicist in his theology, and thus contributed to the foundations of latitudinarianism.

In the anonymous tract *Mysterium religiosum* (1649) Hammond offers a remarkable definition of reason:

HAMMOND, Henry (1605–60)

Henry Hammond was born in Chertsey, Surrey on 18 August 1605 and died in Worcester on 25 April 1660. The son of John Hammond, court physician to Prince Henry, eldest son of JAMES I, he was educated at Eton and Magdalen College, Oxford. His proficiency in Hebrew, Greek and Latin earned him distinction: 'besides an exact dispatch of the whole Course of

By Reason we understand that supreme Faculties of the Soul, which differenceth us, not only from Inanimate, but other Living-Creatures; which (for its innate strength) sit as a judge within us, and is indifferent to Natural and Divine Objects ... it weighes, and prizeth all things, and

arguments by their several Topicks (which too, as *Muenta Rationis*, for their Poise, we call Reasons) and accordingly by elevating or vanquishing the grounds of Doubt through Discourse, begets Faith or Assent. It tries all outward rules and guides. And itself makes laws for us, And what rule soever it admits of, is awaies the last and immediate Guide of Human action. (*Mysterium religiosum*, pp. 1, 2)

Hammond viewed faith itself as the assent of the intellect: 'the spirit of God workes but by men, and is nowadayes secret in its operations to themselves, and no way evident to others, but by its effects in Reason or Discourse, which nothing differs from Reason itself' (p. 6). Yet for Hammond reason was more than a merely formal faculty. He in fact adhered to a conservative version of natural-law theory, and reiterated HOOKE's claim that such law has an ontological status independent of covenant and convention. Thus even divine laws presuppose 'Pre-existent faculties, and Notions of Reason in conceiving' (p. 4). Salvation consequently comes to depend more upon *inquiry* than upon belief.

Inspired by Hugo Grotius's attempt in *De veritate religionis Christianae* (1627) to construct a rational demonstration of Christianity, Hammond composed his own treatise *Of the Reasonableness of Christian Religion* (1650). Rationality can be understood either theoretically as sufficient evidence for demonstrable truth or, in a more pragmatic sense, as the means to the attainment of given ends. Hammond seizes upon the latter sense in his defence of Christianity as the reasonable and prudent course in the realm of moral action. Religion is justified precisely on account of its inspiration to good action; the rationality of Christian belief stands upon its moral necessity. Following Grotius and Arminius, Hammond rejected the Calvinistic account

of predestination. Indeed, Hammond held that God justifies none who are unsanctified' (*Reasonableness, Works*, 1847–50, vol. 1, p. 149) and thus seemed to depart from the classical reformed teaching formulated in the *Thirty-Nine Articles of Religion* that 'faith alone' justifies. His moralistic soteriology, expounded at length in the highly influential treatise *A Practical Catechism* (1644), was criticized by Francis CHEYNELL as pelagian. In the spirit of Erasmian Protestant humanism, Hammond defended Grotius repeatedly against accusations of Socinianism and popery.

Hammond assumed the ideal of the *corpus Christianum* whereby 'there is not any man of the church of England, but the same is also a member of the Commonwealth' (Hooker, *Folger Library Edition*, vol. 3, p. 319) and viewed the universal faculty of reason as the main support for a broadly conceived national Church. The infallibility of ecclesiastical tradition and Scripture are both rejected in favour of reason as the 'rule of faith'. In principle, the universality of innate 'common notions' offered the basis for free and unconstrained consent to ecclesiastical uniformity. For Hammond the fallibility of reason nonetheless precludes the possibility of any final resolution of religious controversy. Despite (or perhaps because of) this potential foothold for scepticism, Hammond postulated a set of fundamental beliefs with respect to Christian conduct (as distinct from dogma) in a treatise *Of Fundamentals* (*Works*, 1847–50, vol. 1, pp. 461–99). Parting ranks with others in the Great Tew Circle, however, Hammond defended the *iure divino* origin of episcopacy. He was called as a member of the Convocation held in conjunction with the Short Parliament in 1640 and was among the very few sympathetic to episcopal jurisdiction to attend the Westminster Assembly in 1643. As a staunch Royalist, he wrote tracts critical of

rebellion and the Parliamentary cause. His *A Paraphrase and Annotations upon all the Books of the New Testament* (1653) is a pioneering work of modern biblical criticism.

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among those who were allowed to keep him company during his imprisonment. The story (due to Harrington's early biographers TOLAND and AUBREY) that he accompanied the king to the scaffold is, however, probably false. Harrington played no great part in public life: he unsuccessfully contested a Parliamentary seat in 1642, but never again sought to enter Parliament. After the king's execution, his financial independence enabled him to devote most of his time to the production of his major literary achievement, *The Commonwealth of Oceana*. After initial difficulties – the manuscript was confiscated at the printer's and only returned at the personal intervention of Cromwell, to whom it is addressed – *Oceana* was published in London in 1656, and much of Harrington's life thereafter was devoted to elaborating and defending its proposals. In 1659 he founded the Rota Club, the membership of which included some very advanced democrats. After the Restoration, he came under suspicion of conspiring to bring back the Commonwealth. He was arrested in December 1661 and imprisoned in the Tower. During his imprisonment his mental and physical health deteriorated rapidly, largely thanks to ill-judged medical advice. Eventually released, he never recovered fully; but there is probably no truth in the story that he died insane.

As Harrington understands it, the work of the political theorist is primarily historical and comparative. The constitutional arrangements set forth in *Oceana* are virtually all developed by reference to the governments of the Jews, Rome, Sparta and Venice, and to the study of existing governments: Harrington is unwilling to recommend anything that has not already been tried and proved successful. He is also almost entirely classical in his literary outlook. He has little time for the political thinkers of his own age. He speaks highly of HOBES, but only as a philosopher; he

greatly dislikes his politics. He finds his political models in Plato's *Laws*, Aristotle's *Politics*, the *Histories* of Polybius and the writings of Machiavelli, whom he especially admires. In form *Oceana* is an elaborate and rather laborious fiction, describing the formation of a new government for the imaginary commonwealth of Oceana. It is a utopia: a representation, not of an actual state, but of the state as it should be. No doubt Harrington chose to write as he did in order to evade the censorship, but it is perfectly clear that *Oceana* is supposed to be England, and that the events, places, and personages depicted in the book are only thinly disguised. 'Emporium' is London, 'Hieria' is Westminster, 'Leviathan' is Thomas Hobbes, 'Panurgus' is Henry VII, 'Parthenia' is Elizabeth I; 'Olpheus MEGALETOR' is Cromwell, and so on. The fiction of *Oceana* is not continued in his later writings.

Harrington is alone among his contemporaries in proposing a straightforward causal relation between economic distribution and political power. It is to this fact that subsequent commentators have without exception pointed in evaluating his contribution to political theory. The form and operation of government will, he insists, always depend upon the distribution of property, and especially of landed property. Whoever holds the 'balance of property', as he calls it, will rule. Harrington adopts a threefold classification of constitutions: a classification obviously inspired by Book 3 of Aristotle's *Politics*, but modified in the light of his beliefs about property distribution. When control of the land is vested in a monarch who lets it out to a large number of small tenants in return for military service, the result is absolute monarchy, as exemplified in imperial Rome and the Turkish empire. When control of the land is in the hands of a relatively small number of nobles who are able to maintain