Office: Leacock 933
Andrew Reisner joined the faculty at McGill in 2005 after being a Visiting Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the Johns Hopkins University. Prior to that he read for a DPhil in Philosophy at the University of Oxford and an MA in Philosophy at Bristol University. His research focuses on topics in theoretical and practical reason and in value theory. He has published papers on theoretical reasons, rational requirements, the buck-passing analysis of value, and the metaphysics of normativity. He is the co-editor (with Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen) of Reasons for Belief, a collection of new essays on theoretical reason published by Cambridge University Press. He is also co-editor (with Iwao Hirose) of Weighing and Reasoning: a Festschrift for John Broome. At present he is working on a monograph tentatively titled, The Foundations of Theoretical Reason: Truth, Good, and Normativity. He has been a visiting fellow at the Australian National University, the Centre for the Study of Mind and Nature, and the University of Oxford. He was a visiting lecturer at Stockholm University in spring 2013 and will be a visiting lecturer at the University of Lund in winter 2014.
Moral Philosophy, Practical and Theoretical Reason, Value Theory, Belief
Ethics, Epistemology, History of Analytic Philosophy, Metaphysics, Philosophy of Mind, Plato
1. Weighing and Reasoning: A Festschrift for John Broome, a co-edited volume with Iwao Hirose. This volume will comprise 15 original papers on the work of John Broome. Oxford University Press: Oxford (Under Contract).
2. Reasons for Belief, a co-edited volume with Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen. This 125,000 word volume comprises 12 original papers on the topic of theoretical reason. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2011).
JOURNAL ARTICLES and BOOK CHAPTERS
1. “Normative Conflicts and the Structure of Normativity”, in Weighing and Reasoning: A Festschrift for John Broome, Iwao Hirose and Andrew Reisner
(eds), Oxford: Oxford University Press (under contract).
2. “Introduction” with Iwao Hirose, in Weighing and Reasoning: A Festschrift for John Broome, Iwao Hirose and Andrew Reisner (eds), Oxford: Oxford University Press (under contract).
3. “Pragmatic Reasons for Belief’, in The Oxford Handbook of Reasons, Daniel Star (ed), Oxford University Press: Oxford (forthcoming).
4. 'Is the Enkratic Principle a Requirement of Rationality?', Organon F, 20, no 4, special volume on the enkratic principle (2013), pp 436-462.
5. 'Leaps of Knowledge' in The Aim of Belief, Timothy Chan (ed), Oxford: Oxford University Press (2013), pp 167-183.
6. 'Is there Reason to Be Theoretically Rational?', Reasons for Belief, Andrew Reisner and Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Cambridge University Press, 2011, pp 34-53.
7. 'Introduction' with Asbjorn Steglich-Petersen in Reasons for Belief, Andrew Reisner and Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Cambridge University Press, 2011, pp 1-10.
8. 'Metaethics for Everyone'. Problema, 4, special volume on the philosophy Ronald Dworkin (2010), pp 39-64.
9. 'Abandoning the Buck-Passing Analysis of Final Value'. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 12, 4, 2009, pp.379-395.
10. 'Unifying the Requirements of Rationality'. Philosophical Explorations Special Volume 12:3 (Practical Reasoning).
Penultimate draft: Unifying the Requirements of Rationality
11. 'The Possibility of Pragmatic Reasons for Belief and the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem'. Philosophical Studies, 145, 2, 2009, pp.257-272.
12. 'Weighing Pragmatic and Evidential Reasons for Belief'. Philosophical Studies, 138, 1, 2008, pp.17-27.
13. 'Does Friendship Give us non-Derivative Partial Reasons?'. Les ateliers de l’éthique, 3, 1, 2007, pp.70-79.
14. 'Evidentialism and the Numbers Game'. Theoria, 78, 4, 2007, pp.304-16.
1. Review of The Domain of Reasons (2011, OUP) by John Skorupski. For Philosophical Review, 122 (3), (2013), pp. 661-664.
1. ‘Prima Facie and Pro Tanto Oughts’, The International Encyclopedia of Ethics, London: Blackwells (2013).
2. ‘John Broome’, The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (forthcoming).
UNPUBLISHED CITED WORKS
Why Rational Requirements Are Not Normative Requirements
Anchoring Diachronic Rationality