**The Labouring Subject of Refugee Economies**

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1. **Refugee Economy as a Site of Several Interfaces**

Most writings on refugee economy or the immigrant economy refer to changes in the immigrant labour absorption policies of the Western governments. In these writings, for instance of Stephen Castles, the refugee economy or the immigrant economy never features directly. Castles refers to changes in the immigrant labour absorption policies of the West European governments, reviews the economic activities of the refugees and other victims of forced migration in several countries.[[1]](#endnote-1)

These writings reflect on the economic activities of the refugees and other victims of forced migration. Refugees are seen as economic actors in the market. But we do not get a full picture of why capitalism in late twentieth or early twenty first century needs these refugee or immigrant labour as economic actors. The idea we get is that refugees and other victims of forced migration want to be economically viable, relevant to host economies; they are economically relevant, but unfortunately discriminated against. These writings showcase refugees’ attempts to survive meaningfully in camps, cities, and other settlements, in ethnically homogenous or mixed settings, and the ways they prove useful to market, big business, and organised trade. Several studies along this line tell us of the success stories of migrants’ economic activities. The message is: the refugee or the migrant as an economic actor has arrived, do not neglect the refugee, do not dismiss the refugee as an economic actor. Yet the organic link between the immigrant as an economic actor and the global capitalist economy seems to escape the analysis in these writings.

However, to be fair to Castles, the immigrant or the victim of forced migration as labour is present, though not centrally, in his discussions. There are of course other studies taking a somewhat different line. In these studies the refugee is seen as an economic actor, an informal trader, an entrepreneur, but not as labour, so much so that Alex Betts’ and his colleagues’ recently co-published book *Refugee Economies* does not have the word labour at all, at least not in a significant way.[[2]](#endnote-2) Betts and his colleagues’ work showcases refugees’ attempts to survive meaningfully in camps, cities, and other settlements, in ethnically homogenous or mixed settings, and the ways they prove useful to market, big business, and organised trade. Several studies along this line tell us of the success stories of migrants’ economic activities. In these studies, the refugee is an economically viable actor in the market, s/he can be an entrepreneur, and an understanding of the market dynamics and its appropriate modulation can be of immense help to the refugee. While these writings recognise that most refugees and illegal immigrants are denizens of informal economies, the guiding thread once more is that these economies and their actors can be of relevance to market if our analysis and appropriate policy response based on such analysis are correct. In such line of thinking again, the refugee or the illegal immigrant as the labouring subject is absent.

Yet as Michel Agier in his detailed study (*Managing the Undesirables: Refugee camps and Humanitarian Government*, 2011)[[3]](#endnote-3) of several camps shows, on the ground however, the structure of care and protection put in place ensures that this remains a situation of permanent catastrophe and endless emergency, where undesirables are kept apart and out of sight, while the care dispensed is designed to control, filter, and confine. How can we explain this duality of care and control coupled with exclusion? Camps are transforming, likewise immigrant settlements are changing. Camps are like holding territories of mobile labour, since they hold at one place an enormous quantity of reserve labour. Camps are becoming towns, and other types of big, quasi informal quasi formal settlements. Without a study of the immigrant as the labouring subject it will be difficult to make sense of such transformation.

Even on occasions where the refugees or immigrants are considered as labouring subjects it is a matter of labour market segmentation and differentiation. For instance, Stephen Castles and Mark Miller’s *The Age of Migration* has an entire chapter on migrants in the labour force.[[4]](#endnote-4) They take note of the dominant presence of the migrants in the informal economy, “growing fragmentation of immigrant employment and the range and significance of immigrant labour market diversity”,[[5]](#endnote-5) and labour market segmentation leading to long term marginalisation of certain immigrant groups and immigrant women workers, and global cities and ethnic entrepreneurs.[[6]](#endnote-6) Castles and Miller are of course able to ask some significant questions, such as: impact of economic restructuring on migrant workers, patters of labour market segmentation by ethnic origin and gender, scope of underground economy, strategies by migrant such as self-employment, small business, mutual aid, ethnic niches, etc., to deal with labour market disadvantages.[[7]](#endnote-7) However, in all these, market is the conceptual anchor, be it labour market or trade, or marketing of skills.

As a consequence, the question frequently asked is about the impact of refugees on the host economy, and not, about why economies cannot do without the so-called refugee economies that supply informal labour for the host economy. The further result is that the economic interface of refugees and economies are little understood - also because sufficient data is not available and the question of refugee impacts does not lend itself to conventional impact evaluation methods. Some suggest comparison of impacts of cash versus in-kind refugee aid. But there is nothing special in this. Studies of poverty alleviation programmes in developing countries show specific relevance of both strategies – depending on specific time, locality, and situation. Most studies do suggest however that despite undergoing forced migration and often living in destitute conditions, refugees have productive capacities and assets, and they actively interact with host-country economies. Some evidence suggests that a large influx of immigrants increases unemployment among the less-skilled workforce and also decreases wages among certain populations. But again that is the general way in which an economy expands. The impact of economic expansion has been always differential. One study found that whereas increased demand may increase prices if supply does not respond, increased demand due to an additional refugee influx exerts limited upward pressure on prices around the camps where cash has been extended to camp inmates. Economic spill over may also result as refugee households and businesses inside the camps purchase goods and services from host-country businesses outside the camps, because the agricultural, livestock, other production activities, and all retail businesses outside the camps are mostly owned by host-country households. One survey found that while refugee households accounted for 5.5% of total income within a 10-km radius of the three camps, 17.3% of surveyed businesses outside the camps reported that their main customers were refugees from the camps. The increase in refugee demand raises host-country incomes and spending which, in turn, generates additional rounds of spending impacts in the local economy. This is of course a familiar story where total expenditures, including savings, equalling total income for all households and activities, ensure that changes in expenditures match changes in incomes for all agents in the local economy. But the snag in the story is that the local poor households may also receive such assistance – cash or in kind or business advance – and thus the problematic is generalised, and does not remain migrant or refugee-centric. Simulations are therefore not always useful tools to understand how impacts unfold in complex systems. Also, the economic impacts of refugees depend on the rules governing interactions between refugees and the host country, the structure of host economies, and the characteristics of refugees.[[8]](#endnote-8)

As we know, with growing population movements from the postcolonial countries to Europe and the United States, and with growing realisation that the idea of a classic refugee defined in the UNHCR statute in the context of cold war is inadequate now,[[9]](#endnote-9) the concept of forced migration has been accepted as more holistic than the concept of refugee.[[10]](#endnote-10) Not that the notion of refugee was found incorrect, but with “massive and mixed population flows”[[11]](#endnote-11) from the South to the North, more importantly within the South, refugee determination as the main mode of protection of the victims of forced migration was found inadequate. The present European migration crisis demonstrates this beyond doubt.[[12]](#endnote-12) Seen in this light, the studies mentioned here along with several others studies deal with what can be called the internalities of the migrant or refugee economy (thus their ethnic composition, hierarchies, location, survival techniques, etc.), and leave out the externalities, by which I mean the broader forces and dynamics that influence such internal configuration and shape labour markets.

A consideration of the externalities will suggest four interactive relations impacting on refugee economies.

1. The deeply close relation between refugees, other victims of forced migration, and the illegal immigrants; likewise the interface of classic refugees and the environmental migrants as the constituting elements of an informal labour market;
2. The similarly close relation between refugees, illegal immigrants, and the internally displaced as labouring subjects;
3. The connection between the refugee economy and the informal economy as a whole;
4. And finally, the incredibly dense network between formal and informal economies, shaping certain types of economic activities as in care and entertainment industry, which features the refugee and the immigrant as the labouring subject, and which borders on both formal and informal economies.

In this lecture I shall repeatedly bring to fore these interconnections in order to suggest why we should be cautious in basing our analysis on a market centric approach, and what may be a more fruitful way to analyse the dynamics of the refugee and the immigrant emerging as the labouring subject.

1. **The Paradoxes of Labour Market Integration**

Governments have realized that labour market integration calls for investment and viewing the arrival of refugees and other forced migrants as opportunities, triggering further growth. Labour market integration helps fiscal sustainability for the host country, given the specific skill base of the migrants say from Syria. Companies therefore call for more efficient refugee policy, so that admitting refugees and other forced migrants becomes a matter of both short-term and long-term investment rather than sunk cost.

Migrant economies pose the issue of labour market integration. Refugees and other immigrant labour market actors, such as climate migrants, illegal immigrants, economic migrants, etc., carry the signatures of footloose labour, and the refugee economies are in turn subsumed in the dynamics of informal economy. The dynamics of informal economy relating to types of economic activities (for instance in care and entertainment industry in countries of Europe) subsumes all distinctions between refugees and other victims of forced migration, illegal immigrants, environmental migrants, the internally displaced, the trafficked labour, and so on. While talking of labour market segmentation we have to keep in mind the countervailing reality of the utmost flexibility of capitalism to create informal arrangements in production and circulation everywhere. Michael J. Piore’s classic study, *Birds of Passage* (1979) argued that the conventional push and pull theory is simply wrong, and industrial development in one place always creates informal, low paid economy, and calls for the import of informal, low wage labour for jobs that otherwise would not be performed. Indeed, informality and segmentation go hand in hand; between stereotyped and regularised skills and jobs, there is a range of work arrangements creating transitory forms of labour, which navigate several institutional spaces of the market. As said, the refugee economy is a footloose economy, whose relevance to global capitalism today lies in the salience of the informal mode of production and circulation. The global now houses the informal within the formal.

Thus a formal sportswear brand company in its production complex may engage informal makers of shoes, soccer balls, cricket bats, caps, etc., who are located across vast distances, or a fashion company may contract tanneries in distant countries of the South for polished leather goods including leather bags. This is possible because standards are global, and the refugee economy in order to survive has to follow the global standards and protocols. The refugee or the immigrant economy in this way becomes a part of the global supply chain of a commodity. Classic is the case of carpet making by Tibetan refugees in Nepal or Syrian refugees making leather and other garment products in Turkey or Bangladeshi immigrants in India engaged in garment making as in Kidderpore in Kolkata. Opportunities and constraints thus have a pattern.

Syrian refugees present an insightful corpus of experiences of how and when refugees become labouring subjects. All these of course link the management of informal economies on a global scale with the dynamics of global governance. Alexander Betts and his colleagues are only partly right when they say of their work, “The theoretical purpose of these three institutions of refugeehood (urban, protected camp, and emergency camp) is to highlight the ways in which refugees’ different institutional contexts shape their economic opportunity structures. Rather than being inherently different from ‘citizens’ or ‘migrants’ what makes them distinct is a set of institutional features that shape their economic lives and interaction with markets.”[[13]](#endnote-13) On the contrary, one may argue that global experiences of refugee and migrant economies suggest a broad uniformity of pattern in the formation of the labouring subjects from refugee and immigrant populations, namely that they form a huge dispersed population of footloose labour whose products are linked to global market chains. These population groups must be made to work as per the requirements of the global supply chains of commodities and labour; on the other hand they must remain invisible from the public eye.

Borrowing from Saskia Sassen we may call this “expulsion”- exactly the dialectical opposite of the inclusion of the immigrant population in the global cities.[[14]](#endnote-14) Sassen shows, soaring income inequality and unemployment, expanding populations of the displaced and imprisoned, accelerating destruction of land and water bodies can be understood in their complexity only as a type of expulsion from professional livelihood, living space, and the biosphere that makes life possible. From finance to mining, complex types of knowledge and technology are being deployed in ways that produce brutalities and result in predatory formations. Today’s financial instruments are backed by engineering expertise that enables exploitation of the environment, trading in futures, also by the legal expertise that allows the world’s rich countries to acquire vast stretches of territory from the poorer ones. And the brutal fact is that the sheer complexity of the global economy makes it hard to trace lines of responsibility for the displacements, evictions, and eradications it produces.

The market opportunities Betts and others speak of have to be seen in this context. In the context of their research on refugees in Uganda Betts and his colleagues admit of “refugee economic activities being embedded in much wider Ugandan network and economies outside the settlements”.[[15]](#endnote-15) But this means not only network of opportunities, but also of linkages of compulsions and burdens. The earlier vocabulary of “refugee burden” and the currently replacement vocabulary of “refugee asset” both hide the salient laws of the functioning of informal economy. The replacement of one phrase with another only suggests the increasing awareness of the social scientists and policy makers of the way neoliberal global economy makes everyone a market enabled actor, though unequally.[[16]](#endnote-16)

Thus, while more than thirty five years ago ICARA 1 (International Conference on Assistance to Refugees in Africa, 1981) and ICARA 2 (1984) highlighted the “burden” that refugees placed on their hosts, such as additional costs on already hard-pressed public and social welfare budgets, arresting economic growth, distorting markets, causing environmental degradation and putting political strains on already fragile and conflict-affected countries, today several reports speak of refugees bringing in economic benefits and social capital, such as, new skills and expanding market of food and building materials stimulating growth of the host economy, with the host community also benefiting from assistance programmes such as infrastructure and welfare services provided by agencies responding to refugees’ needs.[[17]](#endnote-17)

It is now being argued that to resolve the enigma of “refugee economy”, analysts will have to ensure that, wherever possible, all relevant stakeholder groups, four in particular – refugees, host population and country, area and country of origin, and providers of assistance (which will include presumably business houses providing marketing opportunities and capital advance to the displaced) – have to be incorporated into the analysis. Then quantitative parameters will have to be evolved to measure impacts (for example, income, assets, employment and access to natural resources), together with mediating factors such as age, gender and length of exile; also qualitative factors such as perceptions of security and protection will have to be identified. With these two methods, the goal has to be to construct an overall socio-economic profile and analyse how the profile is affected for each of the stakeholders by forced displacement. The host country’s public sector fiscal costs and impacts in providing social and welfare assistance for refugees have to be measured, such as, increased medical and education provision, increased demand for utilities such as water, and longer term capital costs and impacts such as infrastructure investment. And finally, while the methodology’s focus will be on livelihoods and micro-economic impacts and costs, assessing the impacts at the macro-economic level will remain an equally important dimension of the analysis.

All these at the end of the day are labour market analyses. They do not throw much light on the larger forces that lead to absorption or otherwise of refugee and immigrant labour in global economy.

1. **Autonomy of Migration and Limits to such Autonomy**

The salience of Syrian and Iraqi refugees and asylum seekers in Europe is that they come from countries occupying the grey zone between the North and the South. With over 80 per cent literacy, wide skill base for entrepreneurship, high rate of women’s participation in non-family forms of labour, these countries have produced refugees who have deployed knowledge in not only reaching countries where they seek asylum, they also learn quickly new skills, adapt themselves relatively quickly – in a year or two – to new requirements of language, labour protocols, self-run business rules, and learn to straddle the two different but interacting worlds of formal economy and the informal economy. The eventual absorption of current immigrant flows of skilled, semi-skilled, and unskilled labour in labour markets of Europe and countries of other regions (Brazil, South Africa, Hongkong, the Gulf countries, etc.), albeit in differential manner, will not be much different from what had happened in Europe, United States, Canada, and Australia in the pre-Second World War years. In this dense labour market scenario pleas for labour market equality receive consideration from well-meaning economists and refugee studies specialists, but formal (political, legal) equality makes sense only if they are relevant for entry in labour markets. Otherwise as labouring subject, the migrant’s lack of political equality is the other side of her economic ability to enter the labour market.

Yet strangely, the absorption of the refugees and the migrants in the informal labour market and informal mode of production also produces the labouring subject’s autonomy. The chronicle of Syrian and Iraqi refugees reinforces the argument of autonomy of migration in a way that is somewhat distinct from the original proposition of the thesis of autonomy of migration. The original thesis of autonomy of migration also spoke of footloose labour, borders that created greater knowledge of how to escape controls and new techniques of circumventing borders, and illegalities provoked by legalities and tighter control mechanisms. One study in particular spoke of “border as method”, which meant borders as signifiers of multiplication of labour.[[18]](#endnote-18) We shall now move on to that discussion on migrants as the plural labouring subjects.

It is strange that migration analysts rarely consider the two aspects together, namely, lack of entry in the formal political arena accompanied by entry in the informal and sometimes formal labour market. Immigrant labour’s autonomy, more known as “autonomy of migration” allows the migrant to cope with this dichotomous world. For long, it was a case of political opportunity, but economic closure; now it is the case of economic opening (entry in the informal labour market), but political closure; yet the migrant as the footloose labouring subject copes with this upside down world of politics/economics with his/her autonomy to move. In a way this return of economy to the centre stage of discussions on refugees and migrants is strange, but perhaps should not be so, if we recall that at the heart of the “durable solutions” debate in refugee studies circles, the issue of economic rehabilitation was always paramount. The formation of the UNHCR itself nudged by the UN Economic and Social Council was an effort towards finding out a durable solution to refugee crisis. Economy buttressed by demography has been always the other scene of refugee and migration management in the modern capitalist age.

Policy responses concerning labour market form the other side of what has been called the autonomy of migration – a term that means among others the willingness and the capability of the migrants to move on from one condition to another, one job to another, one economic situation to another, and one economy to another. Autonomy of migration means thus heterogeneity of labour forms. This is again brought out by empirical studies, like the one conducted by Betts and his colleagues. That more than two-thirds of refugees are in protracted displacement, at times in camps and without the right to work or move freely, does not mean that they stay put in one place. As Betts and his colleagues in their research on African refugees demonstrated, despite the constraints placed on them, vibrant economic systems often thrive below the radar, whether in the formal or informal economy. Refugees are not economically isolated; they are part of complex systems that go beyond their communities and the boundaries of particular settlements. Their report tells us of maize grown in settlements then exported across borders to neighbouring countries, and Congolese jewellery and textiles imported from as far as India and China. Somali shops import tuna from Thailand, via the Middle East and Kenya. Thus mostly they are not burden on host states. Migrant labour is relevant to global supply chains of commodities, it is the global nature of the supply chains that produces footloose informal labour and ensures that various categories of the displaced finally add up to the reserve army of labour to be deployed where and when necessary to the extent that big refugee camps look like townships with specific economies linked to various commodity chains. And it is this condition that accounts for the relative autonomy of migration. Therein is the significance of migrant labour, whose marks are irregularity, informality, subjection to unequal labour regimes, degradation of work, footloose nature, subjection to violence, and the fundamental relevance to the logistical aspect of neoliberal capitalism, such as construction labour, work in supply chains, waste processing including e-waste recycling, and last but not least in care and entertainment industry.

The last area of work mentioned above is important for our discussion here, not least because in discussions on migrant economy sex work is almost absent. Yet it is in discussions on sex work and trafficking that we find all the paradoxes of the labour market reality. In fact the trafficking framework is inadequate for the purpose of analysing the experiences of sex work and exploitation in the field of commercial sex. The problems migrants encounter in this field are more often related to the institutional structures of immigration and the implementation of prostitution policies that restrict and prevent possibilities of migration. Sex work is a migrant-dominated field throughout the world. A recent study shows that half of the sex workers in Europe are migrants, and in West Europe the percentage is much higher – nearly 60 to 75 per cent.[[19]](#endnote-19) We rarely analyse the situation from the migrant’s point of view because of the dominance of the discourse of trafficking, which means that migrant sex work has been seen always in the context of sex trafficking, known today as modern slavery. We rarely take into account the struggles and negotiations on restrictions of movements and against constraints in the labour market. The trafficking discourse also takes our focus away from labour market analysis, analysis of the associated institutional and structural framework, such as border and immigration controls, visa requirements, and a discriminatory labour protection framework that can be extremely racist. These controls modulate access, in this case of the sex workers, to labour markets. The situation produces circular migrants, who would not have the protection of welfare benefits, but on the other hand face continuous deportation threats and possibilities.

In short, immigration policies produce precarious labour. What is important to note in this context, and this has general significance for the task of theorising the migrant as living labour, is that, migrants in the informal labour market are not always particularly dependent on specific employers. Often their fate depends on immigration policies. They reproduce the overall uncertain conditions of the life of labour under capitalism. This calls for a rigorous analysis of the link between the refugee like condition and capitalism, and helps to understand thereby the reasons as to why refugees and migrants working for low wages are essential for capitalism.

To conclude: The question of the production of living labour is important because it puts in a critical perspective the necessity of the states and the international regime of protection to synchronise the economic and the political strategies of protection. The refugees and the migrants to be treated as labour must become de jure subjects, citizens or almost citizens with proper registration, defined entitlements and rights, at times with rights claiming voices, and right kinds of attributes and skills. Only then, they can be helped to become market enabled actors. Yet the disjuncture between the two strategies of protection is not only typical of the postcolonial parts of the globe, the disjuncture is evident in the developed countries also – in Europe and the United States.[[20]](#endnote-20) The search for “economically viable” migrant labour continues both in Europe and the United States; and nearly every time the rulers in these lands deploy the languages of economic interdependence, they quickly recoil back to the assertion that they must also fight the external agents of violence, tighten the borders, and remain vigilant. Such a paradox calls for a policy of permanent flexibility, so that the different temporalities of migration can be made to suit the economic interests of the dominant classes/states. Thus in Europe (for instance, the recent German determination) Afghanistan is now a "safe" and “stable” regime, while Syria is a “crisis”, which means that in practice "crisis" in Syria allows a government to selectively accept an influx of variably skilled labor (say, Turkish or Syrian refugees) while shutting the door on unskilled migrants from slower, steadier streams (i.e. Afghans).

In this way capital sets in motion movements of labour within a specific field of force that dictates how and why migrant labour is to be harnessed, disciplined, and governed (for instance the dominant presence of immigrant labour in logistics, health care, agriculture, etc.), and that shapes the links between “strategies” (that control migrants once they are in motion) and the mechanisms that set these movements in motion. We have to thus think of the question of “autonomy of migration” within this “field of force”. We shall then realise that there is no escape from the dialectic between autonomy of migration and the policies to govern migration. Fostering mobile footloose labour is functional more than ever to capital’s reproduction – and this “flexibility” is the dialectical other to migrants’ autonomy. The resilient migrant labour is therefore an adaptive agent, and indeed, neoliberal capitalism in order to continue has to keep on fostering these adaptive subjects.[[21]](#endnote-21)

1. See Stephen Castles, “Migration” in David Theo Goldberg and John Solomos (eds.), *A Companion to Racial and Ethnic Studies* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2002, pp. 561-579), pp. 570-572; also Stephen Castles and Mark J. Miller, *The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World* (Hampshire, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003) [↑](#endnote-ref-1)
2. Alex Betts, Louise Bloom, Josiah Kaplan, and Naohiko Omata, *Refugee Economies: Forced Displacement and Development* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017) [↑](#endnote-ref-2)
3. Michel Agier in *Managing the Undesirables: Refugee camps and Humanitarian Government* (London: Polity Press, 2011) [↑](#endnote-ref-3)
4. *The Age of Migration*, chapter 8, “Migrants and Minorities in the Labour Force”, pp. 178-197 [↑](#endnote-ref-4)
5. *The Age of Migration*, p. 183 [↑](#endnote-ref-5)
6. Alex Betts and his colleagues also take note of this factor of global cities in the three fold institutional context of refugee economies – urban, protected camp, and emergency camp - *Refugee Economies*, p. 202 [↑](#endnote-ref-6)
7. *The Age of Migration*, p. 179; the issue of strategies by migrant such as self-employment, small business, mutual aid, ethnic niches, etc., to deal with labour market disadvantages has been dealt at length by Betts and his co-authors.. [↑](#endnote-ref-7)
8. . Many of the observations including cited figures here are based on J. Edward Taylor, Mateusz J. Filipski, Mohamed Alloush, Anubhab Gupta, Ruben Irvin Rojas Valdes, and Ernesto Gonzalez-Estrada, “Economic Impact of Refugees”, *PNAS (Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America)*, 113 (27), July 2016, pp. 7449-7453 [↑](#endnote-ref-8)
9. Margaret E. McGuiness discusses the 1951 Convention’s “limited nature of the definition of a refugee” in her essay, “Legal and Normative Dimensions of the Manipulation of Refugees” in Stephen John Stedman and Fred Tanner (eds.), *Refugee Manipulation: War, Politics, and the Abuse of Human Suffering* (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), Chapter 5, pp. 135-166 [↑](#endnote-ref-9)
10. B.S. Chimni, “The Birth of a ‘Discipline’ - From Refugee to Forced Migration Studies”, *Journal of Refugee Studies,* Volume 22 (1), 2009, pp. 11-29 [↑](#endnote-ref-10)
11. The concept of “mixed and massive flows” is indirectly admitted by the UNHCR; see the UNHCR document, “’”Mixed Migration: A 10 Point Plan of Action” – <http://www.unhcr.org/mixed-migration.html> (accessed on 19 Januray 2017); “Refugees’ and ‘Migrants’ – Frequently Asked questions”, question 8-9 <http://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2016/3/56e95c676/refugees-migrants-frequently-asked-questions-faqs.html> (accessed on 14 January 2017); see also Christophe Tometten, “Judicial Response to Mixed and Massive Population Flows”, Refugee Watch, 39 & 40, June and December 2012, pp. 125-140 - <http://www.mcrg.ac.in/rw%20files/RW39_40/11.pdf> (accessed on 1 December 2017); “The Issue: The Growing Salience of Mixed Migration”, and “Mixed Migration: Policy Challenges”, The Migration Observatory, 24 March 2011 - <http://www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/primers/mixed-migration-policy-challenges/> (accessed on 15 January 2017); and Report of the UN Secretary General, “In Safety and Dignity: Addressing Large Movements and Refugees and Migrants”, 9 May 2016 - <http://www.un.org/pga/70/wp-content/uploads/sites/10/2015/08/21-Apr_Refugees-and-Migrants-21-April-2016.pdf> (accessed on 29 January 2017) [↑](#endnote-ref-11)
12. UK is a case in point. “In the early 2000s, in response to a rise in asylum applications, it constructed a network of detention centres, ostensibly to process applications more quickly, and made the system tougher. Asylum seekers are banned from working and must live on £36.95 a week, one of the lowest rates in Western Europe. Detainees can be locked up for unlimited periods while allegations of verbal abuse and mistreatment have been widely reported. The institutional violence of this system is hidden…” - Daniel Trilling, “What to do with the People who do make it across?” London Review of Books, 37(19, pp. 9-12)), 2015, p. 12 - <http://www.lrb.co.uk/v37/n19/daniel-trilling/what-to-do-with-the-people-whodo-make-it-across> (accessed on 3 January 2016) [↑](#endnote-ref-12)
13. *Refugee Economies*, 2014, p. 54 [↑](#endnote-ref-13)
14. Saskia Sassen, *Expulsions: Brutality and Complexity in the Global Economy* (Harvard: Belknap Press, 2014) [↑](#endnote-ref-14)
15. *Refugee Economies*, p. 123; Where Betts and his colleagues admit of constraints, it is “constraints arising from refugee-hood”(p. 138). They do not speak of the general linkages and constraints of the informal economy, for which refugees and migrants with their particular de-institutionalised lives and regulations become the most appropriate subjects. [↑](#endnote-ref-15)
16. Not unexpectedly the UNHCR commissioned a study in 2011 for innovation that laid emphasis on the organisation’s private sector engagements.The UNHCR’s Innovation Unit of the UNHCR evolved in this way to become a platform for collaboration between the UNHCR Divisions, refugees, academia, and the private sector (such as Vodafone, IKEA Foundation, Microsoft, etc.) to address complex refugee challenges. See for instance - <http://innovation.unhcr.org/about-us/> (accessed on 4 January 2017). Betts also mentions the collaboration between a Silicon Valley company like Samasource and the international NGO Care International for Somali refugees following Samasource’s work in the Dadaab camp focusing on crowdsourcing. (*Refugee Economies*, pp. 196-197) [↑](#endnote-ref-16)
17. # For instance, a report on Dadaab refugee camp speaks of positive impact –“In Search of Protection and Livelihoods: Socio-economic and Environmental Impacts of Dadaab Refugee Camps on Host Communities”, Joint Report by Government of Denmark, Government of Kenya, and Government of Norway,*Reliefweb*,September 2010 -<http://reliefweb.int/report/kenya/search-protection-and-livelihoods-socio-economic-and-environmental-impacts-dadaab> (accessed on 1 January 2017); the report claimed the positive economic impact of the camps for the host community was USD 14 million – about 25% of the per capita income of the province. Income benefits to the host community from the sale of livestock and milk alone were USD3 million, while over 1,200 local people benefited from refugee camp-related employment or trade-related work. Roger Zetter referred to the Report while discussing the issue, “Are Refugees an Economic Burden or Benefit?”,*Forced Migration Review*, 41, December 2012, pp. 50-52 - <http://www.fmreview.org/preventing/zetter.html> (accessed on 19 January 2017)

    [↑](#endnote-ref-17)
18. Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Neilson, *Border as Method, or the Multiplication of Labour*(Durham: Duke University Press, 2013) [↑](#endnote-ref-18)
19. Report by TAMPEP – *European Network for HIV/STI Prevention and Health Promotion among Migrant Sex Workers* – “Sex Work in Europe: A mapping of the Prostitution Scene in 25 European Countries”, Amsterdam, 2009) [↑](#endnote-ref-19)
20. One instance is the Sudanese refugee rehabilitation in the United States; Jennifer Lynn Erickson in her research thesis, *Citizenship, Refugees, and the State: Bosnians, Southern Sudanese, and Social Service Organisations in Fargo, North Dakota* (Dissertation presented to the Department of Anthropology and the Graduate School of the University of Oregon for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, September 2010), wrote, “… economic self-sufficiency was a measure of successful refugee resettlement and social citizenship in the U.S. Regardless of prior experience or formal education the newly arrived refugees were mandated to find waged labour as soon as possible. For most refugees in Fargo, including Sudanese, this meant working in factories, hotels, retail, and other entry level jobs. In addition to decades of war-related trauma and forced migration, lack of experience in waged labor markets resulted in barriers to Sudanese integration. As a caseworker in Sioux Falls (2001-02) with dozens of Sudanese clients, I was surprised by the variety of experiences among Sudanese when it came to resettlement, and more specifically by the vast differences in levels of formal education and experience with waged labor. There were men (and some women) who had a college education abroad (in India, Cuba, Egypt, and Kenya) and who spoke fluent English. Others had worked for large, well-paying international organizations. There were many women, and some men, who had almost no formal education and little experience in waged labor. There were men and women who suffered from psychosocial trauma and there were men of all ages who had fought in the war” (pp. 251-252). “In a conversation with Santino, a man in his twenties, about the challenges facing young Sudanese men in the U.S., he said, “There is a lot of suicide going on. Some people, they feel their life's not okay.’ He recounted several cases of suicide and then added that for some Sudanese, alcohol and drugs became solutions.” (p. 273); Classic is the case of tens of thousands of immigrants reportedly detained by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) who are forced to work for $1 day, or for nothing at all, which is a violation of federal anti-slavery laws, as a lawsuit claims. The lawsuit, now having class-action status filed in 2014 against one of the largest private prison companies in the country, implies that the case can involve as many as 60,000 detained immigrants. According to the same report, Under ICE’s voluntary work programme, detainees sign up to work and are paid $1 a day. The nationwide program according to the , ICE says, provides detainees opportunities to work and earn money while confined, subject to the number of work opportunities available and within the constraints of the safety, security and good order of the facility.” - [Kristine Phillips](https://www.washingtonpost.com/people/kristine-guerra/), “Thousands of ICE Detainees Claim They were Forced into Labor, a Violation of Anti-slavery Laws”, *Washington Post*, 6 march 2017 - <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2017/03/05/thousands-of-ice-detainees-claim-they-were-forced-into-labor-a-violation-of-anti-slavery-laws/?utm_term=.5c796b97f65a> (accessed on 8 March 2017) [↑](#endnote-ref-20)
21. On the theme of resilient subject of neoliberal capitalism, Brad Evans and Julian Reid, *Resilient Life: The Art of Living Dangerously* (London: Polity Press, 2014) [↑](#endnote-ref-21)