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Contents

Foreword 1

Brian Lewis

Introduction 3

Joseph Bricker & Alexandra Wapia

Making Macho Men 5

**Masculinity in turn-of-the-century Canada,
as documented in *The Canadian Magazine*, the
University Magazine, and *Queen's Quarterly***

Mookie Kideckel

Politics of Invisibility 33

**Changing Perceptions of British Asian Women in the
Wake of the 1976 Grunwick Dispute**

Manisha Aggarwal-Schifellite

Building a Nation out of Communities 55

Theatre in Canada in the Interwar Period

Annie MacKay

Tracking 'Progress,' Keeping Tabs on 69

**Foreigners and Enforcing Racial Boundaries
The Construction, Diffusion and Interpretation of the
Canadian Census, 1871-1921**

Brendan Shanahan

Cultivating Identities 97

English Gardens After 1688

Lauren Barkley





American Indian Voting Rights in *Bone Shirt* v. *Hazeltine* (2001) 109

Oglala and Sicangu Lakota Equality in South Dakota

Anastasia-Maria Hountalas

The Fight for the Falklands 131

Understanding the Falklands Conflict in the Context of the Cold War

Laura Andrea Saavedra

Radicalizing the Latvian Popular Front 161

The Effects of Baltic Solidarity

Inta Plostins





Foreword

The blank computer screen. Not really blank, of course, since it's littered with icons and applications and old documents that haven't been properly catalogued, plus an abundance of devilish temptations to sin in the alluring guise of the web, email, social networking sites, youtube ... But you catch my drift: a "New Blank Document," as intimidating and unforgiving as the blank piece of paper inserted into a typewriter, the writer staring at it in despair in one of the film industry's stock clichés, before typing something jejune or incoherent, snatching at it in frustration, crumpling it into a ball and hurling it at the wastepaper basket in the corner.

The trouble is, your charming editors have given me a deadline. The clock is ticking. Not really a clock, of course, and not ticking at all: just the silent reminder in the top corner of the pitiless screen that time is passing. But before I proceed, please excuse me for a few minutes while I check my email, answer my messages, do a Google search and make a cup of tea. Good God, is it that the time already? What the hell have I been doing all afternoon? Now ... where was I? Ah yes, your editors' instructions. They told me, very nicely, that I could write whatever I wanted but they preferred quirky to formal. OK, I said, I can do that (what had I been smoking?). When do you need it? Oh, plenty of time then. But isn't it funny how time is subject to unexpected and inexplicable accelerations? Plenty has become zero and the deadline is now.

Which artist was it who said, on being challenged to explain his latest work, "I thought I had absolutely nothing to say, and I wanted to express that fact"? (I guess I could Google it. Maybe later.) Don't you love a paradox? You have to admire his chutzpah. But I suppose most writers, historians included, write because they do have something to say, they are committed to the enlightenment of themselves and of others and believe they can and do make a difference in making the world a more





decent, humane and tolerant place. Just not all the time. And certainly not without considerable self-doubt, self-laceration and plenty of procrastination in front of a blank screen.

Writing is painful, and it doesn't get any easier with age and experience. Most of the historians that I know will confess to having enjoyed writing a book or an article only in retrospect, rarely at the time. But the writers in this collection have worked through the pain: after labouring long and hard in the libraries and archives, employing considerable self-discipline in front of the computer, vaulting daunting time-management hurdles, fending off perpetual distractions and working through multiple drafts, they have produced thoughtful, imaginative, polished papers of which they can be proud. The blood, sweat, toil and tears was worth it. (Well, maybe not the blood.) I congratulate them all, and the editors, on their achievement.

There: maybe I said something useful after all. Quirky enough? Or maybe it became a bit too preachy towards the end? Oh well, doubts be stilled: too late to change it now: the deadline is upon us. Attach. Send.

Prof. Brian Lewis
10 March 2011



Introduction

“A talent for history may be said to be our chief inheritance,” wrote Thomas Carlyle in his essay *On History*. “In a certain sense all men are historians.” The universal itch to ask questions about the past is part of what makes us human. In that respect, everyone is an historian. And for that reason, the papers published here should find a wide audience, not just among history students, but among those interested in the diversity of historical times, places, and topics they cover.

As the twenty-fifth edition of *Historical Discourses*, this year’s journal marks a major milestone. Since its first appearance, the journal has provided a showcase for the best undergraduate history papers written at this university. Its continued publication is a testament to the vibrancy and sense of intellectual excitement that continue to characterize the study of history at McGill.

This year, we received more than 130 submissions. While we could easily have filled two volumes, we were forced to pick eight of the best. As Professor Lewis notes in his Foreword, writing history isn’t easy. These papers are, we’re sure, a testament to experiences familiar to many a history student: several nights in a row being chased out of the McLennan Library complex at closing time; hours spent writing and re-writing; and weeks at a time spent immersing oneself in the ways and byways of the past.

The essays selected this year reflect a wide variety of themes and approaches. We begin with two papers which examine the important historical category of gender. Mookie Kideckel traces the ways in which contributors to three highbrow Canadian magazines – *The McGill University Magazine*, *Queen’s Quarterly*, and *The Canadian Magazine* – deployed the concept of masculinity, concluding that it was used not only to separate men from women, but to distinguish some men from other men. Manisha Aggarwal-Schiffelke explores portrayals of British South Asian women during – and in the wake of – the Grunwick industrial dispute, and asks why the fact that the majority of the strikers were





Asian women has received so little attention in both contemporary press coverage and later historiography.

This year's *Discourses* contains two further papers on Canadian history. Annie Mackay assesses the efforts of Canadians in the inter-war period to shape a distinctly Canadian theatre, and in so doing, to create a distinctly Canadian national consciousness. Brendan Shanahan offers a new perspective on the evergreen topic of the Canadian census, source of much recent controversy. Focusing on the period from 1871-1921, he argues that not only was the census a means of counting Canada's population; it was also a means of measuring "progress," tracking "foreigners," and enforcing certain boundaries in Canadian society.

Lauren Barkley investigates English gardening in the wake of the Glorious Revolution, and shows how the attempts of William of Orange and Mary Stuart to create an Anglo-Dutch identity manifested themselves in English gardening practices. Then, Anastasia-Maria Hountalas provides a thorough account of the recent legal case of *Bone Shirt v. Hazeltime*, in which a redistricting plan that would have adversely affected the voting power of South Dakota's Sioux population was successfully challenged in court – proving that the struggle for minority voting rights in the United States is ongoing.

The journal's last two papers take us to the 1980s. Laura Andrea Saavedra places the Falklands conflict in the context of the Cold War: after analysing the reasons for Argentina's attack on the islands and Britain's armed response, she discusses why the United States eventually sided with Britain when caught between allies. Finally, Inta Plostins accounts for the radicalization of the Latvian Popular Front, which, though it started as a *pro-perestroika* organization during *glasnost*, eventually came to oppose Latvia's membership in the USSR. She pays particular attention to the role played by solidarity among the Baltic states.

Publishing these papers has required the help of several key people and organizations. Many thanks to the History Students' Association for their help and support, and to the Student Society of McGill University and the Arts Undergraduate Society for their financial assistance. Thanks as well to our dedicated and talented editorial team, who made this year's journal not only possible, but a pleasure to work on. Finally, thanks to the professors in the department who have both guided and inspired the work presented here. Enjoy!

Joseph Bricker
Alexandra Wapia
10 March 2011



Making Macho Men Masculinity in turn-of-the-century Canada, as documented in *The Canadian Magazine*, the *University Magazine*, and *Queen's Quarterly*

Mookie Kideckel

In the last decade of the nineteenth century, elite Canadian writers responded to the world around them in highly gendered language. Many spoke of “manliness,” “manhood,” or “masculinity” to describe a wide variety of virtuous characteristics. While ubiquity can rob terms of impact, frequency of use also indicates that for these writers expressions of masculinity were meaningful. For the contributors to three important highbrow publications, *The McGill University Magazine*, *Queen's Quarterly*, and *The Canadian Magazine*, invoking masculinity was, rather than just a tool to separate men from women, also a way to differentiate men from each other. It was part of creating what Ian McKay describes as the ‘liberal project of rule,’ whereby groups that placed the propertied individual at the heart of their political and economic philosophy built a state to ensure their welfare.¹ McKay notes that there were challenges to the liberal order through the nineteenth century,² and in all three periodicals competing definitions of masculinity conveyed different values regarding work, public service, and political participation. First, writers invoked manliness to indicate ideals of acquired liberal citizenship. Second, they used masculinity to demonstrate the values of producing, indicating business acuity as a desirable trait. Finally, writers used manliness to exclude primarily the poor and unrefined from attaining political power.

The discourse in these three periodicals represented a specific elite subset of society. It did not speak for the majority of Canadians, but it did indicate the opinions of a large cross-section of people who were contributing to the public conversation at the turn of the twentieth century. It is important to examine the publications under discussion to try to understand whose views are being represented.

University Magazine is a compelling example of highbrow discourse in the early twentieth century. Ostensibly a combined effort by McGill University, the University of Toronto, and Dalhousie University,





the journal picked up from the *McGill University Magazine* (1901-6) and was supported by McGill professor Andrew Macphail essentially out of pocket until it ceased publication in 1920.³ The periodical was prestigious and widely read, and Peter F. McNally argues that even before Macphail's editorship it "made a sufficient contribution to be considered one of the leading Canadian journals of culture and general intellectual interest."⁴ The *University Magazine* was, at least after 1906, also intentionally not limited to the ivory tower in either subject matter or its contributor pool. It was instead directed at "all intelligent men."⁵ Robertson describes the typical writer as an Anglo-Saxon English Canadian, Anglican or Presbyterian, educated abroad, and working in "the professions" or academia.⁶ If the typical reader shared these characteristics, the *University Magazine's* prestige and wide readership make it a significant indication of highbrow Anglophone writers' and readers' relationship to masculinity.

Another important source is Canada's oldest and longest-lived university-based journal, *Queen's Quarterly*. Sandford Fleming and George M. Grant, some of the most prominent intellectuals of their time, were among the journal's founders. With well-connected intellectuals at the helm, *Queen's Quarterly* gained notability almost immediately after its initial publication in 1893.⁷ While also an example of university-based discourse, *Queen's Quarterly* differed from the *University Magazine* in several important ways. For one thing, it was avowedly denominational, echoing the Presbyterianism of the university itself. Moreover, during Grant's reign as editor-in-chief, which extended until his death in 1902, critics noted his micromanaging of the magazine content and a scope of contributors largely limited to Queen's alumni in Britain as serious shortcomings. Nonetheless, *Queen's Quarterly* reformed after 1902, and even before then, it was well received by many in the academic community.

Finally, *The Canadian Magazine* served as a measure of highbrow opinion published outside university walls. It advertised in *Queen's Quarterly*, which suggests that its editors courted the same audience. The wealth of other advertisements in its own pages, and a breadth of articles including literary, business, politics, and general interest pieces indicate an attempt to reach a broader audience as well. It had a fairly long run—1893 until 1939—and though Fraser Sutherland cautions that it was "no economic bonanza,"⁸ the magazine at least claimed to have exorbitant subscription numbers. Therefore, it was a voice for some part of the Anglophone Toronto establishment⁹ and an important counterpoint to the Montreal-based *University Magazine*. *The Canadian Magazine*





illustrates how a long-lived monthly, which often featured well-known writers, attempted to appeal to a broader bourgeois Canadian society, and how that segment of the population portrayed and read about itself.

Scholarly discourse on Canadian masculinity is by no means extensive. Many gender historians have viewed studies of masculinity as either potentially unhelpful or as male obstructions to understanding femininity.¹⁰ Moreover, many nineteenth century writers regarded masculinity as the default gender and so spent less time explicitly defining it than they did womanhood.¹¹ However, some older works have addressed nineteenth century intellectuals' relationship to masculinity. For instance, Carl Berger's *The Sense of Power* notes that turn-of-the-century Canadian imperialists often expressed their affinity for the British Empire by invoking its manliness, and that men like Upper Canada College principal and Rhodes Trust organizing secretary George Robert Parkin valued institutions' ability to cultivate a manliness based on "work and discipline."¹² In the last two decades, masculinity has also started to be addressed more prominently in important social histories.

One such area is in social reform. Jarrett Rudy documents that the Women's Christian Temperance Union's fight against social vice was often stymied by the "manly" cachet attached to the activities.¹³ Many social reformers introduced amateur organized sport to the working classes as part of their doctrine of "muscular Christianity."¹⁴ Nancy B. Bouchier and Colin D. Howell also hint at another important connection to masculinity: manliness as opposed to consumption. Some American histories of consumption have noted that the idealized productivity of manly men limited advertisers' capacity to sell to men. Mona Domosh argues that men were seen as producers—not consumers—and as rational, and therefore less susceptible to advertisers' charms. "Civilized men," she writes, "were manly—that is, they were self-controlled, rational and were the providers of the economic and physical well-being of women and children."¹⁵ It is worth noting, however, that this ideal often failed to pan out, leading to state measures to provide for destitute women and children. Another American writer, Lisa Jacobson, argues that advertisers' appeals to boys in the second decade of the twentieth century was an attempt to link manliness and consumerism for the next generation, as a result of having failed on the one that then had buying power.¹⁶

Authors consistently used manliness to imply the values associated with virtuous liberal citizenship. They emphasized rationality and an ability to think independently in a reasonable manner. Duty and loyalty to the country—and sometimes crown—were also prized





values. Manly citizens would have known the value of freedom, military service, discipline, and serving the greater good. Importantly, those who lacked the finer points of male behaviours could acquire them through a traditional, liberal education. A manly bourgeoisie, then, could obtain virtues that fully justified its right to participation in the economic, but more importantly elite political, Canadian life.

The Canadian Magazine was the most emphatic of the surveyed periodicals in its espousal of manly virtues. It mentioned either ‘manhood,’ ‘manliness,’ or ‘masculinity’ nearly once per issue. Many of these instances were related to citizenly virtues. Authors rarely defined masculinity explicitly. Instead, they discussed broader issues, slipping in manliness more subtly to reinforce points. It is from there that we must extrapolate a broader meaning.

One common theme was independence and freedom, both in terms of individual liberties, national sovereignty, and commitment to democratic society. James Cleland Hamilton described the American slaves that John Brown helped transport to Canada as “lowly ones of the Earth whom he brought to Canadian manhood and freedom from Missourian bondage.”¹⁷ The honourable J. W. Longley argued in favour of public service over personal gain, implying that to, “pursue a life which is inevitably bound to be strewn with thorns during life, but will result in the lasting fame and gratitude of mankind” is “the true character of manhood which is essential to creating a sound and wholesome public sentiment in the country.”¹⁸ Katherine Hughes claimed that the “manhood” of the “public-spirited men” who came together to forge confederation, “rejoiced in the give-and-take of the struggle.”¹⁹

Duty was also a frequent theme. This can be the obligation to act kindly, as William Clark described, so that acting with noble motives will prevent temptation to engage in conduct “unworthy of...manhood.”²⁰ Thomas E. Champion describes Lord Salisbury’s “manly and courageous conduct in the House of Lords on the second reading of the bill for the disestablishment of the Irish Church.” What qualified his conduct as manly was that apparently, he “boldly spoke in favor of the second reading and did so on the highest grounds, not those of expediency, but of duty.”²¹ Cooper impels Canadians to meet their duties to the British Empire through arms and naval commitments, “with a manly and unshrinking attitude.”²² E. H. Dewart writes of national poets, claiming that in many countries they have “strengthened the ties of patriotic unity, and stirred the hearts of the people to deeds to manly daring.”²³

Manliness also referred to more general positive character traits, presumably ones to differentiate some men from their less refined





brethren. As Cooper hinted at in a passage explored more fully later, manners would help distinguish aspiring gentlemen from those that society disowned—the “cad, the sneak, the drone,” and most importantly, “the criminal.”²⁴ A wide range of virtues were extolled throughout the years by a range of *Canadian Magazine* writers. J. A. Radford spoke of “manly hospitality.”²⁵ Goldwin Smith contrasted a writer answering his arguments “in a manly and well-bred way” with one who would “seek to hurt my feelings and insult me personally.”²⁶ David Christie Murray described William Makepeace Thackeray as “a gentleman,” commenting on his “good breeding and manliness.”²⁷ Meanwhile, Mark Twain’s work was “manly, and clean, and wholesome, and the man who lives by it is one to be admired.”²⁸ Other authors linked manhood to bravery,²⁹ truthfulness,³⁰ temperance,³¹ punctuality,³² amiability,³³ generosity,³⁴ and the commonly cited trope of rationality.³⁵ Consistently, authors included “manliness” on their lists of desirable traits. While this was in some ways exclusionary, it was also a laundry list of what real men should try to become; a how-to manual.

Manliness was a set of values that distinguished one group of men from another, but it appears to have been a mark of distinction that one could acquire. Military training was one such route to manhood. Cooper, for instance, claimed that after military training, a man’s “patriotism and loyalty are stimulated, and his manhood still further expanded.”³⁶ Frederic W. Falls echoed this, suggesting that training at the Royal Military College of Canada made recruits “truthful, manly, temperate and punctual.”³⁷ For Norman Patterson, some virtues and feelings *had* to be acquired. “Love,” he wrote, “is an acquired or communicated sense to which cultivation is a necessity... It is the last, best gift of heaven, and one essential to the full development of manhood.”³⁸ People could also engage in actions that were manly, implying that to some extent ‘manliness’ was not a zero-sum disposition. John C. Brown, for example, wrote that acknowledging constitutional failures “is better and manlier than to stumble along from one readjustment to another.”³⁹ Interestingly, while the journals published at universities mentioned education as a means to increasing manliness, writers in *The Canadian Magazine* appear to make no mention of it.

Manhood was also something that could be lost. This could happen through political weakness. W. Sanford Evans for example was unsurprised by Chinese hostility to foreign encroachment because the country “would have lost the last spark of political manliness if they accepted the situation with indifference.”⁴⁰ It could even be lost through no action, just a moment of weakness. Newton MacTavish recalled that,





“cowardice and unmanliness will creep into a man’s life in spite of him. That is my experience; others may see it differently.”⁴¹ Some writers were also upset about the state’s increased role in traditional male breadwinner roles. Longley warned that socialism at its worst “seeks to destroy the great stimulating influence of competitive exertion; to wither manhood by dooming him to an effete and enervating system of the State Founding Hospital, with his wants anticipated and supplied without care on his part.”⁴² In a guest piece, the editor of the *Ottawa Citizen* expressed similar fears regarding new regulations on municipal treasurers: “The ratepayers are treated as if they are children. How is a healthy and sturdy manhood to be developed unless people are held responsible for their own laxity or negligence?”⁴³

Writers in *The Canadian Magazine* discussed anxieties about the country’s future, admiration for its ancestors, and hopes for its current citizens, many in a highly gendered way. Manliness was invoked quite frequently, and to mean so many only loosely-related things, that it is possible to argue that it had essentially no meaning at all; that it was just a reflection of male insecurity amid the rise of ‘the new woman,’ and that its constant use said more about writers trying to assert their sexuality than about a general trend among highbrow intellectuals. Yet masculinity’s ubiquity, and the variety of writers who used it and the contexts in which it appears, raises the question of why writers referred to it so frequently. In part, at least, it seems apparent that a general consequence of discussions of manliness was to extol virtues of liberal citizenship that could be acquired. Though invoking masculinity less frequently than writers in *The Canadian Magazine*, writers in the *University Magazine* also used masculinity in this way.

The *University Magazine* started publication later and printed less frequently than *The Canadian Magazine*. Unsurprisingly then, it offers fewer examples of authors invoking masculinity in order to make a point. However, there were still frequent mentions of manliness, and they appear to refer to similar values as those outlined in *The Canadian Magazine*.

Freedom, both political and personal, was once again exalted as a manly virtue. Warwick Fielding Chipman, for instance, wrote of a German state under iron conservative rule, and suggested that an impotent Social Democratic Party was trying to “imitate the manlier hands of freedom.”⁴⁴ William Trant described restrictions on personal freedom in a jail. There, “the stillness of [the convict’s] cell is broken by the whispers of degraded manhood.”⁴⁵ Trant may have meant that prison withered manhood or that the unmanly were more likely to be criminals





and thus, undeserving of freedom. Either way this article, which argued for reforming the country's prisons, was similar to other social reform paeans in appealing to the object-of-reform's manhood as one of the things to be fixed.

Duty also featured in the writings of *The University Magazine*. R. C. Jebb likened Canada adopting a larger share of imperial defense spending to "acknowledg[ing] and fulfil[ling] the duties of manhood."⁴⁶ John Castell Hopkins described obedience to the law as a crucial component of boys' ascents into "manly citizens."⁴⁷ Citizens seem to be key here, as writers in *The University Magazine* noted the importance of participatory virtues for liberal citizenship even more explicitly than those in *The Canadian Magazine*. Maurice Hutton, for example, discussed Plato, and argued that, "the first requisite for any state or family or individual, as I understand him, is that virtue which was Virtue to the ancient world; Virtus, manliness, self-reliance, aggressiveness; the power of government and organization; and the spirit of adventure; the Imperial or Roman spirit, as it has been called since his time."⁴⁸ Robert Alun Jones argues that Victorians saw in the ancient Greeks a model for independent self-government.⁴⁹ At the same time, Platonism like that of Oxford's Benjamin Jowett argued against utilitarianism and individualism.⁵⁰ This complicated the use of 'aggressiveness' as a function of respectable masculinity. While it may be a response to the ever-encroaching nanny state described later, in the context of a duty that supports adventure and strong government, it could also refer to the aggressiveness of the Empire to maintain and spread freedom. For some observers, there may have been an irresolvable tension between military aggression—notoriously tainted by state intrusion in the form of patronage⁵¹—and the individual-focused liberal order they were constructing. For others, the military may have been the one acceptable outlet of aggressiveness. Desmond Morton claims that a key motivation for the many attendees of Canadian militia camps was "a chance to pass some of the familiar tests of young manhood."⁵² The 'aggression' of bawdy working class manly men would not make the cut here, but in service to the state, liberal observers may have considered it more legitimate. A post as a military officer seems to have been something accessible to people with the wealth to attend military college and, according to Morton, could include people who would otherwise be excluded from access to respectable society.⁵³ Canadian politicians in the late nineteenth century were consolidating the rule of the propertied classes, as marked by Prime Minister John A. Macdonald's property requirement introduced in the 1885 Franchise Bill.⁵⁴ This is consistent with McKay's depiction of a liberal society based





on property. The military, outlet of aggression or no, may have been a useful fixture of the liberal project of rule for its promise to elevate the wealthy and willing—but not those they wished to exclude—into respectability and positions of political power.

Other authors also discussed the virtues of manhood. A. H. F. LeFroy highlighted the ancients' manly and virtuous citizenship, arguing that Roman jurists were imbued with a "sound and masculine sense."⁵⁵ Much like in *The Canadian Magazine*, *University Magazine* contributors consistently linked manliness with desirable traits. They paired it with "moral strength" and "truth;"⁵⁶ straightforwardness;⁵⁷ and stamina.⁵⁸ And, in keeping with values of social mobility, manliness seems to have been something that could be both gained and squandered. W. R. Givens heralded the military as a training ground in manliness, arguing that drills make boys "more vigorous, more manly, more erect, more courageous, more self reliant."⁵⁹ He also observed that education could do ill, as "communities abandoned to the public school and the female teacher quickly lose that character which for good or ill is well described as 'manly.'"⁶⁰ This comment hints at something distinctly present in *The University Magazine*: a complicated relationship between women and masculinity.

The University Magazine adds a unique contribution to discourse over masculinity in its consideration of the role of women. Several articles give an impression that even if staking claims to a more legitimate form of masculinity, it was a competition between men. On the other hand, women had a complex role to play in defining manliness, often in the realm of social reform. Bouchier and Howell both note the gendered language of reform, and Trant's piece on prisons mentioned earlier seems to confirm that, for at least some writers, fixing social ills also meant removing the most emasculating parts of society. Some female writers also bore out this image of women as definers of masculinity. Caroline O. Cox, for instance, wrote in the spirit of Bouchier and Howell's muscular Christians, bemoaning urban "trivial amusements" that had taken the place of "public recreation and manly sports."⁶¹ Blanche Lucille Macdonnel described a military officer's self-exonerating letter in response to allegedly false accusations as "manly and straightforward."⁶² If moralizing was related to promulgating masculine ideals, Frank Dawson Adams made it clear that in excess it was not a manly activity. He wrote that the Young Man's Christian Association, "always laboured under the disability of having an undue infusion of the 'unco guid' in it, which gave to it a certain lack of manliness in the eyes of the general public."⁶³ On the other hand, Givens' contention about the effete effects



of female school teachers, although it was only explicitly mentioned once, ties in with other indications of gender insecurity to suggest that some men wanted to (re)claim the job of defining masculinity from women. Either way, *The University Magazine*, both before and during Macphail's leadership, indicated a complex relationship between masculinity and ideas of civilized citizenship. *Queen's Quarterly* carried even fewer mentions of masculinity than the *University Magazine*, but when it did invoke manliness, it did so in ways that corroborated the term's implications in other publications.

While *Queen's Quarterly* may deserve attention primarily for how rarely it invoked manliness in the period under question, it is worth considering its few mentions of masculinity. There was R. Vashon Rogers' contrast of Professor James Williamson's sternness, as "a man strong in mind and body," with the fact that he was "gentle and lovable as a woman."⁶⁴ In the same issue, A. T. Drummond lamented the paternalism of party newspapers, possibly due to the fact that parties were linked to patronage⁶⁵ and thus, emasculating state dependency: "we also want more manliness in [their] tone... They appear to overlook the fact that large circles of their readers are not of the party stripe, but are men who, whilst desirous of information, and ready to hear arguments, think for themselves."⁶⁶ A. McLeod hit on themes both of independence and the female role of spreading manliness, as he lamented the state's intrusion into education:

It is the duty of the parent as a parent, not as a citizen," he writes, "to educate the child, not that he may become a good citizen but that he may become a good man, in short, that all this power physical, mental and moral may be developed. Being a good citizen is only one phase of good manhood. Parents performed this duty for centuries before ever a State school was established, they are doing it to-day and they will doubtless continue to perform that duty until government presumes to 'take away the child from the mother'..."⁶⁷

A writer solely identified as S. tied manliness to a cultural nationalism based on rationality, suggesting that, "to the stolid male Anglo-Saxon, the Frenchman seems to be particularly womanish. He is gossipy, fickle, excitable and, in crises, hysterical. He is unable to conduct a calm and sustained argument on any vital question."⁶⁸ F. J. Campbell of the Manitoba Paper Company echoed Givens' concerns on the feminizing effects of female teachers, arguing that, "it is just possible that the sterner





discipline of male teachers would do more to develop the masculine qualities, than the sensitive and nervous restraint exercised by a woman.”⁶⁹ There appears to be an inconsistency between the fear of female teachers and the conviction that parents—including mothers—and females could define masculinity. James Cappon described masculinity as an ideal basis of liberal citizenship, praising the United States for having “achieved something truly great, something which is a worthy end in itself. It has set up manhood, not class, as the standard of life, and it has done so successfully.”⁷⁰ Though explicit deferrals to manliness were less frequent in *Queen’s Quarterly* than in other publications under consideration, when masculinity was invoked it was to promote the same values as other periodicals promoted: strong character that can be acquired, and was required, for political involvement. Moreover, while the Kingston writers may have deployed masculinity more subtlety, their other articles support similar ideas.

Writers in *Queen’s Quarterly* may not have invoked gender consistently. Instead, they did so by using race and religion to fulfil that function for them. They depicted the Canadian race—typically Anglo-Saxon—as related to masculine liberal virtues. This included national character and industriousness, as when W. D. LeSueur claimed that the Canadian climate “tends to produce a hardy, industrious, energetic and resourceful race.”⁷¹ It was related to materialism and education, as demonstrated in an anonymously penned article that described the ability of education to make better Christians.⁷² A. B. Nicholson also implied that education could qualify people for public participation, writing that, “a people that surrenders its self-respect, and puts up its favor to public auction, is not worthy of freedom. Universal suffrage without universal education is an added menace of civilization—the knife in the maniac’s hand.”⁷³ N. F. D. linked “civilization” to the English language, race, and Christianity.⁷⁴ Related to social reform, G. M. MacDonnell excused big state ideology when it came to the question of moral questions, because in that case it “does not touch the liberty of the individual apart from his relation to his fellow citizens and the state. It has regard to the promotion of good citizenship. It deals with man in his relation to the state.”⁷⁵ Evidently, anxieties about the relations between citizens and the state and the expansion of the public political sphere still played on the mind of *Queen’s Quarterly* contributors. They were just articulated in different ways.

While most of the publications under review expressed themselves in the same level of gendered terms, all of them used manliness to denote values of desirable citizenship. This may well have





been a reaction to the new roles of citizens in a changing society. As the industrial state expanded, so did the numbers of the urban jobless and an often paternalistic discourse on poverty. Consider the most explicit definition of manliness given by *The Canadian Magazine* chief editor John A. Cooper in 1899:

What does manliness mean? It means a dignity which makes the young man respect his own rights and those of others. It includes a moderation in speech, a temperance in action, a magnanimity in conduct toward others, and an earnest loyalty to duty. It has no limits, no defined bounds. It is a garment which envelops and surrounds the man, so that he may always be distinguished from the cad, the sneak, the drone, the criminal. It is the mainspring of all generous acts, of all progress, of all wisdom. It is the first and most necessary equipment of the man who would write his name in silver letters on the golden page of history. It is the concentrated essence of all virtues without a trace of impurity. It is the halo which makes the man a god.⁷⁶

The cad, the sneak, the drone—these were all likely synonyms for the unproductive jobless poor. Partly in response to their living conditions, the Canadian welfare state was expanding in the 1890s. After the institution of free public education in the 1870s, Dennis Guest notes that free public libraries spread during the 1890s, as did a plethora of reform proposals regarding sanitation, health, factory regulation, and more.⁷⁷ As testimony in this essay reveals, some critics of the welfare state pointed to its infringement on male duties to educate and provide for his family as evidence that it feminized citizens. Perhaps for this reason, many reformers supported welfare reluctantly with charities invoking the language of self-improvement and moral reform to blame the poor for their poverty. Guest argues that up until the First World War, these organizations dismissed most of the people who submitted relief applications as responsible for their suffering, plagued by the intemperance and immorality highlighted by Cooper.⁷⁸ Peter Baskerville and Eric W. Sager also note that the unintentionally unemployed were often maligned in gendered terms. Work was associated with manhood, and state poor relief threatened to undermine independence and thus virility.⁷⁹ Many of the poor also defended their dignity by attesting to both their productivity and their sobriety.⁸⁰ In their reaction to a changing world, then, men like Cooper and other contributors to highbrow publications reacted against a welfare state that threatened





their own masculinity. They also had a complex relationship with poor relief, trying to find a balance between facilitating improvement and encouraging *self*-improvement. Self-betterment and independence were good liberal virtues. They were also encompassed by the manly value of productivity.

While masculinity glorified the virtues of a liberal society, it was heavily tinted towards those on the supplier side of it. All three publications emphasized this sort of masculinity less strongly than they did the values of liberal citizenship. Nevertheless, as industrial producers gained prominence, the language they used to legitimize their new positions in society, and more importantly the debates that ensued also came to the fore.

For writers in *The Canadian Magazine*, economic vitality and independence were manly ideals. Lieutenant-Governor the Northwest Territories C. H. Mackintosh, for instance, called for an influx to Kootenay mining country of “men of capital, men of experience, men of probity and energy,” to unite for “something worthy of manhood.”⁸¹ Sometimes masculinity was related to how producers treated their workers, in which case it carried a paternalist tinge. Alfred Fitzpatrick described what seem to be the owners of lumber camps as “a manly, humane lot of men, devoted to what they know to be the best interests of their men.”⁸² The flipside of the attacks on socialism and government intervention mentioned earlier was that to make an independent living unsheltered by the state was in fact, manly.

The *University Magazine* took a dissenting view from *The Canadian Magazine*. While its writers did not explicitly discuss commercial productivity in relation to masculinity, some of them made it clear that productive virtues could run contrary to some of the values associated with masculinity in other writings. Much of this played into debates over the purpose of education in the late 19th century, and supports Michael Bliss’ contention that Andrew Macphail, Stephen Leacock, and their contemporaries, “condemned the way in which ‘business values’ turned everything human into cold yellow metal.”⁸³ Opponents in this debate seemed to agree that the end goal of education was to fashion better citizens with stronger character. As Berger recounts, for an educator like Parkin who fell on the side of utilitarian visions of manliness, character, “did not depend upon brains, physical strength, or good manners; it meant the fulfilment of the individual’s qualities through work and discipline.”⁸⁴ Macphail and others had different ideas. Macphail postulated, for instance, that work:

Is in itself neither good or bad. A man who works to





keep himself out of mischief only a little less vicious than the idler. This 'work for work's sake' is entirely modern; and our present civilization is the only one which has ever been established upon the principle... With all our talk about freedom we have only succeeded in enslaving ourselves. We have created a huge treadmill; and, if we do not keep pace, we fall beneath its wheels.⁸⁵

Macphail did not need to say manly to imply that a society that eschewed higher culture for the yoke of labour violated the love for freedom that was such an important component of the masculine ethic. This was not an isolated implication, nor one confined to Macphail's editorship. His predecessor argued in favour of a student building in order to cultivate social skills, suggesting that, "one of the most palpable signs of education is not knowledge but the possession of superior character, keener perceptions and finer tastes; in short, education ought to lead to the acquirement of culture and gentlemanliness..."⁸⁶ He also criticized those who pushed for "usefulness" in education, whose ideal university would be "framed according to the creed that the chief end of man is to get on in the world, and that by getting on in the world is meant a career... No literature of any kind...would be read in it as such, for literature as such is a useless thing." He cited as his preference Princeton president Woodrow Wilson's conviction that, "we must deal in college with the spirits of men, not with their fortunes."⁸⁷

It is tempting to think that the *University Magazine's* institutional origins account for its differing views on industrious masculinity, but despite some writers' attachments to traditional education, *Queen's Quarterly* hinted at a masculinity linked to the productivity of *The Canadian Magazine*. Once again, much of this was couched in terms of race and civilization. There was LeSueur's conviction that the Canadian climate produced an industrious race.⁸⁸ T. R. Glover reconciled civilized virtues and commercial society, arguing that, "when we reflect that the Greek trader invariably left more in the shape of ideas than he took in profits, we begin to realize that an important factor in civilization is Commerce, what vast powers are in the hand of the merchant, and how great and noble, after all, in spite of the vulgarities of the tradesman and the sneers of the superfine, Commerce really may be."⁸⁹ Manitoba businessman Campbell was given a podium with which to suggest a more manly education that could breed industrious boys.⁹⁰ And Cappon wrote a treatise in which he contended that "...the ability to make the most of natural resources and the manner in which it is done are part of the moral and intellectual character of a nation,"⁹¹ but made clear that





industrious commerce is only helpful if carried out by those with the right—implicitly manly—disposition: “the leading businessman of fifty years ago in England or France was generally a well-bred gentleman... this new type of business man has become a monstrosity in the States and is sucking out the higher intellectual life of the nation... if he is going to govern us, he must learn to educate himself better for that purpose.”⁹²

The three publications were not nearly as congruous in their considerations of whether productivity was masculine as in their associations between manliness and virtues of liberal citizenship. Yet that citizenship was linked to a world based on business, and where there is common ground it may have been that producers in society should be cultivated. Moreover, while there was debate about the masculinity and value of wealthy producers, there was consensus that the poor and consumers were most definitely not manly men.

If masculinity could be acquired in order to be a better citizen, this was not an option open to everybody. Many of the qualities linked to manliness were also imbued with racial dimensions, and it seems that anybody who was not a white Anglo-Saxon would have a difficult time achieving masculine standing. E. W. MacBride, for instance, described evolution in the *McGill University Magazine* as follows: “As the yellow race spread still further towards the North...the struggle for the necessities of life, the need for bravery, endurance, and all the manly virtues reached its climax, and the highest type of man was evolved—the Nordic type or white man.”⁹³ The definition of manliness was also arbitrary, and thus open to the interpretations of those with the power to create definitions. Cooper’s cad, sneak, drone, and criminal could be essentially anybody. They were likely the unemployed, but the terms are ambiguous enough that they could be reserved as epithets for people with whom the author disagreed. Attributions of masculinity were often meaningless and sometimes contradictory, and so what manliness was *not* was a bit more complicated than simply the inverse of what it *was*. The main theme of exclusion based on masculinity was an aversion to the vulgarity of the masses. Thus, in an apparent contradiction, while manliness itself was in theory democratizing and accessible, things that were too popular were inherently unmanly.

This is evidenced by all three publications. In *The Canadian Magazine*, Longley once again issued opinions on manliness, writing that popular views on most moral issues had been unsound, and that paying attention to them was “not heroic, this is not the true character of manhood which is essential to creating a sound and wholesome public sentiment in the country.”⁹⁴ Cooper, also true to form, described





the boisterousness of large crowds in the United States as “decidedly decorous, and at times insipid and almost unmanly.”⁹⁵

The *University Magazine* did not mention manliness in direct connection to popular politics or consumption, but it consistently expressed disdain for the uncultivated and materialistic. W. D. McBride, for example, defended Western settlers against charges of material crassness that he saw as inextricably linked to racial degeneracy: “I hope that I have shown that condemnation [of the West as materialistic] is unjust. It is working out a sane, order-loving, strong civilization, and is not recreant to the best ideals and traditions of the race.”⁹⁶ Principal Falconer argued for an enduringness of the qualities listed in the first argument, which may also suggest a difficulty in spreading them. Of the spread of “character” across the country, he writes that,

Older Canada has sent out her sons to possess the new lands, and these first settlers belonging to the strong races from which the older portions of Canada were colonized established the type of the new life. Older political, social, and religious ideals are so essentially inherent in the character that, like hardy seeds wafted by ocean currents to distant shores, they reproduce in the new environment fruit similar in quality to that which was found in their former home.⁹⁷

If the thoughts of these authors were like those of McBride when he wrote about evolution, then racial strength was equivalent to, and an embodiment of, masculinity and its concomitant virtues.

Queen's Quarterly echoed these publications. There was Nicholson's warning against the extension of franchise without cultivation, for instance, stated in terms of freedom and civilization.⁹⁸ Cappon's excoriation of overly materialistic Americans has also already been discussed, though it is worth adding that he claimed that the influence of “the business man, with his principle of ‘All that is new is good,’ and his utilitarian views of education, may have been a considerable factor in producing some of the worst phenomena in the American democracy.”⁹⁹ The rejection of consumption and materialism as effete in these three publications was not as clear-cut as Domosh suggests it was for the American public. Yet whether expressed explicitly in terms of masculinity, or only hinted at by invoking values otherwise associated with manliness, authors in all three publications conveyed that masculinity could only be acquired within limits. The poor, those outside “the race,” and the uncultivated were essentially cut out from a





dominant position inherently linked to the dominant gender.

Masculinity at the turn of the twentieth century was primarily a tool to distinguish some men from other men. Academics' intent on preserving liberal education sometimes sparred with businessmen trying to create a more utilitarian society. Nevertheless, they converged in their interest in creating a society that was meritocratic and freedom-loving even as it excluded the buyers of new industrial products and emphasized a cultivation that many could never hope to attain.

It is strange to think of men being excluded from the realm of masculinity, but it is something that remains with us to this day. Particularly in the realm of homosexuality, gender norms have marginalized many males. The exclusion of people based on their sexuality or difference has had serious negative consequences. Today, attackers of homosexual rights still use similar language to their nineteenth century forebears, focusing not just on supposedly effeminate characteristics but calling into question the ability of gay men to be heads of households and to raise children. The implication that a manly man is needed to raise manly children was present in the 1890s and is still there today. If exploring the dialogue of old highbrows a century ago can teach anything important, it should be that this sort of dialogue is constructed, often unintentionally, and has real consequences. Some say that no matter what decade you look at, there is a crisis in masculinity, a bout of men unsure of what it means to be a man. It is important to look at these men, and how they established themselves as masculine. It is even more crucial to study those who never did.



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Politics of Invisibility

Changing Perceptions of British Asian Women in the Wake of the 1976 Grunwick Dispute

Manisha Aggarwal-Schifellite

In the 1970s, changing social, political and industrial structures fomented widespread anxiety and social action that greatly affected the societal fabric of modern Britain. One such development was the monumental strike that took place at the Grunwick Photoprocessing plant in North London from 1976 to 1978. The strike was instigated by a largely female and Asian factory workforce and attracted a large amount of interest from the national press, politicians, trade unionists, and ordinary British citizens.¹ The reactions to the dispute reveal the differing anxieties and opinions about the position of people of colour in British society at the time, particularly with regard to the social and industrial role of women of colour. The strikers at Grunwick fought for the right to unionize, as well as against gender and racial discrimination in the workplace. Yet anti-union media coverage of the strike in the *Sun* and *The Times* largely ignored the strikers' allegations of discrimination, rendering the main actors in the strike—Asian women—invisible. In addition to analyzing the reactions to the strike from government and trade union representatives in this paper, I will examine the representation of the strike and its instigators in the British daily periodicals *The Times* and the *Sun*. The invisibility of these women in contemporary press coverage of the dispute has been perpetuated by recent historical scholarship, contributing to the ongoing lack of public acknowledgement and discussion of the impact of Grunwick on Asian women's activism in the 1970s and into the present day.

In order to evaluate the role of Asian women in the Grunwick dispute and their legacy in British social history, it is first necessary to provide background information on the national political and cultural climate that existed in the mid-1970s. The 1970s are often characterized as a time of cultural, economic and political crisis in the United Kingdom. During this decade, Britain faced widespread changes that would affect





the identity of the nation and its citizens. The federal government changed hands three times, and the severe shifts in voting patterns in support of the Conservative and Labour parties reflected conflicting public opinions about a range of issues. These differences in opinion centred around changing sexual and moral codes, the nation's growing economic problems, and the decline in local large-scale manufacturing as a major source of employment.²

British citizens were also facing challenges to existing working conditions in the wake of increased immigration and an influx of immigrants of colour into a traditionally white factory workforce.³ These changes in workplace demographics led to heightened tensions between white workers and workers of colour, as well as between immigrants of colour and larger white society. The British government and its citizens were constantly divided over how to address the changing dynamic of race relations in Britain, but the loudest voices were of those who opposed immigration.⁴ One of the most outspoken foes of non-white immigration was Conservative Member of Parliament Enoch Powell, who became an infamous figure in British politics after delivering what has become known as the "Rivers of Blood" speech in April 1968. In this address, Powell cited immigration as one of the major problems facing British society. He inveighed against the national consequences of immigration, claiming that

We must be mad, literally mad, as a nation to be permitting the annual inflow of some 50,000 dependants, who are for the most part the material of the future growth of the immigrant-descended population. It is like watching a nation busily engaged in heaping up its own funeral pyre.⁵

Powell claimed that this influx of immigration was destroying white British society and that the current government policy of integration was ultimately harmful to the social order of the country. He concluded the speech ominously:

For these dangerous and divisive elements the legislation proposed in the Race Relations Bill is the very pabulum they need to flourish. Here is the means of showing that the immigrant communities can organise to consolidate their members, to agitate and campaign against their fellow citizens, and to overawe and dominate the rest with the legal weapons which the ignorant and the ill-informed have provided. As I look ahead, I am filled





with foreboding; like the Roman, I seem to see 'the River
Tiber foaming with much blood.'⁶

Powell's inflammatory and racist tirade was a stark departure from contemporary accepted political rhetoric on race and immigration. In the 1960s, both Conservative and Labour party members had refrained from directly addressing race relations in British society.⁷ However, the Labour government under Prime Minister Harold Wilson had begun the process of addressing issues of racism with the passing of the 1968 Race Relations Act, designed with the intention of easing tensions between white and non-white Britons, and alluded to in Powell's speech.⁸ Powell's direct condemnation of immigrants represented a more radical view on immigration that had not yet been expressed in the political arena, one which defied the neutral stance of the Conservative Party. As a result of this outspoken assault on immigration, Powell was shortly removed from his post. Yet his message was popular among many white Britons, and support for his ideas undergirded the tactical change in government policies on race relations in the 1970s.⁹

Two years after Enoch Powell gave "Rivers of Blood," the Conservative government won the 1970 general election under Prime Minister Edward Heath.¹⁰ The Conservatives remained in power for four years, during which time they curbed immigration under the 1971 Immigration Act, which was designed to restrict permanent settlement by immigrants of colour.¹¹ While immigration from East Africa, the Indian sub-continent and the West Indies declined after the Immigration Act passed, many immigrants already living in Britain became more vocal about the issues facing their communities and the tensions between white Britons and their immigrant neighbours. In order to address these concerns, the Labour party passed an updated version of the first Race Relations Act in 1976.¹² The new Act contained some of the earlier clauses dealing explicitly with both direct and indirect racial discrimination in various areas of social interaction including the workplace and educational institutions. It also created a governmental Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) intended to investigate and enforce non-discrimination more efficiently than the previous enforcement agency, the Race Relations Board (RRB).¹³

The new Race Relations Act clearly acknowledged the existence of problems with race relations in the United Kingdom, and historians have found that after its passing both the Conservatives and Labour were forced to take positions on the issue of race relations. Ultimately, according to scholar Anthony Messina, "by 1979 the eclipse of the Conservative party's liberal wing on race and Labour's interest in





securing the non-white vote induced each party to recast its race policies in the light of these changed political circumstances.”¹⁴ The acknowledgement of race relations in Parliament could be seen in British tabloids like the *Sun*, whose readership was largely working-class and supportive of Powell’s ideas. In contrast to the readership of major daily newspapers such as the *Guardian* and *The Times*, the *Sun* found forty percent of its audience in the “C2” class of skilled manual workers.¹⁵ The *Sun*’s presentation of immigrants and interpretation of race relations are significant precisely because of the popularity of the periodical and the social import of its working-class readership.

In samples of the *Sun* taken from August 1974 and August 1976, black and Asian Britons are largely absent from cover stories, celebrity gossip, and sport pages. However, the *Sun* did not ignore these minorities in its content. In late August 1976, the newspaper ran a series on “Black Britain” that discussed the benefits and problems of integration and racial cooperation.¹⁶ In an advertisement for the series on August 28, 1976, the *Sun* included a photo of two babies in an embrace (one black and one white) with the caption: “This picture reflects what most of us would like to see in Britain today – true racial harmony. But what have we REALLY got? Violence. Prejudice. Bitterness. And an ocean of misunderstanding.” A list of topics in the series followed this headline, including questions such as “Do we give our black neighbours a fair deal?” and “Do THEY give US one?” spoke to the concerns of working-class white Britons who were raising their voices in protest over the arrival of immigrants in the manufacturing sector. The first part of the “Black Britain” series was a set of interviews with Britons of colour conducted by reporter Jeremy Sandford.¹⁷ This section was published on August 31, 1976 and ran the headlines “Is it the end of a great ideal?” referring to the assimilation of immigrants into white British culture, and “Now they are ready to fight back,” referring to the growing sense of non-white identity among young people of colour in the country. This section warned that “both the West Indian and Asian communities are growing increasingly proud of their ‘non-whiteness,’” and that young people in these communities may resort to violence against whites in retaliation for discrimination.

The language of these headlines and the content of the series that follow reveal some of the feelings of the white working class towards Britons of colour and indicate how their concerns were expressed in the *Sun* during this period of social change. The persistent usage of the terms “us” and “they” spoke to the inability and resistance of white Britons to accept or carry out the social component of integration despite the legislation laid out in the Race Relations Act. The advertisements and





the series itself rarely referred to black people as Britons, emphasizing their non-British identity in the eyes of white indigenous citizens.

In contrast to the promotion of non-integration in publications like the *Sun*, poll statistics suggested that the 1976 Act was encouraging tolerance and acceptance of new immigrants. In a study of Gallup polls on immigration and acceptance in Britain from the 1960s to the 1980s, Anthony Messina found that in 1976, seventy percent of respondents responded affirmatively to the question “Do you think... (immigrants, coloured persons)... are very serious social problems today?” Three years later, that number decreased to forty-eight percent, and by 1982, only forty-five percent agreed with the statement.¹⁸

While these polls suggested that problems with race relations were declining overall, cultural tensions grew in British factories in the 1970s, both between workers of colour and management and between workers of colour and local unions. Particularly in Northern industrial cities such as Manchester, Birmingham and Leicester, white factory workers viewed the influx of non-white immigrants into their cities and workplaces as a threat to job security and a way of life.¹⁹ Immigrants were considered to be a vulnerable workforce, and many industrial workers worried that management would ignore their demands for better working conditions in favour of hiring more docile employees. Immigrant women were deemed especially liable to exploitation for a combination of factors including limited English language ability and other cultural differences.²⁰

Trade unions also expressed ambivalence about issues of race in the workplace, in keeping with what Sheila Patterson calls “the attempt to reconcile the principles of universal working-class brotherhood and non-discrimination with the fears and antipathies of rank-and-file members.”²¹ As Pratibha Parmar points out, “in contrast to West Indian women, the majority of Asian women came to Britain as the dependants of male workers... [and] were never drawn into the metropolis as wage labourers.”²² This legal categorization of Asian women as dependents had encouraged the emergence of persistent stereotypes that classified them as docile and weak-willed, and scholar Avtar Brah shows that although Asian women had been organizing in the workplace for almost ten years prior to Grunwick, stereotypes of Asian women as passive beings lingered in the minds of employers at the time of the strike.

This stereotype had been embedded in the attitudes of factory employers for many years and became increasingly prevalent in the early 1970s. During this time, a large number of Asian women began to work in factories across Britain, following a decline in the immigration





of Asian men.²³ Many scholars of Asian women's employment in this period argue that factory owners deliberately hired Asians based on assumptions that they were quiet, efficient workers who would not demand special privileges from their employers.²⁴ These beliefs were drawn from additional suppositions about the women's educational backgrounds and cultural values, for Parmar observed that

the specific literature on Asian women conceptualizes them as non-working wives and mothers, whose problems are that they do not speak English, hardly ever leave the house, and find British norms and values ever more threatening as their children become more 'integrated' into the new surroundings.²⁵

Parmar's findings are echoed in the words of many Asian immigrants to Britain, and especially the words of women involved in mid-century labour struggles. In *Finding a Voice*, her seminal work on Asian women in Britain, Amrit Wilson interviews a number of Asian migrant women employed in factories across the country.

In many of these interviews, the women reported discrimination and poor conditions in their workplaces. Wilson interviews a laundry worker named Prabhaben, who declared that "the trouble is that in Britain our women are expected to behave like servants, and we are not used to behaving like servants and we can't. But if we behave normally like saying a few words to each other, the supervisors start shouting and harassing us."²⁶ Another interviewee, a woman named Surinder, said:

For a long time I never realized how badly paid and overworked I was, but what made me feel bad in those days was the rudeness and lack of respect with which I and other Asian women were treated by the supervisors. Now I have begun to understand, bad pay, rotten conditions and this insufferable contempt shown to us, it is part of the same picture.²⁷

Corroborating workers' testimony about management attitudes, Wilson reports that a mill manager in Bradford, England referred to his Asian employees as "so well behaved. They have no complaints... but lately these ladies in the Spinning department, they seem to be rather odd. They can be rude. It concerns me because it is unusual for an Asian lady to be rude, to answer back, to be a chatter-box."²⁸

Despite their low-ranking position within the British industrial workforce, Asian women overwhelmingly proved that they were willing





and able to organise against oppressive and discriminatory workplace practices. The practice of taking collective action against poor working conditions and workplace discrimination was not a new one for Asian women entering the British workforce in the 1970s. Brah notes that these women had been taking a stand against their employers on a variety of issues in the years leading up to the Grunwick dispute.²⁹ One of the most well-known of these strikes was the 1974 strike at Imperial Typewriters in Leicester, England. In this dispute over a number of issues including discriminatory wage differentials between white workers and workers of colour, a number of Asian workers walked off the job in protest.³⁰ Of the 39 striking workers, 27 were Asian women and the rest were Asian men.³¹ The strike ended after a few months, but it marked an important symbolic victory for Asian women and continued to increase their visibility as a central force in modern labour struggles in Britain.³²

At the time, commentators accused unions of catering mostly to “white men over the age of thirty-five,” and thereby ignoring the racial and gendered elements of migrant labour issues.³³ Amrit Wilson argues that the strike at Grunwick demonstrated an important exception in the history of trade union relationships with Asian workers, in that “the rank and file of the labour movement... demonstrated their support of black workers.”³⁴ Jayaben Desai, the woman who became the face of the Grunwick struggle, echoes this point in a quote from an article about Grunwick featured in a 1977 issue of *Spare Rib* magazine. In the article, Desai says of the Grunwick strike and others that came before it:

The trade unions in this country were feeling that our community was not interested – that was always a gap in our community. But this will bring the distance nearer. We can all see the result – people coming here from all over the country are seeing us as part of the workers now.³⁵

The two issues of race relations and trade union politics came together in the monumental events at Grunwick beginning in the summer of 1976, when the largely female and Asian workforce at the Grunwick Photoprocessing plant walked off the job.³⁶ In general, according to Brah, “low wages, different rates for the same job paid to Asian and white workers, allocation of worse tasks to Asians in the production process, and racial as well as sexual harassment, were some of the key issues around which the major industrial struggles of the period were initiated by Asian workers.”³⁷ In the case of Grunwick, the non-unionized strikers demanded admission into the Association of Professional, Executive,





Clerical and Computer Staff Union (APEX).³⁸ Upon striking, the workers were fired by Grunwick manager George Ward. The workers' demand to join APEX attracted support from the national Trade Union Congress (TUC) and from workers in all sectors of the British industrial workforce.³⁹

The strong pro-union sentiment among the Grunwick strikers was crucial to the support network that grew around them, and their resistance "became symbolic of the fundamental right of a worker to belong to a union."⁴⁰ As the strike wore on into 1977, other workers' groups and unions began to protest in solidarity with the Grunwick strikers. One of the most famous examples of this solidarity was the movement by the Cricklewood postal carriers to cease the delivery of all mail to and from Grunwick during the strike.⁴¹ The postal workers were threatened with suspension and were eventually forced to stop their campaign. In addition to the Cricklewood solidarity initiative, a variety of workers joined the ranks of protesters during the strike, including members of mining unions and feminist organizations.⁴²

The demands of the strikers also extended into the area of race relations, and these concerns are observable in a bulletin released by the Grunwick Strike Committee in May 1977 that outlined the potential results "if this strike is lost."⁴³ One of the five points listed under this title was: "The confidence of Asian and West Indian workers in our movement will be severely affected."⁴⁴ The inclusion of this point speaks to the racialized component of the strike and the demands of the Grunwick workers, and supplements other evidence that the strike was not based entirely on traditional class-based issues of labour rights. In their account of the dispute, Jack Dromey and Graham Taylor, both local trade union representatives who were present at Grunwick, argue that the actions of this immigrant workforce served to "explode the prevalent myth that first-generation immigrants are incapable of struggling for workers' rights. They reassured those who feared that immigrants undermined the pay and conditions for which British trade unionists had struggled over two hundred years."⁴⁵

The dispute ended in 1978 after the publication of the Scarman Report, an inquiry commissioned to determine the best resolution of the strike. The inquiry concluded that a better system of grievances needed to be implemented at Grunwick in order to address worker concerns, in addition to better wages and a fairer system for overtime work. The Report also recommended that striking workers be reinstated and the workplace suggestions be put into operation.⁴⁶ The strikers and management rejected the Report's suggestions, for the strikers





demanded the guaranteed provision to join a union and the Grunwick management claimed that the report was biased in favour of the strikers and unions.⁴⁷ The workers continued the strike without the support of the APEX union, which gave into government pressure to accept the terms of the Scarman Report. Ultimately, without the support of APEX and its affiliates, the strike came to a close in 1978 without realizing its main goal of unionization.⁴⁸

Yet despite the strike's failure, the militancy of the Asian women workers at Grunwick changed the perception of their abilities in the eyes of white workers and the larger British population. White workers began to see Asian women as dependable allies in the struggle for labour rights, rather than solely as weak-willed and exploitable adversaries. Jayaben Desai, a Gujarati woman who had emigrated from Tanzania in 1969, was the first onto the picket line in 1976 and quickly became the symbol of the Grunwick workers' cause and an icon of strength for Asian women in the workplace.⁴⁹ According to many scholars whose work centres on the Asian experience in Britain, the visibility of women like Desai on the picket lines at Grunwick created new understandings of Asian women workers and their ability to organize and force real change in their workplaces.

Historical accounts of the strike and its actors have been largely influenced by the media representations and reporting of the strike from 1976 to 1978. In their account of the strike and its effects on perceptions of Asian women, Dromey and Graham argue that Grunwick exhibited the strength and power of women who had previously been underestimated by unions, government and ordinary citizens and erased "the image of the passive and unorganizable traditional Asian woman" in British society.⁵⁰ However, other historians and commentators on Grunwick have claimed that the dispute was entirely based on labour issues and that the issue of race was not as important as some scholars claim. For example, Jack McGowan argues that the placement of Grunwick into the chronology of strikes by Asian workers falsely enmeshes the terms of the dispute with race. In his interpretation,

A race-driven narrative is a tenacious trope in the accounts of Grunwick from the Left. Its origins are often identified in the 1974 Imperial Typewriters dispute in Leicester. The assumed similarities are inaccurate... The Grunwick workforce did not divide along race lines.⁵¹

It is true that the strikers at Grunwick were seeking better conditions from their employers, and their demands were indeed centred on their





rights as workers. A leaflet printed in promotion of the mass picketing campaign of October 1977 explicitly outlines the demands of the striking workers. It reads:

1. What are we fighting for?
2. 1. The right to belong to a Union.
3. 2. The right to have our Union recognized.
4. 3. The right not to be dismissed for having joined a Union.⁵²
- 5.

This display of solidarity between immigrant and white workers was crucial to raising awareness about poor working conditions for manufacturers in Britain, regardless of the race or immigration status of the workers. Prior to the Grunwick dispute, trade unions were generally concerned with workers as a collective unit, and did little to acknowledge differences among them. This point is emphasized by Ian McDonald, who quotes then-General Secretary of the TUC Vic Feather's assertion that "the trade union movement is concerned with a man or woman as a worker. The colour of a man's skin has *no relevance* to his work."⁵³

The desire to separate issues of race from labour rights which is observable in historical accounts of the dispute at Grunwick perpetuates existing patterns in the recording of the strike in British newspapers in the 1970s. The issue of labour rights was discussed extensively in these newspapers, often at the expense of discussions of race relations and discrimination. This paper will evaluate this trend in the more traditional journalistic publication *The Times* and in the daily tabloid the *Sun*. In examining the presentation of the strike and its leaders in these two periodicals, it is important to note that their coverage of the strike reflects differences in their circulation and readership.

The Times maintains a relatively neutral stance on the Grunwick issue, interviewing union representatives, management representatives and political figures for its stories on the conflict. This neutrality, typical of more traditional newspaper reporting, may reflect the more educated position of *The Times*' readership. According to statistics gathered in 1976, the readership of *The Times* chiefly belonged to the "AB" class of professional, managerial, and administrative positions, with fifty-one percent of this group reading *The Times* in 1976.⁵⁴ This audience composition contrasts with the working-class readership of the *Sun* discussed above.

Another important difference between the two publications can be seen in circulation numbers. In the mid-1970s, the *Sun*'s readership increased, and annual sales reached 3.5 million copies in 1975, greatly surpassing *The Times*' circulation of 310,000.⁵⁵ This was an indication of





the *Sun*'s growing popularity, and the tabloid eventually became Britain's best-selling daily paper.⁵⁶ The discrepancy in circulation and popularity speaks to the accessibility of the *Sun* as a publication, as well as to the popularity of the opinions expressed in its pages.

The *Sun* took a decidedly negative stance on unions in accordance with the policies of Margaret Thatcher, who became Conservative party leader in 1975. After pledging political allegiance to Thatcher, the *Sun* followed her hard line against union activity. This bias becomes clear in the *Sun*'s coverage of the Grunwick dispute, particularly during the summer of 1977 when the conflict appears to have attracted the most press coverage. Like *The Times*, the *Sun* neglected to mention that the majority of the strikers were Asian. In articles written about the strike in July 1977, reporters referred only to "the workers," and focused more attention on the reactions to the strike by government leaders and Grunwick manager George Ward. The *Sun*'s anti-union position was often publicized through its support of actors like Ward, highlighting the manager's "double victory" over the strikers and the APEX union in late July 1977.⁵⁷ The *Sun*'s coverage of the strike also focused on the role of the police in clashes with pickets, often touting their actions as admirable and brave in headlines such as "the battered boys in blue: 18 police injured in Grunwick flare-up,"⁵⁸ and "End of the Battle for a Brave PC [Police constable]."⁵⁹

The coverage of the strike in *The Times* consistently discusses the ongoing struggles between the union, Grunwick management, and the government, but rarely includes accounts of the women involved in the struggle. Overall, the workers' struggle for union recognition was the most prominent feature of newspaper coverage of the events of the strike from 1976 to 1978. In an article that ran on 12 July of that year, *Times* reporter Tim Jones announces "Police arrest 70 as Grunwick battle leaves 30 hurt."⁶⁰ In this article, Jones omits any reference to race when discussing the arrests of workers and those protesting in solidarity with them, despite the evidence that police violence directed at protesters may have been racially motivated. Additionally, reports from Parliament published in *The Times* on June 20, 1977 lack any reference to racism or sexism in their discussion of the issues at Grunwick.⁶¹

In a pair of articles published on June 22, 1977, a reporter writes: "the dispute originally involved just over a hundred people of Asian descent (the number has since diminished) who were not unionized when they went on strike... The pickets' banners held aloft every day carry allegations of low pay, exploitation, bad conditions, intransigent management and anti-unionism."⁶² While the reporter





acknowledges the role of Asian workers as instigators of the strike, he neglects to incorporate any of their perspectives into his text. Instead, in the companion article, “Owner of Grunwick says he will never give in,” the reporter includes an extensive interview with George Ward. Among other examples, these articles signify how Grunwick managers were given a prominent venue to express their opinions on the dispute, often in the place of worker perspectives.⁶³ *The Times* also reports a great deal on Conservative reactions to the strike in Parliament and in public, despite the fact that the Labour government, under Prime Minister James Callaghan, was in power for the duration of the strike.⁶⁴ For example, on June 28, 1977, the political editor of *The Times* quotes a Conservative spokesperson calling Grunwick a “constitutional crisis” and goes on to illuminate the arguments presented by the government on the strike and its merits.⁶⁵

In another feature on the same page of the newspaper, reporters use a photograph of an Asian striker alongside the article “Pickets jeer Mr. Rees on visit to factory.” However, the article fails to include any input from the striking women on the arrival of Rees, the British Home Secretary. Instead, the reporters use a quote from Jack Dromey to illuminate the other side of the debate.⁶⁶ *The Times* presents Dromey as one of the key spokespeople for the strikers during this period, and touts him as a “father figure” in a June 1977 article profiling his participation in the Grunwick dispute.⁶⁷ Although Dromey was a union representative and not a Grunwick employee, he emerged as the representative voice of the workers in mainstream press coverage of the strike. By placing him in this position, media actors endowed him with the legitimacy and power to speak for the workers and by extension muted the voices of the Asian women who had begun the strike action a year earlier.

In an article published on August 19, 1977, an unnamed “representative” of the striking workers remarks on fears that extremist groups such as the right-wing National Front could wage violent attacks on Grunwick pickets, but no name for the speaker is given.⁶⁸ Based on the *The Times*’ precedent of naming its union and management interviewees and representatives in the coverage of this dispute, it is possible that the “representative” in the article was an Asian woman who had requested her name be withheld, or who had not been identified by the reporter.⁶⁹ At the end of the strike, when four remaining pickets staged a two-day hunger strike, they were referred to in *The Times*’ short write-up not by name, but as “woman strikers.”⁷⁰ Much like *The Times*, the *Sun* appears to virtually ignore the women strikers in its coverage of the Grunwick dispute, and often focuses mainly on the actions of the





factory's management and the police as described above.

While these practices effectively rendered Asian women invisible, it is difficult to determine whether it was the intent of institutional representatives to undermine the contribution of these women to the struggle at Grunwick. It may have been common to employ male representatives for both sides of labour disputes such as Grunwick during this time, and as such it would have been considered standard to have leaders such as Jack Dromey represent the interests of the Asian women involved in the dispute. The omission of names and other identifying markers of the women in question may also have been done at their own request in order to protect their safety while on the picket line. In an interview with Wilson, Jayaben Desai argues that

Our Gujarati women are often weak, weakened by the acceptance that their life must revolve round dressing up, housework, wearing jewellery and other things like that. Often it does not occur to them that they can speak up, raise their voices in front of people. Personally, I don't think it is traditions which are weighing them down but the fact that they have no support at home.⁷¹

The apprehension of many women regarding the strike and the lack of support from family and community members may have discouraged them from speaking to the press. However, based on photographs of striking women, video footage of the pickets, and testimonials from many of the women involved in Grunwick and other strikes, it appears that the majority of Asian women on the picket lines did not hesitate to speak out in support of their actions.

Regardless of the intentions behind the Asian women workers' diminished visibility in the media during the strike, the effect has been debilitating to the placement of these women in British society. Parmar argues that, in the historical retelling of the events of Grunwick, "there has been little significance attached to the fact that most of the strikers were Asian women subject to particularized forms of racial and sexual oppression."⁷² In the same vein, she finds that historical accounts of migration to Britain and race relations in the mid-twentieth century have largely neglected to analyze the role of women in "the processes of migration and settlement... [and] the struggles against racism which have characterized the everyday lives of West Indian and Asian people in Britain."⁷³

This approach to workers' rights has since been challenged by feminists and anti-racist scholars who indicate that a more extensive



critical framework is necessary to determine the full extent of demands from striking migrant workers, particularly in the United Kingdom. As Sheila Rowbotham argues, for “ethnic-minority women... unionization has had more extensive personal and cultural meanings because it has been an intense struggle. They have described both an individual sense of power and a determination to change the way unions relate to ethnic minorities.”⁷⁴ Parmar echoes this point, arguing that “a more long-term and positive effect of the strike has been the impetus it has given other Asian workers, particularly the women, to make more demands at their workplaces.”⁷⁵ In this sense, the legacy of Grunwick within the Asian community has centred on the role of the Asian women involved in the dispute. Their actions have served as a historical inspiration to women workers in exploitative conditions from the 1980s to the present day. Most recently this inspiration has been seen in the 2005 Gate Gourmet workers’ strike at Heathrow Airport, in which the majority female Asian workforce went on strike in a similar fashion to the workers of Grunwick.⁷⁶

Yet despite the vital importance of the role of female Asian workers at Grunwick within the Asian community, wider scholarship on the issue places much less emphasis on the contributions of these women to the strike and by extension overlooks the changing legal and social position of Asian women in British society. While the implementation of the 1975 Equal Pay and Sex Discrimination Acts and the 1976 Race Relations Act contributed to the rising visibility of women of colour as productive members of British society,⁷⁷ feminist and anti-racist scholars argue that public acceptance of this new prominence has been slow to take hold.⁷⁸ Brah argues that Asian women’s activism is not coded in Western terms, for their responses to oppression “may not always take a form which is familiar to a Western observer or be crystallized around issues defined as relevant from a Western frame of reference.”⁷⁹ The inability of Western scholars to frame Asian women’s activism alongside traditional second-wave feminism or the Civil Rights movement has contributed to the scarcity in “academic work relating specifically to Asian women’s activism.”⁸⁰ Pearson, Sundari and McDowell also find that scholarship in labour history only discusses the intersectionality of Asian women’s identity in abstract terms, and that “little of this rhetorical good practice has actually entered the discussion of these...disputes in the UK over recent decades.”⁸¹

The emergence of Asian women’s organizations and services that occurred during and after the strike at the Grunwick Photoprocessing plant reveals the growing power of Asian women within their own





communities and in larger British society. The growth of these organizations is discussed at length in Wilson's *Dreams, Questions, Struggles*, as she evaluates the success of groups like Awaz and the Organisation of Women of African and Asian Descent (OWAAD) in the late 1970s and into the 1980s.⁸² However, many texts still consider black and Asian women to be a homogenous group, both in contemporary and historical contexts. This confluence of identity has often resulted in the continued underestimation and marginalization of Asian women and their role in British society. It is important to look to recent academic texts that speak directly to the historical role of women of colour in order to ensure that the contributions of these women will not be forgotten in mainstream scholarship on issues of labour, identity and race relations in Britain. As Wilson maintains: "In this period, when women's struggles are both denied and portrayed as deviant, these voices remind us that we must acknowledge our battles and use them to reflect on the world we want."⁸³



Notes

1. In my investigation, the term “Asian” is used to refer to those whose heritage can be traced back to the Indian sub-continent, including Bangladesh and Pakistan. This categorization also applies to immigrants from East Africa who share this heritage.
2. Sheila Rowbotham, *A Century of Women: The History of Women in Britain and the United States* (London: Penguin Books Ltd., 1997), 416.
3. Amrit Wilson, *Finding a Voice: Asian Women in Britain* (London: Virago, 1978), vii.
4. Avtar Brah, *Cartographies of Diaspora: Contesting Identities* (London: Routledge, 1996), 37.
5. Comment, “Enoch Powell’s ‘Rivers of Blood’ Speech,” *The Telegraph*, November 6, 2007, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/3643826/Enoch-Powells-Rivers-of-Blood-speech.html#disqus_thread.
6. “Enoch Powell’s ‘Rivers of Blood’ Speech,” *The Telegraph*, November 6, 2007.
7. Harry Goulbourne, *Race Relations in Britain since 1945* (London: MacMillan Press Ltd, 1998), 56.
8. Ian McDonald, “UK Commentary – the Race Relations Act 1976” in *Race and Class: The Journal of the Institute of Race Relations and the Transnational Institute* 28, no. 4 (Spring 1977): 405.
9. Tom Nairn, *The Break-Up of Britain* (Victoria, Australia: Common Ground Publishing, 2003), 245.
10. Jeremy Black, *A New History of England* (Gloucestershire, UK: The History Press, 2008), 249.
11. John Solomos, *Race and Racism in Britain* (New York: Palgrave, 2003), 64.
12. McDonald, “UK Commentary,” 405.
13. Ibid.
14. Anthony M. Messina, *Race and Party Competition in Britain* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 148.
15. Colin Seymour-Ure, *The British Press and Broadcasting since 1945* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, Inc., 1991), table 6.2, 125-6.
16. “Black Britain: A Series You Must Not Miss,” *Sun*, August 28, 1976, 5.
17. “Black Britain,” *Sun*, August 31, 1976, 12.
18. Messina, *Race and Party Competition in Britain*, 39.
19. Alwyn W. Turner, *Crisis? What Crisis? Britain in the 1970s* (London: Aurum Press, Ltd, 2008), 30.
20. Ruth Cavendish, *Women on the Line* (London: Routledge, 1982), 159.
21. Sheila Patterson, *Immigration and Race Relations in Britain 1960-1967* (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), 174.
22. Pratibha Parmar, “Gender, Race and Class: Asian Women in Resistance,” in *The Empire Strikes Back: Race and racism in 70s Britain*, ed. Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (London: Hutchinson, 1982), 241.
23. Ibid., 248.





24. Ruth Pearson, Anitha Sundari and Linda McDowell, "Striking Issues: From Labour Process to Industrial Dispute at Grunwick and Gate Gourmet," in *Industrial Relations Journal* 41, no. 5 (2010): 408.
25. Parmar, "Gender, Race and Class," 250.
26. Prabhakaran quoted in Wilson, *Finding a Voice*, 52.
27. Surinder, quoted in Wilson, *Finding a Voice*, 50-51.
28. Wilson, *Finding a Voice*, 51.
29. Brah, *Cartographies of Diaspora*, 35.
30. UK commentary, "Race, class and the state (2)." *Race and Class: The Journal of the Institute of Race Relations and the Transnational Institute* 19, no. 1 (July 1977): 71.
31. Wilson, *Finding a Voice*, 57.
32. Brah, *Cartographies of Diaspora*, 72.
33. *Race Today* Editorial 1974, quoted in Wilson, *Finding a Voice*, 59.
34. Wilson, *Finding a Voice*, 59.
35. Beatrix Campbell and Valerie Charlton, "Grunwick women" in *The Spare Rib Reader*, ed. Martha Rowe (Suffolk, United Kingdom: Penguin Books Ltd., 1982), 211.
36. Joe Rogaly, *Grunwick* (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books Ltd., 1977), 12.
37. Brah, *Cartographies of Diaspora*, 72.
38. Rogaly, *Grunwick*, 43.
39. *Ibid.*, 125.
40. Parmar, "Gender, Race and Class," 266.
41. Neill Nugent, "The National Association for Freedom," in *Respectable Rebels: Middle Class Campaigns in Britain in the 1970s*, eds. Roger King, and Neill Nugent (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1979), 90.
42. Rogaly, *Grunwick*, 81.
43. Strike Committee bulletin in Jack Dromey and Graham Taylor, *Grunwick: The Workers' Story* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1978), 105.
44. *Ibid.*
45. Dromey and Taylor, *Grunwick*, 21.
46. *Ibid.*, 156-8.
47. *Ibid.*, 153.
48. Sarfraz Manzoor, "How Asian women made trade union history and shattered stereotypes: As the courageous stand by Asian women during the Grunwick dispute in the 1970s is honoured in a new exhibition, Sarfraz Manzoor meets the leader of the 'strikers in saris,'" *The Guardian*, January 20, 2010, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jan/20/asian-women-trade-union-grunwick>.
49. Rogaly, *Grunwick*, 13.
50. Dromey and Graham, *Grunwick*, 197.
51. Jack McGowan, "'Dispute', 'Battle', 'Siege', 'Farce'?—Grunwick 30 Years On" in *Contemporary British History* 22, no. 3 (2008): 389.
52. Grunwick Strike Committee, "Mass Picket, 17 October, page 2" (TUC





- Library Collections: London Metropolitan University), 1977, <http://www.unionhistory.info/Display.php?irn=7000056&QueryPage=AdvSearch.php>.
53. Vic Feather, quoted in McDonald, "UK Commentary," 407.
 54. Seymour-Ure, *The British Press and Broadcasting since 1945*, table 6.2, 125-6.
 55. Roy Greenslade, *Press Gang: How Newspapers Make Profits from Propaganda* (London: MacMillan, 2003), 249-267.
 56. Torin Douglas, "Forty years of the Sun," *BBC News*, September 14, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/magazine/3654446.stm.
 57. Peter McHugh, "Grunwick Chief's Double Victory," *Sun*, July 30, 1977.
 58. Victor Chapple and Robert Bolton, "The battered boys in blue: 18 police injured in Grunwick flare-up," *Sun*, July 12, 1977, 5.
 59. "End of the Battle for a Brave PC," *Sun*, July 12, 1977, 1.
 60. Tim Jones, "Police arrest 70 as Grunwick battle leaves 30 hurt," *The Times*, July 12, 1977, 1.
 61. House of Commons Report 20 June 1977, "Police and pickets in Grunwick dispute: cooler situation wanted," *The Times*, 21 June 1977, 4.
 62. Christopher Thomas, "Unions involved refuse to be thrown off the scent," *The Times*, 22 June 1977, 2.
 63. Robert Parker, "Owner of Grunwick says he will never give in," *The Times*, 22 June 1977, 2.
 64. Messina, *Race and Party Competition in Britain*, 39.
 65. "'Constitutional crisis' over Grunwick," *The Times*, 28 June 1977, 2.
 66. Stuart Tendler and Craig Seton, "Pickets jeer Mr Rees on visit to factory," *The Times*, 28 June 1977, 2.
 67. Robert Parker, "Picket organizer 'regarded as a father figure,'" *The Times*, 25 June 1977, 2.
 68. Messina, *Race and Party Competition in Britain*, 109.
 69. Robert Parker, "Leaders of Grunwick strike fear repetition of Lewisham violence," *The Times*, August 19, 1977, 2.
 70. Annabel Ferriman, "Grunwick hunger strike plan," *The Times*, November 16, 1977, 4.
 71. Desai quoted in Wilson, *Finding a Voice*, 63.
 72. Parmar, "Gender, Race and Class," 261.
 73. *Ibid.*, 236.
 74. Sheila Rowbotham, *The Past is Before Us: Feminism in Action since the 1960s* (London: Pandora, 1989), 231.
 75. Parmar, "Gender, Race and Class," 268.
 76. Pearson et al., "Striking Issues," 409.
 77. Rowbotham, *A Century of Women*, 405.
 78. Sharminder Takhar, "South Asian Women and the Question of Political Organization," in *South Asian Women in the Diaspora*, eds. Nirmal Puwar and Parvati Raghuram (Oxford: Berg, 2003), 216.
 79. Brah, *Cartographies of Diaspora*, 81.





80. Takhar, "South Asian Women and the Question of Political Organization," 217.
81. Pearson et al., "Striking Issues," 411.
82. Amrit Wilson, *Dreams, Questions, Struggles: South Asian Women in Britain* (London: Pluto Press, 2006), 162.
83. *Ibid.*, 171.

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Building a Nation out of Communities Theatre in Canada in the Interwar Period

Annie MacKay

The two World Wars of the twentieth-century had a profound impact on both the way Canadians saw themselves and the way they viewed their country. Half a century after Confederation, World War I had provided a nation-building moment that sparked a wave of nationalism that manifested itself, among other ways, culturally. The flurry of cultural activity that emerged in the interwar period was part of a greater project seeking to articulate a national identity that was, as of yet, undetermined. A study of theatre in Canada during the interwar period reveals a growing dramatic movement at the community level in virtually every corner of the provinces. Mostly Central Canada-based cultural nationalists drew upon the increasing importance of drama at the regional level as they attempted to harness this local activity into a distinctly Canadian national theatre. They firmly believed that “To do a play is to do a nation”¹ and that an indigenous drama had great potential to operate as a tool for nation building. The scarcity of sources discussing Canadian theatre in the interwar period has much to do with the fact that, until the second half of the twentieth century, the federal government did not agree that theatre could serve such a purpose.

The aftermath of the Second World War saw the official birth of a Canadian theatre, but this proved to be less a moment of creation than it was an acknowledgement of the spirited theatrical efforts alive across the country in the years since the First World War. The history of the Canadian theatre in the interwar period is an instance of the twentieth-century attempt to define Canadian nationhood, a project involving the ever-present interplay between geographical limitations on unity and the desire for a cohesive national identity.

The post-war surge of cultural activity in Canada in the 1920s developed a nationalist character partly as a means of resistance to a wave of American cultural fare that greeted the country following the





war. The cultural nationalism of the interwar years was thus, in some ways, a backlash against this American cultural invasion – an invasion of a country already deeply embedded in British culture.² This cultural North Atlantic Triangle increasingly marginalized Canada as the United States infiltrated broadcasting, print media, and, most restrictively, the film industry of the Dominion. In 1922, future Governor General Vincent Massey wrote, “In the theatrical world we are—as I am afraid in some other things—a province of New York.”³ Massey had founded the Hart House Theatre in Toronto three years earlier with the aim of producing new Canadian plays. Such attempts to stray from American cultural colonization were symptomatic of the theatre from early on, according to Canadian theatre historian Alan Filewood. Filewood writes that theatre was one of the earliest “sectors of Canadian society to have been penetrated deeply by American capital; consequently it was one of the first sectors to resist the penetration.”⁴

Resistance appears to have occurred primarily at two levels. For cultural nationalists, like Massey working out of urban Ontario, American drama was resented because of its American origins. In a subtle but important contrast, at the grassroots level of communities across the country, American drama was resented primarily because what it offered onstage was a portrayal of the American, rather than Canadian, experience. At the Hart House Theatre, Merrill Denison became the first of the new school of Canadian playwrights, but to earn this distinction he had to be forcibly locked “in a room with a typewriter and sandwiches.”⁵ Outside of Central Canada, the move toward a more distinctly Canadian theatre occurred somewhat more organically.⁶ Across the board, the effort was bound up in the post-war endeavour to shape Canada’s identity.

Articulation of the Canadian identity was necessarily concerned with definition by way of negation. Even if Canadians did not yet know what their nation was, they seemed to know what it was not: America. From Frank Manning’s perspective, the whole of “Canadian popular culture can be understood, at one level, as symbolic protection from, and resistance to, American domination.”⁷ This reluctance to accept the mounting influence of another country is understandable given Canada’s history of struggling to break free from British colonial rule. The Dominion did, however, find itself caught between these two powers, and this, Professor Arthur Phelps wrote in 1938, fundamentally weakened the development of an indigenous drama. “[W]e are still psychologically on the one hand a colony or at most an outpost of Empire, and on the other hand a parasitic appendage to the USA,”⁸ he lamented.





Phelps' opinion - that there was not yet a national drama of which to speak - was one contested in the later 1930s by his contemporaries. Indigenous playwrights, even those from urban Central Canada, had been increasingly drawing on the unique Canadian—and predominantly rural—experience for material. Merrill Denison's 1923 play *Marsh Hay* depicted "the hardships of Ontario farming life."⁹ Elsie Park Gowan wrote of her circle of Alberta playwrights in 1935: "We [believed] that...[the reality of our land] might be best known by those who live close to its prairies and forests and mountains. We imagined a dramatic theme in the impact of these tremendous forces on the spirit of man."¹⁰ For his plays, Herman Voaden began to take inspiration from the distinctly Canadian landscapes painted by the Group of Seven.¹¹ Cultural explorations of Canadian identity were certainly not confined to theatre, and the various forms of art drew inspiration from one another in their common project of shaping a Canadian cultural life distinguishable from that of the United States.

Despite a widespread consensus among its inhabitants that Canada should distance itself culturally from its southern neighbour, the question of its relationship to Britain was less certain in the realm of theatre. Daniel Fischlin sees Shakespeare as a "fraught symbol of colonial cultural dependency,"¹² and yet headlines regarding productions of the bard's plays were a near-weekly occurrence in English Central Canadian newspapers during the interwar years, judging from the archives of both *The Globe and Mail* and *The Toronto Star*. In her account of the Shakespeare Society of Toronto (1928-1969), Karen Bamford notes the striking "extent to which ethnicity and patriotism (British, not Canadian—or, rather, British-Canadian) were explicitly celebrated in [the SST's] veneration of Shakespeare."¹³ The "Imperial Theme," as she calls it, points to a greater problem inherent in the development of a Canadian drama. The interwar stage was not reflective of a sole project of national rule. The SST espoused the vision of a Canadian nation with substantial ties to Britain.

The Quebec stage, outside of the very few English theatre companies, most prominent among them being the McGill University Players Club,¹⁴ followed a different trajectory than the rest of the regional theatres across the country. Canadian cultural historian Mary Vipond explains that "Quebec's distinctive language both encouraged more indigenous cultural development and offered some protection from the tidal wave of American popular culture."¹⁵ Studies of the drama of the Northwest and Yukon Territories and the First Nations peoples were completely omitted from the sources consulted for this paper and only





acknowledged as an omission in Maria Tippett's *Making Culture: English-Canadian Institutions and the Arts before the Massey Commission*. There were countless stages across the country and they were not all speaking with one voice. The voice that was ultimately heard was that of Vincent Massey and his cultural nationalist peers in the Massey Commission and Report following the Second World War that secured, at long last, federal resources for the cultural development of Canada.

The vision of indigenous drama as a manifestation of cultural nationalism and, as such, a useful tool for nation-building, cast Canadian nationalism in a particular light. That light shone from the white, upper class, liberal, Anglophone,¹⁶ Ontarian project of national rule, a hegemonic and exclusivist vision of Canada that dominated throughout much of the twentieth-century. Paul Litt, Alan Filewood, and Mary Vipond all point to the liberal humanist nationalism inherent in the path of Canadian culture in the twentieth century. The Massey Commission, which ultimately resulted in subsidies for the arts, "came down firmly on the side of cultural nationalism,"¹⁷ owing, Vipond writes, to its liberal humanist nationalist perspective. As defined by Litt, liberal humanist nationalism indeed proved to be at the very core of cultural nationalism. According to Litt, it "relocates the sense of nationhood from economics and political structures to the public signifiers of culture and identity."¹⁸ Thus, developments like that of a national theatre took on supreme importance. Theatre existed across the country in many forms and had for decades before the eruption of interwar nationalism, but in order for Canada to have a theatre defined as "national," some of these forms had to be pushed aside. Looking at nationalism in the theatrical medium, Kiki Gounaridou suggests that in seeking "to create an overall feeling of...national identity, rarely is the [nation's] culture presented in all its complexities."¹⁹ The requisite definition of the 'nation' in nationalism is not only exclusive but it denies the porous nature of a people.²⁰ Theatre in Canada in the interwar period was not a product of a singular vision of the Dominion, but its cultivation in the name of cultural nationalism and a unified Canadian identity may very well have been.

At the forefront of the challenge of carving out a unifying national identity were the realities of geography. Canada was unified geographically only in name, so culture became a strategic vehicle for amalgamating the regions of the country. The increasingly universal presence of the radio in Canadian homes over the course of the interwar period became a significant symbol of this mission. Vipond writes that R.B. Bennett understood that in the same way that the Canadian Pacific Railway was a means of stitching the country together in geographical





terms, the radio had the potential to stitch it together in cultural terms.²¹ Accordingly, broadcasting enjoyed more federal involvement than any other cultural sector during the interwar period.

Theatre, it appeared, did not share this same border-transcending potential. Throughout the 1920s and 30s, Canadians expressed serious doubts that regional theatrical activities across the nation could be woven into a cohesive national drama. Massey felt the weight of regionalism, yet professed that “it would be comforting, of course, to feel that whatever the diversities of material, a characteristic feeling, manner or style, was possible that could be called Canadian.”²² Decades later, Mavor Moore expressed a similar acknowledgment of the regionalism of her country’s theatre: “total unity is a geographical impossibility,” she wrote, as the idea of Canada as one nation was simply a myth.²³ There was thus recognition on the part of the major engineers of the national theatre movement in Canada that regionalism was inevitable. They were, however, dedicated to finding a way to surmount the geographic obstacle.

The 1932 establishment of the Dominion Drama Festival (DDF) marked, in many ways, an embrace of regionalism. Ultimately, the festival strove to yoke those regional theatres into a greater national drama. A study of issues from 1932-1941 of the Canadian theatre periodical *Curtain Call* illuminates the efforts to simultaneously support regionalism and to mould a distinctly Canadian drama. *Curtain Call* existed for a number of years before the birth of the DDF, but one quickly attached to the other in a symbolic gesture of unification of the growing national theatre movement. The periodical became the official publication of the Festival.

The advent of the DDF on the Canadian theatre scene marked a third phase in the post-World War I development of theatre in Canada, alluded to in Diane Bessai’s essay, “The Regionalism of Drama.” The first phase was a postwar amateur boom, of which the 1919 establishment of Massey’s Hart House Theatre was indicative.²⁴ The explosion of amateur theatre across the country in the 1920s led to a second phase: the establishment of provincial drama festivals, which, although competitive in nature, marked a move toward a more pluralistic theatre that extended from cities and towns to provinces.

A similar extension occurred upon the founding of the DDF, from provincial to national. This crucial progression, according to The Right Honourable Earl of Bessborough in 1935, owed much to the Great Depression. The Depression’s impact on theatre, the Earl wrote in an article printed in *Curtain Call* titled “Community Drama Sweeps Canada,” was the end of touring English, French, and presumably most American





theatre companies in Canada for obvious financial reasons.²⁵ “Almost overnight drama leagues sprang into being in towns large and small, even quite small, all over Canada,”²⁶ he noted. If the immediate postwar years produced an amateur boom, so too did the Depression years, with the latter able to build meaningfully upon the former.

The 1920s and 30s saw the flourishing of the “Little Theatre” movement across the country. In every issue, *Curtain Call* abounds with references to local “Little Theatres” from all over the provinces. The provincial drama festivals, which would precede the national DDF competitions, featured performing groups from even the smallest of towns. Many of these community theatres were not created in response to provincial and national festival competitions, but rather, the Earl wrote, “without any prompting or previous consultation, in centres thousands of miles removed from one another,”²⁷ they sprang up of their own volition in an illustration of art for art’s sake. Massey believed that the route to a real national drama resided in the development of amateur theatre across the country. “Let us welcome therefore,” he wrote, “every group of men and women who come together to ‘do a play’, whether they use a theatre, a church, a school or a barn for their purpose. There is no finer form of communal effort than this.”²⁸

The theatre did not enjoy the border-transcending stage of the radio broadcast, but within provincial and municipal borders, theatre-makers were working in what amounted to a national effort. The transcendent quality of the radio greatly impacted theatre. Radio theatre was a booming enterprise in the 1920s serving not only to expose isolated regions to drama but also to foster playwriting among indigenous writers, many of the most prolific and successful of whom were women. The Canadian Broadcasting Company had a transformative effect on multiple spheres of the national culture. Its broadcasts “finally made hockey Canada’s national sport...and with its radio plays... which featured adapted and original plays by Canadians [won] a large enough audience to become the national theatre of English Canada.”²⁹

The Radio Theatre movement started in a much smaller capacity than the CBC, but provided a crucial precedent, effectively bringing theatre, as well as a consciousness of and an appetite for it, to the Canadian masses. Pioneering stations like Alberta’s CKUA were dead by 1940, but stood as an example of how regional activity was extended into a more national dramatic endeavour subsidized by the government. Non-radio theatre in Canada experienced a similar trajectory, slowly extending from the amateur Little Theatres of the 1920s to the national-minded festivals of the 1930s and finally to the federally supported





Canadian theatre of the 1950s and onwards. In the interwar period, Canadian theatre remained regionalized but it anticipated a more national drama in subsequent decades and furthermore reflected the problem of geography that faced the shaping of a Canadian identity on the whole.

There were theatres virtually everywhere across the Dominion, but not in equal numbers or esteem. If *Curtain Call* included news of Little Theatre groups throughout Canada, a bias toward its central region did not escape the notice of a British Columbian who complained to the periodical. “He said that naturally our interest lay exclusively in the East [i.e. Central Canada], where the ‘big money’ existed and not in the West,”³⁰ *Curtain Call* summarized. The editors disputed this, but the fact remained that no matter the nominal national scope of the festival, it was a project of Central Canadians. That the nationalizing effort was primarily an Ontarian endeavour did not escape the eyes of the other provinces, thus becoming an extension of the monopolizing power of the urban hubs of Central Canada. In some ways, Canada went from being a theatrical territory of New York, to one of Ontario. Like so many other instances in Canada’s history, the determination of the nationalism of theatre stemmed from the perceived centre of the country and its existing financial, political, and cultural power kept other areas of the nation from contesting with any effect. It is interesting to note, however, that to an outsider, in this case the American Barrett H. Clark, the DDF appeared to be “unquestionably a national affair. As such it transcends in importance and meaning the sum total of its elements, and becomes a sort of symbol of national concern.”³¹

However “national” it may have been in performance, much of the content staged was still borrowed chiefly from the United Kingdom and the United States. At the 1934 Western Ontario Festival, first and second prizes went to groups performing the work of British playwrights, while third prize was awarded to a production of seminal Canadian playwright Merrill Denison’s work.³² This instance echoes a disappointing reality: Canadian playwrights remained third best alongside their foreign counterparts even in their own country. Canada had found a stage but its indigenous plays were second- — make that third- — rate.

In sources from the time and from the modern-day, there is a debate over whether there was a theatre that can be called “Canadian” during the interwar years. There was, to be sure, much more indigenous theatre production in the decades following the Second World War and by extension much more historiography thereof. Where the aftermath of the First World War had in many ways seen the “mobili[sation of] cultural





life”³³ in Canada, the reconstruction following the Second World War saw the federal nurturing of this cultural life through subsidies programs. The second half of the twentieth century saw a heightened concern with the professionalization and institutionalization of a Canadian theatre movement that had overwhelmingly remained at the amateur and community level during the first half of the century. Throughout the late 1930s and early 1940s, *Curtain Call* recounted how theatre was building more and more of a support base among the population marked by higher attendance and more diverse crowds. Contrastingly, a touring Englishman said of the state of Canadian theatre in 1940: it is “moribund,” lacking “at present even the will to live.”³⁴ It would appear that he did not engage with theatre at the community level. If the national drama had not yet found its bearings at the time, the interwar period was nonetheless characterized by an active effort to establish an indigenous theatre.

Curtain Call is a vital source in a study of the progression from a theatre *in* Canada to a theatre *of* Canada. It has not, however, been taken advantage of by existing historical works. The periodical is not cited in any of the secondary sources drawn upon for this paper. Thus its insights into the budding enthusiasm and recognition for the national theatrical endeavour throughout the interwar years are somewhat novel and contribute significantly to a study of the period. Filewood writes, “It is the practice of culture, not the actual content of art, that marks the nation...[what is always] coming of age [is] the cultural narrative rather than cultural practice.”³⁵ In many ways, the 1920s and 1930s set in motion a unified practice of culture in Canada. The narrative that put the “Canada” in Canadian theatre was a crucial development but did not come until the second half of the century and could not have come without the theatrical activity of the interwar years.

Theatre building in Canada between the two World Wars is illustrative of the greater narrative of nation building during that time. The development of Canadian theatre in the interwar period can perhaps be interpreted as the triumph of the liberal Anglophone Central Canadian project of national rule over the wider regional and ethnic varieties, a domination so typical of the Canadian experience. However, since the granting of funding to theatre initiatives in Canada post-World War II, the national drama has been permitted to expand in an ever-growing number of ways. The national theatre movement may have needed to be co-opted into a politically friendly statement of cultural nationalism in order to obtain the subsidies that would permit it to grow artistically.

Regardless of whether the interwar Canadian theatre experience





represented a victory for an exclusive Canadian vision or not, it stands as a poignant example of the way in which Canada strove to find a national identity following its symbolic emergence from the Great War as a fully-fledged nation. The ambiguity that surrounds the answer to the question of what constitutes distinctive Canadian drama, which arguably persists to this day, is in fact representative of Canadian identity as a whole, an identity very much shrouded in ambiguity and cultural pastiche.





Notes

1. Alan Filewood, *Performing Canada: The Nation Enacted in the Imagined Theatre* (Kamloops, BC, 2002), 40.
2. Daniel Fischlin, "Nation and/as Adaptation: Shakespeare, Canada, and Authenticity," in *Shakespeare in Canada: 'a world elsewhere'?* (Toronto, 2002) 314.
3. Vincent Massey, "The Prospects of a Canadian Drama," *Queen's Quarterly* 30 (1922): 53.
4. Alan Filewood, "Theatre, Navy and the Narrative of True Canadianism," *Theatre Research in Canada* 13 (1992).
5. Richard Perkins, "Introduction," in *Major Plays of the Canadian Theatre 1934-1984* (Toronto, 1984) 6.
6. Howard Fink, "CKUA: Radio Drama and Regional Theatre," *Theatre Research in Canada* 8 (1987).
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10. Anton Wagner, "Elsie Park Gowan: Distinctively Canadian" *Theatre History in Canada* 8 (1987): 70.
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12. Fischlin, "Nation and/as Adaptation: Shakespeare, Canada, and Authenticity," 314.
13. Karen Bamford, "The Imperial Theme: The Shakespeare Society of Toronto, 1928-1969," in *Shakespeare in Canada: 'a world elsewhere'?* (Toronto, 2002) 76.
14. *Curtain Call* 5 (1932): 8.
15. Mary Vipond, *The Mass Media in Canada* (Toronto, 2000) 42.
16. Ryan Edwardson, *Canadian Content: Culture and the Quest for Nationhood* (Toronto, 2008), 30.
17. *Ibid.*, 43.
18. Filewood, "Theatre, Navy and the Narrative of True Canadianism."
19. Kiki Gounaridou, "Theatre and Nationalism: Introductory Remarks and Acknowledgements" in *Staging Nationalism: Essays on Theatre and National Identity* (Jefferson, NC, 2005) 1.
20. *Ibid.*, 8.
21. Vipond, *The Mass Media in Canada*, 41.
22. Massey, "The Prospects of a Canadian Drama" 53.
23. Perkins, "Introduction," 1-2.
24. Diane Bessai, "The Regionalism of Canadian Drama," *Canadian Literature* 85 (1980) 9.
25. The Right Hon. The Earl of Bessborough, G.C.M.G., "Community Drama Sweeps Canada," *Curtain Call* 7 (1935): 3.
26. *Ibid.*



27. Ibid.
28. Vincent Massey, "Introduction," in *Canadian Plays from the Hart House Theatre* (Toronto, 1926) vi.
29. Paul Rutherford, "Made in America: The Problem of Mass Culture in Canada" in *The Beaver Bites Back?: American Popular Culture in Canada* (Montreal, 1993) 269.
30. *Curtain Call* 9 (1937): 1.
31. Ibid.
32. *Curtain Call* 5 (1934) 1.
33. Edwardson, *Canadian Content*, 27.
34. Wagner, "Elsie Park Gowan," 69.
35. Filewood, *Performing Canada*, 42.

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Annie MacKay

Historical Discourses XXV • 67

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Tracking ‘Progress,’ Keeping Tabs on Foreigners and Enforcing Racial Boundaries The Construction, Diffusion and Interpretation of the Canadian Census, 1871-1921

Brendan Shanahan

Fundamentally the importance of the census hinges upon its enumeration and analysis of the human element or manpower of the country – the people themselves – the basic asset of every state.¹

Introduction of the *Sixth Census of Canada*, 1921.

A census offers nearly unlimited questions and poses an equal number of challenges for the modern historian. On one hand, a census can be analysed directly for its raw numbers. Thus, in quantitative historical studies of the Canadian past, censuses have been used to uncover many aspects of the lives of ordinary Canadians – from birthrates and life expectancy to employment status and marital rates – long relegated to the background of historical analyses prior to the 1970s.² But a census can be useful for much more than just its data. As Canadian scholar Bruce Curtis reminds us in his landmark study, *Politics of Population*, “censuses are made, not taken.”³ In this regard, the census offers a rare view into how the state classified members of its society, how these views changed over time and what contemporary observers thought about questions posed in these state-directed decennial investigations.

These queries form the centrepiece of this paper. In this investigation, I analyse the evolution of the Canadian national census from 1871 to 1921, while evaluating contemporary parliamentary debates, newspaper articles and academic accounts that surrounded each enumeration. After a brief examination of how the census was organized and conducted in pre-Depression era Canada, I scrutinize the ostensibly central objectives of each census – the collection of data and human enumeration for the purposes of reapportioning provincial





representation in the House of Commons. Beyond examining these obvious uses of the census, I argue that the census – used both as a means to gauge levels of population growth and as a tool to classify individuals into “linear”⁴ groups – was also employed by Canadians as well as foreign observers to measure the ‘progress’ of the Canadian nation and its constituent elements. By virtue of its ability to classify people according to racial and social hierarchies, however, the census was further utilized to analyse the impact of suspect foreigners in the Canadian nation and to track their assimilation into mainstream Canadian society. Meanwhile, the census also served as a marker for an established social boundary between those deemed capable of integration into white Canadian society, and those who, by virtue of their skin colour, were considered incapable of assimilation.

While one might analyse any number of subjects in this paper, time and space constraints precluded a full examination of all related topics.⁵ I have instead opted to examine four subjects featured as questions in Canadian censuses between 1871 and 1921 – questions that were used to classify Canadian individuals, measure Canada’s progress, track foreigners and highlight those who were deemed incapable of assimilation into mainstream Canadian society. The subjects of examination are queries related to racial origins, nationality, mother tongue of Canadian individuals and population returns in general. An examination of the Canadian census demonstrates that this device served as far more than a tool of inventory for the Canadian state in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century. It was instead a barometer of the supposed progress of the Canadian nation and its subset populations, while census questions reinforced hierarchies among racial groups that delineated social boundaries between supposedly assimilable and un-assimilable members of Canadian society.

The Canadian Census 1871-1921

Although any Canadian census conducted between 1871 and 1921 would appear radically different from modern censuses of the twenty-first century, like the enumerations of our era, each census conducted during this fifty-year span was a massive undertaking of the Canadian state. By virtue of the British North America Act of 1867, the task of enumerating Canada’s population and measuring its agricultural and industrial output fell to the new Canadian federal government. As the new federal Department of Agriculture was tasked with enticing foreigners to immigrate to the Dominion and was charged with





facilitating colonization within the nation, the census came under the portfolio of the Minister of Agriculture.⁶ Unlike twenty-first century, self-reported enumerations, the censuses of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century were entirely recorded by state enumerators, who went door to door asking the supposed “head” of every Canadian household to report on the status of his, or in some cases her, family. Consequently, each census enumeration required an ample amount of manpower. For instance, in 1871 the state employed more than 2,800 enumerators to (presumably) reach every Canadian household in the span of roughly one month.⁷

In this process of data collection, the Canadian government followed the American model for counting populations, employing the so-called *de jure* census instead of the British *de facto* method. The American model differed from the British one in asking individuals to report where they were “regularly domiciled, irrespective of the locality of residence at the day of enumeration.”⁸ Thus, rather than enumerating the entire Canadian population based on where they were on one particular day, enumerators asked the heads of Canadian families where all family members and servants lived on a usual basis.⁹ Since these censuses relied so heavily upon often poorly-trained and imperfect human enumerators, each census included errors and problematic responses in its returns. To address these imperfections, the Canadian government employed bureaucrats and statisticians in Ottawa who proofread census returns to correct enumerators’ mistakes, such as accepting “Canadian” as a valid first language.¹⁰

During this *fin-de-siècle* period, efforts to limit human error and improve the quality of statistical data obtained from the national census led to a constant re-evaluation of the census’s function and place within the state administration by Canadian politicians and bureaucrats. Unlike the American census, which had very specific constitutional obligations attached to it, the Canadian census had no required functions under the British North America Act other than enumerating the population on a decennial basis.¹¹ Owing to this dearth of direction, in 1871, the statistician and Deputy Minister of Agriculture, Joseph-Charles Taché, was given a *carte blanche* to plan the census according to his own expertise and views on population.¹² Following this 1871 enumeration however, parliamentarians increasingly debated the census, and through legislation passed in 1879, 1885 and 1905, brought the Department of Agriculture under greater oversight, mandating that the census include questions related to the nativity, racial origins, employment status and nationality of individuals in Canada.¹³





Meanwhile, during this fifty-year period, Canadian census officials closely followed trends in international statistics, attending and reporting on academic conferences in Western Europe. In response to the accumulating demands by census statisticians, such as Taché and George Johnson, for an increased investment in government statistics, a new Census and Statistics Office was established within the Department of Agriculture in 1905, with the goal of bringing higher levels of professional statistics to Canadian census enumerations. This office soon became responsible for a new mid-decade census a year later, which was added to enumerate the new Prairie Provinces, Alberta and Saskatchewan, which were carved out of the Northwest Territories in 1905.¹⁴ Shortly thereafter, in 1912, the census was transferred from the Department of Agriculture to the Department of Trade and Commerce, where census officials were able to coordinate their research to an even greater extent by combining it with the work of other government statisticians.¹⁵ The history of the evolving responsibilities surrounding the census within the Canadian bureaucracy demonstrates that it was viewed as a major state investment between 1871 and 1921. If the census was so important to the Canadian government, then what questions were asked in census forms and what did census officials hope to learn from the returns of these enumerations?

Between 1871 and 1921 the Canadian census was used for far more than the enumeration of the nation's population. When constructing the 1871 enumeration, census officials took their cue from "the United States' census, which, since its inception, had extended its content far beyond purely demographic data."¹⁶ Canada's first national census was therefore an extensive questionnaire that posed 211 queries regarding "landholdings, vital statistics, religion, education" alongside questions related to "agriculture, commerce, industry and finance."¹⁷ The encompassing nature of the Canadian census only increased in the *fin-de-siècle* period and by 1901, the number of questions on the census had swelled to 561!¹⁸ Why were there so many questions? On one hand the census was used as a tool to take inventory of the industrial and agricultural growth of the state and was even employed to track the geographic contours of the Canadian nation. In their lengthy introduction to the 1921 enumeration, census officials wrote that "the census is essentially a 'stock-taking'" of the Canadian "people themselves" and "their affairs and institutions."¹⁹ Among the more unexpected "affairs" addressed in these enumerations, the 1871 census was used by the federal government to ascertain the political geography of the new Dominion of Canada, for census returns made detailed maps of the





electoral divisions of each Canadian province possible. Not surprisingly, the first of these maps were printed for and included in the first volume of the 1871 census.²⁰ On the other hand, in 1901 the Department of Agriculture began temporarily employing special agents from various administrative departments, such as the Department of the Marine and Fisheries and the Department of Mines and Minerals, during the census enumeration because tracking the development of Canada's various mining and fishing industries census queries had become difficult. In fact, the queries were so field-specific that most ordinary enumerators were insufficiently trained to ask questions to mine owners and commercial fishermen about their work.²¹

Despite the varied topics addressed in these census forms, the enumeration of the Canadian population and the classification of individuals residing in Canada remained the central subjects of evaluation and observation among census officials and politicians of this era. Census officials in Ottawa clearly considered the nation's population to be the most important subject of analysis in every decennial enumeration because in their introduction to each census report, their analyses centred upon population returns and the various classifications of Canadian individuals recorded in their studies.²² As census officials wrote in 1921, the "importance" of any census rested upon its counting "the people themselves – the basic asset of every state."²³ In fact, census officials created and conducted the new quinquennial Prairie census in 1906 precisely to "keep track of the rapid expansion of the population of the West" by making "available some pertinent mid-decade population statistics on western Canada, including statistics on migration."²⁴ Meanwhile, the subject of the Canadian census in the House of Commons had become a new interest for parliamentarians; as debates in the period demonstrate, the census was no longer interesting solely for its figures on Canada's agricultural or manufacturing output, but also as a means to gauge Canada's population. During debates on the census, if MPs were not discussing its cost, then they were either arguing for better ways to classify people or impatiently inquiring when the Minister of Agriculture "will have the population returns."²⁵

Outside observers also eagerly awaited population returns; for instance, when addressing the returns of the 1901 census, Canadian newspapers such as the *Ottawa Citizen* asked their readers to consider first and foremost Canada's "increase of population."²⁶ When the census attracted foreign attention, it was owing to a fascination with Canada's demographic growth. For example, in August 1901 the *Atlanta Constitution* and the *Chicago Tribune* sought to inform their American





audience about "Canada's Population" and let them know that with the release of the newest census data, "Canada's Population is out."²⁷ If the focus of analysis and observation regarding the Canadian census in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century was Canada's population, why were these reports so eagerly anticipated?

In its most basic sense, the population count of each census was closely awaited because these returns determined the reapportionment of electoral districts representing each province in the House of Commons. As historian David Worton writes, the British North America Act mandated a decennial census so that the findings could be used "as the basis for the future adjustment of parliamentary representation among [the] "respective populations of the four provinces."²⁸ Since that point, the results of the decennial census have served to determine each province's representation in the House of Commons.²⁹ It should therefore come as no surprise that many Canadian observers closely awaited census returns to see how the results would affect their representation in Ottawa. In one instance, following the announcement of new census returns in August 1901, Toronto's *The Globe* included a front-page story covering the results. Predictably, *The Globe* also reported that shortly after these returns were made public, "Chief Census Commissioner [Archibald] Blue was asked" if they would "result in any reduction of the Parliamentary representation of Ontario."³⁰ Meanwhile, several foreign newspapers such as the *Chicago Tribune* found the reapportionment of Canadian electoral districts to be a topic worthy of examination. In one 1901 *Tribune* article about the Canadian census, an unnamed author spent half of a column describing how the returns would affect each province's federal representation.³¹

Since the census played such a crucial role in determining representation in Ottawa, the returns of the census (and at times even the census itself) became subjects of debate and fodder for charges of fraud, as accusations of inaccurate reporting and malapportioning were charged by Canadian politicians and journalists alike. As Bruce Curtis found in the pre-Confederation era, census returns became contentious issues in mid-nineteenth century Canada because French Canadians and English Canadians feared that the other group would pad their numbers unfairly to gain advantages in representation at the Canadian Legislative Assembly. These debates frequently spilled into the anglophone and francophone press as *The Globe* and Montreal's *La Minerve* and *Le Canadien* hurled accusations of fraudulent reporting at each other following the census returns of 1861.³²

Accusations of faulty population returns and complaints





against the census did not end with Confederation. Following the 1881 enumeration, Liberal MP Sir Richard Cartwright charged that the expanding Northwest Territories were being overcounted, which had the effect of greatly reducing Ontario's rightful share of seats in Ottawa.³³ Arguing for a more frequent enumeration of the population, Labour MP A. W. Puttee of Winnipeg maintained that his district was growing at such a fast rate that despite the recent 1901 count, "in 1904 we shall have one representative here for a population of 70,000 to 75,000," while the average district of other parliamentarians contained around "22,000 to 23,000" persons.³⁴ Meanwhile, Conservative MPs were also unsatisfied with the 1901 census and were (rightly) suspicious of the motives of the Liberal government with regards to enumeration in Quebec. Following the returns of this census, Conservatives demanded to know why Thomas Côté, a Liberal-appointee and the federal official responsible for the census in Quebec, had asked Catholic clergymen to report the number of families from their parishes who had recently emigrated to the United States to census enumerators. Though the small number of emigrant families that were actually recorded by Catholic priests made this issue negligible, Conservatives were adamant that these individuals should not be counted in the census as they would unfairly boost Quebec's representation.³⁵ Thus, at least ostensibly, the purpose of the census was to 'take stock' of Canada's industrial, agricultural and population growth and to divide the nation into electoral districts. In actuality however, the census performed many other roles in late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century Canadian society.

Using the Census to Measure 'Progress' and 'Assimilation' while Defining Boundaries in Canadian Society

In the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century, the word 'progress' was in constant use across North America, and its varying notions were promoted by both Canadian politicians and journalists. After all, it was during the Progressive Era in the United States – an age of industrial expansion, immigration and reform in local and national government – that the terms 'progress' and 'progressive' became widely used at the turn of the twentieth century.³⁶ The notion of progress did not escape Canadian politicians. For instance, in 1904 Prime Minister Sir Wilfrid Laurier famously predicted that, though the "nineteenth century was the century of the United States, the twentieth century will be the century of Canada."³⁷ Meanwhile, Canadian newspapers were replete





with articles that documented rates of Canada's progress during this *fin-de-siècle* period. For example, in 1900, the *Montreal Gazette* praised the Grand Trunk rail company for stimulating the "industrial progress of Canada in recent years," while in that same year, the *Ottawa Citizen* instructed Canadian readers to never forget that "the progress of the country" was closely connected to the recent governance of Canada by "the Conservative Party."³⁸ Outside observers also noted that Canadians had been caught up by the spirit of progress. As one American observer remarked in 1904, Canadians proudly professed their "satisfaction with the progress of the dominion" under Laurier, which was made evident by recent railway developments and increased agricultural and industrial productivity.³⁹ Canadian progress, however, was not limited to that which individuals could produce as a nation. Human beings, formed as a population, could also be used to appraise Canada's rate of development in contrast to other nations.

Faced with an age of immigration to North America and continued Canadian emigration to the United States, Canadian bureaucrats principally viewed their nation's population growth and ability to attract immigrants as a measure of Canada's progress. The late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century was an age of mass European migration to North America, with immigrants arriving from the British Isles, Scandinavia, Southern and Eastern Europe.⁴⁰ With the United States serving as the major destination for the incoming migrants, demographers Roderic Beaujot and Kevin McQuillen find that "Canada clearly stood in the shadow of the United States which acted as a magnet for European immigrants."⁴¹ In an effort to convince European immigrants to choose Canada over the United States, the Department of Agriculture employed immigration agents who advertised the vast availability of farmland in Western Canada to potential European settlers.⁴² Unsurprisingly, when speaking of settling the Prairies, these immigration agents spoke in terms of progress. Some agents, such as Emanuel Ohlén, spoke directly to this progressive ideal and wrote that the "progress" that French and Belgian colonists brought to Manitoba could only be described as "rapid."⁴³ Other agents were less direct but no less sincere in their belief that the peopling of Canada was a sign of their nation's progressive development. According to agent John Daley, as British immigrants were totally self-reliant and perfectly adaptable to their new environment, they were "just the sort of people required in this Canada of ours."⁴⁴

Canadians were not alone in viewing the Dominion's population growth in terms of Canada's progress. American journalists frequently





followed trends in Canada's population growth to measure Canada's demographic expansion in comparison to that of the United States. For instance, in 1902, the *Chicago Tribune* printed an article entitled, "Comparisons in Population between the United States and Canada." The author of this article gleefully noted that the state of Pennsylvania had a population larger than Canada's total population and went on to compare differing population trends between the two countries. In his view, these divergent population patterns reflected the "marked difference in the rate of progress of the two countries."⁴⁵ Just two years later however, following a marked increase in immigration to Canada, in 1904 'Uncle' Dudley of the *Boston Daily Globe* wrote that Canadians were right to be proud of the "progress of the dominion." The author's opinion also reflected the views espoused by American Secretary of War Elihu Root who had recently stated that Canada was destined to become equally as "prosperous" and "powerful" as the United States. While 'Uncle' Dudley recorded that the increased agricultural productivity of the Canadian West and Canada's growing industrial output were signs of Canada's development, he argued that the key to the nation's growth was its rapidly increasing population. Subsequently, he devoted more than half of his article to comparing past and recent trends in Canadian population growth with rates of demographic expansion in the United States.⁴⁶

If Canada's progress was largely gauged by its population growth, then the national census was the tool used to measure the nation's development. In the case of the 1871 enumeration, the census was used to measure the supposed failure of the Canadian state to attain previously-anticipated levels of demographic growth. As Bruce Curtis argues, the first national census of Canada in 1871 was largely anticipated by observers to be a measure of whether the Canadian government had succeeded in stemming the tide of emigration to the United States and been successful in attracting immigrants to the new Dominion. With high hopes, "Officials at Agriculture and Statistics expected the 1871 census to indicate that the population of the four Canadian provinces had surpassed 4 million, up from the 3.1 million reported in 1861."⁴⁷ But as Curtis finds, "Officials were shocked when the tabulations of returns indicated a population of less than 3.5 million." The population results were so embarrassing for the sitting Minister of Agriculture that resigned the day prior to the public announcement of the census returns.⁴⁸

Thirty years later, the 1901 census was seen by observers as another sign of failure by the Canadian government to demonstrate sufficient progress in attracting immigrants. Why did John Davidson of





London's *Economic Journal* write that the "results of the Fourth Census of the Dominion of Canada have been a source of great disappointment throughout the country"?⁴⁹ According to Davidson, despite the fact that it appeared that Canada had been rapidly swelling with immigrants, "the national pride received a blow" to learn that the "rate of increase was less than [in] 1891."⁵⁰ Meanwhile, the *Chicago Tribune* wrote that the "growth of population between 1891 and 1901 as shown by the census totals was disappointing."⁵¹ Thus, in Canada, Britain and the United States, the Canadian censuses of 1871 and 1901 remained symbols of Canada's failure to demonstrate an adequate rate of demographic growth, since mass immigration in the United States loomed larger in the background.

Twenty years later however, the census had become a measure of Canada's veritable progress. As a proud Canadian Census Bureau wrote in 1921, "it is within the present century that the most spectacular expansion of the Canadian population has taken place."⁵² These officials were not exaggerating, because between 1871 and 1901 Canada's influx of immigrants had totalled approximately 980,000 individuals and in the twenty years between 1901 and 1921, around 2,950,000 immigrants had come to Canada's shores.⁵³ Therefore, according to Canadian census officials, the 1921 enumeration was able "to show from the widest possible angle the stage that has been reached in the general progress of the nation."⁵⁴ Whereas the census had once been a source of national embarrassment, census bureaucrats echoed the sentiments of former Prime Minister Laurier by writing that the 1921 returns were evidence that "Canadian progress in the twentieth century is duplicating that of the United States in the nineteenth."⁵⁵

Still, Canadian census takers were not solely interested in capturing the progress of Canada's population as a whole. Instead, census officials subdivided Canadian individuals into groups with common backgrounds, as every national census to date has included at least one question related to the origins of each individual. In 1871 and 1881 for instance, the census asked respondents to define their origin, while in 1891 persons were curiously asked whether or not they were of French Canadian descent. As these questions were found to be too vague, from 1901 to 1941, census enumerators asked Canadian respondents to define their "racial origins."⁵⁶ In this context, 'race' usually corresponded to modern conceptions of ethnicity – defined as membership in a group with a collective "lineage" or "descent" in which individuals share "a common origin and history."⁵⁷ Thus, in 1901 Canadians were asked to classify themselves as members of one of the "English, Scotch, Irish, French, German, Italian [or] Scandinavian" races. For the purposes of





this question, ‘American’ and ‘Canadian’ were deemed to be unacceptable answers since they were not recognized as ‘races’ by contemporary scientists, ethnographers or government officials.⁵⁸ With the exception of the Métis, the census did not accept multiple origin responses; census officials instead asked Canadians to trace their racial origin “through the *father*” (with the exception of Amerindians whose lineage was to be traced matrilineally), thereby attempting to create linear identities for the ‘racial’ origins of the Canadian population. Even the Métis could not escape this policy of linear categorization, for they too were to be classified based on whether they were of the “French breed,” “Scotch breed,” “Irish breed” or, in “rare cases,” of some “other breed.”⁵⁹

Why were racial origins so important for census takers? Owing to Canada’s much-discussed English-French ‘duality,’ throughout the nineteenth century French Canadian government officials, clerics, politicians and journalists closely tracked and compared the demographic ‘progress’ of their ‘race’ in contrast to Canadian populations of other origins. As Bruce Curtis argues, French Canadian political and clerical leaders were very much interested in tracking birthrates among their population in pre-Confederation Canada. Census queries inquiring into an individual’s origins thus enabled these elites to gauge the demographic growth of their race.⁶⁰ Population counting was no small matter for leaders and following the returns of the 1861 census, the Montreal newspaper *Le Canadien* joyfully praised the “remarkable and much remarked fecundity of our race.” This newspaper also continued to cheerfully declare that the high rate of reproduction among French Canadians enabled their population to increase from thirty-five percent to thirty-eight percent of the total population of Canada-East and Canada-West.⁶¹

Forty years later, census queries about origins were not without their predominantly English Canadian detractors. For instance, in 1901 Conservative MP Edward Prior of Victoria argued before the House of Commons that instead of including a question about origins in the census, “we should cultivate the idea of calling ourselves Canadians instead of Frenchmen, Irishmen, Englishmen or Scotchmen.”⁶² Opposing Prior were many French Canadian MPs who supported questions related to racial origins. For example, Conservative Manitoban, A. A. C. LaRivière, defended the origins query in the House of Commons by arguing that “we are all Canadians, but at the same time have a certain affection for our origin [...] if this whole country is to become one people, then we should follow the progress of the respective nationalities in origin.”⁶³ His colleague and fellow French Canadian parliamentarian Sir





Adolphe Caron echoed his sentiments and stated that it was necessary “to track the development of these different races in different parts of the country.”⁶⁴ While embracing a common ‘Canadianness’ in both of their speeches, the two French Canadian politicians defended the origins question and deemed it an essential tool to track the progress of their own race in contrast to Canada’s English-speaking races.

The queries related to racial origins became more important in turn-of-the-century Canada as the number of immigrants coming to Canada from Southern and Eastern Europe rose rapidly. While Canada continued to receive thousands of immigrants from traditional nations with high rates of emigration, such as Britain and Germany, Canada also witnessed, at the dawn of the twentieth century, a “turning point not only in the volume of migration but in the composition of the immigrant population as well.”⁶⁵ In the first two decades of the twentieth century, the so-called ‘New Immigrants’ comprised of Italians, Ukrainians, Russians and various groups from the Austro-Hungarian Empire began migrating *en masse* to the Dominion.⁶⁶ These immigrants were often the object of suspicion and derision among native Canadians as both labour interests seeking to protect their job market and nativist groups wary of these newcomers’ impact on Canada’s cultural heritage sought immigration restrictions. Anglophile nativists were “particularly offended by the increasing number of central and eastern Europeans” who seemed to be questionably assimilable to Canadian life.⁶⁷ As American sociologist Brewton Berry found in 1951:

Canadians usually prefer that settlers should be of a readily assimilable type, already identified by race or language with one or other of the two great races now inhabiting this country. The great bulk of the preferable settlers are those who speak the English language [...] next in order of readiness of assimilation are the Scandinavians, Dutch and Germans. Settlers from Southern and Eastern Europe, however desirable from a purely economic perspective, are less readily assimilable.⁶⁸

In response to these changes in the immigration patterns, the Canadian census was then used to track New Immigrants, study their impact on Canadian society and gauge whether they were assimilating to Canadian norms. In the introduction of the 1921 enumeration, census officials were blunt in defending the question of origin. They wrote that an examination of an individual’s “Racial origin is especially important in





a 'new' country like Canada," particularly "from the standpoint of the student of ethnology" and more interestingly, "criminology."⁶⁹ For these officials, the census had become a state tool that could be employed to keep tabs on potentially troublesome immigrant groups. And the federal government did not hesitate to use the census for these very purposes. For instance, in 1937 the Dominion Bureau of Statistics commissioned W. Burton Hurd, an economics professor at McMaster University, to analyse various characteristics of Canada's population in a census monograph entitled *Racial Origins and the Nativity of the Canadian People*.⁷⁰ In addition to measuring the "assimilability" of various immigrant and "European-stock" populations, Hurd paid close attention to criminal data and the relationship between crime and immigration. Using census data drawn from questions related to an individual's 'racial' origins and nativity, he came to the conclusion that the "conviction rates for indictable offences [...] are materially higher for the foreign born than for native Canadians."⁷¹

Nonetheless, while Southern and Eastern European immigrants could be treated with suspicion by 'native' Canadians at the turn of the century, the census reflected widely-held views that these newcomers were never completely un-assimilable to mainstream white Canadian society. As historian Chad Gaffield found in his analysis of the 1901 census, despite a recurring "emphasis on progress and on continental and international comparisons" in this enumeration, "the notion of assimilation loomed large."⁷² For instance, while Italians and Russians were classified as separate races in the 1901 census, this same census also grouped the two as part of a greater "white race" that distinguished them from Amerindians, Asian-Canadians and Black Canadians.⁷³ Meanwhile, in the introduction of the 1921 census, officials in Ottawa noted that while it was not possible to speak of a Canadian-specific race, they noted a great "desirability" for "racial assimilation" among Canada's *white* population.⁷⁴ However suspiciously or coolly-treated the New Immigrants could be greeted by native white Canadians, such immigrants were never totally excluded from ultimate integration into white, mainstream Canadian society. The manner in which these immigrants were incorporated into turn-of-the-century Canadian censuses reflected such complexities.

In sharp contrast, the census could also serve as a clear dividing line between those who could meet the requirements for mainstream Canadian society and those – by virtue of their blood and skin colour – who could not. Although the *fin-de-siècle* censuses used the word to classify whites along what is now today considered ethnic lines, the





use of this term also referred to biologically and culturally constructed notions of race as something that could be distinguished by one's skin colour, and also supposedly by one's blood.⁷⁵ Thus, the 1901 census asked enumerators to categorise each individual based on their classification among the "races of men."⁷⁶ Enumerators were instructed to mark "'w' for white, 'r' for red, 'b' for black and 'y' for yellow" for each individual counted.⁷⁷ Taking their cue from the "one drop rule" in use in the United States, census officials in Ottawa stipulated that for the 1901 enumeration, "only pure whites will be classified as whites; the children begotten of marriages between whites and any one of the other races will be classified as red, black or yellow, as the case may be, irrespective of the degree of colour."⁷⁸

Why were such racialized questions included in these censuses? In addition to the rise of Social Darwinism and scientific racism in western countries like Canada in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century, most white Canadians simply did not view Asian, Native and Black-Canadians as capable of assimilation into mainstream white Canadian society. In his popular 1909 social commentary, *Strangers Within Our Gates*, social gospeller and nativist J. S. Woodsworth echoed the attitudes of many contemporary white Canadians towards immigrants and visible minorities. Considering a widespread negative white Canadian opinion of Asian-Canadians, Woodsworth came to the abrupt conclusion that "Orientals cannot be assimilated."⁷⁹ Likewise, he found that while, "neither the negro nor the Indian are immigrants," they "both stand out entirely by themselves." According to Woodsworth, since they were "so entirely different from the ordinary white population" they required separate treatment in his book from other 'native'-born Canadians. Interestingly, of all the populations analysed in his study, these two appeared last in his book.⁸⁰

In this racialized climate, the census was used as a tool to measure the respective populations of individuals that could never become part of mainstream Canadian society. Writing in 1921, census officials explained why they could not accept "Canadian" as an acceptable answer for questions related to an individual's 'racial' origins.' In their opinion, special criteria had to be considered in this line of questioning. After all, "over 800 Chinese and Japanese children were born in Canada in 1921, whom it would not be expedient to enumerate solely on the basis of birthplace and nationality."⁸¹ Despite their Canadian birth, the race of these children made them too alien to be classified as unqualified and full members of Canadian society. Such sentiment should not come as a surprise since the early twentieth century witnessed three rounds of





Chinese Head Taxes, the Lemieux “Gentlemen’s Agreement” with Japan and ultimately the Chinese Exclusion Act were designed to limit Asian immigration to Canada. Thus, census questions related to racial origins underscored a contemporary view held by most whites that Asian, Native and Black-Canadians could never progress towards complete integration into mainstream white Canadian society.⁸²

Meanwhile, the evolution towards including a Canadian ‘nationality’ question in the census was evidence of the federal government’s increasing recognition of a version of ‘Canadianness’ that remained tied to, but distinct from, British citizenship. In the censuses of 1871, 1881 and 1891, individuals could not define themselves as Canadian. After all, these individuals could not have classified themselves as Canadian citizens because they remained legally British subjects until the mid twentieth century when Canadian citizenship was officially established in 1947.⁸³ Accordingly, while nineteenth-century Canadian censuses asked for a person’s place of birth, they often placed a Canadian-born individual under the inclusive title of ‘British subject’. For instance, in the official reports from the 1881 census, the nativity of individuals were classified under various subheadings such as the “British Isles,” “Canada” and “Other British Possessions,” but all of these titles were placed under an even larger heading as they were all subjects of the same British Empire.⁸⁴

By the turn of the twentieth century, several English Canadian parliamentarians had become increasingly unsatisfied with the fact that Canadian-born individuals could not identify themselves Canadian in their own national census. While MPs like Edward Prior failed to eliminate census questions related to one’s ‘racial origins,’ starting with the 1901 census, the Canadian government began recognizing a Canadian ‘national’ identity on census forms.⁸⁵ In response to these pressures, beginning in 1901, Canadian-born subjects, British subjects residing permanently in Canada and naturalised citizens could claim a Canadian “nationality” in the census.⁸⁶ Although the Minister of Agriculture, Sydney Arthur Fisher, was forced to defend this additional query from charges that a Canadian nationality question did not go far enough in representing the wishes of the Canadian people, he defended his claims in terms of progress stating that “for the first time [...] a citizen of Canada living here is allowed to call himself a Canadian [...] I believe that this is an important step in the right direction.”⁸⁷

Meanwhile, during the same period, census queries related to an individual’s mother tongue were closely tied to notions of progress and social hierarchism in Canadian society. Just as questions related to racial





origins were used to track the integration of foreign-born Canadians into greater Canadian society, language questions were also employed. Thus, in 1901 census officials included queries which inquired into a person's mother tongue and asked about his or her acquisition of either the English or French language. As they explained, "In a country peopled by so many foreign elements as Canada, it is desirable to know if they are being absorbed and unified, as may appear by their acquirement of one or other of the official languages."⁸⁸ Since an individual was not allowed to report multiple mother tongues, this line of questioning created a "linear approach" that, like questions related to race and origins, sought to classify individuals into clearly-defined and non-overlapping categories.⁸⁹ These questions also reinforced an "assumed hierarchy" that granted native English-speakers the top spot while it relegated those who spoke neither official language to the bottom..⁹⁰ Census officials created this hierarchy by establishing English ahead of French as the language of paramount importance in their writings. As they wrote in the introduction of the 1901 census, "while it is advantageous to know whether foreigners coming to Canada speak one of the two official languages [...] as English is now in a very large degree the language of commerce throughout the world, it is also desirable to ascertain to what extent *citizens of French origin* are able to speak it in addition to their own."⁹¹ Of all census questions posed, the query related to an individual's mother tongue most potently reflected how notions of 'progress' and hierarchy were both central and complementary features of pre-Depression era Canadian censuses.⁹²

While the Canadian census was used to measure the nation's development and as a means to gauge the 'progress' and integration of its constituent elements in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century, the census was not a neutral device. Instead it perpetuated and at times accentuated social and racial hierarchies. A massive undertaking, the Canadian national census was ostensibly an imperfect "stock-taking" of the country's agricultural and industrial production that was also used to reapportion electoral representation in Ottawa.⁹³ However, the census was also used for many other, far-reaching purposes and was regarded as an object of great utility for the state and its population by foreign and domestic observers, politicians and bureaucrats alike.

The Canadian census's primary function was, and still is, to measure the state's population. More specifically, during the period between 1871 and 1921 the census also became an instrument used to gauge the progress of the Canadian population and its racial diversity. Even more striking is the fact that the census was also employed to





track groups deemed potentially disruptive to Canada's progress, such as New Immigrants, and served as a boundary between normalised white Canadian society and non-white outsiders. Lastly, whereas the census reflected an increasingly popular notion of a Canadian 'nationality,' it could also accentuate hierarchies among Canada's linguistically diverse groups.

In crafting this study one might have looked at any number of subjects – gender, religion, even class – to analyse how the census tracked 'progress' and reinforced social and legal boundaries in post-Confederation, pre-Depression era Canada. Nonetheless, language, nationality, origins and particularly race are excellent examples through which to envision how individuals who crafted and responded to the census envisioned Canadian society in their own time. Just like the census itself, these views were anything but straightforward.





Notes

1. Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Canada, *Sixth Census of Canada, 1921: Volume I – Population: Number, Sex and Distribution – Racial Origins – Religion* (Ottawa: F. A. Acland, Printer, 1924), xi.
2. Though I could provide a long list of historical works that have been crafted by research overwhelmingly based on census material, good examples include Donald H. Akenson's *The Irish in Ontario: A Study in Rural History* (Kingston, ON: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1984) and *History and Historical Methods*'s Fall 2000 issue dedicated to research drawn almost entirely from the 1901 Canadian census.
3. Bruce Curtis, *The Politics of Population: State Formation, Statistics, and the Census of Canada, 1840-1875* (Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press, 2001), 33.
4. When using the concept of linearity, I am borrowing from Chad Gaffield's article, "Linearity, Nonlinearity, and the Competing Constructions of Social Hierarchy in Early Twentieth-Century Canada: The Question of Language in 1901," *Historical Methods* 33: 4 (Fall 2000), 255-260.
5. In this examination, gender and religion are unfortunately absent as subjects of study.
6. David A Worton, *The Dominion Bureau of Statistics: A History of Canada's Central Statistical Office and Its Antecedents, 1841-1972* (Canadian Public Administration Series), (Montréal, QC & Kingston, ON: The Institute of Public Administration of Canada, 1998), 15-16.
7. Curtis, *Politics of Population*, 274.
8. *Sixth Census of Canada, 1921*, xii.
9. Ibid., xii. Although the *de jure* census was a topic of hot debate in the House of Commons, it was deemed by census administrators to be the most efficient and most accurate way to ascertain Canada's population. The alternative, the *de facto* method, which measures a population based on its condition on one particular day, did not account for travellers, students, and people who were not in their usual location (xii).
10. Chad Gaffield, "Linearity and Nonlinearity," 255-260, Curtis, *Politics of Population*, 276-277, 285.
11. Curtis, *Politics of Population*, 46-48.
12. Worton, *The Dominion Bureau of Statistics*, 19, Curtis, *Politics of Population*, 242-243.
13. Department of Agriculture, Canada, *Fourth Census of Canada, 1901: Volume 1 – Population* (Ottawa: S.E. Dawson, 1902), xiii, *Sixth Census of Canada, 1921*, ix.
14. Worton, *The Dominion Bureau of Statistics*, 29-30, 39, 47, Sylvia T. Wargon, *Demography in Canada in the Twentieth Century* (Vancouver, BC: University of British Columbia Press, 2002), 45. The purpose of this new office was 'progressive' in outlook, as Worton writes, and its aim was "just as much at improving the effectiveness of statistical function as a whole as at





providing continuity in census taking” (Worton 39).

15. Worton, *The Dominion Bureau of Statistics*, 42, 46-47, 61-65.
16. *Ibid.*, 17.
17. Statistics Canada, “History of the Census of Canada,” <http://www12.statcan.ca/english/census01/info/history.cfm>. (Accessed 3 November 2010), 1.
18. A. W. Flux, “Canadian Census Results,” *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society* 69: 2 (June 1906), 433, Statistics Canada, “History of the Census of Canada,” 1-2. It should be added that not all families had to answer every question. For instance, families that did not possess a farm were omitted from questions related to agricultural holdings (Stats Can, 1-2).
19. *Sixth Census of Canada, 1921*, xiii.
20. Curtis, *Politics of Population*, 257.
21. *The Canada Gazette*, 15 January 1901, 2.
22. See Department of Agriculture, Canada, *Census of Canada 1870-71 – Recensement du Canada: Volume I* (Ottawa: L. B. Taylor, 1873), v, Department of Agriculture, Canada, *General Report of the Census of Canada, 1880-81 – Rapport général sur le recensement du Canada, 1880-81: Volume IV* (Ottawa: MacLean, Roger et Co., 1885), xii, Department of Agriculture, Canada, *Census of Canada 1890-91 – Recensement du Canada: Volume I* (Ottawa: S. E. Dawson, 1893), x, xii, *Fourth Census of Canada, 1901*, viii, Department of Agriculture, Canada, *Census of Population and Agriculture of the Northwest Provinces Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta, 1906* (Ottawa: S.E. Dawson, 1907), vii, x-xvii, Department of Agriculture, Canada, and Archibald Blue, *Fifth Census of Canada, 1911: Areas and Population by Provinces, Districts and Subdistricts – Volume I* (Ottawa: C. H. Parmelee, 1912), v-viii, *Sixth Census of Canada, 1921*, x-xxxi.
23. *Sixth Census of Canada, 1921*, xi.
24. Sylvia T. Wargon, *Demography in Canada in the Twentieth Century*, 45.
25. *Debates of the House of Commons* Volume LIV, 11 April 1901, 2862, *Debates of the House of Commons* Volume LV, 21 May 1901, 5785, *Debates of the House of Commons* Volume LVII, 2 May 1902, 4077-4078, 7 May 1902, 4434.
26. “Canada’s Foreign Born,” *The Ottawa Citizen*, 3 May 1902, 32, John Davidson, “The Census of Canada,” *The Economic Journal* 11: 44 (London, UK: December 1901), 595.
27. “Canada’s Population,” *The Atlanta Constitution*, 22 August 1901, 4, “Canada’s Census is Out: Total Population is 5,338,883 – Figures Disappointing,” *The Chicago Tribune*, 17 August 1901, 13.
28. Worton, *The Dominion Bureau of Statistics*, 15.
29. Statistics Canada, “History of the Census of Canada,” 1.
30. “Ontario and the Census,” *The Globe*, August 19, 1901, 1.
31. “Canada’s Census is Out: Total Population is 5,338,883 – Figures Disappointing,” *The Chicago Tribune*, August 17, 1901, 13.
32. Curtis, *Politics of Population*, 220-223.





33. Worton, *The Dominion Bureau of Statistics*, 17
34. *Debates of the House of Commons* Volume LIII, June 19, 1900, 7786.
35. *Debates of the House of Commons* Volume LVI, January 19, 1902, 133, Conservative MPs also attacked this census' commissioner, M. Côté, for violating his sworn impartiality by attaching a Liberal Party political survey to the state documents sent to census enumerators (*Debates of the House of Commons* Volume LV, April 15, 1901), 3062-3074.
36. See Richard Hofstadter, *The Age of Reform; From Bryan to F.D.R* (New York, NY: Knopf, 1955).
37. Richard Clippingdale, *Laurier, His Life and World* (Toronto, ON: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1979), 72.
38. "The Grand Trunk: What Recent Improvements Have Done for the Road," *The Montreal Gazette*, August 22, 1900, 1, "The Grand Old Man: Sir Charles Tupper Enthused the Electors in a Brief Speech," *The Ottawa Citizen*, September 13, 1900, 7.
39. "Uncle" Dudley, "How Canada Will Grow," *The Boston Daily Globe*, 30 November 1904, 32, J. Shaw Thompson, "A Jewel of the Empire: Canada," *Otago Witness*, (Otago, New Zealand), April 3, 1907, 69. Another observer from New Zealand remarked that Canada owed much of its national development to the expansion of Canadian railways, which was made possible by the interventionist, "progressive policy of the Government." (Thompson 69).
40. Roderic Beaujot and Kevin McQuillen, *Growth and Dualism*, (Toronto, ON: Gage Publishing Limited, 1982), 81, 85, 87, 95.
41. *Ibid.*, 87.
42. Department of Agriculture, Canada, "Report of the Minister of Agriculture for the Dominion of Canada for the Calendar Year 1891" *Sessional Papers – Volume IV* (Ottawa: Brown Chamberlin, 1891). Reports of Immigration Agents John Daley, 11-12 and W.J. Willis, 39.
43. Report of Immigration Agent Emanuel Ohlén, 103.
44. Report of Immigration Agent John Daley, 12.
45. "Comparisons in Population between the United States and Canada," *The Chicago Tribune*, January 16, 1902, 16.
46. "Uncle" Dudley, "How Canada Will Grow," *The Boston Daily Globe*, November 30, 1904, 32.
47. Curtis, *Politics of Population*, 278.
48. *Ibid.*, 278.
49. John Davidson, "The Census of Canada," *The Economic Journal* (December 1901), 595.
50. *Ibid.*, 595-596.
51. Flux, "Canadian Census Results," 434.
52. *Sixth Census of Canada, 1921*, xxviii.
53. Roderic Beaujot and Don Kerr, *Population Change in Canada* (Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press, 2004), 107. Notwithstanding the fact that many of these immigrants would later return to their native homes





while others would head to the United States, the 1901-1921 period was Canada's most rapid period of immigration to date.

54. *Sixth Census of Canada, 1921*, xi.
55. *Ibid.*, xxviii.
56. Monica Boyd, Gustave Goldman and Pamela White, "Race in the Canadian Census" in *Race and Racism: Canada's Challenge* edited by Leo Driedger and Shiva S. Halli (Montréal, QC: McGill-Queen's Press, 2000), 35-38.
57. Boyd, Goldman and White, "Race in the Canadian Census," 36, Pierre L. van den Berghe, "Race and Ethnicity: A Sociobiological Perspective," in *Ethnicity and Ethnic Relations in Canada* edited by Rita M. Bienvenue and Jay E. Goldstein (Toronto, ON: Butterworth, 1985), 19, J. W. Berry and J. A. Laponce, "Evaluating Research on Canada's Multiethnic and Multicultural Society," in *Ethnicity and Culture in Canada: The Research Landscape* edited by J. W. Berry and J. A. Laponce (Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press, 1994), 5. The evolution of the terms 'race' and 'ethnicity' has its own story. As Pierre van den Berghe writes, "ethnicity and racial group affiliation" were largely considered to the same thing in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century – an "ascribed 'primordial identity,' deeply rooted, given at birth, and largely unchangeable" (19). However, as J. W. Berry and J. A. Laponce find, after World War II, "race had become so loaded with political associations that it became an irresistible temptation to use 'ethnic' as a euphemism and dilutant" (5).
58. *Fourth Census of Canada, 1901*, xviii.
59. *Ibid.*, xviii.
60. Curtis, *Politics of Population*, 224.
61. *Ibid.*
62. *Debates of the House of Commons*, Volume LV, April 15, 1901, 3072.
63. *Debates of the House of Commons*, Volume LIII, July 16, 1900, 10334.
64. *Ibid.*, 10335. We as historians should be thankful for Caron, for he also added that "the student of history or the writer of history, who wants to get such information as my hon. friend has been discussing, ought to be able to find it in the census" (10335).
65. *Ibid.*
66. Beaujot and McQuillan, *Growth and Dualism*, 88-89.
67. *Ibid.*, 81.
68. Brewton Berry, *Race and Ethnic Relations* (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1951), 413.
69. *Sixth Census of Canada, 1921*, xv.
70. W. Burton Hurd, *Racial Origins and the Nativity of the Canadian People (A study based on the Census of 1931 and supplementary data)* (Ottawa, ON: J. O. Patenaude, I.S.O., 1937).
71. *Ibid.*, 18.
72. Chad Gaffield, "Language, Ancestry, and the Competing Constructions of Identity in Turn-of-the-Century Canada," in *Household Counts: Canadian Households and Families in 1901* edited by Eric W. Sager and Peter





Baskerville (Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press, 2007), 429.

73. *Fourth Census of Canada, 1901*, xviii, Boyd, Goldman and White, "Race in the Canadian Census," 35-38.
74. *Sixth Census of Canada, 1921*, xv.
75. Constance Backhouse, *Colour-Coded: A Legal History of Racism in Canada, 1900-1950* (Toronto, ON: Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History by University of Toronto Press, 1999), 1-5.
76. *Fourth Census of Canada, 1901*, xviii.
77. Ibid.
78. Ibid.
79. J.S. Woodsworth, *Strangers Within Our Gates; or, Coming Canadians* (Toronto, ON: F.C. Stephenson, 1909), 155.
80. Ibid., 158.
81. *Sixth Census of Canada, 1921*, xv. (emphasis mine).
82. Backhouse, *Colour-Coded*, 162, *Debates of the House of Commons* Volume LIII, 8 June 1900, 7052.
83. Ivana Caccia, *Managing the Canadian Mosaic: Shaping Citizenship Policy, 1939-1945*, (Montréal, QC: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2010), 206-210.
84. *General Report of the Census of Canada, 1880-81*, 14.
85. *Debates of the House of Commons* Volume LV, April 15, 1901, 3072.
86. *Fourth Census of Canada, 1901*, xix.
87. *Debates of the House of Commons* Volume LV, April 15, 1901, 3071, *Sixth Census of Canada, 1921*, xiv. Though Canada's entrance into the League of Nations had "made it necessary for an official definition of Canadian nationals and a Canadian nationality" the term had not changed much by the time of the 1921 census (xiv).
88. Ibid., viii.
89. Gaffield, "Constructions of Identity," 424. Ironically, a person's mother tongue was defined by the language spoken by his or her father; thus, "the children of an English mother-tongue parent and a French mother-tongue parent were attributed with the mother tongue of the father" (424).
90. Gaffield, "Linearity and Nonlinearity," 256.
91. *Fourth Census of Canada, 1901*, viii. (emphasis mine)
92. Gaffield, "Constructions of Identity," 424.
93. Curtis, *Politics of Population*, 285, Gaffield, "Linearity and Nonlinearity," 258, and Gaffield, "Constructions of Identity," 424. As a compilation of the work of thousands of enumerators, each census contained large numbers of irregularities. In all pre-1931 Canadian censuses, "Canadian" was deemed an unacceptable term for questions related to "origins." Regardless, many individuals responded with this term. Since enumerators were not machines, quite a few of these responses got through. For instance, in 1871 Ontarian enumerator Samuel Young accepted the definition of Canadian for several individuals. However, his superiors back in Ottawa had these "entries scratched out and 'Irish' was substituted for them in a different





hand” (Curtis, 285). Likewise, in 1901 no one was supposed to report that they had more than one “mother tongue.” As Chad Gaffield found in his analysis of the 1901 census, however, “0.4 percent of the responses” were “clearly problematic,” as answers included Austrian, Hebrew and Belgian (Gaffield 2000; 258). Most common among these ‘errors’ however was the response “Canadian.” As roughly four out of five individuals who listed their mother tongue as ‘Canadian’ were French Canadian, this term could have meant several things – a desire to distinguish between Parisian French and Québec French, “a strategy for listing both French and English as mother tongues,” or simple ignorance of the fact that Canadian was not a language (Gaffield 2000; 258). Again however, if a mother-tongue was “incorrectly” labelled, it could be easily “corrected” by census officials in Ottawa” (Gaffield 2007; 424). Without a doubt a fascinating subject in its own right, the tale of census response ‘corrections’ is unfortunately a story for another paper.

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Cultivating Identities English Gardens After 1688

Lauren Barkley

The arrival of William of Orange and Mary Stuart in 1688 has been extensively studied as a defining moment in English politics. While Mary's claim to the throne was legitimized by her Stuart blood, the population still had to grapple with the prospect of a foreign leader gaining power over England in the person of her husband. The purely political aspects of this problem have largely overshadowed the discussion of how these political issues manifested themselves in tangible cultural phenomena. Though they may at first seem quite far removed from broad issues of politics, the gardens of seventeenth-century England can in fact offer a great deal of information about the inextricably linked cultural and political impacts of the Revolution of 1688-89.

Gardens, much like any other form of art, can be studied as a way of determining information about the historical context out of which they were produced. While gardens did serve practical functions such as being the sites of production of food for sustenance or for sale, they also operated as cultural artefacts that we can now situate in a number of broader discussions about post-1688 England. A garden may seem an innocent, neutral thing, but according to John Dixon Hunt, "gardens are no more immune from political meanings than other human inventions and constructions."¹ The involvement of human beings in gardens, then, permits us to understand them as more than aesthetically pleasing patches of land. The involvement of monarchs in gardens allows us to further substantiate the links between nature and politics in the late Stuart period. William and Mary shared an active interest in gardening that sparked numerous royal gardening projects. These projects, particularly their redesign of the gardens at Hampton Court, illustrate the various ways in which the new Dutch monarchs came to interact with their English subjects and the land of England itself. Using gardens as a specific example, we can trace the ways in which English identity was





shaped by the arrival of the Dutch monarchs and how this uneasy, Anglo-Dutch identity formulated itself against the ultimate other of France.

The culture of gardening in England was quite well-developed prior to the arrival of William and Mary. English garden enthusiasts praised the mental and physical benefits of gardening. Sir Francis Bacon included a piece on gardens in his collection of essays, many of which concern more abstract or philosophical subjects such as liberty, beauty, death, and truth. In his essay “On Gardens,” Bacon speaks of the delights of various plants and flowers and describes his rules for a perfect garden, which he calls “the purest of human pleasures.”² He is convinced that a garden is the greatest thing one can create, as it is “the greatest refreshment to the spirits of man; without which, buildings and palaces are but gross handiworks.”³ The visual pleasure derived from a well-planned garden seems to have inspired great devotion among English people at the time. David Coffin sees this preoccupation with gardens as a particularly English trait, stating that “more than other Europeans, the English sought contemplative consolation in their gardens.”⁴ While other nations, including France, developed highly sophisticated and intricate gardens, Coffin believes that the English had a unique relationship with theirs. As he writes, “for the English the garden was the locale where harmony with nature and with God could be achieved.”⁵ Spending time in a garden allowed one the solitude and silence necessary for contemplation or private conversation. Gardens were clearly thought of as a space set apart, providing an escape from the busy house and all of its potential distractions in the form of numerous other people.⁶ To have a garden was to have a private retreat where the beauty of nature, presented in the most pleasing way, could inspire peaceful feelings and productive contemplation in its owners.

The widely-touted benefits of gardens were complemented by another form of garden literature, the garden design manual. Design manuals provided instructions and patterns for a variety of types of gardens. André Mollet’s handbook, *The Garden of Pleasure*, contains written descriptions of numerous arrangements of plants, grasses, and hedges in order to form the most pleasing gardens. At the end of his work, Mollet declares that it has been “published for the publick good.”⁷ Design manuals were a way of imparting knowledge about gardening to a wider audience, so that they too could share in the benefits of a well-planned garden. Bacon’s essay fulfills the same role by sharing his thoughts on the proper components and design of the most perfect garden. At the end of his essay, however, Bacon admits that he has “made a platform for a princely garden... and in this I have spared for no cost.”⁸ The perfect





garden must be a royal garden, since no others could afford to create such an expensive addition to their houses. Gardens were a form of luxury good in the sense that they were simply not available to all, though the literature endorsing them suggests that the benefits of gardens were well worth their costs.

Royal gardens, following models similar to those described by Mollet and Bacon, were not a creation of William and Mary. Several English monarchs, who reigned before 1688, had an interest in gardening as well, and this interest is best seen in the specific example of Hampton Court Palace. Though its history reaches back almost to the Norman Conquest, Hampton Court became famous as the seat of Cardinal Wolsey, which Henry VIII took from him following Wolsey's fall from favour in 1528.⁹ Henry then began an extensive renovation project on the palace and its surrounding grounds, including the gardens. According to Todd Longstaffe-Gowan, "the pleasure gardens were seen to pertain to the King and to the court as outward signs of regal magnificence."¹⁰ Though Hampton Court was used by all of Henry's children, they did not seem to have taken much interest in renovating it, and the next major stage of its development did not occur until the reign of Charles II. As Gowan writes, "Charles II had an informed interest in garden planning, which he had developed during his exile in France."¹¹ Under Charles and his garden master André Mollet, a canal, vineyard, and Wilderness were added to Hampton Court.¹² Though the name conjures images of nature left to grow unchecked, the Wilderness at Hampton Court was in fact "a large skewed rectangular piece of ground [...] criss-crossed with broad rectilinear paths and sprinkled with trees and shrubs [...] contain[ing] the world-famous Maze."¹³ The French influence on the gardens at this time was treated as a positive aspect of their design, as it was widely acknowledged that Mollet, as a French designer, was especially skilled at his craft.¹⁴ Despite the success of his plans for the gardens, they would not remain static, as William and Mary also took an active interest in gardening.

When William and Mary began their own remodelling of the gardens at Hampton Court, they were continuing the work of several previous monarchs who had shared their passion for gardening. We can see continuity between these earlier English monarchs and the new Dutch rulers, all of whom left tangible marks on the grounds of Hampton Court. Though their interest in gardening did link them to other English monarchs, John Dixon Hunt sees William and Mary's gardening activities as a marker of their Dutch identity. As he writes, their interest in gardening was a "manifestation of a long-standing Dutch





penchant- for gardens, country living, horticulture, and botany.”¹⁵ This was confirmed by the choice of Hampton Court as their most involved gardening project. Once installed as monarchs, William and Mary were expected to take up residence at Whitehall, but after living there for only a few short weeks, they found it too dark and too public, and also realized that the air quality was having a negative effect on William’s asthma.¹⁶ In Hampton Court, the new monarchs found both a country escape that suited their previous Dutch experiences with court life and also gave them a project: the remodelling of the gardens. According to Andrea Wulf and Emma Gieben-Gamal, William commissioned Christopher Wren, an English architect, to design the new plans for Hampton, rather than one of his Dutch compatriots for diplomatic reasons, “given that his subjects may still have been suspicious of their foreign king.”¹⁷ In selecting Wren as the designer of their new residence, William and Mary made a strong political statement about their intentions with regard to legitimizing their rule. Though their interest in gardening and their approval of Hampton Court’s natural beauty and more private setting may have been informed by their previous lives in Holland, they were also willing to accommodate themselves to the work of English craftspeople and artists. In many ways, the design of the new Hampton Court was a way for William and Mary to conflate their Dutch backgrounds with their new positions as English monarchs.

The renovation and remodelling of Hampton Court was not a simple undertaking. Wren was assisted by a team of other designers and architects, including William’s good friend Hans William Bentinck, who was given the post of Superintendant of the Gardens.¹⁸ Under his supervision, the gardens were entirely transformed. The new gardens included a new Fountain Garden, a Great Parterre, a remodelled Privy Garden, and several new avenues leading up to the palace.¹⁹ The finished gardens must have been marvellous to behold, as they were even the subject of a ballad written several years after their redesign began. Found in a collection by Thomas D’Urfey, the ballad “Hampton Court” describes the palace as “the choicest delights, Art and Nature prepar’d, on the bank of fweet Thames.”²⁰ It is due to this combination of art and nature that the gardens of Hampton Court were seen as such a marvel. The application of principles of art and design to nature combined at Hampton to create a sight worthy of a song.

Though their beauty may have been inspired by the French style, the gardens at Hampton Court could never be entirely French. French gardens were normally far larger in area than either Dutch or English gardens. However, as Hunt writes, “it is not scale alone that





identifies Dutch rather than French garden style; it is also a relative lack of relation of parts to the whole.²¹ This lack of coherence can be explained by complicating geographical factors in both the Low Countries and in England. Just as gardens in the Netherlands often had to be built around canals, the gardens at Hampton were to a certain extent dictated by the course of the river Thames. As Hunt writes, “the gardening activities at Hampton Court owed much to its river site, which forced awkward adjustments to geometrical planning in the French mode exactly as did sites in the Low Countries.”²² Simply put, the gardens around French palaces could be designed in perfect geometrical lines due to an absence of natural obstacles, while in the Netherlands and at Hampton Court, waterways interfered with the precision to which this angular style could be replicated. The land itself was not accommodating to French styles, allowing for the development of a particular Anglo-Dutch style of garden, which, while indebted to French ideas, was more suited to the landscape of England.

To what extent, then, was this particularly Anglo-Dutch style of garden replicated in the rest of the country? David Jacques and Arend van der Horst are firmly against the idea of a new Dutch style garden taking hold in England after 1688. As they state, “with the exception of the Royal Gardens alone, the idea of Dutch gardens in England is a myth.”²³ The enthusiasm of the Dutch monarchs may have sparked an even greater interest in gardening among their English subjects, but the Dutch style of gardening did not take root among the majority of the population. Jacques and van der Horst insist that the greatest influence on garden design in England even after 1688 was still drawn from the work of the French and also Italian garden designers.²⁴ Hunt, however, contends that after 1688, one could see a distinct Dutch influence on gardens in England. As he writes, “it is now clear that a certain kind of gardening and a certain kind of garden increased enormously in popularity in England as a result of the arrival there of William and Mary.”²⁵ Whether or not the people of England did choose to imitate the new style of gardens of their monarchs may seem a trivial debate, but it can point out larger issues regarding the acceptance of the Dutch monarchs by their new English subjects.

William and Mary had to deal with a troubling situation upon their ascension to the English and Scottish thrones in 1689. The question of their legitimacy as monarchs was never entirely answered, and while the majority of the population seems to have accepted them, they were not necessarily embraced with enthusiasm. In his political biography of William, Wout Troost writes, “even though there was much discontent





with the rule of 'Dutch William', I do not think that his regime was ever in serious danger."²⁶ William and Mary were, for the most part, tolerated rather than accepted by the English people; not disliked enough to be removed from power but not beloved enough to ever be fully endorsed. Because of the ambivalence of their people,, William and Mary had to make conscious efforts to maintain the acceptance of their subjects. The creation of a new Anglo-Dutch identity was one way to create connections between the rulers and their people. Wulf and Gieben-Gamal sum up the situation, writing that "William and Mary's preoccupation with their garden plans might seem inconsequential, even irresponsible; but they played a key part in William's strategy to cast himself in the image of a powerful monarch."²⁷ However, the connections between the rulers and their gardens did also lead to some criticism. As Hunt explains, Alexander Pope critiqued the excessive use of topiary in Dutch gardens, which really represents his Tory sympathies railing against anything to do with the Dutch.²⁸ According to Jacques and van der Vorst, "excessive topiary is often thought to have been a Dutch vice."²⁹ Pope and his fellow Tories, naturally suspicious of their Dutch monarchs, were those people William hoped to convince of his legitimacy and ability to rule England. Gardens, like other luxury goods, were an indication of power, wealth, and prestige, and by developing his gardens, William seems to have been hoping to develop a popular perception of himself as exactly the kind of king the English people wanted.

William's cultivation of his gardens, and thus of his self-image, also had significant connections to the larger political trends of Europe at the time. William had an extremely antagonistic relationship with Louis XIV of France while in the Netherlands, but could now face Louis as an equal, now being a king himself instead of a mere Stadtholder. The image of William as an Anglo-Dutch monarch is incomplete without the comparison to the French king. William defined himself against the French, with whom he had personal troubles, and with whom the English had their own uneasy history. This dislike of France served as one of the most powerful connections between England and the Low Countries, even prior to 1688, and now that William led both nations, the French became the ultimate other against which the new Anglo-Dutch identity could be formed. Dale Hoak sees the Revolution of 1688-89 not in constitutional or parliamentary terms, but rather in the context of an international alliance against France. As he writes, "1688-89 signalled more than a dramatic turn in the dynastic affairs of Orange and Stuart. By harnessing England to his anti-French war machine, William of Orange forced English politicians to build the greatest military-commercial





engine the world had yet seen.”³⁰ The Anglo-Dutch identity that arose after 1688, in Hoak’s view, was one of aggression towards France.

This emphasis on military power seems to have little to do with gardening, but discourses of power and control had been forever changed by the ideas of the New Science, which can help explain the connection between the two. As Rebecca Bushnell argues, no matter your perspective on the Scientific Revolution itself, “the seventeenth century did witness fundamental changes in how the English understood connection to nature.”³¹ Gardens were a way of exerting control over nature, just as one could exert control over people through political processes. Wulf and Gieben-Gamal make the argument that Hampton Court “symbolised the bold aspiration of a king who believed he could conquer nature just as he had conquered England and saved it from a Catholic despot.”³² We can extend this argument to include William’s vision of conquering France, another facet of his attempt to gain control, whether over nature or over another nation. Gardens were designed and strategized in ways similar to the planning of a military campaign. The desire to conquer ran strongly in William, informing even the most seemingly innocent of his actions, such as gardening. Though Mary’s gardening habits do not have the same military connotations, as she did not have the same function of war leader as did William, we can still see in her project of remodelling Hampton House, an attempt to both connect to her predecessors and, conversely, a way of setting herself apart from them with her fondness for the Dutch style of gardens.

Gardens in post-1688 England serve as an excellent illustration of the tensions that arose in developing a new English identity that took into account the Dutch background of the new monarchs. While England had already developed a strong culture of gardens and gardening, the arrival of William and Mary prompted a reconsideration of that culture in light of their Dutch background, which would reveal itself in the new gardens created at Hampton Court Palace. It became clear that the gardening projects of William and Mary were not only hobbies, but that they were shaped by significant political agendas. This political statement culminated in an assertion of the anti-French nature of both Anglo-Dutch gardens and the newly negotiated Anglo-Dutch identity. Though the gardens were marked by French influences, they were nonetheless set apart, becoming a uniquely Anglo-Dutch phenomenon. The Anglo-Dutch identity was perhaps more difficult to cultivate than were the Hampton Court gardens, but in the end, it was marked by the same differentiation from France. As perhaps the greatest power in Europe at the time, Louis XIV’s France was not lacking in enemies, with





William of Orange being one of his most notable opponents. William's previous conflicts with Louis were carried over into England when he arrived in 1688, and thus also became the concern of the English people. By defining his new kingdom against the French, with its curious blend of English and Dutch cultures, William was able to stay true to both his background and to the general trend in England of seeing the French as their natural opponents. Though this conflict between French and Anglo-Dutch identities did play itself out on the fields of battle, it can also be found in the most unexpected of places, such as the English gardens.



Notes

1. John Dixon Hunt, "Anglo-Dutch Garden Art: Style and Idea," in *The World of William and Mary: Anglo-Dutch Perspectives on the Revolution of 1688-89*, ed. Dale Hoak and Mordechai Feingold (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), 188.
2. Sir Francis Bacon, "On Gardens," in *The essayes or counsells, civill and morall, of Francis Lo. Verulam, Viscount St. Alban* (London: Jo. Beale for Richard Royston, 1642), 266.
3. Ibid, 266.
4. David R. Coffin, *The English Garden* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 1.
5. Ibid, 6.
6. Ibid, 59.
7. André Mollet, *The garden of pleasure containing several draughts of gardens* (The Savoy: T.N. for John Martyn, 1670), 15.
8. Ibid, 279.
9. Todd Longstaffe-Gowan, *The Gardens and Parks at Hampton Court Palace* (London: Francis Lincoln Ltd, 2005), 8.
10. Ibid, 11.
11. Ibid, 13.
12. Ibid, 13.
13. Ibid, 122.
14. Ibid, 13.
15. Hunt, "Anglo-Dutch Garden Art," 189.
16. Andrea Wulf and Emma Gieben-Gamal, *This Other Eden: Seven Great Gardens and Three Hundred Years of English History* (London: Little Brown, 2005), 49.
17. Ibid, 51.
18. Ibid, 52.
19. David Jacques and Arend van der Horst, *The Gardens of William and Mary* (London: Christopher Helm Publishers, 1988), 69.
20. Thomas D'Ufey, *A Choice collection of new songs and ballads the words made to several pleasant tunes* (London: William Pearson for Henry Playford, 1699), 597.
21. Hunt, "Anglo-Dutch Garden Art," 194.
22. Ibid, 198.
23. Jacques and van der Horst, *The Gardens of William and Mary*, 99.
24. Ibid, 99.
25. Hunt, "Anglo-Dutch Garden Art," 191.
26. Wout Troost, *William III, the Stadholder-King: A Political Biography*, trans. J.C. Grayson (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), 236.
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Historical Discourses XXV • 107

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American Indian Voting Rights in *Bone Shirt v. Hazeltine*

Oglala and Sicangu Lakota Equality in South Dakota

Anastasia-Maria Hountalas

In 1870 the Fifteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution declared that “the right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”¹ Nearly one hundred and fifty years later, the struggle for equal suffrage among America’s minorities is far from over. This phenomenon has been extensively documented and the journey of many minority groups, most notably African Americans, is the focus of a wealth of literature. However, amidst this literature the American Indian remains largely invisible. The reasons for this omission are several. Much of the Indian population of America is geographically and socially segregated from non-Indian society by the federal reservation system. In addition, Indians have only recently been enfranchised and the study of Indian voting rights is still quite young. Finally, for a host of reasons including poverty, unemployment, racism, and educational deprivation, many Indian communities suffer from poor socioeconomic conditions. As a result, a large portion of literature concerning American Indians focuses on the social and economic challenges that they face rather than on their voting rights. In an attempt to address the literary void, this analysis will explore the contemporary voting situation of South Dakota’s Lakota Sioux through the 2001 voting rights case *Bone Shirt v. Hazeltine*.

In 1965 the Voting Rights Act (VRA) was implemented in the United States. Through the creation of a set of national provisions, the VRA aimed to reduce voting rights violations among minorities and equalize political participation in America. §5 of the VRA provided “federal review of specified State and local actions which affect the right to vote.”² This included federal preclearance of voting rights changes as well as language provisions for minority voters in select parts of the country. Similarly, §2 addressed the illegal dilution of the minority vote.³





Although American Indians were protected implicitly under the 1965 VRA, their coverage was made explicit in the 1975 amendment which extended protections to the “language minorities” of the United States.⁴ In the fight for equal suffrage for South Dakota Indians, the VRA is the single-most important piece of legislation.

In 2001 four American Indian plaintiffs and residents of South Dakota took the Secretary of the State of South Dakota, the South Dakota House of Representatives, the South Dakota Senate and both of their respective speakers to court on two accounts of VRA violations in *Bone Shirt v. Hazeltine*.⁵ According to the plaintiffs, the 2001 legislative redistricting plan (the “2001 Plan”) violated local preclearance provisions and illegally diluted the Indian vote. Undoubtedly, contemporary cases such as *Bone Shirt v. Hazeltine* illustrate the continued need for voting rights action and advocacy in the United States, especially in minority communities. Such cases reveal the complex socio-political dynamic surrounding minority voting rights legislation and explore the connections between voting rights and racial discrimination. They effectively illustrate the continued legal, social and political struggle for equal suffrage. *Bone Shirt v. Hazeltine* proves that the struggle for minority voting rights is ongoing.

Terms and History

The contemporary voting rights environment of South Dakota’s Lakota Sioux is the product of a long history of legal and political exclusion, socio-economic disparity, and prolonged racial conflict. The Sioux of South Dakota are “a loose alliance of tribes in the northern plains and prairies of North America.”⁶ They usually self-identify as either Lakota or Dakota, indicating the two major factions of the Sioux.⁷ *Bone Shirt v. Hazeltine* addresses the voting rights of Indians in Districts 26 and 27 of the legislative districting plan, the majority of whom reside on Pine Ridge and Rosebud Reservations. Most Indians in Pine Ridge Reservation are Sicangu Lakota, while those in Rosebud are Oglala Lakota.

Pine Ridge and Rosebud Reservations were once part of the massive Great Sioux Reservation which consisted of about half of what is now South Dakota.⁸ Over the past century and a half, the United States government has reclaimed or sold most land traditionally belonging to the Sioux. In 1889 the US Congress forced the Sioux to sign the Great Sioux Agreement which ceded eleven million acres of Sioux homeland to the government.⁹ The land that was ceded had been promised to the





Sioux in the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868. Over time this process resulted in the creation of the nine reservations which exist in South Dakota today.

Historically, the Lakota have been the target of extensive voting discrimination. When the Dakotas achieved statehood in 1889, suffrage was limited according to citizenship, effectively disenfranchising most Dakota Indians.¹⁰ In 1903, Indian discrimination became explicit in a state civil code which prevented Indians from voting or holding office while maintaining tribal relations.¹¹ Enfranchisement according to tribal ties is known as “termination” and remained a part of South Dakota law until 1951.¹²

Although all Indians were made US citizens in 1924 under the Indian Citizenship Act, South Dakota continued to legally exclude Indians from voting and holding office until the early 1950s. After the law preventing Indians from voting was officially repealed, the county system became a vehicle for minority disenfranchisement. As late as 1975, Indians living in unorganized counties were prohibited from voting. The only three unorganized counties in South Dakota - Todd, Shannon and Washabaugh - were overwhelmingly Indian.¹³

The 1975 amendment to the VRA addressed the highly contentious voting procedures in South Dakota. Shannon and Todd Counties, the two counties with Indian majorities between 85 and 95 percent, are required under §5 to submit “all changes in laws, practices, and procedures affecting voting to either the US Attorney General or the US District Court for the District of Columbia.”¹⁴ Out of the eight Indian-majority counties in South Dakota, six counties were also required to provide bilingual election materials. Three of these eight counties rank among the 50 poorest counties in the United States. The other five rank among the top ten.¹⁵ Evidently, minority voting in South Dakota is the product of a complex history of political discrimination.

South Dakota’s voting rights history is further complicated by a legacy of government-perpetrated violence and racial discrimination against the Lakota. Perhaps the most significant instance of racial violence occurred on what is now Pine Ridge Reservation. In 1890, Wounded Knee was attacked by the United States Army and soldiers killed between 175 and 340 unarmed Sioux women, men and children.¹⁶ The attack has left a deep scar on white-Indian relations in South Dakota and remains a formative event in Sioux history. Former US Senator James Abourezk explains that the “significance and memory [of Wounded Knee] have not diminished throughout the hundred and more years since it occurred.”¹⁷ This event is one example from a long history of





racial violence that contributes to an atmosphere of tension and hostility between the white and Indian communities in South Dakota.

The 2001 Redistricting Process

According to the South Dakota Constitution, legislative redistricting must occur every ten years after 1991 to reflect decennial census data.¹⁸ This redistricting process creates minority-majority districts where minority groups have the potential to elect the candidate of their choice. Interestingly, the 2000 census was the first federal census which allowed respondents to identify themselves with multiple racial groups. This allowed all individuals who self-identified as Indian to be considered by a court notwithstanding whether they were “fullblood” Indians or of mixed descent.¹⁹ The 2000 census revealed that South Dakota had an Indian population of 67,990 which represented 9.05 percent of the total state population. Indians also constituted 6.79 percent of the voting age population (VAP) in South Dakota.²⁰ Nearly two thirds of all South Dakota Indians resided in “Indian Country”, making them the majority in eight rural counties across the state.²¹ Without a doubt Indians are the most substantial minority in South Dakota.

During the 1990 redistricting process concerns were raised that the reservations had a “significantly larger population than the Census indicated.”²² Had a census recount revealed larger populations in reservation areas, there may have been cause for two Indian-majority districts rather than one. As it was, the redistricting plan adopted in 1991 combined Shannon, Todd and most of Bennett County into District 27.²³ District 27 was the only Indian-majority senate district in South Dakota. However, during a special session in 1991, the legislature divided District 28 into two single-member house districts, only one of which had an Indian-majority.²⁴

Following the 2000 census a fifteen member redistricting committee, including two Indian legislators, convened to create the 2001 Plan. Acting on the suggestion of the South Dakota Advisory Committee to the United States Commission on Civil Rights’ 1981 report, they held “meetings on or near the reservations to seek Indian viewpoints on State issues.”²⁵ Two redistricting meetings were conducted on Pine Ridge Reservation and Rosebud Reservation. Unfortunately, turnout was very low; only seven people total attended both meetings.²⁶ According to Representative Bradford, an Indian legislator elected in District 27, the few attendees were “very, very sensitive to the atmosphere” and felt like they were “inadequate... to appear before a committee of that





magnitude.”²⁷ Obviously, the history of racial and political discrimination in South Dakota negatively affected the participation of Indians at these meetings. As a result, very little Indian input was collected during the redistricting process.

The redistricting committee’s 2001 Plan divided South Dakota into thirty-five legislative districts, each electing a single member to the state Senate and two members to the state House of Representatives.²⁸ District 27 contained Shannon and Todd Counties as well as Precinct 27 of Bennett County. Indians made up 90 percent of District 27 and accounted for 86 percent of the VAP. Moreover, the 2001 Plan kept District 28A as an Indian-majority single-member house district. Although Representative Bradford submitted an amendment to the state house suggesting that District 26 also be divided into two single-member house districts, one of which would be an Indian-majority, his amendment was defeated by a large margin.

The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) was also involved in the 2000 redistricting process. Like Representative Bradford, they disagreed with the boundaries being drawn by the legislature. Indeed, the ACLU believed that the significant Indian population growth between 1990 and 2000 merited the reapportionment of District 27 to create a second Indian-majority senate district.²⁹ The legislature disagreed with the ACLU and implemented the new redistricting plan in November 2001. In December 2001 lead plaintiff Alfred Bone Shirt, along with plaintiffs Belva Black Lance, Bonnie High Bull and Germaine Moves Camp filed *Bone Shirt v. Hazeltine*, accusing the state of violating §5 and §2 of the VRA.³⁰ The ACLU assigned attorney Neil Bradley to the Bone Shirt case.³¹

Section Five Violation

The VRA §5 charge was brought to court on May 2, 2002 in the Central Division of the South Dakota District Court. District Judges Schreier and Kornmann and Circuit Judge Loken presided over the case. The defendants were represented by attorneys Guhin and Wald from the Attorney General’s office while the plaintiffs were represented by attorneys Bradley, Duffy, McDonald and Sells. Before the trial began the United States moved to participate as *amicus curiae*.³² The court granted this request and the United State was represented by the Voting Section of the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice.³³

The foundation of the plaintiffs’ §5 claim was that the 2001 Plan violated the VRA since it had never been federally precleared. The





judges began by examining §5 of the VRA. The 1975 amendment covered jurisdictions where a language minority comprised more than 5 percent of the population and where less than 50 percent of that minority group's VPA was registered to vote. Moreover, the statute applied to any changes in "voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting."³⁴ Since Indians in Shannon and Todd Counties easily fulfilled the population and registration clauses, there remained two issues before the court. First, it had to determine whether preclearance was required in this case. Then, if the court ruled in favour of the plaintiffs, their injunctive relief had to be arranged.³⁵

The United States Supreme Court had previously determined in *Georgia v. United States* that a reapportionment plan constituted a voting procedure.³⁶ Furthermore, they had clarified that §5 of the VRA only prevented changes that would "lead to a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise."³⁷ Consequently the district court was responsible only for determining whether the 2001 Plan had the potential to be retrogressively discriminatory. Bone Shirt and his fellow plaintiffs argued that since the demographic makeup of District 27 had changed between the 1991 legislative plan and the 2001 Plan, there was potential for discrimination.³⁸ In the 1991 Plan, District 27 contained an Indian VAP of 82 percent, and underage Indian population of five percent and a Non-Indian population of thirteen percent. By 2001, the Indian VAP had increased to 86 percent, the underage Indian population had changed to four percent and the Non-Indian population had decreased by three percent.³⁹ The district court found that the plaintiff's claim was supported by *Young v. Fordice* (1997) which stated that "even minor changes must be precleared".⁴⁰ Since the state had indeed failed to submit the 2001 Plan for preclearance, the court ruled in favour of the plaintiffs.

Judges Kornmann and Schreier proposed four possible remedies for the violation. The first option was to enjoin the entire 2001 Plan. This was the preferred plan of the United States Attorney General. The second option included enjoining only Districts 26 and 27 as requested by the plaintiffs, while the third alternative was to enjoin District 27 alone. However the court noted that this option did not oblige the state to remedy the violation, so while it validated the §5 violation it proposed no concrete solution. The fourth and final option was adopted by the court. It included an "injunction prohibiting the State from implementing its 2001 Plan with regards to District 27 together with an order directing the State to submit its 2001 Plan for preclearance."⁴¹ Thus the state of South Dakota was ordered to act immediately to redress the §5 violation



by submitting its plan for preclearance within thirty days.

Judge Loken dissented from the §5 ruling. In his dissent he concluded that the demographic evidence provided by the plaintiffs was not indicative of discriminatory purposes since Todd and Shannon Counties remained intact while Precinct 27 of Bennett County had no resident voters.⁴² This conclusion parallels the reasoning provided by the Secretary of the State of South Dakota, Chris Nelson. Secretary Nelson inherited *Bone Shirt v. Hazeltine* from former Secretary Joyce Hazeltine. When asked why the state failed to have the 2001 Plan precleared Nelson responded that “the district has not changed and therefore there’s nothing to preclear...The only change to District 27...was to move a fire station from one district to another.”⁴³ Essentially both Nelson and Loken argued that while the physical boundaries of District 27 were altered, the demographic makeup of the district ultimately remained the same.

The problem with this argument is that it defeats the purpose of the VRA §5 provision. Since Shannon and Todd Counties were identified under the VRA as high-risk jurisdictions with a history of discriminatory practices and low voter turnout, the federal government implemented the preclearance provision. The fundamental purpose of such a provision is to ensure that all voting rights changes, large or small, discriminatory or not, are subject to review on the grounds of legal, racial and moral equality. The question of whether or not demographic change in District 27 significantly altered the makeup of the district is overruled by the fact that a districting change was implemented by the state without federal preclearance.

Section Two Violation

The second part of *Bone Shirt v. Hazeltine* was brought to court on September 6, 2004. Like with the §5 case, Judge Schreier led the three-judge panel. The plaintiffs alleged that the 2001 Plan illegally packed a 90 percent supermajority of Indians into District 27 in violation of the VRA §2. They sought the creation of at least one more Indian-majority single-member house district to remedy the violation.⁴⁴

Judge Schreier began her investigation by looking at the history of Districts 26 and 27. She reaffirmed the legacy of voting rights exclusion among the Lakota Sioux and reviewed the 1980 and 1990 redistricting plans.⁴⁵ Next, the court examined the 2000 redistricting process and heard the testimony of Representative Bradford. According to Bradford the 2001 Plan unjustly created an Indian supermajority in violation of §2 of the VRA. The court found his testimony to be “highly credible” and





gave it “great weight.”⁴⁶ Similarly the court heard testimonies from the two Indian members of the redistricting committee. Both Representative Valandra and Senator Hagen preferred keeping the redistricting plan in its original form.⁴⁷

Interestingly, the court dismissed the testimonies of Valandra and Hagen since, as incumbents of District 27, they “had a vested interest in resisting change to their district’s boundaries.”⁴⁸ However Representative Bradford was also an incumbent of District 27.⁴⁹ This legal inconsistency unfairly disadvantaged the defendants. Nevertheless, both lay testimony and expert opinion supported Bradford’s testimony that the 2001 plan employed “packing,” tipping the scales in favour of the plaintiffs.

During a §2 trial plaintiffs are not required to prove racist intent.⁵⁰ However plaintiffs must prove that the §2 violation fulfills all three of the “Gingles preconditions”. The Gingles preconditions were established by the Supreme Court in *Thorburgh v. Gingles* (1986) and they act as a test for all subsequent §2 cases.⁵¹ They stand as follows:

1. The minority group must demonstrate that it is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district.
2. The minority group must demonstrate that they are politically cohesive.
3. The minority group must demonstrate that the white majority sufficiently votes as a bloc to usually defeat the Indian-preferred candidates.⁵²

A §2 violation is established only if the minority group is shown to have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate politically and elect the candidates of their choice.⁵³ These preconditions help the court assess minority vote dilution through packing or fragmenting.⁵⁴

In order to prove the first Gingles factor, plaintiffs “need only to propose a plan that demonstrates the possibility of a majority-minority district using regular redistricting guidelines.”⁵⁵ The plaintiff introduced five possible plans which were drawn by their demographics expert William Cooper. “Plan A” created two majority senate districts and one single-member house district for a total of six Indian-elected legislative seats.⁵⁶ Thus, Cooper’s plans demonstrated that the Lakota were sufficiently large and geographically compact to create an Indian-majority single-member district and the court awarded the first Gingles factor in favour of the plaintiffs.⁵⁷





The second Gingles factor proved significantly more complicated to prove. In order to fulfill the second factor the plaintiffs had to prove that the Lakota vote cohesively. This, in turn, would illustrate that the Lakota had distinctive minority group interests. If the minority does not share political interests, then it is not legally justifiable to say that an unfair political system would harm them in any way.⁵⁸

In court, political cohesion is estimated using statistical equations to analyze voting patterns. The plaintiffs used expert statistician Dr. Cole. Dr. Cole analyzed elections using two methods, bivariate ecological regression analysis (BERA) and homogeneous precinct analysis (HPA). The defendant's expert, Dr. Zax, contradicted Dr. Cole by using ecological inference (EI) to estimate cohesion. All three methods are accepted by the court and yield similar but not identical results.⁵⁹ Dr. Cole measured cohesiveness on a scale "starting slightly above 50 percent and going all the way up to 100 percent."⁶⁰ Dr. Zax defined minority cohesiveness as "arising when a group devotes a supermajority of at least 60 percent of its votes to a particular alternative."⁶¹ The court agreed with both definitions. While cohesion exists above 60 percent, it also exists less decisively below 60 percent.

In order to evaluate the probative value of the statistical results, the court established a ranking system. For instance, endogenous elections weighted more heavily than exogenous elections since they more accurately represented the voting population of District 26 and District 27.⁶² Similarly, interracial elections were weighted more heavily than all-white races since Indian voters had the opportunity to vote for an Indian candidate. Endogenous interracial races were deemed the most probative of political cohesion by the court and exogenous all-white elections the least probative.⁶³

The results of both experts' analyses were consistent. Dr. Cole and Dr. Zax analysed twenty-two races from the past two decades that the court deemed probative. The average level of Lakota cohesion according to Dr. Cole's statistical evidence was 82 percent.⁶⁴ Similarly Dr. Zax concluded that Indians voted cohesively the majority of the time, although by a much smaller margin than Dr. Cole.⁶⁵

Interestingly, the court also evaluated non-statistical data demonstrating Indian political cohesion, such as Indian newspapers and political advocacy groups. Once the court had assembled the election data using all three statistical methods and weighted them accordingly, the second Gingles factor was awarded in favour of the plaintiffs.⁶⁶

Unlike the statistical equations for political cohesion, no equation exists to determine the third Gingles factor. As a result, the best





indicator of the usual defeat of Indian-preferred candidates by white bloc voting is racial polarization over time. Using figures provided by Dr. Zax and Dr. Cole, the court was able to determine the percentage of Indians that voted for the Indian-preferred candidate versus the percentage of white voters who voted for the Indian-preferred candidate. Then, by looking at election outcomes, the judges could determine whether the white vote defeated the Indian-preferred candidate. Since 1992 there have been nine state senate and house elections. Eight out of nine times the white majority voted sufficiently as a bloc to defeat the Indian-preferred candidate.

In endogenous interracial contests the Indian-preferred candidate was defeated one out of one times (100%). Similarly in endogenous all-white contests, the Indian-preferred candidate was defeated eight out of nine times (89%). In the exogenous elections, the Indian-preferred candidate was defeated two out of two times (100%) in interracial contests and sixteen out of twenty-two times (73%) in all-white contests.⁶⁷ Evidently the historical pattern of racial polarization leads to the usual defeat of the Indian-preferred candidate. The court found this evidence to show “legally significant white bloc voting within the meaning of the third Gingles factor” and awarded it in favour of the plaintiffs.⁶⁸

The use of the Gingles preconditions in VRA cases has been the site of considerable controversy in the academic and legal fields. For many, redistricting according to the Gingles tests is congruent with racial redistricting. In *Race and Representation in the United States*, Robert McKeever explains that minority-majority affirmative action, such as the Gingles factors, “sits rather uncomfortably alongside the Constitutional principle of race-neutrality.”⁶⁹ Indeed the question of racial redistricting and constitutionality in relation to the Gingles factors has appeared in several cases. For instance, in *Shaw v. Reno* (1993) the plaintiffs claimed that redistricting must be colourblind in accordance with the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection clause.⁷⁰ The Supreme Court, however, ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment only prohibits race-conscious redistricting efforts that create “unusually shaped”, “bizarre” or “extremely irregular” districts.⁷¹ Put simply, geographic compactness permitted racial redistricting.

More recently the Supreme Court has adopted a slightly different justification. In *Easley v. Comartie* (2001) the court ruled that racial redistricting violates the equal protection clause only if “race is the predominant factor in placing voters within or outside of a particular district.”⁷² Evidently the Gingles factors have resulted in a muddled





interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Supreme Court has failed to provide a uniform, concrete explanation of the role of racial redistricting in the United States.

The final step of in a VRA §2 violation is the totality of the circumstances. Here the court must examine various elements which may affect minority voting patterns. These elements were determined by a Senate Report in 1982 and are “supportive of, but not essential to...a minority voter’s claim.”⁷³ The seven “Senate factors” are as follows:

1. The extent of any history of official discrimination in the state or political subdivision that touched the right of the members of the minority group to register, to vote, or otherwise to participate in the democratic process
2. The extent to which voting in the election of the state or political subdivision is racially polarized
3. The extent to which the state or political subdivision has used unusually large election districts, majority vote requirements, anti-single shot provisions, or other voting practices or procedures that may enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the minority group
4. If there is a candidate slating process, whether members of the minority group have been denied access to that process.
5. The extent to which members of the minority group in the state or political subdivision bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as education, employment and health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political process
6. Whether political campaigns have been characterized by overt or subtle racial appeals
7. The extent to which members of the minority group have been elected to public office in the jurisdiction.⁷⁴

Unlike the Gingles factors, the plaintiffs are not responsible for proving the Senate factors. Rather, the court must decide whether each factor weighs in favour of the plaintiffs or the defendants. In *Bone Shirt v. Hazeltine*, the judges found that all of the Senate factors weighed in favour of the plaintiffs, except factor four which was not awarded to either side.⁷⁵





The central focus of the Senate factors is to assess the local voting rights climate on a case-by-case basis. Senate factors one, two, three and seven had already been established in *Bone Shirt v. Hazeltine*. Moreover, the court dismissed factor four on the basis that there is no candidate slating process in South Dakota. Thus the court determined the remaining factors five and six by analysing the socioeconomic conditions on Pine Ridge and Rosebud Reservations.

The most significant socioeconomic challenge to South Dakota Indians is poverty. Across the United States, approximately 31 percent of American Indians have incomes below the national poverty line.⁷⁶ This is more than any other race or ethnic group in America. According to the 2000 census, in South Dakota 48.1 percent of Indians were living below the poverty line, while only 9.7 percent of white South Dakotans were in the same position.⁷⁷ In Pine Ridge and Rosebud Reservations the picture is no better. Today there are 38,000 enrolled tribal members living on Pine Ridge Reservation.⁷⁸ Rosebud Reservation has 21,245 enrolled tribal residents.⁷⁹ The 2000 census revealed that 52.3 percent of people in Shannon County (located in Pine Ridge Reservation) and 48.3 percent of people in Todd County (located in Rosebud Reservation) live below the poverty line.⁸⁰ Moreover, all eight Indian-majority counties in South Dakota rank among the thirty-five poorest in the nation. Obviously, there is severe economic disparity among Indians in the United States, in South Dakota and on the reservations.

This grueling poverty is the result of several factors. Unemployment is a persistent problem in Rosebud and Pine Ridge and is a debilitating contributor to Lakota poverty. Indians in South Dakota have an average unemployment rate of 23.6 percent, while average white unemployment comes in at 3.2 percent.⁸¹ On the reservations unemployment figures are significantly multiplied. For instance the Rosebud Sioux Tribe reports that unemployment rates on Rosebud Reservation have ballooned to 85 percent and figures for Pine Ridge are similarly drastic.⁸² This level of unemployment results in poor housing conditions, poor health, the escalation of bad personal habits such as alcoholism and crime, and low levels of education, all of which perpetuate the cycle of poverty.

In *Social Inequality*, Verba, Schlozman and Brady examine the relationship between persistent poverty and political participation. Indeed, they find that “affluence and activity go together.”⁸³ Among the eight Indian-majority counties in South Dakota, the highest per-capita income is \$10,362, while the lowest is \$686; every county has a population of at least 30 percent below the poverty line. Moreover, Verba,





Schlozman and Brady contrast various forms of political participation between households making under \$15,000 and those making \$75,000 and over. Voting among the low-income group averages at 52 percent, while it soars to 86 percent among the high-income demographic. Similarly, there is a thirteen percent difference for campaign work, a 25 percent difference for community activity, a 44 percent difference for political organization and a massive 50 percent difference for campaign contributions.⁸⁴ Since every Indian-majority county in the state falls well below the \$15,000 mark, poverty severely impacts their ability to participate equally in South Dakota's political system.

Using the civic voluntarism model, Verba, Schlozman and Brady identify three ways in which poverty negatively affects political participation: resources, orientations to politics and recruitment.⁸⁵ By applying this model to the situation of the Lakota, the negative influence of poverty on political participation becomes obvious. "Resources" such as organizational and communication skills make it easier to effectively participate in politics.⁸⁶ However, many of these skills are developed through post-secondary education and high-level employment. Due to the deep-seeded poverty among the Lakota, most Indians cannot afford post-secondary education. Since poverty is combined with extremely high-levels of unemployment, the majority of Lakota Sioux are unable to secure high-paying, high-skilled jobs. Consequently they are afforded less opportunities to develop their civic skills, making them less likely to participate in politics.

Another link between affluence and activity is an orientation to politics. This is also largely associated with educational attainment.⁸⁷ Simply put, if an individual is well-informed about politics and effective participation then they are more likely to participate. Furthermore, people who feel that their vote will make a difference are also more likely to participate.⁸⁸ As proven by the court in *Bone Shirt v. Hazeltine*, the vast majority of the time Indian voters are defeated by white bloc voting even when they vote cohesively. This disillusioned many Lakota voters in Pine Ridge and Rosebud Reservations and leaves them with little orientation to politics.

Finally, recruitment is a key factor in the relationship between poverty and political activity. Verba, Schlozman and Brady explain that individuals with an interest in politics are more likely to actually participate if they are asked. Interestingly, this concern was reflected in the 1981 report from the South Dakota Advisory Committee to the US Commission on Human Rights. They suggested that the "State Department of Personnel should take every opportunity to search out





qualified Native American candidates” in an effort to increase Indian political participation.⁸⁹ However, people with strong civic skills and orientations to politics are the ones who are most likely to be targeted by political organizations, “a fact that has further exacerbated the SES [socioeconomic status] stratification of political participation.”⁹⁰ Thus the civic voluntarism model shows that reservation poverty breeds conditions for poor political participation which, in turn, make the Lakota less likely to be asked to participate in politics at all.

Undoubtedly, Lakota poverty also increases discrimination in education and health, which hinders the Lakotans’ ability to participate effectively in the political process. In his analysis of the VRA in South Dakota, Laughlin McDonald notes that twenty nine percent of South Dakota Indians twenty-five years and older have not completed their high school education, while only fourteen percent of white South Dakotans in the same age group are without a high school diploma.⁹¹ Moreover the high school dropout rate among South Dakota Indians aged sixteen to nineteen is twenty four percent, four times the rate among whites.⁹² Obviously, non-completion of secondary school - let alone a postsecondary education - is a crucial obstacle to political participation among American Indians in South Dakota.

Educational deprivation has important consequences for political participation. For instance literacy and language barriers on the reservations are a huge challenge to Indian political activity. The illiteracy rate on Rosebud and Pine Ridge Reservations, as well as other reservations in South Dakota, is high and many Siouan-speakers struggle with English proficiency. As a result, many South Dakota Indians need both written and oral Lakota and Dakota translations of elections materials.⁹³

Similarly, the poor socioeconomic conditions on the reservations have taken a serious toll on the health of the Lakota Sioux. Perhaps the most detrimental factor to general health on Pine Ridge and Rosebud Reservations is alcoholism. Among Indians in the United States the death rate from alcoholism is four times the national average.⁹⁴ In Pine Ridge it is ten times the national average.⁹⁵ Rampant alcoholism in the reservations is combined with other poverty-related health issues such as malnutrition and elevated levels of heart disease, Fetal Alcohol Syndrome (FAS), influenza, adult diabetes and cancer.⁹⁶ Consequently Pine Ridge has a life expectancy of only fifty years old, the lowest in the western world apart from Haiti.⁹⁷ The political effects of poor health conditions are varied and range from increased educational disadvantages to unemployment. Evidently, the court’s decision to award Senate factors



five and six in favour of the plaintiffs reflects the political disadvantages that face the Lakota Sioux as a result of poor socioeconomic conditions.

On September 15, 2004 Judge Schreier released a one hundred and forty-four page memorandum opinion and order for the §2 VRA violation in *Bone Shirt v. Hazeltine*.⁹⁸ She outlined in detail the proceedings of the court and their decisions regarding the Gingles factors and the totality of the circumstances. The court concluded that evidence proved that “the South Dakota 2001 Plan results in unequal electoral opportunities for Indian voters.”⁹⁹ Since redistricting is the domain of the state, the defendant is given the first opportunity to remedy a §2 violation. The judgment was ordered in favour of the plaintiffs and Judge Schreier ordered the state of South Dakota to file remedial redistricting plans within forty-five days.¹⁰⁰

Aftermath, Appeals and Remedial Orders

Judge Schreier’s memorandum opinion and order launched a long paper trail of appeals and remedial orders. On July 29, 2005 the state of South Dakota respectfully refused to submit remedial redistricting plans. Secretary Chris Nelson explained that “the state’s position was that there was no plan that was fairer than what was already in place” and that, due to low Indian voter turnout rates, any new plan would reduced the potential for Indians to elect Indian-preferred candidates.¹⁰¹ As a result, the duty of remedial reapportionment fell to the district court.

On August 8, 2005 Judge Schreier filed a remedial order for *Bone Shirt v. Hazeltine*’s §2 violation. The court adopted the plaintiff’s illustrative redistricting Plan A as the basis for the remedial plan.¹⁰² “Remedial Plan 1” reorganized Districts 26, 27 and 21. The new District 27 contained all of Pine Ridge Reservation and its off-reservation trust lands. It had an Indian population of 73 percent with an Indian VAP of 65.56 percent.¹⁰³ Similarly District 26 encompassed Todd, Mellette, Tripp and Gregory Counties, as well as all of Rosebud Reservation and most of its off-reservation trust lands. Moreover, the court adopted Representative Bradford’s original suggestion and divided District 26 into two single-member house districts. District 26A had an Indian majority. The Indian population was 80.88 percent and an Indian VAP was 74.36 percent.¹⁰⁴

Furthermore, the district court took precautions to ensure that the Indian VAP in minority-majority districts was substantial enough to account for low Indian voter turnout. Dr. Zax provided a statistical analysis of voter turnout rates in both districts. The results showed that





District 27 and 26A had “a sufficient number of Indians to constitute a politically effective voting group.”¹⁰⁵ Judge Schreier ordered that Remedial Plan 1 replace the 2001 Plan effective immediately.

The state appealed *Bone Shirt v. Hazeltine* on the grounds that Remedial Plan 1 violated the equal rights clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The United States Court of Appeals upheld Judge Schreier’s decision according to *Easley v. Cromartie*.¹⁰⁶ As previously discussed, this defense is highly contentious since the very nature of the VRA is race-based. §2 of the 1965 VRA prohibited discriminatory practices “on account of race or color” and the 1975 amendment extended the provision to “language minorities”.¹⁰⁷ The language minorities identified by Congress included “American Indians, Asian-Americans, Alaskan Natives and persons of Spanish Heritage.”¹⁰⁸ Every one of the protected language minorities is also a racial minority. Moreover, the Gingles test refers to the minority group as separate and distinct from the “white majority”.¹⁰⁹ Obviously *Easley v. Cromartie*’s claim that race is not the predominant factor behind redistricting is tenuous at best.

Beyond Bone Shirt

Despite the inconsistencies in Supreme Court VRA rulings, minority voting rights advocacy is morally, legally and politically important because it yields tangible results. Indian voting prospects are improving. Over the last two decades Indian voting and registration have shown significant increases.¹¹⁰ Moreover, tribal governments continue to work to improve the socioeconomic conditions on Rosebud and Pine Ridge Reservations. Foundations such as the Oglala Sioux Tribe Higher Education Program grant financial assistance to Lakota students wishing to pursue a baccalaureate degree.¹¹¹ New businesses can also improve reservation life and help erode the cycle of poverty. Talks of a major interstate running North-South along the western edge of Pine Ridge could bring gamblers to the Prairie Wind Casino and provide a much-needed source of income in Pine Ridge Reservation.¹¹² Undoubtedly, continued decreases in poverty and increases in education would be highly beneficial for Lakota political participation.

Bone Shirt v. Hazeltine contributes to a broader narrative of voting rights struggles in America. It brings to light contemporary obstacles that minorities in the United States encounter, including socioeconomic disparity, state politics, government representation and political participation. Moreover, it reveals the complex legal and judicial process that governs the right to vote. The efforts of the Lakota



Sioux parallel the efforts of minorities all over the United States in their continued fight for equality. Indeed the struggle for the right to vote speaks to a larger journey towards equal and inclusive citizenship in the United States of America.

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20. *Ibid.*
21. *Ibid.*
22. *Ibid.*, II.
23. *Ibid.*
24. *Ibid.*
25. *United States, South Dakota Advisory Committee*, VII.
26. *Bone Shirt v. Hazeltine*. DSD 18 (2004), III.
27. *Ibid.*
28. *Ibid.*
29. Daniel McCool et al., *Native Vote*, 144.
30. *Bone Shirt v. Hazeltine*. DSD 18 (2004).
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32. NOTE: Amicus Curiae refers to an advisor to the court who is not directly involved in the case.
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51. *Ibid.*
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53. *Ibid.*, Introduction, IV.
54. NOTE: Packing refers to the creation of unnecessarily large supermajorities in the effort of diluting a minority vote. Fragmenting refers to the division of minority voters among several districts to avoid a minority-majority district.
55. *Ibid.*, IV, A.
56. *Ibid.*





57. Ibid.
58. *Bone Shirt v. Hazeltine*. DSD 18 (2004), IV, B.
59. Ibid.
60. Ibid, IV, B, 1.
61. Ibid, IV, B, 2.
62. NOTE: Endogenous elections elect representative from Districts 26 and 27, while exogenous elections elect representatives to the state or the nation.
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79. South Dakota: Tribal Government Relations, "Rosebud Sioux Tribe," South Dakota Office to Tribal Government Relations, <http://www.state.sd.us/oia/rosebud.asp>.
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The Fight for the Falklands

Understanding the Falklands Conflict in the Context of the Cold War

Laura Andrea Saavedra

On March 23 1982, several scrap metal workers entered the Island of South Georgia and raised an Argentine flag. A few days later the British Intelligence Service received reports that Argentina planned a military invasion of the Falkland Islands. In order to avoid any military confrontation among his allies, American President Ronald Reagan personally telephoned the Argentine *Casa Rosa* in an attempt to dissuade then military Dictator, General Leopoldo Galtieri from his actions in the Atlantic. His efforts proved to be useless. The next day on April 2, Argentine military troops passed on to seize the Falklands, the South Georgias, and the South Sandwich Islands. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher instantly responded with a military task force,¹ leading to a war that was to leave the American administration in a critical diplomatic endeavor for a month. Overall, this conflict, in which both parties fought over islands that had only 1,813 inhabitants and no economic activity besides sheep farming,² was to cause the displacement of more than 11,000 soldiers, and the death of 910 soldiers.³ The perceived low worth of these islands calls into question the motives behind the Argentine and British ventures. The Americans' behavior during the conflict is equally questionable. For a month, in an attempt to save a new alliance – Washington and Buenos Aires never had a close relationship until 1980 – the United States declared neutrality, at the risk of alienating their closest ally. Why then did the United States take the time to mediate the conflict?

In order to attempt to answer these two questions, extensive research has been conducted in several primary as well as secondary sources. The main source of evidence on Argentina was the daily Latin American transmissions from the Foreign Bureau of Investigation Services (FBIS). For the United States and Britain, the memoirs of influential members of the government, such as Reagan and Thatcher, gave insights





into almost all the aspects of the conflict. Although, there were no memoirs from the main Argentine participants, it was fortunate to find one volume that contained an interview conducted with an Argentine officer on the conflict.⁴ Finally, official governmental publications, as well as American and Argentine newspapers were consulted. Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind that given the relatively recent timing of the event, most official documents remain classified. Therefore, even if these sources provided sufficient information on the events, there is the possibility that this interpretation might vary after more documents are declassified.

Secondary sources have not been scarce, especially concerning the motives for the Falklands War. On the one hand, most British and American scholars have focused on the British reaction to the conflict, giving insufficient attention to the Argentine motivations. Their focus is mainly how the negative course of British domestic politics influenced Thatcher's decision to launch a devastating attack in order to save her government.⁵ On the other hand, Argentine authors have brought their own national biases into their research and have tended to dwell on the reasons for their country's attack on the Falklands.⁶ It would seem that their main intention is to denounce both the military government and British imperialism. Overall, there is a consensus that the Argentine Junta saw the Falklands War as a temporary diversion from the deteriorating domestic situation. Few authors have written on the American mediation of the conflict.⁷ Their main conclusion is that the United States had never abandoned Britain, and that they mediated in order to prevent an armed conflict. With respect to the Argentine-American alliance during this period, only one book has examined the common interest that both Argentina and the United States had in Central America.⁸

Overall this research paper intends to portray the Falklands War through a Cold War lens. Therefore, all the aforementioned aspects are included, and have been reinterpreted keeping in mind the international atmosphere of the 1980s. According to the evidence, the following paper sustains that the Argentine government caused the 1982 Falklands crisis in order to save face as their domestic situation deteriorated. Yet this attack came at the wrong time. Also facing domestic problems, the Thatcher Government had no other choice but to respond or, potentially, to lose power. Therefore, the Reagan administration was caught between two important allies, especially since Argentina was helping the United States with the Communist infiltration in Central America. Thus the American government attempted to mediate the conflict in order to





obtain a peaceful solution. The unwillingness to compromise on both sides, led the United States eventually to tilt towards the British. This paper is divided into three main sections. First, it explores the motives of both the Argentine and British government to fight for the Falkland Islands. Following this, the interest of the United States in the conflict will be discussed by exploring their attachment to Argentina. Finally, it will conclude by examining the reasons why the United States eventually turned towards the British.

An Unlikely War

The Falklands are located on the Southeast coast of Argentina, and are approximately 4,700 square miles in area. The dispute over these islands dates the time of the Spanish colonization, originally amongst the British and the Spanish.⁹ After gaining independence from the Spanish in 1810, the Argentines inherited the Falklands' sovereignty dispute.¹⁰ In 1833, the United Kingdom occupied the Islands, and has administered them ever since. The British *de-facto* control of the Falklands has angered Argentina and prevented the achievement of a common agreement.¹¹ The main debate is centered on the date that these islands were discovered, since it "is one of the bases for claims to legal title".¹² According to scholar Lowell Gustafson both Britain and Argentina have presented sets of evidence, such as "log entries, diaries, and autobiographies of the early European sea explorers",¹³ in which "the explorers [do] not make accurate estimations of their positions." Additionally he notes that "[t]heir descriptions of sea conditions and the positions of landmasses are equally imprecise."¹⁴ Hence, such records have only led to further exacerbation of the diplomatic struggle, which an unstable Argentine government would transform into a violent conflict in 1982.

Confronted with a critical economic situation and a volatile political scene, the Argentine Military Junta's hold on power was threatened. In order to maintain their political position, the Junta sought to distract the public by winning the Falklands for Argentina. Yet the invasion demanded a response from Britain, given that this act also threatened its government's hold on power – which the Junta did not expect. Since their 1976 coup d'état, military commanders – General Jorge Rafael Videla, Admiral Emilio Massera and General Orlando Ramon Agosti – took over the Argentine state. A couple of years prior to this coup, Argentina was not only prey to corruption and economic decay,





but also to political unrest.¹⁵ At the time, head of state Isabel Perón, wife of the former president Juan Domingo Perón, was known to be under the influence of the Minister of Social Welfare José López Rega.¹⁶ Lopez Rega, also known as *el brujo*,¹⁷ was the founder and protector of the *Alianza Anticomunista Argentina* (AAA), an extreme-right terrorist group.¹⁸ This atmosphere of discontent led to the rise of leftist guerrillas, such as the *Movimiento Peronista Montonero* ('Los Montoneros') and the *Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo* (ERP), who in 1975 increased their terrorist activities.¹⁹

The members of the 1976 military Junta acted swiftly and decisively during this period of instability to establish their rule, and dubbed their regime *El Proceso de Reorganización Nacional*. According to the military, democracy had to be put temporarily on hold since "the government's present capacity was seriously compromised by the infiltration of subversives, and the political vacuum created by the death of President Peron."²⁰ Their main intention was to control the Argentine government until they felt that the people were capable of handling a democracy, which was devoid of unwanted elements, especially communists.²¹ In the last document emitted by the Argentine military government before they surrendered power, known as the *Final Document of the Military Junta*, the regime established that their mission only had been to destroy the insurgent radicals, who had caused years of turbulence in the country.²² Yet with time, the military Junta had not only sought to destroy the guerrillas but had also moved to annihilate all those that they labeled as "subversives" – in other words, anyone who opposed the regime.²³ As the opening statement of the 1985 trial report on the Argentine military generals mentioned, "the defendants had been tried for a series of crimes, from murder to falsification of documents, committed during the 'dirty war' against subversion – a state-organized campaign of systematic repression".²⁴

Although this military dictatorship was originally unchallengeable, by the beginning of the 1980s the regime ran into trouble. First, the Junta's economic policies proved to be a failure. By mid-1981 the biggest economic crisis ever to hit Argentina was looming in the air.²⁵ According to a governmental economic report in August 1981,

In the first half of 1981 the foreign debt increased by 4,8 percent in relation to that of December 1980. According to provisional statistics, this debt amounts to a bit more than \$28 billion, without counting the corresponding interest, some \$7,8





billion from the private sector and \$3,8 from the public sector.²⁶

Moreover, unemployment rates had reached 13 percent of the population, and “in addition to the large-scale unemployment there was also a reduction of 20 percent in the real salaries of the manufacturing sector during the first 7 months of this year [1981].”²⁷ When interviewed on the situation, former Minister of Industry, Eduardo Oxenford commented, “unemployment levels are following a dangerous trend.”²⁸ He later added that this situation was the “result of one of the worse crises that the productive system has undergone in its history.”²⁹ The economic decay increased by December 1981.³⁰ The Junta attempted to change this situation by taking new economic measures. However, when the new Economic Minister Roberto Alemann attempted to implement various changes to liberalize country’s economy, various people – both influential and non-influential – regarded these measures with great hostility. For instance, groups such as the Union of State Workers protested against Alemann’s new economic plans, because they saw them as “a new exponent of a policy of hunger, misery and repression which [had] been in force since 24 March 1976.”³¹ These new economic measures increased popular dissatisfaction towards the government.³²

As troubling economic conditions threatened the regime’s control, internal divisions further weakened the Junta’s strength. Since the beginning of the 1980s, the members of the military regime had increasingly become divided. According to Carlos M. Túrolo, about five years into the Process of National Reorganization infighting increased amongst the members of the government.³³ The economic crisis appeared to be one of the main causes for the disagreement. By July 4, 1981, former Interior Minister Guillermo Borda “stated that the current economic crisis was “affecting the country’s power structure” and that if it [was] not solved soon ‘it could lead to a military coup.’”³⁴ The Junta’s political differences had surfaced in 1980, on the eve of President General Videla’s retirement. The debate was centered on the necessity to name his replacement.³⁵ Although the front-runner was General Roberto Viola, naval captain Armando Lambruschini opposed his nomination. He wanted to designate the chief of the army, General Galtieri, as president – a nomination that would give the latter control of both the presidency and the military. However, this proposition was opposed, as it would have greatly centralized power,³⁶ and most members of the military junta were dead-set on making Viola president, as in fact occurred on March 29, 1981.³⁷





With Viola's election, the disagreements among the members of the military Junta did not cease. The new president's worsening health problems permitted their internal discords to resurface. Using the general's deteriorated physical condition as an excuse, his opponents brought his short presidential term to an end. During the first interview he granted to reporters after his ouster, Viola made clear that he had not voluntarily left the presidency. According to a news broadcast, he "emphatically asserted, 'I did not resign for reasons of health. It is perfectly clear that I was removed.'"³⁸ He later added, "I have decided to remain silent, so as not to obstruct the national reorganization process."³⁹ His ousting appeared to be the consequence of both economic and political differences with the Junta. The members of the previous military administration did not agree with Viola's new economic policies. This subject had become a public debate between Videla's Economic Minister José Alfredo Martínez de Hoz, and Viola's Economic Minister Lorenzo Sigaut.⁴⁰ The Junta also disagreed with his political opinions.⁴¹ Although there was no explicit mention in the documents, as soon as Galtieri reached power, he immediately made changes in the personnel. All civilian ministers and presidential advisers resigned straight away, and their positions were filled with sympathizers towards the new regime.⁴² Furthermore, Galtieri's arrival in the government brought about many protests, especially by those that opposed the presence of the Junta in general.

At first, the Junta's rule was absolute, and any protest against their actions was considered a grave offense. Nevertheless, the private and, more importantly, public infighting among the members of the military substantially weakened the regime since they could no longer show one common and coherent front. At the beginning of the 1980s the levels of protest had also increased, showing that the Junta was no longer strong enough to hold back the public dissatisfaction and protest. As proof of this, in October 1981 the group *Las Madres de la Plaza de Mayo* were able to publish a list of all those that 'disappeared' in a local newspaper, an action that was previously unthinkable.⁴³ Support for this group gradually increased over time. Several hunger strikes were initiated in their favor,⁴⁴ and reporters even dared to directly confront president Viola on the matter in national press conferences.⁴⁵ As time passed, the regime was no longer able to hold political prisoners, and several of them were released as they were captured: a sign that the system was beginning to crack.⁴⁶ The strength of the regime suffered a further blow when many of the labour unions became revitalized. Although immediately re-suppressed,⁴⁷ on October 14, 1981 the Peronist





Labour Unions “resuscitated the ‘62’, the political branch of the Peronist union movement that was banned by the military government in March 1976”.⁴⁸ Radical party leaders also increasingly voiced their opposition towards the government in public.⁴⁹ A former Communist Party leader overtly stated in newspapers the need to “urgently implement measures and actions designed to obtain the freedom of political and union prisoners, the clarification of the status of missing persons and the launching of an emergency economic plan capable of expanding job sources and security a fair salary.”⁵⁰ Moreover, many of the government’s censorship attempts were no longer kept secret. For example, the news network publicly denounced “that they were warned not to cover news about the activities of human right organizations, about a speech subtly critical of the government made by Colonel Esteban Solis at the war college on Thursday, or about the multi-party grouping.”⁵¹ The sudden resurgence of protest groups that would publically denounce the regime thus demonstrates that the regime was no longer effectively in control of the opposition. This freedom was a sign that the Junta had grown weaker over time.

The possible collapse of the regime was further accentuated when the protests against the regime’s abuses evolved into calls for democratization. By July 16, 1981, several people throughout the nation came to support the idea of pressuring the government for elections with the help of *La Multipartidaria Nacional*, a political coalition that regrouped the members of the opposition and called for a return to democracy.⁵² A couple of weeks later, on August 4, more parties, such as “the Peronists, Radicals, Developmentalists, Christian Democrats and the Intransigents” would decide to join *La Multipartidaria*.⁵³ Although the Junta had not yet set a date for the return to democracy, the political atmosphere in the country gave the impression that the end of the military regime would come soon. Former parties, which had been shut down by the Junta, such as the Christian Democratic Party, started to re-organize, and they increasingly demanded “the repeal of the freezing of political activity.”⁵⁴ Several other radical groups also reappeared and demanded that the multiparty system be legalized. The Argentine news on August 19 1981 claimed that “the Multiparty Group today received ‘total support’ from Victor Garcia Costa’s Popular Socialist Party (PSP) and Athos Fava’s Communist Party (PC).”⁵⁵ The Junta attempted to quell these protests and demands, especially with the replacement of Viola by Galtieri. Yet this was of no avail; the population refused to accept the new leader.⁵⁶

In a desperate attempt to save their rule the Argentine





government decided to find an event that would restore its power over the population. The takeover of the Falklands represented the perfect solution. For Argentines, the Islands had always represented the symbol of the battle against colonization and imperialism; and, according to Junta, neither the British nor the American government would react if they were to seize them. The United Kingdom had never granted much importance to the Falklands. For many British citizens, the Islands held no value;⁵⁷ as Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Lord Peter Carrington put it in his memoirs, “[t]he Falklands represented no vital strategic or economic interest for Britain.”⁵⁸ For Argentina, however, this territory was a prized position; the battle against imperialism and colonialism had always been an integral part of Argentine history.⁵⁹ The connection between the anti-imperialist struggle and the Falklands is made clear by several Argentine texts from the 1980s. These authors justified the regime’s venture by citing the resolution 1514 of the United Nations,⁶⁰ which granted the “independence to colonial countries and peoples”.⁶¹ According to them, imperialist Britain was acting against the resolution set by the United Nations. The Junta could not have found a better argument to suit their purpose. This claim was so appealing to Argentines that it was able to overcome deep political divisions: when the Junta launched the war for the Falklands, even those previously persecuted by their regime supported the cause. The leaders of leftist terrorist groups, such as *los Montoneros*, defended the Junta’s initiative in the Falklands,⁶² and Argentine exiles living in the United States, who had fled military oppression, supported the invasion and protested against British intervention.⁶³

This anti-colonial theme was also evoked in the Junta’s propaganda campaign to internationalize support for their cause. On April 10, 1982, a letter was sent to all the presidents of Latin America in order to obtain their endorsement for the Falklands conflict. In justifying the invasion, General Galtieri called for a “prompt solution” to the “intolerable survival of the colonial regime”.⁶⁴ Interestingly, this cry against European imperialism persuaded many South American countries and organizations, such as the Andean Pact, to back the Junta.⁶⁵ Various Latin American countries even condemned the United Kingdom’s move to get the European Economic Community (EEC) to close all markets to Argentina.⁶⁶ The permanent secretary of the Latin American Economic System (SELA) would “denounce the economic sanctions applied against Argentina by the EEC and countries outside the Latin American region in support of colonial interests.”⁶⁷

Most importantly, the military Junta sought to repossess



the islands since they believed that neither the United States nor Britain would intervene. During an interview, the governor whom the Argentines had designated to the Falklands, General Mario Benjamín Menéndez, confessed that the Junta viewed a response from the British as “unlikely”.⁶⁸ Their lack of preparation for the war also made clear that they believed the United Kingdom would not respond. According to Menéndez, the Junta knew that the army was in no condition to fight, especially after new budget cuts that limited their fighting capacity.⁶⁹ The Argentine regime also believed that the United States would not intervene given their recent cooperation. As Reagan mentions in his memoirs, “Galtieri thought we would side with Argentina because we were neighbors in the Americas and because we had requested the junta’s help in fighting Communism in the hemisphere.”⁷⁰ In other words, the military Junta thought they had received a green light to take over the islands.

The invasion on April 2 came as a surprise to the British, and although they were not as attached to the Islands as the Argentines, the act was a blow to the Thatcher government. Prior to the conflict, the United Kingdom did not pay much attention to the Falklands despite the fact that the majority of the settlers on the Islands were of British origin.⁷¹ By 1982, the main language of the Falklands was English, and the majority of the settlers had a link to Britain⁷² – according to the 1980 census only 30 of the 1,813 inhabitants were Argentine.⁷³ In fact, the main reason Britain had not given up the Islands prior to the conflict was the islanders’ strong influence in the U.K. For instance, their lobby in the London Parliament stopped the creation of a Memorandum of Understanding in 1968, which would have “promised eventual recognition of Argentine sovereignty [over the Falklands] in return for guarantees of the islanders’ rights”.⁷⁴ Nevertheless, the 1982 attack created a crisis within Thatcher’s government that made the Falklands impossible to ignore. The press accused the Foreign Office of not having paid sufficient attention to the signs that Argentina was going to attack.⁷⁵ Lord Carrington resigned three days after the Argentines landed on the Islands.⁷⁶ Although after the war Thatcher would conclude that “[t]he truth is that the invasion could not have been foreseen or prevented,”⁷⁷ Carrington would claim otherwise. He recognized that since Galtieri’s rise to power, Argentina became increasingly cold and impatient during the diplomatic debates.⁷⁸ He also claimed that several intelligence reports had indicated “that there was a volatile situation in Argentina and hints (clearly inspired) in the Argentine newspapers that if negotiations failed a military solution might be inevitable.”⁷⁹





Thus for both the people and the government of Britain, winning the Falklands war became crucially important. The Argentine attack brought a feeling of outrage to the British public – in opinion polls 80 per cent of the population approved military action against the invasion.⁸⁰ This attitude contrasted with their previous lack of attachment the Islands. The British thought that losing the Falklands would make them appear a tired, defeated power. The Argentine invasion contributed to the British public's overall disappointment with the development of British foreign policy.⁸¹ As Thatcher writes in her memoirs, "[t]he significance for the Falklands War was enormous, both for Britain's self-confidence and for our standing in the world. Since the Suez fiasco, 1956, British foreign policy had been one long retreat."⁸² Moreover, the attack came at a time when the Tory government was at a low in popularity. To lose the Falklands might have posed a serious challenge to Thatcher's rule. In the post-Second World War era, an atmosphere of consensus between the right and the left dominated British politics.⁸³ During these years, the labour movement had gained substantial influence over the government.⁸⁴ But the beginning of the 1970s had brought a deep economic crisis to the country.⁸⁵ This situation was further exacerbated by the non-collaboration of the trade unions, who, owing to their constant strikes and protests, were depicted as "holding the nation to ransom".⁸⁶ On entering government in 1979, the new Prime Minister intended to bring change to British politics. Her main strategy, later known as Thatcherism, relied on implementing new drastic economic policies, which were designed to boost the British economy. Thatcher's chief economic advisor Sir Alan Walters summarizes the objectives of her plan into four objectives: to "secure financial stability, particularly the reduction in the rate of inflation to low and stable levels, diminish the role of the state in the economy, privatize state-owned industries, and weaken the power of the trade union movement."⁸⁷ Although in the long run these policies stabilized the British economy, at the beginning of the 1980s they seemed only to cause massive unemployment.⁸⁸ Consequently, Thatcher's government was constantly under attack, and to fail to respond to Argentine aggression or to lose the conflict might well have brought her government to an end.⁸⁹ The British thus felt compelled to respond to the aggression, and with U.N. Resolution 502 in their favor they went on to counterattack.⁹⁰

A Convenient New Alliance

On April 2, 1982, Reagan was informed that the Argentine





government had ordered the invasion of the Falklands Islands, an event that caught the American administration between two important allies. From the beginning, Britain assumed that the United States would support them unconditionally, in view of their close historical relationship, which had improved considerably under Thatcher and Reagan. Secretary of State Alexander Haig recalled in his memoirs that the British demanded an immediate American condemnation of Argentine actions. He also mentions that London insisted that Washington “withdraw its ambassador to Buenos Aires, take the issue of Argentine aggression to the Organization of American States (OAS), and embargo arms shipments to Argentina.”⁹¹ Over the years, America had singled out Britain as its closest ally among the western powers. This partnership reached its peak in the 1980s, during Thatcher’s and Reagan’s terms in office. These two heads of state were known for their personal bond during their time in power. The American President even admitted to having felt an immediate deep connection with British Prime Minister from their first meeting, deeming her “warm, feminine, gracious, and intelligent”.⁹² By the end of Reagan’s term, he would record this partnership as one of the greatest he had ever had during his presidency, and would admit that this was one of the reasons why in the end he was unable to support Argentina during the Falklands conflict:

Throughout the eight years of my presidency, no alliance we had was stronger than the one between the United States and the United Kingdom. Not only did Margaret Thatcher and I become personal friends and share a similar philosophy about government; the alliance was strengthened by the long special relationship between our countries born of shared democratic values, common Anglo-Saxon roots, a common language, and a friendship deepened and mellowed by fighting two world wars side by side. The depth of this special relationship made it impossible for us to remain neutral during Britain’s war with Argentina over the Falkland Islands in 1982⁹³

Unlike the long-standing relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom, American-Argentine relations were never as warm.⁹⁴ Although these two countries had long had an uneasy relationship, especially under Jimmy Carter, this situation changed significantly with Reagan. Mark Falcoff writes that “Argentina has not been a particularly active player in the inter-American system, but to the degree that it has,





it has striven to represent a pole of opposition to the United States.”⁹⁵ In other words, Argentina always saw the United States as a source of competition rather than an ally on the South American continent.⁹⁶ However, these two states managed occasionally to collaborate, despite their uneasy relationship. The official break between these two governments only came under Jimmy Carter in the late 1970s. The American president advocated a new foreign policy direction in which the campaign against human rights violations became a priority.⁹⁷ Given the Argentine Military Junta’s record as one of the most brutal administrations in Argentine history,⁹⁸ they were among the first targets on his list. Hence, during the Carter administration the United States limited the foreign aid that was designated to Argentina,⁹⁹ which created a difficult background for developing bilateral relations with the then Argentine dictatorship until the 1981 presidential change.

The Reagan administration sought to shift American foreign policy from that of the previous administration, especially in the area of human rights. The new president sought to restore diplomatic relations with all the countries that Carter had alienated during his term, thus including Argentina once again as an American ally.¹⁰⁰ As Reagan’s Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig noted in his memoirs:

We told Argentina that it had heard its last public lecture from the United States on human rights. The practice of publicly denouncing friends on questions of human rights while minimizing the abuse of those rights in the Soviet Union and other totalitarian countries was at an end.¹⁰¹

Reagan’s increased desire to restore diplomatic relations with this Latin American country was in part because he needed the help of regimes like the Argentine military Junta in order to advance his anti-communist agenda. During the Jimmy Carter era, the United States had been forced by Carter’s human-rights policies to withdraw from most foreign interventions. Yet this retreat made many Americans feel discredited in the international arena, especially in light of events such as the Iranian Hostage Crisis, which had humiliated the American government in front of the world.¹⁰² Reagan thus sought to restore America’s international reputation, especially in the battle against communism. Jeane Kirkpatrick, the American Ambassador to the United Nations and influential member of the Reagan administration on the matter of foreign politics, noted this change of spirit in a speech given on May 28, 1981:





The elections of 1980 marked the end of a national identity crisis through which the United States had been passing for some ten or fifteen years. This was a period of great national self-doubt and self-denigration for Americans. Now there is a new national consensus in both our domestic and our foreign affairs, and that new consensus reflects a return of the nation's self-confidence.¹⁰³

Reagan increased the animosity with the Soviet Union that the previous administrations, except Carter's, had lowered with *détente*.¹⁰⁴ The sudden necessity to reignite an anti-communist crusade came from the fear of Soviet expansionism.¹⁰⁵ As Haig mentions, the administration believed that in the 1980s they "were witnessing the conjunction of Soviet ambition and a maturing Soviet global reach."¹⁰⁶ At international conferences, Kirkpatrick also mentioned that fear of Soviet expansionism: "[d]uring the decade from 1970 to 1980, the Soviet Union expanded its sphere of control in Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and the Western Hemisphere."¹⁰⁷ The United States therefore felt the urge to reignite the fight against Communism, an opportunity that they would find in Central America.

For several years prior to the Falklands War, leftist groups had gained much influence within Central America. Given that this region was dangerously close to the United States, close attention was paid to its domestic upheavals.¹⁰⁸ According to Reagan, since his initial days in office there had been reports of Marxist influence within Central America.¹⁰⁹ The president believed in the domino theory, and he thought that both the Soviets and Castro were aiming towards Central America.¹¹⁰ According to Reagan, "El Salvador and Nicaragua were only a down payment. Honduras, Guatemala, and Costa Rica were next, and then would come Mexico."¹¹¹ Accordingly, he was committed to defend this part of the globe: "[w]e had already lost Cuba to Communism. I was determined the Free World was not going to lose Central America or more of the Caribbean to the Communists".¹¹² Although, the American government was concerned by the case of El Salvador – where Communist guerrillas had provoked a civil war in the countryside by constantly challenging the Salvadorian military government – ¹¹³ they saw the greatest challenge in Sandinista Nicaragua.¹¹⁴ Under the Somoza dynasty, which ruled from 1936 to 1979, this Central American country was one of the most faithful American allies.¹¹⁵ Yet the Somoza family was also known to be very corrupt, and their infamous wealth was built on the country's funds.¹¹⁶ The situation under these leaders gave rise to an opposing force of Marxist tendencies,





later known as the Sandinista Front for National Liberation (FSLN),¹¹⁷ which would eventually triumph over the Somozas in 1979.¹¹⁸ With this new government, Nicaragua officially began to follow the communist ideology, thus establishing another socialist friendly government in Latin America.¹¹⁹ The situation in Central America led Reagan on a crusade against all possible communist insurgencies. Whereas in El Salvador the United States could offer aid to the official Salvadorian regime,¹²⁰ their anti-communist crusade came to a halt in Nicaragua. It was impossible for them to openly support anti-communist militias against a legally recognized government.¹²¹ The president recognized that neither Congress nor the American public would have approved the initiative.¹²² Although the Reagan administration would eventually resort to covertly funding the anti-Sandinista movement, the Contras,¹²³ they initially sought the help of other countries that disapproved of the communist presence in Central America.¹²⁴

The American administration found the perfect ally for their Central American quest in the Argentine Military Junta. The Argentine regime was not only virulently anti-communist in its own territory,¹²⁵ but at the time, they also were attempting to expand their anti-communist activities throughout the Southern hemisphere.¹²⁶ For example, on his first day as president of the Argentine government, general Viola said in an interview that not only did Argentina share the new American policy in El Salvador, but that they would “place a special emphasis on regional affairs.”¹²⁷ After visiting the United States in late 1981, Foreign Minister Oscar Camilión declared in an interview that “if the possibility of concerted cooperation of Latin America or non-Latin American countries with Central America was ever brought up, Argentina would be willing to listen to such ideas”.¹²⁸ According to historian Ariel Armony, the Argentine government, and not the Reagan administration, began to fight in Central America against communist forces.¹²⁹ Prior to Galtieri’s rise to power in December 1981, this connection was hidden from the public eye. Constant statements were made by the Argentines denying any ties to Central America.¹³⁰ Yet despite their claims, since the Junta’s rise to power in 1976 they had been interfering in Central America, especially in Nicaragua, where they collaborated closely with Somoza.¹³¹ The Junta’s major contribution to fight the left “was provided through military training, intelligence, and arms sales.”¹³² In addition, the regime always looked explicitly willing to collaborate in the anti-communist crusade in El Salvador: in March 1981, Secretary General of the Army, General Alfredo Saint Jean reported that “we offered our advice in this struggle (of the Salvadoran regime against the guerrillas), which we





experienced once ourselves.”¹³³ The aid to this country was explicitly mentioned after Galtieri’s rise to power in December 1981, when the government began sending around “15 million dollar low-interest, long-term credit for the purchase of medicines and capital goods”¹³⁴ to the Salvadorian junta, thus openly supporting the country’s military regime.

The United States found an ally in Argentina in order to fight against the communist insurgencies throughout Central America. The Reagan administration felt it essential to build new ties with Argentina. From his first months in office, Reagan oriented his foreign policy in Latin America so as to improve the relationship with the Military Junta. This intention is clear in a statement Reagan made to the press on March 17 1981, when he met General Roberto Viola, who was meant to replace General Jorge Rafael Videla as the leader of the Junta.

I am glad to have had this chance to meet and talk with President-designate Viola on the eve of his inauguration as President of Argentina. We have had a good discussion on bilateral and multilateral issues of concern to our respective countries. I look forward to efforts by both governments to further improve our relations, and I have extended to General Viola my best wishes for his tenure as President.¹³⁵

Reagan then immediately proceeded to sign increased foreign aid documents, which the previous administration had discontinued.¹³⁶ As he declared in a Statement on Signing International Security and Foreign Assistance Legislation on December 29, 1981, this policy allowed “the repeal of the absolute prohibitions on security assistance to Argentina and Chile.”¹³⁷

The Argentines understood and reciprocated the American initiative. The improvement in American-Argentine relations is demonstrated by the increasing number of trips that Argentine military members made to visit American generals during Reagan’s first year in office.¹³⁸ Indeed, Commander-in-Chief of the Army Leopoldo Galtieri greatly “encouraged” Foreign Minister Oscar Camilión to visit the United States more frequently.¹³⁹ Camilión would later admit that relations had improved: he said in an interview that “with the coming to power of the Reagan’s administration, Argentina’s relations with the White House and the U.S. executive branch have improved considerably.”¹⁴⁰ Thus the beginning of the 1980s were years of great friendship between Argentina and the United States,¹⁴¹ in which the Reagan administration, as well as the Argentine government both spoke of their attempts to move towards



an Argentine democracy, and to continue the fight against perceived threats to democracy.

The necessity of an alliance with Argentina placed the United States in a difficult position as to choosing what side to support during the Falklands War, especially after Reagan had devoted such effort to building ties with the Junta. For this reason, Washington made an attempt at mediation before siding with London on April 30. The American President would later refer to this dilemma in his memoirs as “a conflict in which [he] had to walk a fine line.”¹⁴² As the president said on April 5 during an interview,

It's a very difficult situation for the United States, because we're friends with both of the countries engaged in this dispute, and we stand ready to do anything we can to help them. And what we hope for and would like to help in doing is have a peaceful resolution of this with no forceful action or no bloodshed.¹⁴³

The Return of an Old Friend

With both allies unwilling to back down, the United States was in a difficult position. For one month they attempted to mediate between their allies, even if success was highly improbable. Haig, for example, preferred that Reagan avoid getting directly involved with the peace process, since this mission was too risky, and it could place him in a bad situation.¹⁴⁴ Accordingly, the president refused to comment on the Falklands during the press conferences he held in April.¹⁴⁵ Although publicly the United States pledged neutrality, the American administration was divided into three different positions on the situation. First, influential members like Jeane Kirkpatrick¹⁴⁶ preferred that the United States consider the option of siding with Argentina. Kirkpatrick believed that Argentina was on the right side of the map.¹⁴⁷ As Haig later put it, “Mrs. Kirkpatrick, a specialist in Latin American questions, vehemently opposed an approach that condemned Argentina and supported Britain on the basis of international law. Such a policy, she told the President, would buy the United States “a hundred years of animosity in Latin America.”¹⁴⁸ For Kirkpatrick, both South and Central America were of great importance,¹⁴⁹ and her pro-Argentine attitude gained her bitterness from the British.¹⁵⁰ Thatcher was especially disgusted with the fact that Kirkpatrick dined with members of the Argentine government on the day of the invasion. For her it was as if



the British Ambassador “had dined at the Iranian Embassy the night that the American hostages were seized in Tehran”.¹⁵¹

Second, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger represented the side that supported Britain. According to him, it was important to support the British not only because the United States should not turn against one of their most important allies, but also because the Argentine invasion of the islands was a sign of “naked aggression” which could not go unpunished.¹⁵² He was one of the most ardent supporters of the British, and it appeared that he authorized sending help to Britain secretly, almost immediately after the Argentine invasion.¹⁵³ Geoffrey Smith argues that the British position had the secret approval and support of the president, which meant that the American policy of complete neutrality was only a façade.¹⁵⁴ Smith writes that throughout the entire war, the Americans secretly supplied help to the British, such as intelligence reports against the Argentines and military equipment.¹⁵⁵ In fact, even Thatcher noted that the United States was always tilting towards the British side. Yet she still acknowledged that the Americans could not take this position overtly, since it “would deprive them of influence in Buenos Aires. They did not want Galtieri to fall and so wanted a solution that would save his face.”¹⁵⁶

Finally, Alexander Haig took the middle road by advocating for negotiations. According to Haig, it was necessary to avoid any war. Interestingly, despite his position, he still favored the British, and he mentioned that if by any chance the negotiations should fail, the United States would side with Britain.¹⁵⁷ But against all odds he still attempted to initiate ‘Shuttle Diplomacy’, in hopes of preventing war. According to Weinberger, his mission was meant to imitate the type of diplomacy that Henry Kissinger pursued between Israel and Syria in the mid-1970s.¹⁵⁸ Overall, Weinberger appeared to maintain a negative attitude towards the secretary of state and his diplomatic endeavor. He depicted one of Haig’s speeches as a “verbal mess”, and argued that more time was lost in finding planes to transport him, rather than in the negotiations.¹⁵⁹ Nonetheless, from the beginning of the shuttle diplomacy, Haig had acknowledged the difficulty of the mission.¹⁶⁰ His first goal had been to obtain an “interim administration” in the Falklands, so that they could settle the conflict later.¹⁶¹ Yet both sides were unwilling to compromise. After the first meeting with the British Prime Minister he said that “Mrs. Thatcher’s terms ruled out Argentine acceptance. If Galtieri accepted her terms, it would be the end of him.”¹⁶² Most negotiations that took place with the Junta demonstrated that there was great division and, especially, indecision amongst the military. For example, Haig noted that once in





mid-April after an apparent success during the negotiation attempt in Buenos Aires, as he was about to board his plane, he was stopped by the Minister of Defense Nicanor Mendés to be handed a paper that cancelled the deal they had just agreed upon.¹⁶³ In the end, the constant deadlocks in the negotiations discouraged Haig.¹⁶⁴ Moreover, public opinion within the United States became increasingly supportive of the United Kingdom. According to polls, around 83 percent of the American people supported Britain's cause in the conflict.¹⁶⁵ An increase in public pressure on the administration and a deadlock in the negotiations compelled the United States explicitly to side with the British on April 30, 1982.

In the end, despite the relative unimportance of these islands, the Falklands had crucial implications for the destinies of two powers. After 74 days, Britain crushed the Argentine offensive. Defeated, the military Junta would lose power in Argentina. In 1983, for the first time in eight years, Argentines would go to the ballot boxes and elect President Raúl Alfonsín, marking the beginning of a new democratic era for the country. For Thatcher the end of the conflict would be the complete opposite. Her victory ensured her re-election, and consolidated the new course of British economics and politics. Argentine participation in Central America would gradually diminish, leaving the United States with no other option but to look for other methods that would enable the triumph of the anti-communist cause. Hence, in 1986 the Iran-Contras Affair would forever taint Reagan's presidency.

In general, this war was the desperate attempt of a decaying government to save its hold on power. Yet at that point in time, circumstances were not in their favor; they had initiated a war at the wrong time, with the wrong enemy. Margaret Thatcher was not the type of Prime Minister who could easily be confronted. The Falklands War had implications beyond the two main players. The war's first victim would be American-Argentine relations, which the United States hopelessly attempted to rescue during the first month of the war. Overall, the approach taken here provides an interesting journey into another dimension of the Cold War, which falls outside of the traditional Soviet-American dichotomy. By looking at other actors beyond those typically analysed under a Cold War lens, it is possible to realize that the world's two superpowers were not the only active players during this period. Further research is required in this direction, so as to expand our vision and understanding of this era, which is much more complex than traditionally assumed.





Notes

1. *The Falklands Islands Dispute in International Law and Politics: A Documentary Sourcebook*, Ed. Raphael Perl (New York: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1983), 57.
2. *The Falklands Islands Dispute in International Law and Politics: A Documentary Sourcebook*, 421.
3. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6499565.stm.
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Radicalizing the Latvian Popular Front The Effects of Baltic Solidarity

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Formed in 1988, *Latvijas Tautas fronte* [“the Latvian Popular Front” or LTF] was an umbrella group that united advocates for change in the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR). A mass political organization that promoted civil disobedience, the Latvian Popular Front had a broad appeal that attracted a cross-section of ethnic Latvian society, from moderate Latvian Communist Party members to political dissidents and radical nationalists. Though the LTF was initially formed as a pro-*perestroika* organization during *glasnost*, it soon became the largest and most important opposition group in the Latvian SSR, protesting neo-Stalinism, bureaucracy, stagnation and ultimately, the Soviet Union’s occupation of Latvia. Historians have identified several reasons for this shift in the LTF’s policies, ranging from disillusionment with *perestroika* to the dominance of ethnic nationalists within the LTF. However, few have analysed the impact of major events occurring in Eastern Europe and other Soviet republics on the political positions of the LTF. The April 9, 1989 state-sponsored violence in Tbilisi, Georgia motivated the LTF to look for freedom beyond the confines of the Soviet Union, while the fall of the Iron Curtain in Central and Eastern Europe in 1989 further emboldened the LTF to push for independence. However, the LTF’s conscious decision to maintain Baltic unity was paramount in the evolution of its policies. The Latvian Popular Front’s concerted effort to maintain solidarity with *Rahvarinne* and *Sajūdis* prompted the radicalization of the Latvian Popular Front’s political orientation. The May 13-14, 1989 Baltic Assembly was critical in the cultivation of close ties among the Baltic popular fronts and in the development of the core radical principles to which the LTF ultimately conformed.



Background: Independent Latvia and the Latvian SSR

In 1940, the Soviet Union illegally annexed the Republic of Latvia, beginning a fifty-year occupation of the formerly independent state. Latvia declared its independence from Soviet Russia on November 18, 1918, and Soviet Russia “forever renounc[ed] all sovereign rights held by Russia in relation to the Latvian nation” in the 1920 Latvian-Soviet Peace Treaty.¹ Despite this legally binding guarantee, the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact undermined Latvia’s independence. Though the Pact primarily affirmed the Soviet Union’s friendship with Nazi Germany, it also contained secret protocols that divided Central and Eastern Europe into Nazi and Soviet spheres of influence. All three of the independent Baltic states—Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania—fell under the Soviet sphere. On June 17, 1940, the Soviet Union began its illegal occupation of Latvia in accordance with these secret protocols. Excluding a brief interlude between June 1942 and late 1944 or early 1945—during which time the Nazis had invaded various parts of Latvia—the Soviet Union continuously occupied Latvia until August 21, 1991. During its fifty-year stint as a Soviet Socialist Republic, the Latvian SSR suffered from a host of problems, including demographic and linguistic upheavals, cultural Russification, environmental degradation and economic mismanagement. By far, the most acute problem was demographic. By the late 1980s, ethnic Latvians were on the verge of becoming a minority group in the Latvian SSR because of Latvian deportations and uncontrolled, or even forced, migration of other ethnic groups into Latvia. This would have effectively nullified the Latvian ethnic group’s aspirations towards renewed statehood.² After almost fifty years of Soviet occupation, the Latvian SSR was in crisis, which led to the *Trešā Atmoda*³ [“The Third Awakening”] in the late 1980s.

Gorbachev’s policy of *glasnost* prompted the emergence of the Third Awakening. *Glasnost* promoted social liberalization and societal openness with the hope of strengthening the Soviet regime. For the first time since the Latvian SSR’s inception, its citizens were allowed to form civil society groups and voice their opinions relatively freely. Because this kind of space for dissent had never before existed in the Latvian SSR, Latvians took advantage of Gorbachev’s leniency and formed numerous grassroots organizations by 1987.⁴ Until about mid-1989, Gorbachev continued to promote these forces of liberalization in Latvia, as well as in Estonia and Lithuania, believing the Baltic to be at the vanguard of social change in the Soviet Union.⁵ However, Gorbachev’s support for these





independent organizations was misplaced. He ultimately encouraged the development of the societal forces that he sought to moderate and contain, which resulted in the renewed independence of the Latvian state.

The grassroots political movements that emerged under *glasnost* were eventually incorporated into the Latvian Popular Front and helped to inform the direction of the Front's policies. The original constituent groups of the Latvian Popular Front included Helsinki-86, *Vides Aizsardzības Klubs* ["the Club for the Defence of the Environment" or "the Latvian Greens"], *Atdzimšana un Atjaunošanās* ["Rebirth and Renewal"], folk culture groups, creative unions and reform communists. Later, the *Latvijas Nacionālās Neatkarības Kustība* ["the Latvian National Independence Movement"] played a key role in the Latvian Popular Front. Formed in 1987, Helsinki-86 was a blue-collar human rights group that sought to end cultural Russification policies and to increase the Latvian SSR's political and economic autonomy.⁶ It was most famous for the series of *Kalendāru dienas* ["calendar days"] protests in 1987 that commemorated important Latvian historical events to delegitimize Soviet power in the eyes of the Latvian people.⁷ *Vides Aizsardzības Klubs* (VAK) was founded in 1987 to promote awareness of the Soviet Union's dangerous environmental policies. After its efforts prompted the USSR's Council of Ministers to cancel plans to build a dam on the Daugava River, VAK began to become more political.⁸ It combined a nationalist orientation with environmental advocacy to reassert a sense of national consciousness among ethnic Latvians.⁹ *Atdzimšana un Atjaunošanās* was a Protestant group that fought for religious rights. Folk culture groups—like *Skandinieki*—promoted Latvian cultural traditions and national pride.¹⁰ Creative unions, particularly the Latvian Writers' Union, were considered more moderate forces for change, though they called for the formation of a Latvian Popular Front at the remarkable June 1-2, 1988 Writers' Plenum. The most conservative members, and about one-third of the founding members, of the Latvian Popular Front (LTF) were also members of the Latvian Communist Party, which supported the LTF because they wanted to mobilize the proletariat in support of *glasnost*.¹¹ Finally, though not a founding group of the LTF, *Latvijas Nacionālās Neatkarības Kustība* (LNNK) quickly became one of the most important groups within the LTF. LNNK was formed in 1988 as an ultra-nationalist anti-Russian political movement that demanded immediate Latvian independence - a radical stance at the time. Its policies would have a great effect on the LTF's ultimate goals. Because the LTF, as an umbrella organization, had to mediate between the interests of each component





group, it is important to understand the motivations of each constituent organization when assessing the LTF's policies as a whole.

Origins of the LTF

The creation of a Latvian Popular Front was first proposed at the June 1988 Latvian Writers' Union plenum, while the Front itself began to take shape over the summer of 1988 and was officially founded in October 1988. The June 1-2, 1988 Writers' Plenum was an exceptional event in the history of the Latvian SSR. In a show of unprecedented defiance, members of the Latvian Writers' Union demanded such things as Latvian sovereignty within the Soviet Union, the prioritization of the Latvian language in the Latvian SSR, and the right to privacy.¹² Most importantly, former hard-line communist Mavriks Vulfsons unequivocally stated that the Soviet Union had occupied Latvia in 1940, posing the first official challenge to the Latvian SSR's legitimacy.¹³ Several weeks after the Writers' Plenum, on June 21, 1988, seventeen activists and notable Latvian figures established a committee with the express goal of founding a Latvian Popular Front.¹⁴ At this point, the more radical and more conservative forces within the organizing committee had already begun to jockey for ideological dominance.¹⁵ Initially, the more conservative voices prevailed and the Latvian Popular Front was founded in October 1988 as a pro-*perestroika* group.¹⁶ According to the LTF's initial program, the Latvian Popular Front "actively supports the radical rebuilding of Latvia on the basis of democratic socialism and humanist principles," though under the guise of "restoring socialism's Leninist principles."¹⁷ At its inception, the LTF had 110,000 dues-paying members, with thousands of Latvians joined the LTF each following day.¹⁸

While conservative and moderate voices controlled the founding congress of the Latvian Popular Front and the LTF's original message, the views of the more liberal wing of the LTF began to dominate by the summer of 1989. For a short time immediately after its inception, the LTF supported *perestroika* and *glasnost* with the blessing of reform communists in Moscow.¹⁹ However, by the winter of 1988-89, radicals began to challenge the conservative and moderate status quo. While more radical nationalist forces commanded great support from the greater ethnic Latvian population, moderates and conservatives had large, established organizations—like the Latvian Writers' Union—capable of commanding state-controlled media attention.²⁰ Even though Soviet officials publicly supported the moderates within the LTF, the





LTF's radical members came to control its political direction by May 1989, as evidenced by the stunning turn-around in the May 31, 1989 statement: "The Invitation of the Board of the Latvian Popular Front to Discuss the Question of Latvia's Complete Independence."²¹ While this was an official invitation to the members of the LTF to *discuss* opinions about the desirability of Latvia's full independence—the resumption of its own independent statehood, wholly separate from the Soviet Union—the Latvian Popular Front's Board plainly stated, "The goal of the LTF is to achieve Latvia's political independence."²² In a seven-month timespan, the LTF reoriented itself politically, refashioning itself from a *pro-perestroika* group supported by the Soviet establishment to a leading voice for Latvian independence.

LTF Radicalization: Baltic Unity and Solidarity

Literature on the Latvian Popular Front outlines several reasons for the Front's radicalization. In his article "The Sources of Latvia's Popular Front," Jan Arvids Trapans concisely describes each explanation for the LTF's policy reversals. One suggestion is that by undermining the Front's ability to compromise among the varied viewpoints of its member organizations, Citizen's Committees and hard-line nationalist groups like LNNK were able to push their radical agenda onto the LTF.²³ Some historians argue that radical nationalist ideas quickly gained traction within much of the ethnic Latvian population, which then compelled the Latvian Popular Front to officially endorse these positions.²⁴ Others argue that the political tensions between reform communists and rigid doctrinaire communists in Moscow prompted the LTF to stop believing that legitimate change within the Soviet framework was possible.²⁵ An extension of this idea is that the LTF soon began to realize that *perestroika*'s intended economic reforms were failing, and thus changed its official position.²⁶ Finally, another possible origin of LTF radicalization lies in the actions of other Baltic popular fronts. According to this reading, the Latvian Popular Front began to radicalize because the other Baltic popular fronts were willing to stand up to the Soviet system. This interpretation suggests that the LTF was lagging behind *Rahvarinne* and *Sajūdis*, and adjusted its policies accordingly.²⁷ While this reason is often cited in the literature on the Latvian Popular Front, most references to Baltic unanimity are brief and superficial. For that reason, this paper will expand upon the idea that Baltic solidarity contributed to the rapid radicalization of the Latvian Popular Front.



The relationship between the Latvian Popular Front and the Estonian popular front, *Rahvarinne*, began before the official founding of either organization. The April 1-2, 1988 Estonian Writers' Plenum gave rise to the idea of forming an Estonian Popular Front. Over the spring and summer of 1988, Latvian elites observed increasing pressure in Estonia that created this proposed popular front, as political discourse rapidly radicalized, and as popular confidence in future *Rahvarinne* leaders Edgar Savisaar and Marju Lauristin grew.²⁸ However, the organizing committee of the Latvian Popular Front at this time was not yet confident enough to use the bold tactics engineered by *Rahvarinne*'s organizing committee. The LTF's organizing committee planned a huge demonstration the night before the LTF's official founding, at which they wanted to sing songs and exchange democratic ideas, just as the Estonians had done before *Rahvarinne*'s founding. However, organizing committee member V. Turiņš, captured the LTF committee's state of mind in September 1988 when he said: "The most important thing in Estonia—independence. We would not dare sing the songs they sang there."²⁹

The first program of the Latvian Popular Front was adopted at its October 8, 1988 founding congress, pushed back a week so as not to interfere with the founding congress of *Rahvarinne*, which reflected the timidity of its organizers.³⁰ While the October 1988 program of the LTF did demand such revolutionary reforms as the separation of Party and State functions, basic human rights, and the creation of a just state, it also called for the "constructive formation of Leninist national self-determination and principles of equality in the context of the Soviet Union."³¹ Particularly when compared to the later demands of the Latvian Popular Front, these demands were relatively moderate. Though the Latvian Popular Front called for the basic privileges of any democratic society, it was still advocating for these liberties within the framework of the Soviet Union.

Despite the LTF's lack of policy coordination with *Rahvarinne* and even *Sajūdis* at its founding congress, the leaders of the LTF still realized the importance of Baltic cooperation. Moderate LTF leader Jānis Pēters said at the LTF's Founding Congress: "To be a member of the Latvian Popular Front means to take on a great responsibility not only for Latvia, but also for the fate of the rest of the Baltic because a strong Estonia and a strong Lithuania depend on a strong Latvia[...]Latvia must become the uniting force of the three republics."³² While the founders of the Latvian Popular Front did not initially adopt *Rahvarinne*'s positions, they were able to build on the momentum of the Estonian Popular Front during the summer and fall of 1988 and prioritize Baltic unity.





From November 1988 to April 1989, the Latvian Popular Front occasionally met with *Rahvarinne* and *Sajūdis* to coordinate important policies, though the slow maturation of the LTF's political views during this period was largely independent of its relationships with the other Baltic popular fronts. On November 8, 1988, the leaders of all three Baltic popular fronts met in Riga, Latvia to discuss their opposition to the Soviet Union's proposed constitutional amendments, believed to be a ploy to consolidate the Union's power in the centre. At this meeting, the leaders of the three fronts decided to publicly support a campaign opposing the proposed amendments.³³ The newly elected head of the Latvian Popular Front, Dainis Īvāns, believed that this was the first showing of all three fronts' collective power, as well as the first legitimate test of Gorbachev's integrity as a reformist leader of the Soviet Union.³⁴

Several days later, on November 19, 1988, the Board of the Latvian Popular Front reaffirmed that relations between the Latvian SSR and Soviet Union should take place on a treaty-to-treaty basis, as per the LTF's Program. For the first time, however, the Board of the LTF discussed the concept of Latvian "sovereignty," which had not been mentioned in the LTF's month-old program, and officially asked the Supreme Soviet of the Latvian SSR to pass a resolution on Latvian sovereignty.³⁵ Just three days earlier, on November 16, 1988, the Estonian Supreme Soviet had adopted a similar resolution, which likely prompted the LTF Board to ask the Latvian Supreme Soviet to do the same.³⁶

A month later, at the December 18, 1988 meeting of the LTF Board, the Board returned to the issue of treaties by asking the LTF's legal committee to work on the relevant legal intricacies. At this same meeting, they again asked the Supreme Soviet of the Latvian SSR to adopt a resolution on sovereignty, as well as resolutions on citizenship and the primacy of the Latvian SSR's laws over those of the Soviet Union.³⁷ While the LTF's positions did not change as a result of this meeting, they did add several items to their agenda, which demonstrates that they were gaining the confidence necessary to demand more of the Latvian SSR's government.

On January 28-29, 1989 in Vilnius, Lithuania, the Latvian Popular Front met with *Sajūdis* and *Rahvarinne*, as well as popular fronts and national movements from other Soviet republics, including Belarus, Ukraine and Georgia. The groups in attendance issued the "Freedom Charter of Enslaved Nations of the USSR," which called for the respect of fundamental human rights, variety within the international system, and freedom by non-violence. The Charter also called for the establishment of a committee to coordinate efforts among the different national groups.³⁸





The issuance implored the Russian republic's intellectuals to recognize that the Soviet Union was using its Russian population to persecute other nationalities within the Soviet Union, adding that they wanted to erect a democratic system based on non-violence and national sovereignty.³⁹ The tone adopted in these documents—especially with regards to the first document's title, which is clearly meant to illicit an emotional response by using of the phrase “enslaved nations”—markedly diverges from the LTF's traditionally more respectful attitude towards the USSR. However, despite this radical change in tone, the content is still fairly similar to the Latvian Popular Front's earlier positions.

The LTF's October 1988 program had asserted the importance of human rights and of non-violent action to achieve democracy, and had pressed for an international system based on treaty relations. Though not included in the LTF's official program, the Board of the LTF had also quickly moved to support sovereignty within the Soviet Union. Many Latvians had believed that Latvia's ethnic Russian minority was oppressing ethnic Latvians, a concept that had filtered into the consciousness of numerous LTF constituent groups. While the content of the declarations adopted at January 28-29 meetings in Vilnius may seem like a departure from the LTF's positions, they differed mainly in tone, not substance.

The Latvian Popular Front's views continued to slowly evolve between February and April 1989. On February 18, 1989, the Board of the LTF adopted a resolution asking candidates in the elections for the USSR's Congress of People's Deputies to support the Latvian SSR's economic and political sovereignty and the creation of a new Union Treaty.⁴⁰ This corresponded with the LTF's earlier positions. As the LTF's political orientation was slowly developing, the April 9, 1989 deaths of twenty protesters at the hands of the Soviet military during an attempt to disperse a demonstration in Tbilisi, Georgia, reminded the Baltic popular fronts that the Soviet Union still employed violent tactics to end undesirable protests in its republics. This nasty reminder of the Soviet Union's fundamental character resulted in Baltic protest actions assuming a particular poignancy. The LTF organized several protests in memory of the Tbilisi massacre. While these LTF protests were held in earnest, they were particularly important in the Baltic context because they prevented the popular re-legitimization of the Soviet Union's use of force.⁴¹

In an April 11, 1989 statement addressed to the USSR's Supreme Soviet, the USSR's Prosecutor General and the Supreme Soviet of the Georgian Republic, the Board of the LTF wrote, “Georgia's mourning is





our mourning. Georgia's resentment is our resentment... Our strength is in our unity!"⁴² As the Latvian SSR was recovering from its shock at the violence in Tbilisi, the Board of the LTF again convened on April 22, 1989. During this meeting, the LTF adopted a resolution stating that the formation of an independent economic model was of paramount importance to the Latvian SSR. The Board also decided that the LTF must work on formulating a new Constitution for a sovereign Latvia, though the LTF would continue to live under the old Constitution for the time being if the Latvian Supreme Soviet would ratify each individual law passed by the USSR's Supreme Soviet.⁴³

While the Board's appeals for an independent economic model and a new Constitution were innovations for the LTF, these new appeals did complement the LTF's earlier calls for economic and political sovereignty within the Latvian SSR. Similarly, while the LTF's positions were slowly growing more radical from November 1988 to April 1989, they were built logically on the foundation of the LTF's original October 1988 program. However, the May 13-14, 1989 Baltic Assembly greatly hastened the LTF's radicalization and solidified the special relationships developing among the Baltic popular fronts.

Turning Point: The Baltic Assembly and Its Effects On The LTF

The May 1989 Baltic Assembly in Tallinn, Estonia, is widely considered to be a turning point in Baltic solidarity because it inspired closer ties among all three popular fronts and increased their collective confidence. *Rahvarinne*, *Sajūdis* and the Latvian Popular Front adopted seven radical declarations and resolutions at the Baltic Assembly. The first document—an appeal to other popular fronts within the Soviet Union—did not particularly differ from the LTF's earlier positions, calling for de-Stalinization within the social realm, historical and social justice, and for internationally recognized national and human rights. However, this appeal does make reference to the increasing aggression of "conservative forces hostile to the restructuring process," which was a departure from the LTF's generally more diplomatic tone.⁴⁴

The second document adopted at the Assembly applied controversial concepts to Soviet Baltic history, stating that genocide, as a political policy, was essential to Stalinism.⁴⁵ While most in the Soviet Union agreed by this time that Stalin had committed atrocities, very few had called these atrocities "genocide." The Baltic popular fronts also boldly stated, "no essential changes have taken place in the



great-power ideology and politics of the USSR,” a barb at Gorbachev’s supposedly “reformist” regime.⁴⁶ The demands prompted by this critical re-examination of history included self-determination, Baltic cultural development without outside interference, and granting to the Baltic states the discretion to choose their own political and social systems. These demands did not vastly differ from the LTF’s earlier demands.⁴⁷ Document Three reinforced the basic message of Document Two, even more clearly defining the relationship between the earlier regimes of the USSR and its present leadership by stating, “a powerful, merciless repressive apparatus [...] has not entirely ceased existing up to the present day.”⁴⁸ This document called for historical justice and reparations for victims of deportation, and demanded that Gorbachev’s regime publicly recognize Stalin’s policies against the Baltic peoples as genocide.⁴⁹

Document Four was an appeal to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the United Nations (UN) to “head [*sic*] the aspiration of our nations to self-determination and independence on [*sic*] a neutral and demilitarized zone of Europe.”⁵⁰ This document represented a huge leap forward for the Latvian Popular Front. Here, the Baltic Assembly called for full independence, not sovereignty, something the LTF had not been brave enough to demand on its own. Further, not only did Document Four ask for independence, but it also implied that the independent Baltic states would become part of Europe, not part of a non-Western Soviet or Russian sphere of influence. The importance of this document for later political developments within the LTF and within in the Latvian SSR cannot be overstated.

Document Five from the May 13-14, 1989 Baltic Assembly, had few policy repercussions for the Latvian Popular Front, but called for the release of information about the Karabakh Committee, a group of Armenian intellectuals. According to Document Six, the relationship between socialist states and the military had created “an oppressive image of socialism as a state system unfit for peaceable, democratic development of society.”⁵¹ The Baltic Assembly then referenced the April 9, 1989 state-sponsored violence in Tbilisi, and excoriated the Soviet Union’s Supreme Soviet for having recently passed two decrees that “legalize[d] repressions” against Soviet citizens.⁵² This document called for the Soviet Union to use its military only for defensive actions and for the state to stop exploiting its military by engaging it to end undesirable protests.⁵³ Document Six also represented a step forward for the Latvian Popular Front. While the LTF had previously chastised the military, it had never used this kind of bold language with regards to the armed forces, nor demanded that the Soviet Union redefine the purpose of its





military.

Finally, Document Seven deemed *perestroika* a failure and demanded that the “sovereign states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania” be allowed to choose their own model of economic development and that the Soviet Union recognize the “economic independence” of each Baltic republic.⁵⁴ While the Latvian Popular Front had previously asked to determine its own economic policies, they had never before condemned *perestroika* as a failure. Like many of the other Baltic Assembly documents, this declaration is notable for its shift in language. Furthermore, while the LTF had previously supported economic sovereignty and advocated for the creation of its own economic model, it had not yet demanded full economic independence. As with matters of a political nature, the Latvian Popular Front was shifting its support from economic sovereignty to economic independence.

The May 13-14, 1989 Baltic Assembly in Tallinn was critical to the radicalization of the LTF’s political demands because it emboldened the Latvian Popular Front to push for political ends it had not previously thought possible. The Baltic Assembly also set the tone for future cooperation between the Baltic popular fronts. The Latvian Popular Front’s weekly newspaper best captured this feeling when it stated: “In the end, when the leaders [of] all three Baltic democratic movements demonstrated their determination to remain unified, when the national hymns resounded—we all understood: we will not move back, not a step. May God be with us!”⁵⁵ After the Baltic Assembly, the LTF had to adjust its own political positions to mirror those adopted at the Baltic Assembly and had to constantly fine-tune its official policies to remain in line with those of the more pioneering *Rahvarinne* and *Sajūdis*. In particular, because of the Baltic Assembly’s resolutions, the Latvian Popular Front soon had to address the question of full independence from the Soviet Union.⁵⁶

On May 31, 1989, just two weeks after the May 1989 Baltic Assembly, the Board of the LTF announced its intention to seek full Latvian independence. While “The Invitation of the Board of the Latvian Popular Front to Discuss the Question of Latvia’s Complete Independence” was technically meant to encourage discussion on this sensitive subject, the Latvian Popular Front’s Board explicitly declared that its new goal was indeed complete independence.⁵⁷ The Board stated that the Tbilisi massacre had impressed upon it the need to leave the Soviet Union, despite the LTF’s earlier commitment to seeking greater sovereignty within the Union itself.⁵⁸ Though there was no mention of Baltic unity or of *Rahvarinne* and *Sajūdis* in the document itself, the





Board's declaration of intention to seek Latvian independence cannot be seen as separate from the Baltic Assembly's resolutions. While the LTF's political positions had been slowly evolving between October 1988 and April 1989, with each consecutive policy building upon the last, this newest declaration represented an abrupt break from the LTF's support of political sovereignty. Little in the LTF's pre-Baltic Assembly resolutions or declarations suggested that full support for Latvian independence was imminent. However, if this document is viewed in the context of increasing solidarity among the Baltic popular fronts, particularly in light of both *Rahvarinne* and *Sajūdis*' aggressive stances towards the Soviet Union, the LTF's declaration in support of independence does not seem like an aberration.

Further evidence also suggests that the Board of the Latvian Popular Front's May 31, 1989 declaration was indeed linked to the Baltic Assembly and to the LTF's commitment to maintain Baltic unity. On July 24, 1989, Deputy Head of the LTF, Ivars Godmanis, wrote an article entitled "About the Board of the LTF's May 31 Invitation" in which he described the reasons for the Board's policy reversal.⁵⁹ Tellingly, his first two reasons were "the Baltic Assembly's resolutions," and "the collective path of the Baltic states."⁶⁰ According to Godmanis, the popular fronts had agreed to binding resolutions at the May 1989 Baltic Assembly regarding Baltic independence, even though these resolutions contradicted each of the organizations' earlier positions.⁶¹ It would be necessary to abide by those documents if Latvia ever hoped to acquire the powers of national self-preservation and self-determination.⁶² Godmanis expressed a similar opinion in his July 10, 1989 piece, entitled "About the LTF's Strategy and Tactics", in which he wrote that the LTF had to develop a model of statehood for an independent Latvia based on Baltic Assembly resolutions. He then proceeded to summarize the relevant points from the Baltic Assembly's documents on the subject of independence, namely that Latvia could not be seen as independent within a federation of states like the Soviet Union.⁶³ Godmanis drew an explicit connection between the content of the Baltic Assembly's resolutions and the LTF Board's decision to support complete Latvian independence.

More importantly, Godmanis went on to describe the Baltic Assembly in "About the Board of the LTF's May 31 Invitation" as having a "clearly formulated and well-defined common path for all three Baltic states: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania [...] as of now, Latvia has fallen behind on this path."⁶⁴ Though the Estonian and Lithuanian Supreme Soviets had adopted resolutions regarding national sovereignty, Latvia's Supreme Soviet had not yet done so. Throughout the rest of the





document, Godmanis reiterated the importance of coordinating Baltic popular front policies and maintaining Baltic solidarity. Godmanis concluded by forcefully stating that the LTF had to change the content of its program at its second congress in October 1989, “including the most important point—that of the question of Latvian statehood.”⁶⁵ He then outlined which particular programmatic points the LTF should change to more accurately reflect the current mindset of the Board and of the LTF’s general membership. According to Godmanis, not only should the LTF abide by the binding resolutions agreed upon at the Baltic Assembly, but it should also make its political positions correspond to those of *Rahvarinne* and *Sajūdis*. While an implicit connection could be drawn between the LTF Board’s May 31, 1989 announcement and the May 13-14, 1989 Baltic Assembly through an examination of the content of the Assembly’s published documents, here, Godmanis unequivocally affirmed that the Baltic Assembly inspired the Board’s declaration of intention to seek Latvian independence.

Following the LTF Board’s May 31, 1989 declaration in support of Latvian independence, the Latvian Popular Front continued to refine its political positions in accordance with this new goal. The LTF Board adopted a resolution asking the Latvian SSR’s Supreme Soviet to address the question of Latvian independence on June 10, 1989.⁶⁶ During a protest four days later, those in attendance passed a similar resolution specifically referencing the state-sponsored violence in Georgia and Armenia as examples of the USSR’s use of force to nullify the sovereign rights of Soviet republics.⁶⁷

On July 15, 1989, at the first meeting of the Baltic Council—a body created by the Baltic Assembly to facilitate discussion among the Baltic popular fronts—held in Pernava, Estonia, the heads of the popular fronts discussed the importance of their cooperation.⁶⁸ At the LTF Board’s meeting, which was also held on July 15, 1989, the Board, in conjunction with the plenum of the Latvian Communist Party, announced that the Latvian Communist Party’s inclusion in the USSR’s Communist Party contravened Latvian sovereignty. The Board asked the Latvian Communist Party to remove the sixth verse of the Latvian SSR’s constitution, which enshrined the leading role of the Party within the republic, so as to facilitate the creation of a democratic multi-party system of government in Latvia.⁶⁹ This was a radical demand in that it necessitated the Front’s confrontation of the Party, but the actual policy position that it demonstrated was in line with the LTF’s stance on democracy and independence.

The LTF Board also decided on that day to support the creation





of reciprocal economic relations with Estonia and Lithuania to work towards the creation of a Baltic common market and to form trade relationships based on the principle of fairness with other Soviet republics and independent states.⁷⁰ As it had with its political policies, the Latvian Popular Front was working to strengthen its economic ties to Estonia and Lithuania. Finally, on August 12, 1989, at a meeting of the Baltic Council in Cesis, Latvia, the Baltic popular fronts discussed their election strategies for the upcoming Supreme Soviet elections.⁷¹ After the Baltic Assembly, the Baltic popular fronts were growing closer and worked to coordinate their policies in every arena.

The Latvian Popular Front made use of the August 23, 1989 Baltic Way to further improve the quality of its relationships with the other Baltic popular fronts. The Baltic Way was a protest action held on the fiftieth anniversary of the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. On this occasion, around two million people formed a human chain through the three Baltic countries, from Tallinn, through Riga, to Vilnius. As one of the largest mass gatherings ever held, the Baltic Way represented the pinnacle of collective protest in the Baltics and captured the moment at which the Baltic nations became psychologically independent of the Soviet Union.⁷² While this demonstration resonated for many reasons, it is most important because it further strengthened the bonds between the Baltic popular fronts.

According to Dainis Īvāns, head of the LTF, the leaders of all three Baltic popular fronts believed it more important to publicly acknowledge and display the unity of the Baltic people in the face of the Soviet menace than to publicize the plight of the Baltic nations to non-Baltic observers.⁷³ Īvāns' radio speech during the Baltic Way mirrors this attitude and interpretation of the event. He declared:

...And at present our joined hands bear witness that the spirit and determination of the Baltic people to win a life worthy of free men and peoples in a restored Baltic region are [*sic*] indestructible... The Baltic land has never seen the peoples of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania so close to one another, having joined hands as they have today... For the first time during our life together under the sky of the Baltic region, we have properly taken up positions on a united Baltic road for freedom and independence...⁷⁴

Though only rhetoric, his speech effectively captured the deep-seated emotion behind the concepts of Baltic unity and solidarity. Īvāns was not





referring to Latvia's struggle individually, but to the plights of all Baltic states and peoples together. This showed that the fates of the other two Baltic countries were of utmost importance to the LTF. In its visibility and emotion, the August 23, 1989 Baltic Way protest action effectively personified the notion of Baltic solidarity.

In the months following the Baltic Way, the Latvian Popular Front and the Baltic Council continued to emphasize Baltic solidarity at numerous meetings and in many statements, though the LTF's policies did not generally change. However, this is not because the LTF became unwilling to further radicalize, but because the Latvian Popular Front had already adopted the most radical position available at the time— independence. From the time they adopted this position, the LTF worked to achieve its goal of independence. At the second annual congress of the Latvian Popular Front in October 1989, the LTF successfully furthered this goal. While the LTF's political orientation had significantly changed between October 1988 and October 1989, its Board's policy positions were not binding, as its program could only be officially changed at the LTF's annual congress. As such, the program adopted by the Latvian Popular Front at its second congress differed significantly from its original program. In the new program, the LTF stated that it was "fighting for an independent and democratic Republic of Latvia."⁷⁵ Additionally, the program declared that the LTF was working to create a democratic parliamentary multi-party republic that respected self-determination and human rights, and which was fundamentally opposed to a one-party state with unlimited power concentrated at the top.⁷⁶

Little in the LTF's October 1989 program was revolutionary or innovative, but this revised version was important because it made the policies for which the LTF had been fighting over the past year official. It was also significant because it showed that the LTF Board's ideas were popular among the LTF's larger membership. A majority of the 1,152 voting delegates at the Congress supported the new program, as opposed to just the 146 members of the Board, who had been discussing and voting on the LTF's policies throughout the preceding year.⁷⁷ While the LTF's new program barely mentioned Estonia and Lithuania, it was undoubtedly influenced by the principles laid down at the Baltic Assembly and reaffirmed during the meetings of the Baltic Council and the Baltic Way protest action. While the second program of the Latvian Popular Front, adopted at the October 1989 LTF Congress, did not represent any significant policy departures for the LTF, it reaffirmed and formalized the radicalization that had been taking place within the LTF over the past year.





Approaching Independence: LTF Control of the Latvian Supreme Soviet

The collapse of the Soviet system in Eastern Europe in 1989 was important to the Baltic popular fronts because it demonstrated to them that concrete change was actually possible. Because the Soviet Union did not intervene militarily in the affairs of its satellite states in 1989, the Latvian Popular Front began to believe that Gorbachev would not attack the Latvian SSR for trying to leave the Soviet Union.⁷⁸ In addition to quelling the LTF's fears, the events in Eastern Europe in 1989 caused the LTF to believe that it could actually create an independent, democratic and parliamentary state; the impossible became reasonable.⁷⁹ Further, not only did Latvians find inspiration in Central and Eastern Europe's newfound freedom, but they believed the events in the Baltics to be part of the Eastern European process of democratization. In an *Atmoda* article entitled "The Year of Eastern Europe" Valdis Bērziņš declared: "Latvia along with Lithuania and Estonia is part of Eastern Europe and is associated with the process of profound democratization in this region of the world."⁸⁰ The Latvian Popular Front began to believe that the Soviet Union would let Latvia go peacefully, adding to the LTF's growing confidence.

In late 1989 and early 1990, the Latvian Popular Front's main focus was the March 1990 election for the Latvian Supreme Soviet. While the Baltic Council continued to meet every few weeks, it merely reaffirmed Baltic unity and promoted ever-closer Baltic cooperation in the political, social and economic spheres. The Latvian Popular Front's February 1990 election platform referenced the recent events in Eastern Europe as proof that the Soviet Union could no longer stave off fundamental change in its satellite states and republics. According to the LTF's electoral platform, "the process of awakening happening in Eastern Europe, in the Baltics and in many regions of the Soviet Union[,] cannot be held back. The Berlin Wall has fallen, the Prague Spring is being reborn, communist parties are splintering and losing power."⁸¹

Baltic solidarity also formed an important rhetorical component of the LTF's platform, with the LTF stating that "the Baltic states are standing together, shoulder to shoulder, on their peaceful and democratic march to independence."⁸² In its actual content, however, the





February 1990 election platform purely summarizes the October 1989 LTF program. According to the election platform, the LTF's main political goal was still the renewal of Latvia's independence and the formation of a democratic state and society, all while trying to force the remaining vestiges of Soviet power in Latvia to peacefully leave.⁸³ Because it reaffirmed Baltic solidarity, confirmed the symbolic importance of events in Eastern Europe to the LTF, and reiterated the LTF's earlier positions in a succinct manner, the February 1990 election platform was palatable to voters.

On March 18, 1990, the Latvian Popular Front won over two-thirds of the seats in the Supreme Soviet, which effectively granted the LTF control of the Latvian Supreme Soviet.⁸⁴ As such, they could pass a resolution on independence. However, despite the LTF's initial enthusiasm for immediately ratifying such a resolution in the Latvian Supreme Soviet, Latvians were very closely observing the events occurring in Lithuania in March 1990. On March 11, 1990, Lithuania—then led by *Sajūdis*—unilaterally declared itself an independent state, prompting the Soviet Union to immediately begin an economic blockade against the new state. Because Latvians saw how much Lithuanians were suffering as a result, they did not want to follow in Lithuania's exact footsteps. This was one of the rare few instances in which the LTF did not emulate the policies of one of its sister organizations.

Despite the radical nature of the LTF's own program and election platform, the LTF-controlled Latvian Supreme Soviet did not act on its promise to pass a resolution on Latvian independence until a month and a half after the elections. On May 4, 1990, the Latvian Supreme Soviet annulled Latvia's illegal annexation, reinstated Latvia's 1922 Constitution, and accepted the UN's and CSCE's human rights accords.⁸⁵ However, despite the significance of these actions, the Latvian Popular Front did not exactly declare Latvia's independence, instead stating that the Latvian SSR would undergo a transition period before full independence. This transition period endured through the Soviet Union's invasion of Latvia in January 1991 until August 21, 1991, when Latvia declared its complete independence from the Soviet Union during the attempted coup in Moscow. After fifty years of Soviet occupation, Latvia was again a free and independent state.

Conclusion: Baltic Solidarity, the LTF's Radicalization and Latvian Independence

The radicalization of the Latvian Popular Front was closely





linked to its desire to maintain Baltic solidarity. While the Latvian Popular Front was founded as a pro-*perestroika* organization in October 1988, it took only several months before it advocated total independence from the Soviet Union. The key turning point in this transformation was the May 13-14, 1989 Baltic Assembly, during which the Latvian Popular Front agreed to seven previously unthinkable binding resolutions alongside the other Baltic popular fronts of Estonia and Lithuania. Just two weeks later, in accordance with the policies of *Sajūdis* and *Rahvarinne*, the Board of the Latvian Popular Front officially stated that it supported complete Latvian independence. From that point forward, the LTF emphasized the importance of Baltic unity. However, its actual positions only changed very slightly from then on, likely because the Latvian Popular Front was already pushing for the most radical solution available—total independence from the Soviet Union. A month and a half after the Latvian Popular Front won a majority in the March 1990 elections for the Latvian SSR's Supreme Soviet, it declared the beginning of a transition period towards Latvian independence. While the LTF did not foment “revolution” in the traditional sense of the word, its actions did result in the renewed statehood of a Soviet Socialist Republic that had previously been in the vice grip of the Soviet Union; this should be considered revolutionary for its magnitude and seeming impossibility. Despite their divergent histories and post-Soviet experiences, the Baltic states are often thought of as a unified bloc. This conceptualization of Baltic unity has assumed poignancy recently not only because of the twentieth anniversary of the Baltic Way and the seventieth anniversary of the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, but also because of the dire economic crisis that has paralysed the Baltics. The connections between the Baltic popular fronts should be further explored to help lay the foundation for stronger and better relationships among Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania today.



Notes

1. "Peace Treaty between Latvia and Russia (Riga, August 11, 1920)," DG External Policies Delegations Europe, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/fd/d-ru20060615_07/d-ru20060615_07en.pdf (accessed April 2, 2010).
2. Juris Dreifelds, "Latvian National Rebirth," *Problems of Communism* 38, issue 4 (July / August 1989), 79 – 80.
3. The First Awakening took place in the mid- to late 1800s, when the concept of Latvian nationhood arose. The Second Awakening occurred in the years leading up to Latvian independence in 1918.
4. Dreifelds, "Latvian National Rebirth," 79; Rasma Karklins, *Ethnopolitics and the Transition to Democracy: The Collapse of the USSR and Latvia* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1994), 68.
5. Jan Arveds Trapans, "The Sources of Latvia's Popular Movement," in *Toward Independence: The Baltic Popular Movements*, ed. Jan Arveds Trapans (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), 41.
6. Trapans, "The Sources of Latvia's Popular Movement," 27; Romuald J. Misiunas and Rein Taagepera, *The Baltic States: Years of Dependence, 1940 – 1990* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993), 307.
7. Dreifelds, "Latvian National Rebirth," 82.
8. Misiunas and Taagepera, *The Baltic States*, 304 – 305; Dreifelds, "Latvian National Rebirth," 85.
9. Artis Pabriks and Aldis Purs, *Latvia: the Challenges of Change* (New York: Routledge, 2001), 51; Dreifelds, "Latvian National Rebirth," 85.
10. Dreifelds, "Latvian National Rebirth," 81.
11. Karklins, *Ethnopolitics and the Transition to Democracy*, 78.
12. Dreifelds, "Latvian National Rebirth," 85.
13. *Ibid.*, 84.
14. Anatol Lieven, *The Baltic Revolution: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Path to Independence*, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994), 222; Pabriks and Purs, *Latvia: The Challenges of Change*, 53.
15. Dreifelds, "Latvian National Rebirth," 84.
16. Trapans, "The Sources of Latvia's Popular Movement," 34.
17. Eric Rudenshiold, "Ethnic Dimensions in Contemporary Latvian Politics: Focusing Forces for Change," *Soviet Studies* 44, no. 4 (1992), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/152200> (accessed January 26, 2010), 613.
18. Original text: "...aktīvi iestājas par Latvijas radikālu pārbūvi, pamatojoties uz demokrātiskā sociālisma un humānisma principiem..." *Latvijas Tautas fronte*, "Latvijas Tautas frontes Programma," <http://www.arhivi.gov.lv/sitedata/VAS/Latvija%2090/Microsoft%20Word%20-%20LTF%20programma%20un%20statuuti.pdf>.
19. Original text: "atdzīvināt sociālisma ļēņiniskos principus." *Latvijas Tautas fronte*, *Ibid.*
20. Dreifelds, "Latvian National Rebirth," 85; Rudenshiold, "Ethnic





Dimensions in Contemporary Latvian Politics,” 613.

21. Kristian Gerner and Stefan Hedlund, *The Baltic States and the End of the Soviet Empire* (New York: Routledge, 1993), 119; Lieven, *The Baltic Revolution*, 223.
22. Trapans, “The Sources of Latvia’s Popular Movement,” 35.
23. Original text: “*Latvijas Tautas frontes Domes valdes aicinājums apspriest jautājumu par Latvijas pilnīgu neatkarību.*” *Latvijas Tautas frontes Domes valde*, “*Latvijas Tautas frontes Domes valdes aicinājums apspriest jautājumu par Latvijas pilnīgu neatkarību*,” May 31, 1989, <http://www.historia.lv/index.htm>.
24. Original text: “*LTF mērķis ir panākt valstisko Latvijas neatkarību.*” *Ibid.*
25. Trapans, “The Sources of Latvia’s Popular Front,” 25.
26. *Ibid.*, 44.
27. Pabriks and Purs, *Latvia: the Challenges of Change*, 54; Trapans, “The Sources of Latvia’s Popular Front,” 40.
28. Trapans, “The Sources of Latvia’s Popular Front,” 44.
29. *Ibid.*, 40.
30. Andrejs Penikis, “The third awakening begins: The birth of the Latvian popular front, June 1988 to August 1988,” *The Journal of Baltic Studies* 27, no. 4 (1996), http://pdfserve.informaworld.com/873099_751319779_770949648.pdf (accessed January 27, 2010), 279; Dainis Ivāns, *Gadījuma Karakalps* (Riga: Vieda, 1995), 174.
31. Original text: “*Galvenais Igaunijā - par neatkarību. Tādas dziesmas, kā tur dziedāja, mēs neiedrošināsimies.*” “*Latvijas Tautas frontes dibināšanas kongresa organizācijas komitejas sēdes protokols Nr.3*,” September 14, 1988, <http://www.historia.lv/index.htm>.
32. Dreifelds, “Latvian National Rebirth,” 85; Juris Dreifelds, *Latvia In Transition* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 59.
33. *Latvijas Tautas fronte*, “*Latvijas Tautas frontes Programma.*”
34. Original text: “*...konstruktīvu veidošanu uz ļēņiniskajiem tautu pašnoteikšanās un līdztiesības principiem padomju valstu savienībā.*” Dreifelds, “Latvian National Rebirth,” 85; Juris Dreifelds, *Latvia In Transition* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 59.
35. Original text: “*Būt par Latvijas Tautas frontes biedru nozīmē uzņemties lielu atbildību ne tikai par Latvijas, bet arī par visas Baltijas likteni, jo no stipras Latvijas lielā mērā atkarīga stipra Igaunija un stipra Lietuva... Latvijai jāšķūst par trīs republiku vienotāju.*” *Latvijas Tautas Fronte: Gads Pirmais*, ed. Ingrida Vāverniece (Riga: LKP CK Izdevniecības tipogrāfijā, 1989), 6.
36. Sandra Kalniete, “Unity of the Baltic States and Its Importance for the National Awakening,” in *The Baltic Way to Freedom: Non-Violent Struggle of the Baltic States In A Global Context*, compiled by Janis Škapars (Riga: Zelta Grauds, 2005), 108; Ivāns, *Gadījuma Karakalps*, 184.
37. Ivāns, *Gadījuma Karakalps*, 184.
38. *Atmoda*. “*Latvijas Tautas frontes politiskais kalendārs*,” October 7, 1989.





39. Jay Ulfelder, "Baltic Protest in the Gorbachev Era: Movement Content and Dynamics," *Ethnopolitics* 3, no. 3 (2004), http://pdfserve.informaworld.com/244048_770885140_783096288.pdf (accessed January 29, 2010), 38.
40. *Atmoda*. "Latvijas Tautas frontes politiskais kalendārs," October 7, 1989.
41. Bohdan Nahaylo, "Non-Russian National-Democratic Movements Adopt Charter and Issue Appeal to Russian Intelligentsia," *Radio Liberty Report on the USSR* 1, no. 8 (1989), 15.
42. *Ibid.*, 16.
43. *Atmoda*. "Latvijas Tautas frontes politiskais kalendārs," October 7, 1989.
44. Nils R. Muiznieks, "The Influence of the Baltic Popular Movements on the Process of Soviet Disintegration," *Europe-Asia Studies* 47, no. 1 (1995), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/153191> (accessed January 26, 2010), 9.
45. Original text: "Gruzijas sēras ir mūsu sēras. Gruzijas sašutums ir mūsu sašutums... Mūsu spēks ir vienotībā!" LTF Domes valde, "Tbilisi – traģēdijas priekšvakarā," *Atmoda*. April 17, 1989.
46. *Atmoda*. "Latvijas Tautas frontes politiskais kalendārs," October 7, 1989.
47. Mall Laur and Riina Lohmus, "The May 1989 Assembly," *Nationalities Papers* 16, no. 2 (1988), http://pdfserve.informaworld.com/25445_751319779_783207198.pdf, (accessed February 5, 2010), 249.
48. *Ibid.*, 250.
49. *Ibid.*, 250.
50. *Ibid.*, 250.
51. *Ibid.*, 251.
52. *Ibid.*, 251.
53. *Ibid.*, 253.
54. *Ibid.*, 255.
55. *Ibid.*, 255.
56. *Ibid.*, 256.
57. *Ibid.*, 257, 258.
58. Original text: "Beigās, kad visu trīs Baltijas valstu demokrātisko kustību lideri nodemonstrēja savu apņēmību būt vienotiem, kad skanēja nacionālās himnas – mēs visi sapratām: atpakaļ mēs neiesim vairs ne soli. Lai Dievs stāv mums klāt!" Elita Veidemane, "Baltijas Asambleja 1989. gada 13. un 14. maijā Tallinā," *Atmoda*. May 19, 1989.
59. Mark A. Jubulis, "The Baltic Way to Independence," in *Nationalism and Democratic Transition: The Politics of Citizenship and Language in Post-Soviet Latvia* (New York: University Press of America, Inc., 2001), 83.
60. Original text: "Latvijas Tautas frontes Domes valdes aicinājums apspriest jautājumu par Latvijas pilnīgu neatkarību." Latvijas Tautas frontes Domes valde, "Latvijas Tautas frontes Domes valdes aicinājums apspriest jautājumu par Latvijas pilnīgu neatkarību," May 31, 1989, <http://www.historia.lv/index.htm>.
61. *Ibid.*





62. Original text: “*Par LTF Domes valdes 31.maija Aicinājumu.*” Ibid.
63. Original text: “*Baltijas Asamblejas lēmumi.*” Ibid.
64. Original text: “*Baltijas valstu kopīgais ceļš.*” Ibid.
65. Ibid.
66. Ibid.
67. Ivars Godmanis, “*Par LTF stratēģiju un taktiku,*” July 10, 1989, <http://www.historia.lv/index.htm>.
68. Original text: “*...skaidri formulēts un pamatots kopīgais ceļš, kurš ejams visām trim Baltijas valstīm: Igaunijai, Latvijai un Lietuvai... Patlaban Latvija, šo ceļu ejot, ir visai atpalikusi.*” Ivars Godmanis, “*Par LTF Domes valdes 31.maija Aicinājumu,*” July 24, 1989. <http://www.historia.lv/index.htm>.
69. Original text: “*arī pašā galvenajā - Latvijas valstiskuma jautājumā.*” Ibid.,
70. *Atmoda*. “*Latvijas Tautas frontes politiskais kalendārs,*” October 7, 1989.
71. *Latvijas Tautas Fronte: Gads Pirmais*, 259.
72. *Atmoda*. “*Latvijas Tautas frontes politiskais kalendārs,*” October 7, 1989.
73. Ibid.
74. *Latvijas Tautas Fronte: Gads Pirmais*, 262.
75. *Atmoda*. “*Latvijas Tautas frontes politiskais kalendārs,*” October 7, 1989.
76. Jay Ulfelder, “Baltic Protest in the Gorbachev Era,” 38; Jubulis, “The Baltic Way to Independence,” 86.
77. Ivāns, *Gadījuma Karakalps*, 242.
78. Dainis Ivāns quoted in Jubulis, “The Baltic Way to Independence,” 85.
79. Original text: “*...cīnās par neatkarīgu un demokrātisku Latvijas Republiku...*” *Atmoda*, “*Latvijas Tautas frontes programma.*” November 4, 1989.
80. Ibid.
81. Jonathan Lyons, “Latvia Offers Biggest Challenge to Kremlin,” *The Glasgow Herald*, October 9, 1989, <http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=2507&dat=19891007&id=kxk1AAAAIBAJ&sjid=Q6YLA AAAI BAJ&pg=5803,2520828>.
82. Jay Ulfelder, “Baltic Protest in the Gorbachev Era,” 41.
83. Andrejs Plakans, “Latvia’s Return to Independence,” *The Journal of Baltic Studies* 22, no. 3 (1991), http://pdfserve.informaworld.com/810126_751319779_770953544.pdf (accessed February 2, 2009), 261; Jubulis, “The Baltic Way to Independence,” 89.
84. Original text: “*Austrumeiropas gads.*” Valdis Bērziņš, “*Austrumeiropas gads,*” *Atmoda*. December 27, 1989.
85. Original text: “*Latvija līdz ar Lietuvu un Igauniju ir Austrumeiropas daļa un saistīta ar dziļo demokratizācijas procesu šajā pasaules rajonā.*” Ibid.
86. Original text: “*Atmodas procesi, kas risinās Austrumeiropā, Baltijā un daudzos PSRS reģionos, nav apturami. Grūst Berlīnes mūris, atdzimst Prāgas pavasaris, šķēļas un zaudē varu komunistiskās partijas.*” “*Latvijas Tautas frontes vēlēšanu platforma 1990.gada Augstākās Padomes vēlēšanām,*” February 3, 1990, <http://www.historia.lv/index.htm>.
87. Original text: “*Baltijas tautas plecu pie pleca iet savu miermīlīgo un demokrātisko ceļu uz neatkarību.*” Ibid.





^{88.} Ibid.

^{89.} Pabriks and Purs, *Latvia: The Challenges of Change*, 60.

^{90.} Lieven, *The Baltic Revolution*, 243.

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