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DESCRIPTION:Executives’ Legal Records\, Lavish Lifestyles and Insider Tradi
 ng Activities\nAiyesha DeyUniversity of Minnesota\nDate: May 9\, 2014Time:
  11:00 am - 12:30 pmLocation: Room 410\nAbstract: \nWe examine how and why
  insider trading varies across senior executives and their firms. We posit
  that relatively materialistic (or unfrugal) executives\, as evidenced by 
 the ownership of luxury goods\, and executives with relatively low respect
  for rules and self-control\, as evidenced by a legal record\, have a high
  propensity to exploit inside trading opportunities relative to other exec
 utives at their firms. Consistent with this hypothesis\, we document that 
 the profitability and strategic timing of trades are higher for unfrugal a
 nd recordholder senior executives than for other senior executives of the 
 same firms. The profitability and strategic timing of unfrugal executives’
  purchases increase significantly with opportunities to trade on inside in
 formation\, as measured by proxies for information asymmetry and a weak co
 rporate control environment\, and\, as expected\, these effects are signif
 icantly larger for unfrugal (i.e. high propensity) executives than for fru
 gal (i.e. low propensity) executives. The analogous results for recordhold
 ers are less pronounced\, as might be expected if recordholders have low s
 elf-control and/or a low respect for rules and norms\, mitigating the dete
 rrent effect of corporate controls. Finally\, as predicted\, the profitabi
 lity of non-CEOs’ purchases is higher in firms run by unfrugal (vs. frugal
 ) CEOs. The effect of CEO type on the profitability of trades by other sen
 ior executives is corroborated on a sample of firms whose CEO died in offi
 ce by the incremental profits detected upon the unplanned transition from 
 a frugal to unfrugal CEO relative to the behavior of trading profits upon 
 other unplanned CEO transitions. \nFor more information\, please contact K
 aren Robertson at: karen.robertson [at] mcgill.ca. 
DTSTART:20140509T150000Z
DTEND:20140509T163000Z
LOCATION:Room 410\, Bronfman Building\, CA\, QC\, Montreal\, H3A 1G5\, 1001
  rue Sherbrooke Ouest
SUMMARY:Seminar: Aiyesha Dey\, University of Minnesota
URL:https://www.mcgill.ca/channels/event/seminar-aiyesha-dey-university-min
 nesota-235827
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