Control, embodiment, and demonstrative semantics

CRLMB Distinguished Lecture by Dr. Rick Grush (Philosophy, UCSD)

Abstract:

I present (work done in collaboration with Amanda Brovold) an account of the semantics of demonstratives, both exophoric and endophoric. The account, which represents a significant shift from accounts typical in philosophy and linguistics, has two features. First, it is argued that the conceptual archetype of what Langacker has called the control cycle is the key to understanding core demonstrative semantics. The control cycle is a conceptual archetype with many semantic and grammatical ramifications in which an agent recognizes something as a candidate for control, acts on it to bring it under control, and then controls it. This cycle can manifest in physical, perceptual, attentional, epistemic, and social domains. We analyze demonstrative semantics as keying on the interlocutors’ assessments of their own and each other’s (individual and joint) control domains – which objects they have control of, or are trying to gain, relinquish, or transfer control of. In languages with a proximal/distal distinction, proximals key on situations where the speaker S has control of the referent (and is often putting it in the addressee’s A control), and distals for referents S does not control.

This account i) does a better job explaining exophoric demonstrative choice than the spatial proximal/distal spatial interpretation; ii) provides a superior and unified interpretation of diverse experimental results; iii) provides a unified treatment of exophoric and endophoric anaphora; and iv) provides revealing analyses of how demonstratives pattern when different control cycles are involved.

(i)-(ii) Despite the view that ‘this’ is for things closer to S (speaker), and ‘that’ for things closer to A (audience), one can say ‘what’s this?” when touching a wound on someone’s back, even if one is touching it with a meter stick. Though closer to A spatially, S has control in several ways in which A does not. Also, as Coventry et al. (2008) have shown, giving S tools that extend the spatial range of their control also expands the range of things referred to with ‘this’ rather than ‘that’. These authors also found that demonstrative choice was affected by who last touched the referent – a subliminal indicator of social control (ownership).

(iii) Just as ‘this’ is preferred for things S has physical control of, and is placing in A’s control, so ‘this’ is preferred for ideas or propositions which S has attentional and epistemic control over, and is giving A control over (by telling her), e.g. 1a/1b.

(iv) Patterns can change as the relevant control domain changes. E.g. the pattern in 2a switches if A has physical control of S’s wrench, and S is giving A social control (ownership) of the wrench that A already has physical control of. An analogous switch occurs in 2c. In 2b/d, the pattern assumes that only the potential joke teller knows (and hence has epistemic control over) the joke. However, if S is given (metonymically) physical/perceptual control, e.g. physically touching one entry one a written list of jokes, ‘this’ is licensed. And if S does not know the joke, but points at a list, ‘that’ is licensed in 2b.

We explain what to make of languages whose demonstratives have specific spatial import (e.g. Burnhult 2008). And we respond to the potential charge that the notion of control is too vague, or is subsumed under notions such as accessibility or a metaphorical understanding of proximity.

The second feature is the embodied nature of exophoric demonstrative reference. As argued in the first part, demonstrative semantics keys on control relations. But the assessment of physical and perceptual control is a highly embodied enterprise. Most of the time, knowing what one's interlocutor has physical or perceptual control over requires being in fairly rich perceptual contact with them. There are exceptions, of course. But the point is that the usefulness of demonstrative reference drops drastically when this sort of rich perceptual contact is blocked, even when both interlocutors know precisely where the other is located, where the conversational deictic center is. Data from naturally occurring communicative contexts of this sort (from sniper teams, and competitive online gaming) are presented which support this analysis.

Data:
1a. If you thought that/*this cookie was good, try this/*that.
1b. If you thought that/*this was a crazy idea, get a load of this/*that.

2a. Take this/*that wrench. 2b. Listen to this/*that joke.
2c. Give me that/*this wrench. 2d. Tell me that/*this joke.

Biography

Dr. Grush is a full professor in the Department of Philosophy, UCSD.  He works primarily in the areas of spatial and temporal representation, the history of theories of spatial and temporal representation, theoretical cognitive neuroscience and cognitive linguistics.